

THE
PARAPHRASE

OF AN

ANONYMOUS GREEK WRITER,

HITHERTO PUBLISHED UNDER THE NAME OF ANDRONICUS RHODIUS)

ON THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK.

BY

WILLIAM BRIDGMAN, F.L.S.



"Ὡς περ γὰρ ὁ φθαλμῷ λημῶντι, καὶ ὁ κεκαθαρμένῳ, τὰ σφόδρα φωτεινὰ ἰδεῖν ἔχ' οἷόν τε· ἔτω καὶ
ψυχῇ μὴ ἀρετὴν κεκτημένη τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐσπείρισθαι καὶ ἀμύχανον. Μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ
καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ ὁ δεμιτὸν ἦ.
Hierocl. in Aur. Carm.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM, 103, GOSWELL STREET;

AND SOLD BY T. PAYNE, PALL-MALL; J. WHITE, FLEET-STREET; CUTHELL AND MARTIN,
MIDDLE-ROW, HOLBORN; AND J. AND A. ARCH, CORNHILL.

1807.

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ERRATA.

Page 69, line 6, for *it*, read *them*.

— 363, — 15, dele *if*.

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IV.L.1

PREFACE.

AMONG the very numerous works of the wonderful STAGIRITE, none have excited a more lively degree of interest than his *Moral Writings*; and among these, the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, since they comprehend every important topic that has been discussed in his other Moral Treatises, have deservedly received the unqualified and increasing approbation of the more wise and enlightened, through all succeeding ages.

That Aristotle wrote, for the most part, with professed obscurity, is amply proved by the testimony of his most able commentators; and though that part of his works now under our consideration ranks among the less obscure, yet a paraphrase on it, at once faithfully elegant and accurate, must always be thought a valuable acquisition to the Republic of Letters.

The intimate and natural connection between *Morals*,

Politics, and *Economics*, and the necessity of a scientific knowledge of the whole, in order to the *full* attainment of *Practical Philosophy*, leave us room to regret that the Author of the work before us had not extended his labours for the benefit of posterity, by transmitting, under similar advantages, the whole that Aristotle has left on those subjects.

But since *Morals* are the very foundation of man's practical felicity, and furnish, as it were, a passport to divine bliss, it cannot be unreasonable to expect that a *scientific* acquaintance with them will be sought with avidity, and pursued with industry *.

The main design then of offering the present Translation to the world, is to encourage and facilitate this search, while we may hope it will be a mean of rendering the path less rugged, that must necessarily be trod in

* In presenting this treatise to the English reader, and earnestly recommending it to his serious and attentive consideration, as the most scientific and perfect system of morality hitherto devised by the mind of man, it is not by any means my intention to detract from the merit to which any others may be legitimately entitled, nor to propose this as the *sole* guide for the regulation of moral conduct. In a far less degree, therefore, would I be thought desirous of substituting this system for that of the GOSPEL, whose precepts, besides being accompanied with the most gracious promises of reward in a future life, have always promoted the temporal interests of mankind in proportion as they have been unpervertedly practised.

the pursuit of the investigated object:—Hence I venture to trust that this part of the fruit of my labours will prove acceptable to and be indulgently received by my countrymen, even though unaccompanied by the desirable additions before-mentioned. This deficiency, however, will, I am happy to say, be at least partially supplied by the indefatigable labours of the celebrated platonist Mr. Thomas Taylor, who is now engaged in the no less arduous than laudable task of publishing an English version of the whole of Aristotle's works. I say *partially*, because no more than FIFTY copies are to be printed, and consequently its possession must fall to the lot of this limited number.

With respect to this translation, in the execution of which I owe much to the liberal and friendly assistance of the gentleman just mentioned, I shall say but little; for its merits, (whatever they may be) as well as its imperfections, must be determined by less partial judges.

Having then ever considered that no translation of a Treatise, scientifically delivered, is worthy to meet the public eye, which does not so far retain the manner and matter of the original as to allow of an easy comparison, it has been my studious endeavour to preserve both. It is obvious, however, that in doing so, regard

to my own ease has had no share ; for no one, capable of judging, will imagine it less difficult to render a tolerable literal version, than to give one less faithful, in which the Translator indulges the fertility of his genius by substituting his own language for that of his Author. I am aware also that besides subjecting myself to the accusation of literal servility, the mode I profess to have adopted extends the means of criticism. On these points, therefore, let me be permitted to observe, that with an honest desire rather to see any performance of mine amended than commended, I shall gratefully receive any suggestion that may be offered for the improvement of this version, and make no other apology for its publication than the want of a better,—that is, of any other.

The Reader will doubtless expect to be made acquainted with some particulars respecting our celebrated Paraphrast:—no certain information, however, has yet reached us ; and though we are desirous at least to record his name to posterity, we are not furnished with the requisite materials to pay even this small tribute of respect to his memory, with any degree of accuracy. It need hardly be mentioned that the work is generally ascribed to Andronicus the Rhodian, an eminent

peripatetic philosopher, who was contemporary with Cicero; but the conjecture that he was the author, seems, when investigated, to require confirmation.

The earliest edition, that of Heinsius, 1607, 4to. is without a name; but the second, published in 1617, to which is affixed a small Treatise (*περι παθων*) ON THE PASSIONS, attributes this work to the philosopher above-mentioned. But Salmasius in his notes on Simplicius, (page 227 et seq.) conjectures that we are indebted for it to some much later writer; and the circumstance he adduces in support of his opinion, gives it some probability, namely, that the Paraphrast calls *εξωτερικοι λογοι*, *dissertationes vivâ voce habitas*, whereas it is well known that *exoteric* doctrines are opposed to *esoteric*, not because the former were delivered *vivâ voce*, and the latter not; but because the exoteric were of a popular nature, and therefore delivered indiscriminately to any auditors, but the esoteric abstruse, and delivered only to a few.

Salmasius, however, is less happy in another reason he assigns for thinking that Andronicus Rhodius was not the author of this Paraphrase, namely, that the Paraphrast does not agree in many particulars with Aristotle, and that he departs so much from his meaning,

that those alone who are entirely unacquainted with these studies, can possibly mistake it for the genuine work of the last-mentioned Andronicus ; and for this he adds a curious reason, (admissible only by himself) that he cannot believe so great a philosopher would have misspent his time so far as to paraphrase a work the most intelligible in the world ! Bayle, from whom these particulars are taken, very justly adds, that this last proof seems to him to be very weak.

Naudæus, in *Bibliograph. Polit.*, thinks that this Paraphrase is to be attributed to Olympiodorus, one of the most celebrated interpreters of Aristotle, who lived in the sixth century ; but I am rather inclined to think with Fabricius that the author, whoever he was, is even more recent than Olympiodorus. For there was one Andronicus Callistus, a peripatetic philosopher, in the time of Gregory Palæologus (the xvth century) to whom an epistle of his is extant among the MSS. of the French King, as we are informed by Labbe in his *Catalogue of MSS.* page 98.—Labbe also notices two other Epistles to Andronicus Callistus, one of Nicolaus Secundinus, and another of Cardinal Bessarion, under whose auspices and roof this philosopher prosecuted his studies. He also mentions the following works of this same Andronicus,

viz. *De Physica Scientia et Fortuna*, *Physical Divisions of the same*, and a Treatise (*περι παθων*), *on the Passions*, the latter of which David Hoeschelius first published in 1593, 8vo. under the name of Andronicus Rhodius, from two MSS. one of which he received from Margunius, and the other was sent to Sylburgius from Spain, by Andrew Schöttus; and which, as we have already observed, Heinsius added to his second edition of the Paraphrase on the Nicomachean Ethics.

On the other hand Meursius does not doubt that Andronicus Rhodius was the author both of this Paraphrase, and the Treatise *περι παθων*; and Reinesius entertains the same opinion, though Vossius ascribes the latter to one Andronicus, not so ancient as the above.

We learn, however, on the authority of Plutarch, Porphyry, and Boethius, that Andronicus Rhodius first arranged the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and published them with Indexes, as amended by Tyrannion the grammarian. Aulus Gellius also informs us that this same Andronicus was an author, and it seems certain from the testimony of Simplicius, who quotes him in his Commentaries on the *Physics* and *Categories* of Aristotle, that a Paraphrase on both these Treatises formed a part of his works:—hence there is some probability

that notwithstanding the preceding objections, this work also is an offspring of his genius.

It is but of small importance, however, to ascertain this point, so far as regards the intrinsic value of a performance which has been always considered no less faithful than elegant, and no less perspicuous than faithful.

But fully admitting its perspicuity, we must at the same time add, by way of caution to the Reader, that the very nature of the subject, and the scientific manner in which it is delivered, demand an attentive perusal, and that it can be understood by those alone who make it a study: this indeed is absolutely necessary to the comprehension of every scientific treatise, and cannot fairly be imputed as a fault to the Paraphrase, (and we hope not to the Translation) but to the peculiarity of the original work itself, which, like the greater part of the writings of the Stagirite, is characterized by pregnant brevity of diction, and by the vast and uncommon profundity of his conceptions, which are so intimately connected with the diction that any innovation in the style must infallibly injure the sense.

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ERRATA.

Page 69, line 6, for *it*, read *them*.

— 363, — 15, dele *if*.

PARAPHRASE

ON

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

THAT THERE IS AN EXTREME END TO WHICH ALL HUMAN ACTIONS REFER.

IN every art and method we not only seek a certain good; but also prefer and do that whence we expect to receive something good. On this account some assert truly, that what all things desire is good. And not only rational beings are moved for the sake of a certain good; but those also which are moved by nature, tend to some good end irrationally, just as an arrow tends to a mark. Every action and motion therefore has its proper end.

Nevertheless it appears that there is some difference of ends. For the end of action is a work; as a ship is the end of the ship-building art.

Again, the end of action is another action ; as the end of a horseman is to ride.

But in those things in which the end is not an action but a work, the work is better than the action *. As, however, there are many actions, there are also many ends. For health is the end of the medical art ; a ship of the ship-building art ; victory of the military art ; and wealth of the economic art. It also frequently happens that many actions and arts are subjected to one power and art, when they are sought on account of the end of that art. As for instance, the bridle-making art, the horseman's art, and all military arts, are sought as the end of the general's art. For they are all exercised for the sake of victory. Hence they are said to be subject to the general's art. But the general's art, with reference to them, is called *architectonic*, or the master art ; for it is able to do that which the architect does with the workmen. For as he, looking to the form of the house, orders the workmen to do those things which the form requires, thus also the general's art (and if there be any others of this kind) prescribes rules to the others with a view to its own peculiar end. For the bridle-maker also makes a bridle, regarding victory as a rule, so that it may be fit for and adapted to him who hastens to conquer. Another makes a horseman's coat, and such others as are artists of equestrian instruments, make something else subservient to this end : the horseman likewise and the foot-soldier so prepare themselves that they may be able to conquer, and in short all other arts, which are under that of the general, consider his art as their end. Each art therefore which falls under the architectonic has its proper end : as a bridle is the end of the bridle-making art ; to ride of the equestrian

* Because in this case the work is the end ; and the end, as being that for which every thing else is undertaken, is always the most excellent.

art; and something else of other arts. But the architectonic art also has its proper end, as victory is the end of the general's art. And the end of the architectonic art is better and more honourable than the other ends. Because, as has been said, the ends of the other arts, which are subject to the architectonic art, are sought for the sake of its end. Moreover although ~~not actions~~ but works may be the end of actions, nothing hinders that the end of the architectonic art, even though an ~~action~~ may be better and more eligible than the work itself, as the end of the bridle-making art is a work, namely, a Bridle. But the end of the general's art is an action, namely, Victory. And nothing prevents victory from being better and more eligible than a bridle. For though a work is better than an action, nevertheless not than every action, but only that of which it is the effect, because it is the end. The end, however, is always more honourable than that which is arranged with reference to the end. But to the many arts there is one end; viz. the architectonic. And at the same time there is one last end to all the arts, for the sake of which the ends of the others are sought; and that, not for the sake of any other, but for its own sake.

For if there was not one extreme end, but we always chose one thing for the sake of another, and that for a second; and again, if we always sought for something besides what is present, we should never obtain what we wish for; and thus the appetite would be fallacious and vain, there being nothing that could terminate our progress.

But this is absurd; for no one natural desire is exercised in vain. It is necessary therefore that as there should be one extreme end; and this will be the good and the best: so likewise the knowledge of it will be a great aid to us through life. For thus, like archers looking to a mark, we shall more easily effect that which is incumbent on us.

CHAP. II.

THAT THE END OF THE POLITICAL ART IS AN EXTREME END.

IF there be an extreme end, we must endeavour to define, in a superficial manner, what it is, and to which of the sciences and actions it proximately belongs; for each art and power has its common end. But this extreme end belongs proximately to one certain power; as the end of the architectonic art is the end of all other arts which are subjected to it; but it proximately belongs to the architectonic art itself. It appears, therefore, that there is an end of the most principal of the arts, and especially of the architectonic: but the political art is of this kind; for it prescribes order and time to the other arts; since it is proper that there should be certain sciences in cities; and it is the province of the political art alone to consider what sciences ought to be learnt by particular men, and to what extent. For the political art indeed alone expels base arts from the city, but it does not consent that all should learn things useful, or, having learned them, that they should always exercise them. For if a man is able to govern and preserve a city, this art does not suffer such a one to be a tanner, neither does it make him a general, who is yet capable of acting properly as a common soldier; but it appoints fit seasons for the exercise of appropriate arts, so that an army shall not be led into the field, when it is proper to be at peace. For a politician will send forth a general when it is requisite, but will restrain him when he should remain quiet. And although the general should frequently prescribe to himself the time, nevertheless he does not do it from the rules of the military art; for all the rules of art regard the

end of that art only; but that which tends to the contrary, or to something else, is not the rule of that art. Hence the general considering when it is proper to wage war; and on this account frequently being quiet, and sending ambassadors to treat for peace, evinces that he does not use the rule of the military art, but that of some other art greater and more principal, which is the political art. Since, therefore, the political art subjects to itself the most honourable of the arts, I mean the ~~military~~ art, the economic art, and the rhetoric art, and uses the other practical arts with a view to its own proper end; for it arranges every thing in order with a view to the common good of the city, and on that account prescribes laws as to what it is proper to do, and what to avoid; hence the end of this will comprehend the ends of the others; but since the ends of all other arts are sought, because they benefit mankind, and it is the end of the political art through which the ends of the others are sought, it is manifest that this will be the good of mankind. And it is evident that the same good is sought for both by one man, and a city; but the good of a city appears greater and more perfect both with respect to obtaining it, and preserving it when obtained. For though it is desirable that this good should be secured to one man, (whether any *one* is able to preserve it to another, or to himself) yet it is more excellent and divine to preserve it for nations and cities, by how much the more the happiness of the many is better than that of an individual. Hence it will be more just that the end of the political art should be the last end, and the ultimate good, which does not consider one end only; but the end of all others as proper to it, being a common and political art.

CHAP. III.

THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SEEK A VERY ACCURATE DEMONSTRATION IN DISCOURSE ABOUT THE POLITICAL ART OR SCIENCE, BECAUSE THE SUBJECT DOES NOT PERMIT IT.

To those however who are desirous to speak about this end, that method of discourse will be sufficient which is adapted to the subject-matter, for we do not seek the accurate similarly in every assertion; since it is not possible to find the most accurate truth alike in every subject. In the mathematical sciences indeed, which have a certain necessary subject, and always subsist in the same manner, the truth is unmixed, and the matter by no means prevents perfect accuracy; but in the others, in which the propositions are neither necessary, nor subsist always alike, that reason is sufficient which collects its consequences from things which happen for the most part; as is the case with the fabricative arts. For artificial form is not similarly congruous with all matter, but the most accurate will be found in that which is adapted to it: not so, however, in matter unadapted to the form. Thus for example, the statuary and the painter will not similarly accommodate the human form to the matter; for the painter both adds colour, and appears to imitate a certain bulk and distance, since the matter permits it; but the statuary accommodates the bulk to the matter, but he cannot show the colour from the matter. And this takes place similarly in the other arts. On this account it is not necessary to require the same accuracy in every art, but such only as the subject matter affords. And the subject of the political art is of this kind with respect to truth. For the beautiful, and the just, which the political art considers, and which form the subject, have

so much difference and error, that neither the beautiful appears to be beautiful by nature, nor the just, just by nature, but by a certain *position* * and law. Hence it is difficult to distinguish that which is really beautiful and just, from that which seems to be so. And not only this, but the goods themselves, from which felicity appears to be constituted, (I mean fortitude, wealth, and other things of this kind) even these are involved in much error, because they are the source of injury to many; for ~~there~~ are some who perish through wealth, and others through fortitude. It is sufficient therefore for those speaking about things of this kind, and of the end resulting from these, to indicate the truth in a rude and superficial manner; and, in short, to him who is speaking about things which happen for the most part, and of the end resulting from these, it will be sufficient to collect conclusions of this kind.

But as he who treats of the political art is not able to find a more accurate truth than the subject admits of, so he who forms a judgment of such assertions, will judge well, if after an equal manner he does not require a more accurate truth than the subject affords, but receives that which presents itself. For it is the province of a well-educated man, according to every method, to investigate the accurate as far as the nature of the subject will permit. For, in the genus of the mathematics, as we have said, nothing casual is admitted; but it is not so in logic, or in physics, or in things which have a various subsistence. For it is just the same thing to admit a mathematician when speaking probably, and to require demonstrations from a rhetorician.

* That is *establishment*; for whatever is established by mutual compact, is said to subsist from *position*.

CHAP. IV.

THAT AN AUDITOR OF DISCOURSES RESPECTING THE POLITICAL ART, OUGHT TO BE
EXPERIENCED IN THE ACTIONS OF LIFE.

SUCH therefore is the judgment that is adapted to these discourses: but he who judges well of the things which he knows, is also a ~~good~~ judge of them. He therefore will judge well of the political art who is skilled in political matters, and has received experience of them from time; and he who is skilled in things *partial* will judge well concerning them; but he who is skilled in *every thing* will be a competent and worthy judge respecting *all*. On this account a youth is not a proper auditor of discourses about the political art; for he is inexperienced in the actions of life. But with respect to the discourses of the political art, some discuss things pertaining to them, but others collect conclusions from such things. Further still; as a youth does not yet live according to reason, but rather follows his passions, his amusements, and customs, he will hear these discourses lightly, and without advantage; for he will not be able to arrive at the true end of them, to change his manners, and live according to reason, while he is yet subdued by custom. For the end of such discourses is not knowledge but action. And not only he who is juvenile in years, but he likewise who is so in manners (although he may exceed the age of youth) will, in a similar manner, hear discourses about the political art without advantage, in consequence of yet living a life adapted to youth. For in him who in age is but a youth, the defect is not from time, but from not being governed by reason, in consequence of yet living according to passion, and still

seeking every thing conformably to it. For to such, the knowledge of these discourses will be fruitless, as well as to those who are perfectly intemperate and immoderate with respect to pleasures. But to those regulating their desires, and acting according to reason, a knowledge of these things will be productive of much advantage. For in these, the reasoning faculty knows what is proper with respect to such discourses, and is able to accomplish it, being freed from the slavery of passion, and ~~now~~ able to exert its own proper power.

CHAP. V.

THAT FELICITY IS THE END OF THE POLITICAL ART; AND THAT WE MAY KNOW WHAT IT IS FROM THE ACTIONS OF THAT ART.

WHAT kind of a person, therefore, it is necessary that a hearer of discourses concerning the political art should be, and how he ought to judge of, and receive them; and what the subject now proposed to us is, we have sufficiently prefaced: but let us thus resume our reasoning. Since every knowledge and deliberative tendency aspires after some good, what shall we say it is that the political art aspires after? And as all actions tend to a certain good, as we have said, to what does this tend, and what is the summit of practical goods, which is the end of the political art? The many therefore call it by one and the same name; and in this both the many, and the best of men, agree. For all men denominate it felicity: but they apprehend that to live well, and to act well, are the same with felicity.

They dispute, however, in what felicity consists; and wise men do not speak similarly about it with the vulgar. For the vulgar say, that it is some one of manifest and apparent goods, such as pleasure, or wealth, or honour: but others assert something else of this kind. And it frequently happens that the same man does not always denominate felicity the same thing; but one thing at one time, and another at another; for those who are sick call it health; and the poor, riches; and, in short, that is always denominated felicity which any one at the moment desires: but the lovers of wisdom wish to learn that of which they apprehend themselves especially ignorant, and admire those who speak something great and above their comprehension. Others, on the contrary, think that, besides these many goods, there is another good subsisting from itself, and that this is the cause of goodness to other things. Hence perhaps it would be fruitless to investigate every opinion concerning felicity: and it will be sufficient if we examine those that are entertained for the most part, and by the majority of mankind, or such as appear to be somewhat rational.

But since we treat of principles (the principle and cause being the end of actions, for we do certain things for the sake of the end) let us consider how it is proper to frame our argument concerning them. For here there is a difference: and, in the first place, let us say something concerning causes. Of causes then one is the final, another the formal, a third the material, a fourth the efficient*. The *efficient*, indeed, is the energy of the artificer, but the *material*, the wood and stones from which a house is built; and the *formal* is the form of the house, but the *final* is that for the sake of which the house is made. But since these

* The doctrine of *causes* is more fully discussed by Aristotle in the first book of his *Physics*.

are the causes of being to things, they are also the causes of the knowledge of them, and through these the things themselves may be known. For if any one knows the art of the artificer by which a house is built, he will know whether it be good or bad so far as is adapted to the art; and in like manner with respect both to him who knows the matter, and to him who knows the form. Again, knowing what the end of it is, we shall also know whether the house itself be good or bad: but sometimes the contrary happens, as when we know the causes from seeing the effects. For he who has a knowledge of the house, will know the art of its artificer, and similarly with respect to other things. Hence it is necessary that our reasoning should be two-fold, either to demonstrate principles from effects, or effects from principles; but we shall use both methods as occasion may present itself, and demonstrate from principles when they are manifest; but the contrary, when effects are more evident. And on this account Plato well investigates, and doubts (as not being a thing indifferent in every subject) whether the appropriate method of demonstration is *from* principles, or *to* principles: as in a race, whether from the president of the games to the goal, or the contrary. Since, therefore, the way is two-fold, whence shall we begin? Or is it not evident that we should begin from effects, that is to say, from political actions, of which the principle and cause is the political end? For it is necessary to begin from things known, not to nature, but to us; since things known to nature are called principles and causes; and nature first produces these, and first looks to them: but to us, effects are first known. Let us then begin from these; for thus our discourse proceeding from things known to us, will be manifest.

CHAP. VI.

THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR AN AUDITOR OF DISCOURSES ABOUT THE POLITICAL ART TO BE ACCUSTOMED TO GOOD ACTIONS.

ON this account it is proper that an auditor of discourses of this kind (if he intends to know them well, judge them rightly, and also to be benefited by them) should be accustomed to beautiful and just actions. For if we had demonstrated from principles, that political actions are good, we should also have persuaded him who is not well instructed in such actions, convincing him by the invincible force of arguments. But since we wish to demonstrate principles from things posterior, that is to say, from political actions, and it is requisite to lay down as a principle of demonstration concerning them, that they are good, it is evident that no one can be persuaded of it, unless he knows that actions of this kind are beautiful and just. For if any one should sufficiently admit that the actions are good, we should require nothing of the why; but the cause, that is to say, the end, he either knows now, or, hearing, would easily apprehend it. He however who neither himself possesses knowledge, nor is able to learn from others, let him hear what Hesiod says :

“ He the first rank of excellence maintains,
“ Who from himself in ev’ry thing is wise,
“ And what ev’n to the end is best foresees;
“ He too is good, who yields to wise advice.
“ But he who neither from himself is wise,
“ Nor to assent to others can endure,
“ Is but a useless, despicable man.”

CHAP. VII.

THAT THERE ARE THREE KINDS OF LIFE, ONE ACCORDING TO PLEASURE, ANOTHER OF THOSE WHO SEEK HONOUR ; (IN WHICH ALSO THE ACQUISITION OF WEALTH IS CONSIDERED) AND THE THIRD IS THE CONTEMPLATIVE ; AND THAT NEITHER THE LIFE ACCORDING TO PLEASURE, NOR THAT ACCORDING TO HONOUR, NOR THAT WHICH PURSUES RICHES, SEEKS FELICITY.

BUT let us resume our discourse whence we digressed ; and our discourse was about this, namely, that men entertained different opinions about felicity. Each person, therefore, defined it agreeably to his own life ; so that both the vulgar and the intemperate say, that it is pleasure ; and therefore they delight in a voluptuous life. For the lives which have a universal extent, are three. The first according to pleasure ; the second, political ; and the third, contemplative. The first life therefore has nothing sacred ; for those who follow it are generally servile, and live the life of cattle ; but, in short, even this appears to be worthy of some regard, because many of those who are in power embrace a life of this kind, and in so doing are similarly affected with Sardanapalus *. But better men, and those who pursue good actions, choose the second life, and think it is honour ; for this is nearly what I call the end of the political life ; and that which is sought by all men is honour. It appears, however, that this is not the ultimate good, but among the things that seem to be so, and that it also is among apparent goods. For it is requisite that the truly good, through which a man becomes happy, should be in the man himself. But honour is not in him who is honoured, but rather in

* A king of Assyria, noted for his voluptuousness. The greatest part of his time was spent in the company of his eunuchs ; and he generally appeared in the midst of his concubines disguised in the habit of a female, and spinning wool for his amusement.

him who honours. Felicity, therefore, does not consist in honour; for it is necessary to the happy man that he should possess good, which is domestic, and of which he cannot be easily deprived. Again, some pursue honour, in order to persuade themselves that they are good; and on this account they seek to be honoured by wise men, and among those to whom they are known, and for the sake of virtue. It is evident therefore that some pursue honour, that they may appear good and worthy; and that through virtue; so that it is clear that honour is not pursued *per se*, but on account of virtue. Hence indeed not honour, but virtue, will be the ultimate end.

Virtue itself however is imperfect, and the last good, namely, felicity, will not consist in it. But that it is imperfect is manifest, since it is possible that any one asleep, or passing his whole life in inactivity, may possess the habit of virtue; as also he who is in an ill condition, or miserable, or exceedingly unfortunate; and thus his virtue will be imperfect. But no one will proclaim that man happy who lives in this manner; so far must he be from admitting and calling felicity the habit of virtue. And thus we have spoken concerning the life which subsists according to pleasure, and that which is political; for we have largely treated of them in our miscellaneous writings. Hereafter we shall consider the contemplative life; the subject now proposed to us being different.

But there is another life considered in the two preceding, namely, that employed in the acquisition of riches; for both the pleasurable life, and that which pursues honour, are wont to collect riches. And on this account we say, that there are especially three kinds of lives, for the life addicted to gain is comprehended in the others, and is attended with violence. For it neither pursues the good, which is perfect, nor does it

very much even seem to pursue it. Whence it is not loved by the many; for few choose to possess riches as the end of every thing valuable in life. But it has been before noted, that this life is not sought as the last good; for wealth becomes a good from the use of it, and is sought for the sake of something else, as honour or pleasure. It is necessary, however, that the ultimate good should be good *per se*. On which account some one may think that the things before-mentioned are rather ends—I mean pleasure and honour; since they are loved for the sake of these. But it appears also that these are not perfect goods, although many of the ancients have disputed about them, some calling pleasure, and others honour, the ultimate good. Let us therefore dismiss this subject.

CHAP. VIII.

THAT THERE IS NOT ONE IDEA* OF THE GOOD.

SINCE we are discoursing about the ultimate end, which appears to be a certain universal good, let us consider how universal is predicated, and whether there be any idea of *the good*; though indeed the discourse will be arduous to us, because our friends have introduced the doctrine of ideas: but it was their opinion that there is a certain idea of every particular thing

* One idea, that is to say, there is not such a thing as the good itself considered as having a universal subsistence, and from the participation of which every thing else becomes good. That Aristotle does not seriously oppose the Platonic doctrine of ideas is demonstrated in the introduction to Mr. Taylor's translation of the *Metaphysics* of that philosopher. The reader who is desirous of further information on this most abstruse subject is referred to the notes on Mr. Taylor's translation of the above-mentioned work, and also to his notes on the *Parmenides* of Plato.

subsisting *per se*. It may, however, perhaps appear to be better, and even necessary, to relinquish our own opinions in order to preserve truth, especially as we are philosophers. And since both truth, and the author of the doctrine of ideas, are our friends, it is more holy to prefer truth.

But those who introduced this opinion have said, that there is not one idea of particulars in which there is both prior and posterior. On this account also they did not assign one idea of number, because it has both first and second. But since there is prior and posterior in *the good*, it is manifest that there will not be one idea of it.

It is evident, indeed, that prior and posterior are to be found in *the good*. For *the good* is in *essence* or *substance*; and is *intellect* or *deity*. It is also in *quality*; and here it is the *virtues*: it is in *relation*, and is there the *useful*: it is also in *quantity*; and is there the *commensurate*: again, in the predicament *where*, it is *diet*: (for diet* is a place in which we pass our time pleasantly) in the predicament *when*, it is *opportunity*; for opportunity is the appropriate time to every thing; and in a similar manner in the other predicaments: but in these there is prior and posterior. For substance or essence is prior to relation; and this because substance subsists *per se*, but relation has its being in something different from itself, and also because substance is without habitude, but relation subsists in habitude; and indeed it appears to be nothing else than an accident of being.

Again, since *the good* may be predicated in as many ways as being; and being is multifariously predicated; *the good* also will be predicated many ways, and it will neither be any thing common, nor universal, nor one; since, in this case, it could not be predicated in all these categories, but in one only.

* *διαίτα*.

Further still, since there is one science of one idea, there will also be one science of *the good*, if there is one idea of it: but this is not the case. Hence there is not one idea of *the good*: but it is manifest that there are many sciences of *the good*. For not only there is not one science of things in different categories, but neither is there of things that are under one category. As for example, in the predicament *when*, *the good* is opportunity; but this opportunity is found both in war and disease, which do not belong to the same science. For the physician knows the opportunity in disease, and the general knows it in war. Again, the commensurate which belongs to the predicament of *quantity*, subsists both in aliment and in labours; and the knowledge of the latter belongs to gymnastic, but of the former to medicine.

Again, since there is one and the same definition of man, and man itself; and of horse, and horse itself*, that is to say, in the idea of them: (for if there be any difference, how can there be ideas of them?) it follows, that man, as man differs nothing from the idea of man, and in like manner in every thing else; so that good, so far as good, differs nothing from good itself. For it is evident that they do not differ so far as goods, merely because *the good itself* is eternal, and good is not: as neither does that which is white for a long time, differ from that which is white only for a day. Neither therefore is there an idea of any other thing subsisting above that thing, as neither is there of good subsisting above good. But the Pythagoreans appear to speak more persuasively about *the good*, for they co-arrange *the one* with *the good*; and Speusippus seems to have followed them. But the co-arrangement of good, of which they speak, is as follows:

* That is, of man and horse as species of animal, and man and horse as individuals of their respective species.

1. Finite.	} Co-arrangement of the good.	opposed to	Infinite.	} Co-arrangement of the opposite to the good.
2. Unequal.			Equal.	
3. One.			Many.	
4. Right.			Left.	
5. Male.			Female.	
6. Straight.			Crooked.	
7. Light.			Darkness.	
8. Square.			Oblong.	
9. Rest.			Motion.	
10. Good.			Evil.	

CHAP. IX.

THAT THERE IS NOT ONE IDEA OF GOOD *PER SE*.

WE shall, however, speak of these things in another place; but let us now treat further and more accurately concerning *the good**; for our preceding discourses will require some examination, and diligent care, because nothing has yet been said by us particularly about every good: but now, making a division, let us frame our argument more accurately. *The good*, therefore, may be predicated in two ways: for some things are good *per se*, are sought for their own sake, are called good, and are the objects of love; but others, on the contrary, are not so considered

* το αγαθον καθ' αυτο, or *the good per se*, signifies good as having an essential subsistence, and is opposed to that good which is merely accidental, or which is pursued as a mean, in order to obtain that which has an essential subsistence.

per se, but for the sake of those that do subsist *per se*. For they are pursued because they are the guardians of things essentially good, or because they produce them, or prevent the introduction of their contraries.—And indeed health, virtue, wisdom, and sight, are goods which have an essential subsistence; but the goods not *per se* are those exercises which tend to virtue, such as gymnastic, and remedies, which are sought for the sake of health: but such things are called beneficial.

Dividing, therefore, the things that are good *per se* from such as are merely useful, let us consider if there be one idea of them. It appears to be needless therefore to say that there is an idea of things good *per se*. For what difference will there be between these goods, if these also are good *per se*, equally with *the good*? For wisdom and sight, as well as certain temperate pleasures and honours, although they are sought with reference to something else, yet at the same time, without any addition from them, are eligible and desirable for their own sake; so that, according to this, they are good *per se*, and we cannot ascribe solely this to the idea of *the good*.

Further still, if there be one idea of things good *per se*, the same definition of *the good* will adapt itself to every good, as the same definition, of whiteness, is adapted to snow and ceruse; but this is not true: for the definition of wisdom and pleasure, so far as they are goods, are different; since the good of pleasure is one thing, and the good of wisdom another.

CHAP. X.

THAT THINGS GOOD, ACCORDING TO ANALOGY, ARE CALLED BY ONE NAME; AND THAT THE MORALIST WILL DERIVE NO ASSISTANCE FROM A KNOWLEDGE OF THE IDEA OF THE GOOD.

SINCE, as has been said, things good are not synonymously predicated; (for they have not the same definition) let us inquire how they are to be predicated. For they are either homonymously predicated, or as things proceeding from one, or as things contributing to one, or according to analogy; just as intellect is called an eye, because it has the same relation with respect to the soul, which the eye has to the body: but it appears that goods are called by one name, according to analogy. For as we call the soul good, so also we predicate good of time and place; for they have the analogous. And what virtue is in the soul, that opportunity is in time; in place, a diet*; and in quantity, symmetry. Let us however dismiss this subject; for an accurate discussion of these particulars will be more adapted to another branch of philosophy, since they do not belong to Ethics. The same thing also may be said as to the universal discussion of ideas; since this is the business of a theologian, and contributes nothing to the investigator of political good.

For if there be an idea of *the good* which may be predicated in common and universally of other things, and which is separate from other things, and subsists *per se*, it is evident that it will not be possible for man to acquire or practise it†. But our discourse is about a good that can

* See Chap. VIII. Page 16.

† Man cannot acquire or practise the *idea of the good*, because by this, according to Plato, the ineffable principle of things is signified.

be practised and acquired. For it is possible that felicity may consist in it; since a man's happiness consists in that which he does, or in that which he possesses, so that it will not become us to speak of that which can neither be done nor possessed. On the contrary it may perhaps appear to some one, that to know the idea itself of *the good*, is better and more useful to the performance and acquisition of acquirable and practical goods; for using this as a paradigm, we shall know what kind of practices and acquirements are goods to us; and if we know them, we shall obtain them. This argument therefore has something persuasive, but it appears to be discordant from the sciences; for all the sciences seek a certain good, and endeavour to supply that which is wanting. As the medical science endeavours to supply the deficiency of health, and the gymnastic of strength, and fortitude; but being thus occupied about the investigation of *the good*, they omit the knowledge of this universal good, which would never be omitted if it afforded them any assistance; since it is contrary to reason that all artists should be ignorant of so important an assistance, and not inquire for it. Hence this idea is in a certain respect vain *. And it is difficult to say how the weaver or the carpenter would be benefited in their respective arts, if they should know universal good itself, or how the physician would be more skilful in his art, or how the general would be a more expert commander if each contemplated the idea itself of *the good*, since an artist does not consider the universal. Thus, for instance, the physician does not consider health universally, but the health of man; nay more, not of man universally, but of an individual; for he exercises his art in particulars.

* Aristotle very properly says, that the idea of the good is in *a certain respect* vain, because the knowledge of it contributes nothing to the arts, and the wants of the *merely animal* life. In *another respect*, however, it is far from being *vain*, since the knowledge of it perfects the *intellectual* part of our nature, and is essentially necessary to the acquisition of the most exalted felicity.

CHAP. XI.

THAT THE END SOUGHT IN THE POLITICAL ART IS A PERFECT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT GOOD.

AND thus much concerning these things. But let us again return to the object of our investigation, and consider what it can be:—I mean the end sought in the political art; for there is a different good in a different art; since there is one good in the medical art, and another in the military art, and similarly in other arts; but the good to each is the end, for the sake of which it effects other things. As indeed health is the good of the medical art, victory of the military, and a house of the building art. Since therefore in every action and art that is the good, for the sake of which other things are effected, *i. e.* the end; and, in short, if we discover the end of every action, for the sake of which we perform them all, this will be the good in all actions; and as a medical good is the end of the medical art, and a military good of the military art; so likewise some practical good will be the end of all actions: but if it be not one, but many, these will be practical goods. What this is, however, we must endeavour to make still more clear, for we have not yet said any thing perspicuous about it; but we have still to investigate what it is, since our discourse in its progress has accomplished nothing more than that of returning to the same thing which we have spoken of in the introductory part, namely, that what is the end of every action, will be *the good and the best*. It appears, therefore, that there are many ends of actions, but of these there are some which we do not choose for their own sake, but for the sake of other ends, of other sciences, and those architectonic, as has been said, and which are useful towards those ends; as wealth, which is the end of one intent upon acquiring money, is useful

to a politician towards the attainment of his proper end; and a pipe is the end of a pipe-maker, but it is useful to the piper through playing upon it, and in like manner with other instruments. Since, therefore, there are some ends which are not good *per se*, all ends will not be perfect; but it is requisite that *the good*, for the sake of which we perform all things, should be perfect, so that it will not be one of those ends which are imperfect. But if there be many perfect ends, it will be the most perfect of these; and if one, it will be *the good* which is investigated in all human actions. And indeed we say, that what is investigated *per se*, is more perfect than that which is sought for the sake of something else. But again, since some goods are investigated both *per se*, and for the sake of others, as to be healthful, or to be wise, the more perfect of these is that which is sought for its own sake only; but never for the sake of any thing else; and this is not only more perfect than another, according to comparison, but is simply *the perfect good*.—Felicity, however, appears particularly to be a good of this kind, since we always choose it for its own sake:—Indeed we choose honour, and pleasure; wisdom, and every virtue, for their own sake; for though nothing else should be the consequence of their possession, we nevertheless make each the object of choice: we choose them, however, for the sake of felicity, conceiving that through these we shall become happy. But no one chooses felicity for the sake of these; or, in short, of any thing else, but solely for its own sake; so that felicity will be *the good* which is investigated by human actions.

Further still, this may be inferred also from what follows: for the perfect good which is sought appears to be self-sufficient. That is self-sufficient, however, which is not only sufficient to any one man living a solitary life, but also to his parents, to his children, to his wife, and in

short to his friends and fellow-citizens ; since man, being by nature political and social, uses the good pertaining to these. And that is self-sufficient, indeed, which standing alone, renders life sufficient and eligible, and not indigent of any thing :—but we conceive felicity to be a thing of this kind. It appears therefore that felicity is the investigated good. Again, we do not say that felicity is con-numerated with other goods ; since we consider it to be the summit of the virtues ; and if we make it co-ordinate with other goods, it is evident that, if we add any thing of other goods to it, we shall make it more eligible, and thus it will not be the summit of things eligible ; for whatever good is added to felicity, will produce a certain good more eligible than felicity. The good sought, however, is of this kind ; not con-numerated with others, but subsisting as the summit of things eligible ; for it is *perfect* : and that which is perfect is the most eligible ; since we always especially choose the more perfect good. Felicity, therefore, is the sought-for end. The discourse, however, about the self-sufficient is involved in some doubt, since if the good is then self-sufficient to any one, when it is so to himself, to all his kindred, and to his fellow-citizens and friends ; and again, to their acquaintance and relations ; as this would proceed to infinity, he would never arrive at the self-sufficient good. Hence it is necessary to fix a certain limit, with respect to familiars, to whom it is proper the good should be extended. This, however, is to be considered hereafter. Let us now speak upon the subject before us.

CHAP. XII.

THAT THE FELICITY OF MAN CONSISTS IN A LIFE ACCORDING TO REASON; AND IS THE ENERGY OF THE SOUL ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, IN A PERFECT LIFE.

To say, therefore, that felicity is the most excellent good investigated by the political art, appears to be a thing generally acknowledged. It is desirable, however, to explain more clearly what it is; and we shall do this if we can discover the work of man, so far as he is man. For as the good of every artist consists in his work; for instance, the good of a piper consists in playing on the pipe, that of a statuary in a statue, and, in short, it is the same in every work and action; so also the good of man consists in his work, if there be any work pertaining to man, so far as he is man. Whether, therefore, shall we say, that there are certain works and actions of the carpenter and the shoemaker, but none of man, and that he is naturally adapted to be idle? Or shall we say, that as there appears to be a certain work of the eye, the hand, and the foot, and, in short, of each of the members, so also it must be admitted that there is a certain work of man different from all these?

What, therefore, is the work of man? To live indeed is common also to plants; but we now investigate the peculiar work of man, so that the consideration about the plantal life must be dismissed. But since after the nutritive and augmentative life, that is to say, the plantal life, the sensitive follows, (for it is nearer to the rational life) let us also make this the object of our investigation. This life, however, is also common to the horse, to the ox, and to every animal; so that neither is this the investigated work of man. It remains, therefore, that it is the

practical life conjoined with reason; and this appears to be a two-fold life. For one part indeed is irrational, but obedient and subservient to reason; and the other is rational, and capable of exercising the *dianoëtic* power *. And that part of the practical life which possesses reason, and energizes dianoëtically, arranges and disposes in order; but the irrational part is arranged and orderly disposed. So that human energy more properly belongs to the rational life, since this is energy; for the other is called passive.

Hence the work of man is the energy of the soul, according to reason, when this energy is dianoëtic; or at least not without reason, that is, where it is moved according to the passive part in conjunction with reason. Since, therefore, human energy subsists according to reason, if it is exercised well and beautifully, nothing hinders but that it may still be human energy. For the work of a harper, and that of a good harper, are not different; since it is the work of a harper to play on the harp, but of a good harper to play well; and their works are not of a different kind, as neither is a horse different in species from a good horse. But if this be the case, and we suppose that a certain life is the work of man, and that this life is the energy of the soul and actions in conjunction with reason, it will be the work of a worthy man to energize well and beautifully according to reason: and every thing subsists well and beautifully that subsists according to the good adapted to it. Human energy, therefore, will also be well and beautifully exercised, when exerted according to the good which is adapted to man. Virtue, however, is the good adapted to man; so that human good will be the energy of the soul according to virtue.

* The *dianoëtic* power is that which is capable of reasoning scientifically.

But if there be many virtues, it will be according to the best and most perfect of them. We have therefore discovered human good : but the good in every thing is the end, as we have already said. The end, therefore, of human actions, is discovered : but the end of human actions is declared to be the same with felicity. Felicity, therefore, is found, which was proposed to be done.

Further still, it is proper that the work of man, if it is to be entirely perfect, should consist in a perfect life ; for as one swallow, or one day, does not make spring ; so neither does one day, nor a little time, render man blessed and happy.

Human good, therefore, that is, felicity, may be defined after this manner, namely, *the energy of the soul, according to virtue, in a perfect life.* For it is necessary, perhaps, in the first place merely to give an outline, and afterwards express more perfectly (as is the practice with painters) our reasoning about *the good*. But to draw conclusions from, and express, things properly delineated, may appear easy, and the province of any one who wishes it ; for time also contributes to it, being a good inventor and coadjutor of things of this kind ; since from this also the increase of the arts is produced ; for it supplies the deficiency of them all.

CHAP. XIII.

THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO REQUIRE ARGUMENTS ADAPTED TO THE SUBJECT MATTER,
AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT INVESTIGATE THE *WHY* IN PRINCIPLES.

It is requisite to keep in mind the foregoing assertions, and not to require the same accuracy in every thing, but in each according to the subject matter, and as much as is accommodated to the method. For a carpenter and a geometrician do not in like manner investigate a right angle; but each so far as is accommodated to his proposed method. For the carpenter investigates it so far as may be useful to his work; but the geometrician investigates *right angle itself*, what it is, and what quality it possesses; since he does not wish to effect any work through it, but to investigate its true proportions. The same mode of conduct must also be adopted in other things, so that such particulars as are superfluous in the work may not be numerous. For if we should require from a carpenter the definition of a right angle, which is superfluous to him with respect to his work, it would require more investigation from him than is necessary to the works relating to his art. Neither is the cause to be similarly investigated in all things; for it will be sufficient in some, if it be well shown *that* they are, although we should not add the *why*. This also happens in the principles of the sciences; since in these we do not investigate *the why*, but only *that*, they are. And this is the principle in every science; for if we were to investigate the causes of principles, we could never begin, but should proceed to infinity. But *the that* becomes manifest in principles, either by induction, by sense, or by custom. By induction, as when we say that things, equal to one and the same thing, are equal to each other; for introducing

certain numbers and magnitudes, we prove this; since induction is a proof derived from particulars. *The that* becomes manifest by sense, as when a natural philosopher shows that fire is hot, or water cold, which indeed are certain principles of science; but the principles of ethics are known by custom. For it is impossible for any one to arrive at the knowledge of discourses about the virtues, who is not accustomed to worthy actions, as has been shown in the sixth chapter.

We must endeavour, therefore, to examine each principle, so far as it is naturally adapted to be demonstrated, to render it sufficiently clear through definition; for principles afford great assistance to the demonstrations consequent to them. Hence it appears that a principle is able to effect more than the half of the demonstration, and that many of the things which are investigated become apparent through it. For the principle is always assumed in the major proposition; but the major proposition is able to effect nearly the whole of the demonstration; and though, perhaps, for some other cause, yet it is on this account also called the major.

CHAP. XIV.

THAT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS CONCERNING FELICITY ARE NOT ENTIRELY DISCORDANT FROM OUR DEFINITION OF IT.

WE have said thus much generally about principles. We must, however, still further consider the principle now proposed to us; that is to say, *felicity*; not only examining its definition, and the reasonings by which it is limited, but also the true assertions of the ancients concerning it, that we may see whether they accord with our definition. For to a true definition all things accord which belong to the thing defined, and on this account other things also accord which are predicated of it; but the true instantly dissents from the false. Goods, therefore, having a three-fold division; some are said to belong to externals, others to the soul, and others to the body; and all men assert, that the goods pertaining to the soul are the most principal and especial goods: but we call the goods pertaining to the soul *psychical* * actions and energies. The psychical actions and energies, therefore, that are good, are the most principal and especial goods; and hence the most principal and especial good consists in a boniform psychical energy: but this is felicity. Felicity, therefore, is the energy of the soul according to virtue; and this definition is conformable to ancient opinion, and acknowledged by philosophers.

Certain energies and actions are also rightly called felicity; for thus felicity will belong to goods pertaining to the soul, and not to externals.

* *Psychical* actions and energies are those *peculiar to the soul*.

On this account the happy man is said to act well, and to live well; both which manifest energy and practice.

It appears also that the things investigated by men, in order to felicity, are inherent in the preceding definition; but by some they are thought to be virtue, by some prudence, and by others a certain wisdom.

To some again it appears that *all these* constitute felicity; to others, that it consists in some one of these, conjoined with pleasure; but with the pleasure produced from these.

But others co-assume external prosperity. Among whom indeed, many, and those ancient, assert some opinions; but a few, and those renowned, dissent from them. It may be reasonably concluded, therefore, that none of these have deviated from the truth in every instance, but perhaps in one only, and that in most cases they have adhered to it.

With those, therefore, who say * that felicity consists in every virtue, or in the most excellent of the virtues, our opinion accords; for felicity subsists according to the energy of virtue. There is a difference, however, between us, because *they* say that felicity consists in the *habit* and *possession* of virtue; but *we* assert, that it consists in the *use* and in the *energy* of virtue. And there is no small difference between conceiving, that what is most excellent consists in possession or use; and that it consists in habit or energy. For it is possible that a habit may subsist, and yet effect nothing; as for instance, in one asleep, or otherwise inactive; but this is not the case with energy. *For he who possesses energy, acts from necessity; and if he possesses a good energy, he will act well. But this is to be*

* Aristotle here alludes to the Pythagoreans and Plato.

happy. For as in the Olympic games, not the most beautiful and most strong are crowned, but those who contend, (since some of these also are victorious) so likewise with respect to the things beautiful and good in life; not those who are *able* to act rightly, but those who *do* act rightly, obtain their end.

CHAP. XV.

THAT A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE IS ESSENTIALLY THE MOST PLEASANT, AND THAT
IT IS ESPECIALLY GOOD AND BEAUTIFUL.

THAT life is essentially pleasurable which does not derive its pleasure from externals. For since it is a property of the soul to be pleased, there is no obstacle to her virtuous energies being accompanied with pleasure; but that they are so is manifest. For since that is pleasant to every one of which he is said to be a lover, (as for instance, a horse is pleasant to a lover of horses, and a public spectacle to one who delights in such amusements) virtue, and the actions according to it, are also pleasant to a lover of virtue. Those things, therefore, which seem pleasant to the many, are accompanied with opposition; for the same things are considered by one man as pleasant, and by another unpleasant*; but the cause of this is that they are not pleasant by nature. For to the lovers of worthy things, that appears to be pleasant which is pleasant by nature; since it follows, that, in consequence of being most excellent characters, they pursue things *truly* pleasant:—but they pursue

* For ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι γὰρ ἄλλο νομίζει ἡδύ, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἀηδές, we read ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ νομίζει ἡδύ, καὶ ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἀηδές.

actions according to virtue. Hence it is manifest that actions according to virtue, are pleasant to the lovers of virtue, and that *per se*; for that which is pleasant by nature, is not so through any thing else. On this account their life does not require external pleasure as a certain appendage, but possesses pleasure *in itself*. But if any one should assert, that all worthy men are not delighted with virtue, (since there are some who do not practise virtue with pleasure) we answer that he is neither good nor worthy who does not rejoice in beautiful actions: for neither can any one be called just, who does not rejoice in acting equitably; nor liberal, who does not delight in liberal actions: and similarly also in other things. If this then be the case, the actions according to virtue, will be pleasant *of themselves*. But these, indeed, are good and beautiful, and especially every one of them if a worthy man judges well concerning them; for it is not reasonable to suppose he will not judge correctly: but he judges that they are both good and beautiful. Felicity, therefore, is the most excellent, the most beautiful, and the most pleasant; and hence one object is not the most beautiful, another the most excellent, and another the most pleasant, according to the Delian epigram, which says,

“ Justice is fairest, health the best of things;

But the most pleasant is the wish obtain'd.”

For all these are comprehended in the most excellent energies. But we assert, that these constitute felicity, or that one of them does so, and *that* the best.

CHAP. XVI.

THAT ONE WHO INTENDS TO BE HAPPY REQUIRES EXTERNALS, ALTHOUGH FELICITY DOES NOT CONSIST IN THINGS EXTERNAL; AND THAT HUMAN FELICITY IS NOT DERIVED FROM FORTUNE.

THE very essence, therefore, of felicity, consists in good actions: at the same time, however, it appears that external goods also are necessary, as we have said. For it is impossible, or at least difficult, to perform beautiful actions without the assistance of externals. For many of the most excellent-objects are effected through externals, as through instruments; such as friends, or wealth; honour, or dominion and power in a city; just as those who are deprived of some of these, cause felicity to lose a part of its splendor: as for instance, if any one should be deprived of nobility of birth, of worthy children, or of personal beauty*. For he is not entirely happy who is either altogether deformed to the view, or of ignoble birth; or who lives a single life, and without children; or who has worthless children, or who loses such as are worthy. On this account we assert, that felicity requires a prosperity of this kind. Hence some think that the prosperity which consists in externals, is the same with the felicity which is the object of our investigation; but others assert, that it is virtue, because he who is properly happy requires both.

On this account it is doubted whether felicity may be learnt and procured by a certain method; whether it is attainable from being accustomed to virtuous actions, or through some other exercise; whether it be imparted to men from divinity, or is derived from a certain fortune. It appears also, that if any thing is a gift from God to men, felicity will be

* Beauty is here meant as merely opposed to deformity.

justly so: and felicity will be much more divine than other things, in proportion as it exceeds all other human things in excellence. But to discuss these particulars belongs to discourses about providence, and to another employment; it is our business, however, to speculate conformably to the method we have proposed.

It appears, therefore, that although felicity should not be a gift of divinity, but procured through virtue, or some other exercise, it belongs at the same time to the most divine of things. For the reward and end of virtue, which is felicity itself, appears to be the most excellent, and something divine and blessed: and it may be procured by all men in common. For it is possible that felicity may be obtained, through a certain discipline and attention, by all men who are not injured in their dianoëtic part, and who are not entirely unexcited to the possession of virtue.

But it is rational to suppose, that a greater and more perfect felicity subsists from exercise than from fortune; and, in like manner, the things which are produced from every other cause, whether artificial or natural, are better than the things which are produced from fortune: and this is especially the case with things produced from the most excellent cause, which is virtue. To which we may add, that to commit the greatest and most beautiful good, namely, felicity to fortune, would be very absurd. But this also is evident from the preceding definition of felicity; for it has been said to be the energy of the soul according to virtue in a perfect life. With respect, however, to the remaining goods, as well those that are corporeal, and which pertain to the body itself, as those which subsist about the body, some of them are necessary to felicity, but others are as instruments with reference to it. The necessities are such as health of body and extension of life, and other things, without

which felicity cannot be perfected; but the instruments to it are such as riches and friends. If, therefore, this is the definition of felicity, how can fortune be the cause of it? For the psychical energy is not derived from fortune. To this definition what has been said concerning the end of the political art is also consequent. For we have said, that the end of the political art is the most excellent, and on this account that human felicity consists in it. Very properly therefore do we say, that neither a horse, nor an ox, nor any other irrational animal, is happy; for no one of these is capable of participating such an energy. For this cause also neither is a child happy; for, on account of his age, he is not yet capable of practising things of this kind: but the children who are called happy, are proclaimed blessed on account of the hope which is entertained of them; for, as we have said, both virtue and a perfect life are necessary to felicity. Besides, many mutations, and all various fortunes happen in life; and it is possible that the most fortunate man may, in his old age, fall into great calamities, as it is fabled in heroic poems about Priam; but no one will call him happy who is involved in fortunes of this kind, and who dies miserably.

CHAP. XVII.

WHETHER IT BE PROPER TO PROCLAIM MEN BLESSED WHILE LIVING.

WHETHER is it proper to proclaim any other man happy than one who is yet alive ; or whether, (as Solon says) is it necessary to regard the end ? If we admit the latter, however, any one will then be happy when he dies.—Or is it entirely absurd to place felicity in dying, since felicity consists in a certain energy ? But from this reasoning it would appear rather to consist in total inaction. We say, however, that neither Solon nor we proclaim a dead man happy through dying ; but because his life was blessed until the end, and because any man may be then securely proclaimed blessed, as being freed from evil and calamities. But again, this solution of the difficulty does not appear sufficient ; for there is yet a doubt if we assert, that the dead are still affected with some good or evil, as if they had sensation, and were still alive ; for they are not only proclaimed blessed and miserable, and disgraced and honoured, but the prosperity also of children and grandchildren is taken into the account of their felicity : for they are happy and blessed through the felicity of their posterity, just as they are unhappy from their misfortunes. But this also is involved in doubt. For to one who both lives and dies blessedly, it is reasonable to suppose that many mutations will occur with respect to offspring, and some of them may be good, and obtain a life according to desert ; but others, the contrary. It would be absurd, however, if the dead were changed together with these, and became at one time happy, and at another again miserable. This also appears to be absurd, that the living should not

participate in the fortune of the dead, through the familiarity derived from kindred. But we must return to the first doubt, and investigate if it be not proper to proclaim the living blessed till after death; for, perhaps, from this inquiry, we may be able to survey the thing now investigated.

If, therefore, it be necessary to regard the end, and then to proclaim an individual blessed, not as being so through dying, but because he was blessed before, will it not be absurd to say, when he is happy, that what he enjoys should not be verified with respect to him? Neither do we say, that he is truly happy, because we were not willing that the living should be proclaimed happy, in consequence of considering the mutations of life, and apprehending that felicity is something stable, and by no means easily changed; but that fortune is entirely the contrary. For it is manifest, if we follow the mutations of fortune, we shall frequently call the same man happy and miserable, making him appear like a certain chameleon, and giving him an imbecile stability.

We reply, therefore, to this doubt, that it is by no means right to follow the vicissitudes of fortune, since felicity does not consist in these, nor misery in the contrary. As we have said, however, human life requires variation of fortune towards the attainment of felicity; though the *essence* of felicity does not consist in this, but in the energy according to virtue. For it is requisite that felicity should be stable, and on this account it is not possible that it should consist in any thing derived from fortune*; to this also our proposed investigation bears testimony, since it hence receives the principle of pre-supposing that felicity is stable: for there is nothing pertaining to human works that subsists with

* Because instability is the *peculiar characteristic of fortune*; for when she becomes stable and fixed, she ceases to be *fortune*.

so much stability as the energies according to virtue, in which felicity consists : for these are more stable than the energies of the sciences. But again, of these energies of the virtues, the more stable are also the most honourable, in consequence of the blessed living in them most especially, and with the greatest continuity ; their actions according to virtue not being discontinued even in the smallest portion of time, because, as we have said, such a life is pleasant to them ; and on this account neither do they become oblivious of them.

Since, therefore, felicity does not consist in fortune, but in the actions according to virtue, the thing investigated will be present with the happy man ; that is to say, *stability of good, and felicity through life*. For above all things, he will invariably act and contemplate according to virtue.

He will also contend with fortunes, and by no means suffer mutation from adverse fortune, but will bear whatever happens in a beautiful and elegant manner, as one truly good, and (as the proverb says) “ square without blame *.”

Since, however, many circumstances happen from fortune ; some great, but others small ; those that are trifling, whether prosperous or adverse, neither cause molestation to a worthy man, nor induce any change in his life.

Those that are great and numerous, if indeed they are prosperous, render his life more blessed ; for they adorn his felicity ; since a worthy man uses them for the most excellent purposes.

But if they are adverse, they oppress and afflict the blessed man, and impede many of his energies ; but at the same time moral beauty

* See this beautifully illustrated by Boethius de Consolat. Philosoph. Lib. 1. Met. IV.

shines through them when any one bears many and great adversities easily; not because he is exempt from, and insensible to, pain, but because he is generous and magnanimous.

For if blessedness has its essence in the energies according to virtue, and these are the mistresses of the happy man's life, no one who is blessed can become miserable; since he will never do any thing hateful or base. For we think that a truly prudent and good man should endure every fortune in a becoming manner; and just as a most excellent artist will show his proper art from any casual materials; for example, a skilful general will employ even an inconsiderable army under his command, in a warlike manner; an expert shoemaker also will make shoes in the best manner *, from any kind of leather that is given to him; and in like manner all other artists. Thus also the blessed man will not always seek prosperity, but at all times employ the present fortune in the most excellent manner.

Hence he will never become *miserable* through fortune; but only *not blessed* †; even if he should be involved in the calamities of Priam.

Neither will he be inconstant, and easily changed; for he will neither be easily moved from felicity, nor by casual misfortunes; but by such perhaps as are great and numerous.

Nor even by these readily; for being liberated from misfortune, he will in a short time arrive at perfect good, from which he had declined but a little, because he was not easily moved; and he will continue a

* That is, so far as regards the *form*, which alone evinces the ability of the artist.

† That is, he will not be blessed in *energy*, in the most adverse fortune, but only in *capacity*, and as it were in a dormant state. This is beautifully illustrated by Plotinus in his book on Felicity, of which see Mr. Taylor's translation.

man of this kind for a great length of time, becoming a partaker of things great and beautiful in this extended period.

What prevents us, therefore, from calling such a man happy, who energizes according to perfect virtue; and although he may become unfortunate from external circumstances, yet he will again return to felicity, and be sufficiently furnished with external goods, not for any casual time, but even till death; and thus he will both live and die according to reason? But I add external goods, because felicity is the end of human actions; and on this account it is proper that good should be perfect, and not deficient in any thing. If this, however, be the case, we must not proclaim the happy blessed merely after death, but while they are yet living, to whom the particulars we have mentioned are, and will be, present. But I speak of them as blessed with respect to *human* blessedness, which does not entirely possess perfect good. And thus much we have said with respect to its being necessary to proclaim the happy blessed, while living.

CHAP. XVIII.

WHETHER THE BLESSED PARTAKE OF THE FORTUNE OF THEIR POSTERITY AFTER DEATH.

LET us now consider the other doubt, namely, whether the calamities of posterity and friends affect the blessed.—That nothing either of prosperous or adverse fortune will happen to the blessed from their posterity, or other relations, is foreign to the communicative nature of man; for man is a social animal. And besides this, it is also contrary to general opinion. For it appears to all men that the property of friends is common. But since many things happen to the familiars of the blessed, and these widely differ, and some of them indeed contribute more to felicity, but others less, to distinguish these particularly, appears both long and endless. But it will be sufficient if we treat of them briefly and superficially. We shall distinguish these things, therefore, just as we distinguish the misfortunes which happen to the blessed; namely, that some are great, are worthy of regard, and have weight in the affairs of life; but others are trifling, and more light. There is, however, as much difference with respect to what happens to the familiars of the blessed while they are yet alive, from what happens to them after their death, as between the evils represented in tragedies, and the pre-existing circumstances, of which they are the shadows.

Let us then investigate this difference: but it is better to consider whether the blessed participate of the fortunes of their familiars after death. It appears, therefore, that if they do partake of them, whether good or bad, it will be in an imbecile and small degree; either because

it is trifling in its own nature, or, though great, it appears small to them, through not living a terrestrial life. But if it has any power, it certainly has not so much, nor of such a kind, as to render those happy who are not so, or to take away blessedness from those who are happy. Hence the dead may be affected by the condition of the living; but in such a manner, and so far only, as not to produce any mutation in them.

CHAP. XIX.

THAT FELICITY BELONGS TO THINGS HONOURABLE.

THESE particulars being determined, let us consider concerning felicity, whether or not it belongs to powers, or to things laudable, or to things honourable. Powers, indeed, are habits of the arts; thus, for instance, it is evident that the power of the piloting art, and of the medical art, consists in the ability to heal and to navigate; but things laudable are those which already possess rectitude, and have arrived at good in energy; and things honourable are divine, and transcend these. This being admitted, let us investigate in which of these felicity consists. It is not power therefore; for it is a *perfect* good; but power is *imperfect*. Besides, felicity is not connumerated with many things; but power is a thing of this kind; for there are many powers. Felicity, therefore, is not power. Neither does it belong to things laudable, since these partake of a certain good; for we praise the just, the brave, and, in short, the good, man; we also praise virtue, because all these severally participate of a certain quality of good, and possess habitude to a certain something good and worthy. On this account those who praise the

gods* are ridiculous, as making them equal to us. But this happens because praises are bestowed for the sake of reference and habitude to *the good*.

Things laudable, therefore, are of this kind; but felicity is not; for it is *the good and the best*: but praise does not belong to the good and the best; since they are not referred to any good. On this account neither do we praise the gods; but proclaim them blessed and happy. In like manner also we do not praise the most divine of men, nor goods that are *essentially good*; and such is felicity. For no one praises felicity as a just thing is praised, but he proclaims it blessed, as being more divine and more excellent. Since, therefore, things laudable are praised for the sake of some good end, but felicity is not referred to any end, being itself the last end, it will not pertain to things laudable. It remains, therefore, that it must belong to things honourable. To this assertion also Eudoxus bears testimony; for wishing to show that pleasure is the most excellent, and a perfect good, he says it is proved from this; namely, that it does not belong to things laudable, but to something better, from not being an object of praise, in consequence of being good; but he says, that God and *the good* are of this kind. For with respect to these things, others also referred to them may be called good and laudable; hence virtue is praised, because through it men practise beautiful actions. And we similarly bestow encomiums on good works, whether they be corporeal or psychical, because they refer to a certain good end. But felicity itself cannot be praised; for it does not tend to

* Divinity, accurately speaking, is not a fit object of *praise*; for HE is above all praise.—God is to be celebrated and adored; magnified, revered, and loved; but *praise* belongs only to such things as contribute to something else; thus virtue is laudable, because it contributes to felicity.

any good end, since, as we have said, it is itself the last end. To speak, however, concerning things laudable, and the objects of encomium, and to say with what they accord, is not the subject of our present investigation; for it is better adapted to other discussions, and it is our business to speak of the inquiry proposed to us. It appears, therefore, from the preceding arguments, that felicity belongs to things honourable and perfect; and also, that it is the principle and cause of other goods; for we perform the others for the sake of this; but we place the principle and cause of goods among things honourable and divine.

CHAP. XX.

CONCERNING VIRTUE; IN THE INVESTIGATION OF WHICH THE POWERS OF THE SOUL
ARE CONSIDERED.

SINCE, therefore, felicity is the energy of the soul according to perfect virtue, let us inquire concerning virtue; for the consideration of it will render our assertion respecting felicity more clear. But it appears that the politician also deliberates about virtue conformably to truth; for he wishes to make the citizens good, and obedient to the laws, just as the Cretan and Lacedæmonian legislators acted, or any others resembling these. Hence it is evident that this investigation will not be foreign from the scope of the principle of our discourse; for it was about the end of the political art.

Let us, therefore, consider about virtue; that is to say, *human virtue*; since we began with the investigation of *human good*.

But because human virtue does not pertain to the body, but to the soul, (for we say that felicity is the energy of the soul) and the politician deliberates concerning human virtue, it is manifest that he ought to know how things subsist about the soul, just as it is necessary that he who intends to cure an eye should have a knowledge of the whole body. And by how much the more the political art is more honourable than the medical art, by so much the more should the politician understand things pertaining to the soul, than a physician those pertaining to the body; and the best physicians perform many things which respect a knowledge of the body. Hence it will be equitable that a politician should have a knowledge of the soul. We must speculate about the soul, therefore, as much as is sufficient to our proposed discourse concerning virtue; for accurately to discuss every thing pertaining to the soul, and to speak universally concerning it, would be a greater undertaking than we have here proposed.

Not only in our writings, therefore, but also verbally to our auditors, we have sufficiently treated of some particulars, concerning the soul:—and let these be used. We assert, then, that of the soul one part is rational, but the other irrational. But whether or no these are separated * from each other, just as the parts of the body, or other things that are divisible, or whether they be one in reality, but two in definition, just as the convex and concave in the periphery of a circle, since they are the same thing, but differ in definition; for there ~~is~~ one definition of a periphery so far as it is concave, and another so far as it is convex: to investigate this, therefore, contributes nothing towards our proposed method. But let us consider about the irrational part of the

* This subject is accurately discussed by Aristotle in his books on the Soul.

soul, of which one part is plantal, I mean the nutritive and augmentative, which is common also to plants, and all animals; for this power is present in every thing that is nourished, and likewise in such as are yet in embryo: the same power exists also in adult men; for it would be absurd to say otherwise. Human virtue, therefore, is not *peculiarly* found in this power, since it is common to all living things. For a virtue of this kind, viz. of nutrition and increase, also energizes in those asleep, and indeed especially then; but human virtue by no means does this; since a good and a bad man, when asleep, are in a very small degree manifest. Hence it is said that, during one-half of life, there is no difference between the happy and the miserable, that is to say, while they are asleep. And this very properly; for sleep is a state of inactivity, both to the worthy and the depraved soul; unless indeed any one should say, that the sleep of a worthy man is better, the daily motions being passed over again in a certain manner during sleep, and on this account the appearances in dreams are better to worthy men than to others. But enough on this subject; for the nutritive part is not endued with human virtue, which is the subject of our present discourse. There is, however, another nature of the soul, as we have observed above, not altogether irrational, but in a certain respect a partaker of reason, and also opposed to reason: on which account we sometimes praise the reason of the continent, and also of the incontinent, because they resist the opposing contrary; the one indeed as far as it is proper, but the other in some certain particular only. Hence it appears that there is something else in them besides reason, which opposes, and has a contrary tendency to reason. For in reality just as paralyzed members of the body, when any one designs to move them to the

right, on the contrary tend to the left, so likewise it is with respect to the soul. For the impulses of the incontinent tend contrary to the motion of reason.

In bodies, indeed, we see this contrariety of motion, but in the soul it is not visible. Though it is not seen, however, it is nevertheless necessary to think that there is something besides reason, and which is contrary to it, and has a contrary tendency : but to say how this takes place, contributes nothing to the elucidation of our present subject. It appears, however, that this part participates of reason, as we have said, so far as it is obedient to reason. For this irrational part, I mean that which consists of anger and desire, is led and persuaded by the reason of the continent man. Further still, it is in a much greater degree persuaded by, and obedient to, the reason of the temperate and the brave man ; for in such all things accord with reason. Hence it appears that the irrational part of the soul is two-fold, one being entirely irrational, I mean the plantal, that is, the augmentative and the nutritive ; but the other, namely, the irascible and the desiderative, in a certain respect partaking of reason : for this part communicates with reason so far as it is attentive and obedient to it. That the irrational part is in a certain respect persuaded by reason, is evident from admonitions, exhortations, and reproofs ; for from these many irrational motions are orderly arranged. But *το μετεχειν λογος*, i. e. to participate of reason is predicated in a two-fold respect, in the same manner as *το λογον εχειν*, to have regard for, or pay attention to any thing. For we say, that to have regard for our father and friends, is to be attentive to them, and obedient to their commands. We say also, that a man pays attention to the mathematical disciplines who knows them, and that scientifically.

After the same manner also that which participates of reason, is predicated in a two-fold respect; the one indeed properly and in itself, as the rational part; but the other, through being obedient to the rational part, is said to participate of reason, as when any one is obedient to his father.

Virtue also is divided according to this difference; for we call those virtues *dianoëtic* which belong to the rational part, but those which pertain to the irascible and desiderative part, we call *ethic*. And the *dianoëtic* virtues are wisdom, intelligence, and prudence; but the ethical are such as liberality and temperance. For when we speak of morals, we do not call a man wise or intelligent, but mild and temperate. But we praise a wise man through a good habit, which is virtue; for we call laudable habits virtues.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

THAT THE VIRTUES ARE PRODUCED IN US NEITHER BY NATURE, NOR CONTRARY TO NATURE; BUT FROM CUSTOM.

SINCE virtue is the perfection of the soul, and of the soul one part is rational, but the other *orectic**, it is necessary also that virtue should be two-fold. And one part of virtue, namely, wisdom and prudence, belongs to the dianoëtic part of the soul; but the other, which is called ethic, pertains to the orectic part. Dianoëtic virtue indeed has its principle from nature, (for man is the recipient of science) and receives a certain increase from custom; but, for the most part, it receives its generation and increase from teaching, and therefore requires both experience and time; but ethical virtue is produced from custom. For nature only enables us to become worthy; but teaching affords us the means of knowing that it is proper to be so. To become worthy, however, in energy, is alone effected by custom; for hence also it is denominated; and it is called (*ἠθικὴ*) *ethical* virtue, this word declining but a little from (*ἔθος*) *custom*.

* *ορεκτικόν*—*Ορεξις* is that vital power of the soul by which we are led to aspire after good, whether real or apparent.

It is evident, therefore, that none of the ethical virtues are produced in us by nature. For if we were worthy by nature, we should not be excited to the contrary by custom; but now we are moved by custom. Hence then none of the ethical virtues are produced in us by nature, since nothing ~~that~~ is moved by nature changes to a contrary bias by custom. For no one can accustom a stone to tend upward, although he should hurl it on high ten thousand times; neither can any one accustom fire to tend downward, nor can any thing else which has a natural subsistence be accustomed to subsist otherwise. The virtues, therefore, are not ingenerated in us by nature, nor contrary to nature; but we possess the power from nature, and are naturally adapted to receive them; but we do receive, and are perfected in them through custom. Again, of natural faculties we first have the power perfect, and afterwards use it; thus having either the optic or the acoustic power perfect, we use it. For we do not receive these senses from seeing often, or hearing often; on the contrary, possessing, we use them; but we receive the virtues first energizing, as is the case in the arts*; for by learning the things that it is proper to do, from doing, we also learn them; as for instance, by building we become builders, and by playing upon the harp we become harpers; so also by performing just actions we become just, and by doing temperate and valiant things we become temperate and brave.

This is also testified by what happens in cities, since legislators make the citizens good by custom. For they compel them by wholesome rewards and punishments to perform good actions, and thus render them worthy. But if this is not done by all, it is an error; for the

* As by operating on those subjects about which art is conversant we become artists, so by engaging in virtuous energies, we become at length *habitually* virtuous.

declaration and the will of every legislator is this, to accustom the citizens to good actions. The virtues, therefore, are not from nature, but custom.

Further still: every virtue is both produced and corrupted from the same, and through the same customs and works; when the customs are good, the virtues are produced, but from contrary customs they are corrupted; and similarly also in art. For from playing on the harp, both good and bad harpers are produced; the good, indeed, from playing well, but the bad from playing ill. In like manner also builders, and all other artists, become either good or bad from an energy according to art. They become good builders from building well, but bad ones from building ill; for if there were not a particular art from a particular energy, but nature were the effector of the artists, no one would require a teacher in respect to an art; but all would immediately become either good, or the contrary. The like also takes place in the virtues. For engaging in contracts with men, some of us become just; but others unjust: the former from performing all things justly and according to law, but the latter from the contrary. Again, when we are involved in any dreadful circumstances, we are accustomed either to be terrified, or confident; and some become brave, but others timid. It is thus also in desires and anger; for from custom and education some become temperate and mild in these passions, but others intemperate and irascible; and, in short, every habit is produced from a like energy; a good habit from a good energy, but a depraved one from a depraved energy. On this account it is not necessary to say, that energy simply is the cause of a good habit, but a good energy: neither is it necessary to say, that energy simply is the cause of a bad habit, but a bad energy. And thus it is with the building

art; for we do not say, that a building energy simply is the cause of a good building habit, but that a good building energy is the cause of a good, and a depraved building energy of a depraved, building habit; and, in short, certain particular energies are to be assigned to particular habits; for habits are consequent to the diversities of energies. Hence there is a great difference with respect to habit from being well or ill accustomed from childhood; or rather, on this the whole difference of habits depends.

CHAP. II.

THAT ACTIONS ACCORDING TO VIRTUE ARE MEDIA, AND THAT THEY ARE CORRUPTED
BY EXCESS AND DEFECT.

SINCE our present discussion does not belong to the contemplative part of philosophy, which has the contemplation of truth only for its end; for it is occupied about beings which are alone the objects of knowledge, and are not practicable; yet it is a part of practical philosophy whose end is to effect good. For we do not speculate that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good; since if it were so, we should derive no advantage from earnest endeavour, as we should not arrive at the end.—Since then actions are the end, and they form our present subject, let us direct our attention to these; for they have the power, as has been observed, of rendering habits either good or depraved. Good actions, therefore, are to be thus defined; namely, such as are produced according to right reason; and bad actions are to be defined contrariwise:—this indeed is true, but it is not

sufficient to distinguish them ; since a subsistence, according to right reason, is something universal ; and a thing of this kind being assumed, is not sufficient to demonstrate a thing unknown. For if any one should ask what man is, and it should be answered that he is an animal, it would not be sufficient to the definition of man. On this account we must omit this subject for the present, for we shall afterwards speak about it, and also show what right reason is, and how it subsists with respect to the virtues in general. It must, however, be previously admitted, that the whole discussion respecting practical actions, that is to say, which of them are good, and which bad, need not be delivered accurately, but superficially, as we have said in the beginning ; because it is proper to require arguments respecting these, consequent to the matter, since actions, and the things pertaining to them, are not always the same ; as neither are things which are at present salubrious ; but they are at one time healthful, and at another wholly the contrary. For they change together with the dispositions of the body, and the mutations of time. It is thus also in actions. For the same actions are at one time noxious, and at another beneficial, and this frequently happens even to the same men. It being thus impossible that a discourse about universals should be accurately defined, that about particulars will be much more uncertain. For we are less able to know particulars than universals, since the consideration of the former does not depend upon any certain art, or method, and defined precept. On this account it is proper that those who act should regard the time, and from it investigate the reason of actions. For speculating after this manner, just as physicians and pilots do, actions are known to be either good or depraved. For they judge the actions of each from time, according to art. But though such is the nature of the present

discourse, we must nevertheless endeavour to give assistance to the truth pertaining to it.

In the first place this is to be considered, that the actions according to virtue may be corrupted by defect or excess, as we see in strength and health; for it is necessary in things unapparent to use evident testimonies; since both excessive exercises, and such as fall short of moderation, corrupt the strength of the body. After the same manner also food and drink, being more or less than is proper, expel health; but these, moderately taken, produce, increase, and preserve it. Thus it is also with temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues: for he who avoids and fears all things, and endures nothing, becomes timid; but he who fears nothing, and encounters every thing, is rash; the brave man, however, preserves the medium. In like manner also temperance is corrupted by excess and defect; for he who indulges in every pleasure, and abstains from none, is intemperate; and he who avoids all, as men of rustic manners are wont to do, is insensate; but he who preserves the medium, is temperate, since both temperance and fortitude are preserved by moderation.

Not only the energies, however, through which the generation, increase, and corruption of the virtues subsist, are consequent to their effects, and are good if they generate and increase, but depraved if they corrupt; but this is the case also with the energies of the virtues, which are posterior to habit, and of which habits are the causes; for these subsist in a like manner, as will be evident from more apparent similars. For strength is produced from taking much food, and enduring many labours: and again, strength becomes the cause of these energies; for a strong man is especially able to receive much food, and to endure

many labours. The like also happens with respect to the virtues; for by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and being temperate we are more able to abstain from pleasures. Thus it is also with respect to fortitude; for being accustomed to despise and endure dreadful things we become brave, but becoming so, we are again better enabled to endure them.

CHAP. III.

THAT ETHICAL VIRTUE IS CONVERSANT WITH PLEASURE AND PAIN.

SINCE prior to arriving at the habit of virtue, and after having acquired it we exhibit the same energies, what token will there be of those who have these habits, or of those who do not yet possess them? No other surely than the pleasure or pain arising from virtuous works. For he who abstains from corporeal pleasures, and delights in abstaining from them, is temperate; but he who is grieved, is still intemperate; and he who sustains dreadful things and rejoices, or at least is not pained, is brave; but he who is pained, is still timid.

Ethical virtue, therefore, is conversant about pleasures and pains; for we do base things through pleasure, and abstain from beautiful actions through pain. On this account, as Plato says, it is necessary that great attention should be paid to good morals and actions from our very childhood, and that while children we should be trained in manners of this kind, in order that we may be able to rejoice in such things as are proper; but to be pained in such things as it is fit to receive pain

from : for this is a right education, and conformable to reason. Further still, since the virtues are either actions or passions, but in those which any one performs, or is passive to, he rejoices if he either does or suffers them willingly ; or is pained if compelled by another, it is manifest that every virtue is conversant with pleasure and pain. Again, this is evident from the punishments which are inflicted in politics. For legislators punishing those who delight in base actions, persuade them to abhor depravity, but to be pleased with good works ; and thus are accustomed to instil into them the delight arising from virtue ; for punishments of this kind have the relation of remedies to those who are politically diseased. And just as diseases are contrary to the remedies by which they are cured, and if we see a physician exhibit a cold remedy, we immediately know that the disease arises from heat ; so likewise we know from punishments being inflicted, that the vices they are designed to cure arise from pleasure. Besides, as we have said, every habit of the soul becomes better or worse from the things through which it is produced ; with these also it is naturally conversant, and in these subsists.—But depraved habits are produced from pleasure and pain ; that is to say, by pursuing pleasure in an improper manner ; and again, by avoiding pain when, and as, it is not proper, and where we ought not, and such other circumstances as cause a base pursuit of pleasure, or disgraceful flight from pain. The like also takes place with respect to virtue ; for it consists in the pursuit or avoidance of pleasure and pain as, and when, it is proper. Hence it is evident that habits have their nature conversant with, and consist in, these. On this account some have defined the virtues as belonging to impassivity and inaction, taking the definition from pleasure : but they have defined badly, because they make the definition without any addition ; neither

adding to tranquillity and impassivity when, nor as, it is proper, nor other circumstances. It remains, therefore, that virtue is a habit thus subsisting about pleasures and pains, as we have premised, and that it is practice of the best things: but vice the contrary. We may, however, understand what has been said still better from the following considerations: Since there are three things through which any thing is embraced, and as many through which it is avoided, I mean the beautiful, the useful, and the pleasurable; and the base, the useless, and the painful; a good man will apply himself to all equitably, pursuing the best things, but avoiding those which it would be noxious to pursue. But a bad man will err in his judgment of them, and especially of such as are attended with pleasure; since pleasure is not only common to all animals, but is consequent to all the above-mentioned objects of choice; for whatever we choose we are wont to be delighted with. The beautiful and the useful also are pleasant in their very nature: on this account, bad men are deceived, apprehending that every thing pleasurable is beautiful and advantageous; and because pleasure is an attendant on these, they think that they are reciprocal. This, however, is not the case; for it happens that many things that are pleasant, are both base and disadvantageous; and hence it is manifest that human actions are conversant with pleasure and pain. Again, this passion is inherent in, and nourished together with us from infancy, our very life being, as it were, tinged with it; and by this, as a rule, we judge both good and depraved actions; namely, that some tend to pleasure, but others to pain; and thus we regulate all our energies although not similarly, but some in a greater, and others in a less degree. Hence it is necessary that the whole of our present subject should be conversant with pleasure and pain. For to one who investigates practical

matters it will afford no small assistance to know what it is to be well or ill pleased or pained; since it is no trifling part of actions to be well affected, or the contrary. For hence we know the manners of men whether they are depraved or good. Further still, both art and virtue are conversant with such practical actions as are not easy; for such as are easy do not require long custom, nor artificial aid. Hence by how much the more difficult they are, by so much the more they will require art and virtue; since it is better to dispose more difficult things well, than to effect such as are more easy. Virtue, therefore, is especially conversant with things more difficult, and is employed about them. But, as Heraclitus says, "it is more difficult for a worthy man to contend with pleasure than with anger." On this account, therefore, it is necessary that the whole employment, both of virtue and the political art, should be conversant with pleasures and pains; for he who properly uses pleasure and pain, is a good man; but who uses them improperly, is a bad man.

CHAP. IV.

THAT A JUST MAN DIFFERS FROM ONE WHO DOES JUST THINGS; AND SIMILARLY IN
THE OTHER VIRTUES.

THAT virtue, therefore, is conversant about pleasures and pains, and that it is increased, and corrupted by the same things from which it is produced, (energies taking place in various ways) and also that it energizes about them, has been already said.

But some one may doubt perhaps why we say it is necessary that he who wishes to be just, should do just things; or temperate, temperate things; since those who do just and temperate things, are just and temperate, in like manner as those who perform musical or grammatical things, are musicians and grammarians.

To which we reply, that there appears to be some difference between one who does just things and a just man; but it is similar also with actions arising from the arts. For it may happen that a man may do a grammatical thing, either by chance, or from the suggestion of another, and still not be a grammarian. But *he* will be a grammarian who performs something *grammatical*, and also *grammatically*; that is, when he follows the rule of a grammarian in doing it. Thus also any one may do just things, and still not be just.

But the difference is much greater in the actions of virtue, than of the arts; for in these, good consists in the energies of art. Thus if any one who understands music should perform musical actions, nothing prevents us from calling him a musician: for he is nevertheless a musician although he did not intend to do any thing musical, but was

compelled by another. With virtue, however, it is not so. For if any one should perform just things he will not be just, unless he does them to others, and that very willingly, being excited by himself, and not compelled by another. For a man will then be just ; in the first place, if he performs just actions, knowing them to be just ; in the second place, if he does them with a deliberate intention ; and in the third place, if he conducts himself firmly and immutably with respect to the action ; for he ~~will~~ not be a just man who merely knows what is just, and performs it willingly, but does not think that justice ought to be exercised at all times. With respect to obtaining other arts indeed, and becoming artists in them, nothing else is investigated than a knowledge of those arts ; for without knowledge, how can any one become an artist ? But if he neither practises the art with a deliberate intention, nor exercises it immutably, he is not on this account prevented from being an artist. With respect to virtue, however, to know every thing concerning it that it is proper to know, will contribute little or nothing to render a man worthy ; but with respect to other things, knowledge effects not a little, but almost every thing ; for it may happen that a man who says nothing accurate about virtue, may nevertheless be worthy. But without having a deliberate tendency to virtue, and subsisting immutably with respect to it, it is impossible to be worthy ; which things, as we have said, are produced from making them the subjects of frequent energy.

Just ~~and~~ temperate actions, therefore, are such as a just, or a temperate man, may perform ; but a just or a temperate man is not one who merely performs all these things, but one who does them as just and temperate men do them. Hence it has been well said, that a man becomes ~~just~~ by doing just, and prudent, by doing prudent things.

But he who does not act in this manner, neither is at any time good, nor will he ever become so.

The multitude, however, do not act thus; but flying to what is *called* wisdom, and to words, they think by so doing to philosophize. They imagine also that they are worthy merely because they know how to speak accurately concerning virtue; acting similarly to those sick persons who very politely hear their physicians, but do nothing that they prescribe. As, therefore, those who are thus treated will never be in a good condition of body, so neither will those who thus philosophize heal the maladies of their soul.

CHAP. V.

THAT VIRTUE IS A HABIT, AND A MEDIUM.

HAVING discussed these points, let us now consider what virtue is. For there are three things in the soul; namely, passions, powers, and habits.

The passions are desire, anger, fear, audacity, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, love, emulation, pity, and, in short, whatever is attended with pleasure or pain.

Powers are aptitudes of the soul with respect to the passions, according to which we are said to be subject to them; as for instance, according to which we are able to be angry, or grieved, or disposed to pity.

But habits are the modes according to which we suffer the passions, that is to say, whether well or ill; for example, if we are very much

given to anger, and unable to restrain it; or, on the other hand, if we are too remiss and effeminate, we are badly affected; but if moderately, well; and similarly with respect to the other passions. There being three things, therefore, namely, passion, power, and habit; in which of these does virtue consist?

Passion, therefore, is neither virtue nor vice; for we are said to become worthy according to virtue, and depraved according to vice; but by ~~no~~ means according to passion; since no one is said to be either ~~depraved~~ or worthy merely through being angry. Hence neither virtue nor vice is a passion. Again, we are neither praised nor blamed according to the passions, but according to the virtues or vices. Further ~~still~~, we may be angry, or frightened without previously and deliberately intending it; and in like manner we are subject to other passions; but this is not the case with respect to virtue and vice: they are not passions therefore. Again, we are not said to be disposed to the ~~passions~~, but rather to be excited by them; but we are said to be ~~disposed~~ to virtue and vice. Hence also they are not passions.

And for the same reasons they are not powers; for we are not called depraved or good, neither are we praised or blamed, simply in consequence of the ability to be angry. Nor are we able to be angry by deliberate intention, as is the case in the practice of virtue, but rather by being naturally disposed to anger; for we are not said to be good or bad by ~~nature~~, as has been shown before.

If, therefore, the virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are among habits. Hence we have found what is the genus of virtue; for it is a habit.

~~It is not only~~ necessary, however, to say that it is a habit, but we must also add what kind of a habit; namely, that it is a good one; for vice

is a depraved habit. With respect to virtue, therefore, we must say, that every virtue adorns its possessor; renders him in a good condition, and well disposes the work which he produces through it. Just as the virtue of the eye perfects the eye itself, and renders both it and its work, that is, sight, good; for by the virtue of the eye ~~we see well~~. In like manner also the virtue of a horse renders both him and his work good; for in consequence of a virtue of this kind he is able to carry his rider well, to run, and to endure the enemy. Since this is the case with all the virtues, human virtue also will subsist similarly, and it will be a habit from which man becomes good, and from which human works are perfected in a beautiful manner. But how can we obtain such a habit? We have explained this indeed a little before; for we have said that he who intends to live virtuously will always regard the medium when excited to the passions, and accustom himself in things of this kind. Again, it will be evident from what follows, if we contemplate the quality of virtue. Let us, however, thus consider it.

In every thing continuous, as in a line, or a superficies; a body, or a ratio; time, or in short in any thing capable of being divided, we may assume the more, or the less, or the equal: thus, for example, in continued quantity, if ten cubits be much, but two cubits little, the equal will be six cubits; and that is called the middle or medium, because it is as much less than ten, as it surpasses two cubits. In like manner also in discrete quantity; for if twenty be much, but ten little, the equal will be fifteen, because it falls as much short of the greater, as it exceeds the lesser, number. But an equal of this description is called a middle or mean; and this kind of order is called arithmetical proportion. In discrete quantity, however, it is not necessary to assume such a proportion in every thing, since it is not infinitely divisible, but

in continued quantity, which may be divided to infinity, it may take place universally. We do not, however, always form a similar judgment of this medium, but sometimes according to the thing itself, and at others with respect to ourselves. According to the thing itself indeed six is the ~~medium~~ between two and ten; for it equally exceeds and falls ~~short of these numbers~~, because the difference is assumed in the things themselves; but it takes place with respect to us when the medium, or excess, or defect, is assumed from ourselves. Thus, for instance, if ten ~~pounds~~ be much, and two pounds little for any one to eat, it is not necessary that six pounds should preserve the medium, and be adapted to the body; for it is possible that either more or less may suffice. With regard to the thing itself, indeed six pounds is the medium and the ~~equal~~; but with us seven or five perhaps may be the medium; that is, as much as is adapted to the body. Six pounds, however, may be little for Milo, who is sufficiently exercised, and his provider might allow him even more; but that quantity would be much for one who is ~~beginning~~ the gymnastic exercises. And the same thing takes place in running and wrestling; for in these we form a judgment of the equal from those who are exercised. But again, every one who intends to apply himself to any science always seeks the medium, and avoiding both excess and defect, pursues the medium; namely, that which is a medium with respect to us, and not with respect to the thing itself.

After ~~this~~ manner also every science performs its proper work well; and hence we are accustomed to say, that nothing can be added to, or taken away from, works that subsist well, showing by this that they similarly avoid both excess and defect, since these corrupt the good of the works, ~~but~~ the medium alone can preserve it. Since, however,

virtue is more accurate, and more excellent than every art, (just as nature is) this also will regard the medium. When I speak of virtue here, I do not mean dianoëtic, (for it has a different subsistence) but ethical, virtue; for this is conversant with passions and actions, which may be either much more or less than is becoming. - On this account also they possess the becoming; that is to say, the equal. For we may be timid, or daring; we may desire, or hate; be angry, or disposed to pity; and, in short, we may be pleased or pained, more or less; and both these, yet in neither case, in a proper manner: but to be passive to all these things when, and as, we ought, and in the things, and whom we ought, and for the sake of what is proper, is the medium and the most excellent; and in this virtue consists. The like also take place in actions arising from the passions; for there are in these excess, defect, and a middle. Since, therefore, virtue is conversant with passions and actions; but of these the medium is always denominated rectitude, and is praised as such, (both which are adapted to virtue) it is evident that virtue is neither excess nor defect, but a medium; which medium it always regards.

Further still, to err is multifarious, as has been said; since a man may err in many ways. For as the Pythagoreans say, *the evil* is infinite, but *the good* is definite and bounded; and on this account rectitude is simple and uniform. Hence also to err is easy, just as it is easy for an archer to miss the mark; but to act rightly is difficult, just as it is to hit the mark. It appears, therefore, that on this account excess and defect belong to vice, (for each of these is indefinite) but that the middle belongs to virtue, since it is definite and one; for

“ Simple the good, all various are the bad ”

Virtue, therefore, is a pre-elective habit subsisting as a medium with reference to us in a definite ratio, and such as a wise man would define. But it is the middle of two vices, the one subsisting according to excess, and the other according to defect; for it surpasses one of these, but ~~falls short of the~~ other; because one of these vices transcends, but the other is surpassed by, the becoming. But virtue alone investigates the becoming; that is, the medium, and makes this alone the object of its choice. So that if we should investigate *the very being itself of virtue*, it ~~is a medium~~; but if the *good* of it, and its *excellence*, it is a *summit*.

CHAP. VI.

THAT THERE IS NOT A MEDIUM IN EVERY PASSION OR ACTION; ALSO CONCERNING WHAT PARTICULAR VIRTUE IS THE MEDIUM OF PARTICULAR VICES.

It is proper to know that neither every action, nor every passion, admits of the investigated medium; that is, the becoming. For there are some which are always base, whether they exceed or are deficient, or preserve a certain medium. As in the passions of shamelessness and envy; and in the actions of adultery, theft, and homicide. All these are called ~~base~~ base, not because they exceed, or fall short of the medium; but because they are base in and of themselves. Hence neither the becoming nor rectitude can subsist in actions or passions of this kind, but they must always be sinful. Neither can it be predetermined in these, ~~as~~ in the other passions, how, and when, they are proper; for it ~~cannot~~ be determined how it is proper that a housebreaker should steal,

or when, or what, or from whom; since simply to do any one of these, is to sin.

In such passions and actions, therefore, there is no medium, nor excess, nor defect, as in injustice, timidity, and intemperance; for some of these exceed, and others fall short of, virtue. But ~~it would be very~~ absurd to investigate the excess, or defect, or medium of an excess, or a defect, or a medium.

Since, however, there is neither excess, nor defect, nor ~~medium~~ of a medium, I mean of virtue; but it is the summit of a medium as ~~one~~ may say; so there cannot be either medium or excess, or defect of excesses or defects; but those who practise either, always err in some way or other. And, in short, there is no medium either in excess, ~~or~~ defect, neither is there any excess or defect in a medium.

But it is not only necessary to say universally that virtue is a medium, and vice an extremity; but particularly to show of what vices, virtue is a medium. For of discourses about actions, those that are universal are more common, and accord with many things; but those that ^{are} particular are more true, as on this account proximately harmonizing with the actions which always take place in particulars; with which particulars also true arguments accord. Let us then assume the things investigated from the description laid down. In every passion of the soul, therefore, as we have said, except such as are essentially depraved, virtue is placed between excess and defect.

In Fear and Audacity (for these are passions of the soul) the medium is Fortitude. But of the extremes, that which is defective, is Timidity; and the excess, Audacity; for the excess has not a name from fear, but from audacity only. Many other passions are also ~~anonymous~~, since the defect is not named from audacity, but from fear only. ~~For it is~~

timidity. Hence of the extremes one is denominated from fear, but the other from audacity.

In pleasures and pains also the extremes are for the most part anonymous, but especially in pains. With respect to corporeal pleasures the ~~medium~~ is Temperance, and the excess Intemperance; but the defect, since those who altogether abstain from it are very few, is anonymous. Let it, however, be called Insensibility.

Liberality is the medium of the passion to which we are liable in bestowing and receiving riches; and of the extremes the excess is Prodigality, and the defect Illiberality. This, however, sometimes happens contrariwise. For in bestowing riches the excess is prodigality, and the defect illiberality, but *vice versa* in receiving them. We shall now, therefore, speak summarily and superficially about them, as it appears to us sufficient at present; and afterwards treat of them more accurately.

There is, however, another medium, and another extreme, with respect to bestowing and receiving riches; and that medium is Magnificence; for it differs from liberality inasmuch as it is employed in great, but liberality in small, concerns. And inelegant and sordid expence is the excess, but Parsimony the defect, of magnificence. For these likewise differ from the extremes of liberality; which differences, however, shall be discussed hereafter.

In the ~~passions~~ of Honour and Dishonour also the medium is Magnanimity, but the excess is called Arrogance, and the defect Pusillanimity.

But as we have said that the dispositions with respect to riches differ, that is to say, liberality and magnificence, the former being conversant with small, but the latter with great, concerns; thus also there is a certain ~~disposition~~ with respect to honour, differing from magnanimity in this,

that honour is conversant with small, but magnanimity with great concerns. For it is possible to desire more honour than is proper, and less than is becoming. And he who exceeds in such desires is called ambitious; and the disposition is called Ambition; but he who falls short is called unambitious, and the disposition is ~~anonymous~~ as also is the medium which differs from magnanimity, as has been stated above. And because the medium is anonymous, it is denominated from the extremes as partaking of both, and we call the same man ~~at one time~~ ambitious, and at another unambitious; and sometimes we praise the former, and sometimes the latter. But why we do Proc of after explained. Let us now speak of the other passions hapne the media, and extremes of each. andc.

In Anger, therefore, the medium is Mildness; for a mild man is called the medium; but the extremes are anonymous. Let the excess, however, be called Angriness; and he who exceeds, an angry man; but the defect Unangriness; and he who is deficient, an unangry man.

There are three other media which partly accord, and partly differ; for of our actions and words in our associations with men, some regard truth, but others pleasure. And of those which respect pleasure, some are done and said for the sake of jest, but others for the sake of other pleasures in life; so that there are necessarily three media. And of those which are said and done with regard to truth, the medium and truth have a name: but of those which regard pleasure, festive merriment is conversant with facetiousness, but friendship with the other pleasures. They communicate, therefore, with each other, because all of them subsist about the communion of words and actions; they differ, however, inasmuch as they are not conversant with the same things, as has been said. But the extremes are anonymous; we invent names for

them, however, for the sake of perspicuity, and that those who hear may more easily apprehend our discourse. But of the extremes of Truth, let that which pretends to something greater be called ostentatious boasting, and he who possesses it an ostentatious boaster; but that which ~~pretends~~ to something less, Dissimulation, and the possessor, a ~~dissembler~~. Of festive merriment the excess is Scurrility, and he who uses it is scurrilous; and the defect is Rusticity of manners, and he who uses them is called clownish. With respect to Friendship, let him who ~~exceeds~~, if without any particular object, be called an agreeable man; if with a view to his own advantage, a flatterer; and he who is deficient and ungraceful in every thing, a certain contentious and fastidious man.

There are media, however, not only in the passions themselves, but also in the things conversant with them, as appears in shame. For Shame is not a virtue, since it is not a medium of a passion, but of those things which are about the passion. Nevertheless it ranks among things laudable; for a modest man is praised, and on each side has excess and defect; and this is a medium. He who exceeds in bashfulness, may be called astounded; he who is deficient, or, in short, is shameless, impudent; but he who preserves the medium, is called modest.

There is a medium also in pain, when any one is grieved at those who are prosperous beyond their desert, which is called a certain indignation. And there is excess and defect on each side of this. The excess indeed is when a man is grieved at every one that is prosperous; and a vice of this kind is called Envy: and he who has it, an envious man. But the defect is when any one not only refrains from ~~grieving~~, but even rejoices at those who are unfortunate contrary to

their desert; and a man of this kind is called malevolent, and the defect itself, Malevolence. But the medium being called Indignation, he who has it is called an indignant man.

We shall, however, treat more accurately about the medium and extremes hereafter: and also about Justice, concerning ~~which~~, since it is two-fold, and requires a more elaborate discourse, this is not a seasonable time to speak. In what follows, however, making a division, we shall discuss each of these, and show how they are media, and of what. And we shall act in a similar manner with respect to ~~the~~ rational virtues.

CHAP. VII.

CONCERNING THE CONTRARIETY WHICH THE VICES ON EACH SIDE OF VIRTUE HAVE BOTH WITH RESPECT TO EACH OTHER, AND TO VIRTUE.

LET us now speak of the contrariety of the extremes, both with respect to each other and to the medium. And since there are three dispositions, namely, one of virtue, which is a medium, and two of vice, one exceeding but the other being deficient, there is a certain opposition in all, and the extremes subsist contrariwise with respect to each other; but the middle, with respect to both extremes. For just as the equal is opposed to the greater and the lesser, (since it is lesser than the greater, but greater than the lesser) so the middle habits are excesses with respect to the defects, and defects with respect to excesses. This also takes place in passions and actions. In the passions, indeed, fortitude is a medium: but in actions, that which is performed according

to fortitude. Hence, therefore, a brave man appears to be rash compared with one who is timid, but timid if compared with a rash man. In like manner also a temperate man appears either intemperate or insensate, and a liberal man prodigal or illiberal, according to the extreme with which he may be compared; and, in short, each of the extremes calls the medium by the name of the other extreme; thus the rash man calls the brave timid, but the timid man calls him rash. And similarly in other passions.

Since the extremes are thus opposed to the medium and to each other, there is a greater contrariety of them; for they are more distant from each other than from the middle; just as the great and the small are more opposed to each other than to the middle, that is the equal. And with respect to the medium, there is a certain similitude in each of the extremes, as in audacity and prodigality with respect to fortitude and liberality. In the extremes, however, there is no similitude, but they differ in the greatest degree from each other; and things that are in a great degree distant from one another, are defined to be contraries; hence the more distant, the more contrary.

But the extremes are more opposed to each other than to the medium; though both are not equally so. In some, the excess is more opposed to the medium than the defect; but contrariwise in others. For the media incline more to one extreme than the other, and at one time have a greater resemblance to the defect, but at another to the excess. Thus, for instance, fortitude more nearly resembles audacity than timidity, and is more contrary to the latter than to the former. Again, temperance has a greater affinity to insensibility than to intemperance; and on this account is more opposed to the latter than to the

former. But not only the similitude to any one of the extremes is the cause of contrariety to the other, but a thing of this kind also happens from ourselves. For since a worthy man, investigating the medium, will contend with the extremes, that with which he has the greatest strife, will appear more contrary to the medium; but the greatest struggle is with that to which we are more naturally inclined, and to which we are more impelled. Hence that to which we are more excited will be more opposed to the medium; just as in the extremes of temperance, we are rather moved towards intemperance than to insensibility, because we are more naturally disposed to pleasure than its contrary*. Hence also we have greater struggles with intemperance, and it is more opposed to temperance than to insensibility. And similarly with the other passions.

* Our author must not here be considered to inculcate an opinion that intemperance is a source of pleasure; for he clearly proves the contrary in another place. He adduces this instance merely because men generally, though mistakenly, seek for pleasure through intemperance.

CHAP. VIII.

CONCERNING THE BEST MEANS OF ARRIVING AT THE INVESTIGATED MEDIUM.

THAT ethical virtue, therefore, is a middle of two vices, the one according to excess, but the other to defect, because the medium of passions and actions is always sought for, has been sufficiently explained. But to be able to arrive at this medium, and to become worthy, is a very laborious task. For in every thing it is difficult to find the medium; as for instance, every one is not able to find the middle of a circle, that is to say, the centre, but he only who has a scientific knowledge of geometry; and thus it is also in passions and actions. For it is easy to be angry, and to give away, and expend, money; but to do these things when, and as, it is proper, and to whom, and as much as, and for the sake of what, we ought, (which is the medium, and the excellent; the rare, the laudable, and the beautiful)—this indeed is not easy, neither is every one willing to do it.

On this account it is necessary that those who wish to become worthy, and to investigate this medium, should avoid as much as possible that extreme which is most opposed to the medium; namely, that which is more especially inclined to the evils on each side of mediocrity, as Calypso admonishes Ulysses,

“ Far from the smoke and waves direct the helm.”

We err, indeed, if we fall into either extreme, but not similarly; for the error is greater in that which is more contrary to the medium, than in that which is less so. Since, therefore, it is extremely difficult to

obtain this medium, we ought to choose the least of two evils; or, according to the proverb, *we should make a second navigation* *. And this will happen if we conduct ourselves with respect to the extremes, after the manner we have pointed out.

But it is not only necessary to consider to which extreme men in general are naturally inclined, but also to which each individual is naturally disposed; since different men tend to different extremes.

This, however, we may know if we investigate in what things we are pleased, and in what pained; and when we know to which extreme we are most naturally inclined, we should studiously draw ourselves to the contrary; for by very carefully avoiding the worst extreme, we shall arrive at the medium; thus imitating those who endeavour to straighten a curved piece of wood; for they bend it in a contrary direction.

Of the other passions, pleasure, and the pleasurable, are especially violent. On this account much accuracy is necessary, and it is requisite to guard against deception by every means, when we wish to distinguish depravity from worthy pleasure, since it is difficult to be an impartial judge of things of this kind. Just, therefore, as the Trojan senators were affected towards Helen, when they called her beautiful, and admired her beauty, but at the same time gave it as their opinion that she should be sent back to the Greeks, in the same manner also ought we to be affected towards pleasure; for by thus dismissing it we shall sin the less. This then is the method, summarily and superficially delivered, through which we may be able to obtain the medium.

Thus also it is at the same time difficult, and especially in particulars; for the judgment of these things is not definite, but different at different

* That is, as explained by Eustathius in his comment on Homer, *when sails are un-
availing, recourse must be had to oars.*

times, since neither are the things themselves definite; as for example, in anger; for it is not easy to define in what, and how, and when to be angry, since judging from time and other circumstances, we say one thing at one time, and another at another. Sometimes also we praise those who are deficient, and say they are mild; and sometimes we praise those who exceed in anger, and call them manly. But he who declines but a little from the medium is not blamed, since he does not appear either to exceed, or fall short of it; he is blamed, however, who declines from the medium, so far as that it cannot be concealed. But how far, and how much, we may blame those who swerve from the right path, cannot be universally defined, nor indeed any thing else which is found in the investigation of particulars, and which has a various subsistence at different times. For a judgment of these things is partial, and produced by the senses: hence it appears that the middle habit is praised in all things. It is necessary, however, as has been said, sometimes to incline to excess, and sometimes to defect, that is to say, to that extreme which is most similar to the medium; for thus we shall more easily obtain the medium and *the good*.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING THE VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY.

SINCE virtue is conversant about passion and action, and virtue is a voluntary good action, and vice the contrary, and in the definition of vice and virtue the voluntary has been assumed, on this account to one speaking concerning virtue and vice, it is necessary also to treat of the voluntary and involuntary. For from these we form our judgment of actions; and we say that some are to be praised, some to be pardoned, but that others again are worthy of reprehension. And we praise such as are good and voluntary, while we blame those that are voluntarily base; we do not, however, blame those that are involuntarily base, but consider them deserving of pardon. Moreover, we judge those to be worthy of pity which are involuntarily base, and at the same time are injurious to the agent. On this account, since our present discourse is about laudable and reprehensible actions, it is proper to understand the voluntary and the involuntary. A discourse concerning these is useful also to legislators; for from these they know who are to be punished or honoured; and who are deserving of pardon or pity; but

this is the summit of the political art. Let us now, however, distinguish what is voluntary, and what involuntary.

It appears, therefore, that the involuntary is produced either by violence, or through ignorance.

But that is violent of which the principle is not in the agent, but external to him, and to which neither the agent, nor he who is acted upon, contribute any thing: as for instance, if the wind should move any thing, and drive it from place to place, or if men who are our masters and powerful should impel us, we being at the same time unwilling. The voluntary, on the contrary, is that of which the whole principle is in the agent. There are some things, however, which are neither properly involuntary, nor properly voluntary, but are, as it were, a medium between both; and they are such, as are done through fear of a greater evil, or for the sake of something worthy. For example, if a tyrant should order something base to be done, he being the lord of the agent, of his parents, and his children, and at the same time being able to preserve both him and his family if he does them, but to destroy them if he should refuse: for it is doubtful whether this be voluntary or involuntary. That which takes place also in storms is similarly doubtful, when the sailors throw the lading overboard, which can neither be called perfectly voluntary, nor perfectly involuntary, but partly both; since the principle of this act, that is, the tempest, is external. But there is something also in the agents; for they, judging this to be necessary, and wishing to do it for the preservation of themselves and those who navigate with them, act wisely, so that actions of this kind are mixed, and partake both of the voluntary and the involuntary. They appear, however, rather to partake of the former than the latter; for actions of this kind are chosen during the time of the

tempest, and the end of them, if any one will regard them with reference to the occasion, is good and proper. Since also the end of an action is estimated according to the circumstances attending it, it becomes good or bad from the occasion. Hence likewise we must investigate the voluntary and the involuntary, according to the time in which any action is performed. He, therefore, voluntarily does what he does according to that occasion, though at another time of tranquillity he would not willingly do these things; for the instrumental parts, as the hands and feet, are not moved externally from any other principle but that which is in the agent: but that which any one does from self-motion, he has the power of either doing or avoiding: and things of this kind are called voluntary. The action itself, therefore, is voluntary; that is to say, with the attending circumstances; but considered simply and without addition, it is involuntary; for separate from circumstances no one would choose to do things of this kind: but some of these actions are judged worthy of praise, and others of reprehension. Of praise, when a man endures any thing disgraceful and painful for the sake of some worthy and great object; but of blame when it is endured for the sake of depravity. For he is depraved who endures the most disgraceful things with a view to nothing either worthy or moderate; but (as we have said) there are some whom we do not judge worthy of either praise or blame, but who are objects of pardon or commiseration; as when any one does things that are not becoming through the fear of mighty evils, which are greater than human nature is able to sustain. There are some things, however, so very base as to leave no excuse to him who does them, but should be avoided by every means in our power, although it should be necessary to suffer death, even if attended with the most exquisite torments. For the circumstances

appear to be ridiculous which compelled the Alcmaeon of Euripides to slay his mother. But it is sometimes difficult to determine through the fear of what dreadful evils it is worth while to engage in certain base actions, and what conduct upon such an occasion is to be preferred. Again, it is much more difficult, having discovered what is proper, to remain in the same opinion. And since, for the most part, the things which we are obliged to do are more base than painful, but those which we previously expect to do are painful; on this account it is the province of a generous man rather bravely to endure pain than submit to do any thing base. Whence in actions of this kind we praise some and blame others; others again are neither the objects of praise nor reprehension, but are judged deserving of pardon. The Involuntary, therefore, is simply when the cause of actions is external to them, and the agent contributes nothing to the action; but the Voluntary is when the cause is entirely in the agent. Those things, however, which are not of themselves eligible, but which we wish to do according to a particular occasion, or for the sake of something else, are indeed involuntary *per se*, but voluntary as being preferred to others. It appears, however, that they are more voluntary than involuntary; for actions always take place in particulars, which at all times have reference to an occasion, a place, and a cause. And these render such actions voluntary.

Because, therefore, actions are conversant with particulars, and there is much difference in them, it is not easy to define, with respect to certain base and painful things, which ought to be preferred to the other.

CHAP. II.

THE VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY FURTHER CONSIDERED ; AND ALSO WHAT SUBSISTS
BETWEEN THE TWO.

It may appear that things beautiful and pleasant are in a certain respect violent, because these being external, excite and compel the agents to act through their beauty, and the pleasure which they afford. But this is not the case ; for if we should grant this, all actions would be attended with violence. For every action that we perform, arises from really thinking it is either beautiful or pleasant. We do some things indeed with pain ; namely, such as are accompanied with external force ; but others with pleasure ; that is, such as are done for the sake of the pleasurable. We do all things, however, for the sake of something beautiful or pleasant ; for even such painful things as we do through compulsion, are done with a view to pleasure ; since we do them that we may avoid things still more painful. But this is to pursue pleasure. On this account it is not proper to call things beautiful and pleasant, violent ; and, in short, it is ridiculous to think that things externally beautiful and pleasurable are the causes of actions ; and that not we ourselves are the causes, in consequence of being easily allured by them.

It frequently happens, however, that a person ascribes to himself the cause of beautiful actions, but attributes such as are base to pleasure, and not to himself. But this is not the case ; for that is involuntary, of which the principle is external, and to which the agent contributes nothing.

Let us then investigate whether the actions produced through ignorance, be voluntary or involuntary. All, however, have not a similar subsistence; for some are *voluntary*, others *involuntary*, and others are neither: and these last may be called *non-voluntary*. And those are involuntary which grieve us when we know that we have done them, and which are followed by repentance. But those with which we are not so affected, are non-voluntary; for he who acts through ignorance, and is not indignant with the action after he knows it, cannot do that of which he is ignorant either willingly or unwillingly; since, when he does know it, he is not indignant with himself. Hence then let actions of this kind be called *non-voluntary*. There is a difference, however, between doing a thing *through ignorance*, and *acting ignorantly*; and on this account to act through ignorance, is either involuntary or non-voluntary; but to act ignorantly, is voluntary. For he acts ignorantly who is enraged or intoxicated, or does any other base thing; since he does not act through ignorance, but with a view to pleasure: this happens also in whatever he does, while he does it ignorantly. Every depraved man, therefore, is ignorant of what he ought to do, and from what he ought to abstain; and through faults of this kind men become unjust, or altogether wicked. But such actions are not involuntary; for ignorance in pre-election, which is the cause of vice, is not the cause of the involuntary, but of depravity. For to be ignorant *universally* that intoxication is a base thing, does not become the cause of the involuntary; but to be ignorant *particularly* of some particular method, as for instance, not to know to what extent a man may drink before he is intoxicated; since this is deserving of pardon and pity, and he who is thus ignorant, acts through ignorance, and involuntarily. It is requisite, however, to define what, and of what kind, those things are,

which being ignorant of, we involuntarily perform; for instance, the person of him towards whom any one does that which he does; and the thing itself which he does; sometimes also that which is done through a certain instrument, and the object for which it is performed; for example, for the sake of safety; and how, that is to say the manner, whether leisurely or vehemently. No one, therefore, can be ignorant of all these things, unless he be insane. It must be admitted, however, that even a wise man is ignorant of some of these particulars; for frequently a man is ignorant of the very thing which he does; just as they are who promulgate the Mysteries; for they say, that speaking about other things, and being confounded, they also added something concerning the mysteries, not perceiving what they said, or not knowing that they were arcane: for these are ignorant of what they do, not understanding that they divulge them. Thus too some one wishing to point out a certain person, may throw a catapult* at him, and by chance slay him. The same thing also may happen to him who mistakes his own son for an enemy, as was the case with Merope; or to one who thinks that a spear extended towards him, is without a point; or to him who taking up a pumice stone, throws it at another with a view to warn him of some danger, and thus slays him whom he intended to preserve. He, therefore, who is ignorant of any particular of this kind which is conversant with action, does it unwillingly. But he is properly unwilling who is ignorant of the most principal circumstances pertaining

* The catapult sometimes signifies an arrow, and sometimes an engine, out of which arrows are cast. It has been taken likewise, though not very properly, for an engine to throw stones, and sometimes it has been employed to throw great pieces of timber. Pliny ascribes the invention of this engine to the Syrians; but Diodorus and Plutarch relate, that it was first contrived in Sicily, about the time in which the elder Dionysius engaged in the war with Carthage.—See *Potter's Antiq.* vol. i. p. 95.

to a thing; and these are the persons, and the work, to which the action belongs, and that for the sake of which the thing is done: of all which, if a man is ignorant, and besides this repents of what he does, he properly acts unwillingly.

This, therefore, being the involuntary, the voluntary is that of which the principle is in him who knows the particulars in which an action consists.

For the involuntary is not properly that which we do when excited by anger or desire, knowing also every thing particularly through which, and in which we act. For if this be granted, we must in the first place assert, that no irrational animal does any thing voluntarily, since it always acts either from desire or anger. The same thing also must be said of children, which would be absurd for us to assert. For either we do nothing voluntarily that pertains to desire or anger; or we perform worthy actions voluntarily, and such as are base involuntarily; since some actions arising from these passions are good, but others bad. It would be ridiculous, however, to say, that worthy actions alone are voluntary, and depraved actions only involuntary. For there is one cause, namely, anger or desire. But the difference of the cause constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary; the one by being internal, but the other external. If, however, every thing is involuntary, how will it not be absurd to say, that we involuntarily aspire after things which are the proper objects to aspire after? For we may use both desire and anger in a becoming manner, since it is proper to be angry on some occasions, and also to desire certain things; such, for instance, as health or instruction, which it would be absurd to call involuntary. For things involuntary are painful, but such as subsist according to desire are pleasant. Again, if the faults arising from anger

were involuntary, they would differ from those which originate from reason, according to the difference existing between the voluntary and involuntary. But they do not differ; for these are similarly to be avoided with such as pertain to the voluntary, and are no less deserving of reprehension, which would not be the case if they differed in the same manner as the voluntary from the involuntary. Further still, the irrational passions, as well as the reasoning faculty, belong to human nature. But from these passions, namely, anger and desire, all human actions are produced. It would, therefore, be absurd to call these involuntary.

CHAP. III.

CONCERNING PRE-ELECTION, OR A DELIBERATIVE TENDENCY TO THINGS IN OUR POWER.

HAVING defined the voluntary and involuntary, it follows in the next place to treat concerning pre-election; for it has an appropriate subsistence with respect to virtue; and by this, as a rule, we are enabled to judge of manners and actions.

Pre-election, therefore, is voluntary; but it is not the *voluntary itself*, but something pertaining to it. For the voluntary is more widely extended than pre-election. And this is hence evident; for the voluntary is present as well to irrational animals, and children, as to animals that are perfect according to intellect; since both of the former act voluntarily. But pre-election is present only with those which are able to judge, and know how to deliberate; for deliberative appetite is

called pre-election. And, in short, those things that we do suddenly without previous deliberation, are called voluntary, but by no means pre-elective.

Neither is pre-election, anger, nor desire; will, nor opinion, as some persons imagine; for anger and desire are common both to us and irrational animals; but pre-election by no means. Again, the incontinent are not said to do what they do, pre-electively, but from desire; the continent, however, are said to act from pre-election, and not from desire. Further still, desire is contrary to pre-election; for we frequently deliberately tend to the opposites of what we desire; but desire is not contrary to desire. Pre-election, therefore, is not desire. Again, desire is painful, and always subsists opposed to the pleasurable; for it always tends towards it. But pre-election is not painful, neither has it a contrary subsistence to the pleasurable.

Further still, anger is not pre-election, and it is much more distant from it, than desire; for things done through anger, appear in the smallest degree to be done pre-electively.

Neither is will pre-election, although it appears to be nearly allied to it; for pre-election is not directed to things impossible; since we do not deliberately desire to fly, or to be immortal, but merely wish such things; for any one deliberately choosing things of this kind, would appear stupid. Pre-election, therefore, is not will. Frequently indeed we wish not for what we ourselves may do, but for what others may perform; as for example, that some player, or person engaged in athletic games, may be victorious on the stage. No one, however, deliberately chooses these things, but such only as he thinks may be effected by himself. Again, will always has reference to some end, but pre-election to those things which tend to the end. We wish indeed

for health, but we deliberately choose those things which tend to it, and through which we may be healthful. We also wish for felicity, and say that we wish for it; but we do not say that we deliberately choose it, since such an assertion would not be appropriate. In short, pre-election seems to be among the things in our power.

Neither is it opinion; for opinion is conversant similarly with every thing; as well with those that are eternal, as with those that are in our power, and those that are impossible. But pre-election is conversant only with such as are in our power. Again, opinion is divided into true and false; for we call some opinions true, but others false; but pre-election is rather distinguished by the good and the bad; for we say, that one deliberative tendency is to good, but another to evil. It does not appear to any one, therefore, that pre-election is the same thing with universal opinion; and not only not with *universal*, but with *any*, opinion.

For by pre-election, we derive the characteristic of our disposition; since by deliberately choosing bad, or good, things, we become good, or bad. But not so from opinion. Further still, we deliberately choose to do, or not to do, also to pursue, or to avoid, some of these things. But we form an opinion either of what we should prefer; or of something else, or to what it contributes, or how: it is not the province of opinion, however, either to take, or avoid, or choose any thing; hence pre-election is not opinion. Again, pre-election is praised when we previously choose those things that are proper; but opinion is praised, when we opine according to truth. We also deliberately tend to the things which we know to be very good; but we opine those which we do not altogether know to be true. Further still, the same person does not, in a similar manner, deliberately choose and opine; for he

frequently forms an opinion badly, opining indeed according to truth, but deliberately tending to things base. Opinion and pre-election, therefore, are not the same thing. But even though opinions should frequently precede, or be attendant on pre-election, they will not on this account be the same ; since nothing prevents there being a difference between them.

CHAP. IV.

PRE-ELECTION FURTHER CONSIDERED ; WHAT IT IS, AND ABOUT WHAT IT IS
CONVERSANT ; ALSO CONCERNING DELIBERATION.

SINCE pre-election is neither desire, nor anger ; will, nor opinion, let us investigate what it is, and what are its qualities. It appears, therefore, that it is voluntary, though not *the voluntary itself*, as we have said. For every thing voluntary is not the object of previous choice ; but that only is called pre-eligible among things voluntary, which we do with previous deliberation ; for pre-election is accompanied with reason, and the dianoëtic energy. And hence it appears to take its name. For (*το προαιρετον*) i. e. that which is the object of previous choice, appears to signify (*το προ ἑτερων αιρετον*) i. e. that which is eligible before other things.

This being admitted, let us inquire whether it be possible to deliberate about every thing, or whether there are some about which it is not possible to deliberate, in order that we may thence know to what pre-election belongs, and to what it belongs not ; for pre-election pertains to things that are the objects of deliberation. But by the object

of deliberation, I mean that about which not a stupid or insane person deliberates, but one endued with intellect. Deliberation, therefore, is neither conversant with things perpetual, such as the world *; (for no one would deliberate how it is necessary that the celestial bodies should be moved;) nor about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they are; such, for instance, as to deliberate how to make the side and diameter of a square have that ratio to each other which number has to number.

Neither does any one deliberate about those things which are always moved in the same manner, whether they be so moved by necessity, by nature, or by any other cause; such as the revolutions and rising of the celestial bodies.

Neither do we deliberate about things that cannot subsist otherwise; such as about immoderately dry and wet seasons.

Nor does any one deliberate about things which originate from fortune; such, for instance, as the discovery of a treasure, because nothing of this kind is in our power, or human.

Again, we do not deliberate about all human affairs, but about those only that are in our power, and which we may effect through ourselves, or others. For the Lacedæmonians did not deliberate concerning the polity of the Scythians, how they should be rightly governed; since it is not in our power to effect any of the things of which we have spoken.

But we deliberate about those practical actions which are in our power, and which we know.

* Those who are desirous to consult the opinions of the ancients respecting the perpetuity of the world, are referred to Ocellus Lucanus de Nat. Univ. and Aristot. de Cælo.

The causes of things, therefore, are three; namely, nature, necessity, and fortune. And together with these, intellect and every thing produced by human means; such as art, or any other action.

But men do not deliberate about such things as have their origin either in nature, or necessity, or fortune; but about those only of which human method and action is the cause.

Again, men do not deliberate about all human methods; for deliberation is not conversant about sciences that are accurate and sufficient to themselves; such, for instance, as about letters; since we do not doubt how they may be written, because it is accurately known, and the characters are defined.

But such things as we are able to effect through ourselves may be produced in many ways; and about these, we deliberate. For example, we deliberate about actions connected with the medical art, which are not altogether defined; or about the acquisition of riches, (since they may be acquired in many ways;) or about the piloting, or gymnastic arts. And we deliberate more about the particulars that pertain to the piloting art, than about those that belong to the gymnastic art; since the former is less accurate than the latter: and similarly about the remaining arts.

We deliberate indeed more about things pertaining to the arts, than about such as pertain to the sciences; since the former are more doubtful, as being less definite, than the latter.

It is possible, however, to deliberate about such things as most usually happen; but when the mode of their occurrence is immanifest, that is to say, how they take place, and in what particulars, then it is not possible that deliberation should be definite.

On this account also we take counsel when we deliberate upon great

concerns; for we distrust ourselves as not being sufficient to form a judgment of the thing.

We do not deliberate, however, about ends, but about such things as have reference to ends. For a physician does not deliberate about giving health to those that are diseased; (since having no occasion to regard any thing else, deliberation in this respect is useless to him) but about such things as tend to health, which may be restored by many remedies. In like manner also a rhetorician does not deliberate about persuasion, but about the means of persuading. - Neither does a politician convene the senate in order to obtain a knowledge of equitable legislation; (for it is necessary that he should govern well) but he deliberates about things which constitute equitable legislation.

In short all men of this kind presuppose the end; but they investigate how, and by what means, they may arrive at it. And since there are many ways through which the objects may be obtained, they inquire by what means they may easily, and in the best manner, discover the end. But when this can be obtained in one way only, then they do not investigate this, but inquire how we should use it, and by what conduct we may arrive at that end. Again, we perform this same action through something, and that something through another thing, until we arrive at that which is effected without a medium, and not through any thing else, which is the first cause of the end, though discovered the last. For thus a man deliberates, beginning from the end, proceeding through those things which regard the end, analysing every action as far as to its first cause; just as mathematicians do in forming their diagrams.

Deliberation, therefore, is a certain investigation; but every investigation is not deliberation; although, as we have said, both he who

deliberates, and the mathematician, after a certain manner, analyse similarly. And that which is last discovered by him who analyses, is the first work of him who deliberates. Just as a mathematician when analysing, makes that his hypothesis which he arrives at last of all, and from this, proceeding through other things, he demonstrates his proposition. Both, however, if in the progress of their analysis they meet with impossibilities, desist from their inquiry. Thus, for instance, if riches should be so requisite towards the investigated end that it cannot be accomplished without them, and it should appear impossible to procure them, they will no longer inquire about the mode of obtaining them, but desist. If, however, it be possible, they will still persevere. But we call those things possible which may be effected through ourselves; for those that are effected through our friends, are in a certain respect produced through ourselves, since the cause of them rests in us. But as we have observed, we deliberate at one time about instruments, and at another about the use of them. And, in short, we sometimes deliberate about such things as tend to the end; namely, how it may be accomplished; but at others, about the mode of using them, or through whom.

It appears, therefore, from the preceding arguments, that the end is not the object of deliberation; since those things are the objects of deliberation which a man has it in his power either to do, or to abstain from. But the things over which man has dominion are human actions. Human actions, however, are exercised for the sake of something else. But those things which are produced for the sake of others are not ends. The object of deliberation, therefore, is not an end. Hence also neither the end, nor the things tending to the end, such as particulars are, are objects of deliberation; for example, whether a piece

of bread be properly baked or not ; since we know things of this kind by the senses, not by deliberation or judgment ; for if we were always to deliberate about such things, we should proceed to infinity.

We have shewn, therefore, what is the object of deliberation ; but that which is pre-eligible is defined to be this object ; since previously to judge from deliberation is called pre-election. For having formed a previous judgment of what is proper to be done, we no longer deliberate about a thing, but know definitely that we ought to do it ; since we refer the principle of ~~the thing~~ investigated to our own will ; but we refer our own judgment and will to that which is pre-eligible, as being now the principle of the action. But this also is evident from ancient republics, which Homer imitates in his Poems ; for he introduces kings after previous judgment, declaring their will to the people, so that they conform to it, as it were, by pre-election. Since, therefore, that which is pre-eligible is also the object of deliberation ; namely, those appetites which are in our power, and to which we aspire after deliberation, being able to do this, it is evident that pre-election will be a deliberative appetite tending to things in our power. For judging from deliberation, we desire according to it. This, therefore, is a superficial definition of pre-election ; and we have also said about what particulars it is conversant ; namely, about things pertaining to the end.

CHAP. V.

CONCERNING WILL, AND THE OBJECT OF WILL.

It is now necessary to speak concerning will. That it is conversant with an end, therefore, appears from the preceding discourse. It may be doubted, however, whether it is conversant with every end that a man may propose to himself, or only with a good end.

Some, therefore, say that it is conversant with a good end only ; but others, with one that merely appears good, whether it be so or not.

It happens, however, that those who say that good only is the object of will, also say that evil is not the object of will with a depraved man, although indeed it is that which he wishes*.

But those who assert that the object of will is apparent good, consider it not as good in itself, but only in appearance, since different things seem good to different men, and the same thing appears good to one man, but evil to another : moreover the very same man will frequently think contrary things good, and thus there will be nothing naturally and essentially the object of will.

If, however, these things do not appear probable, we must say, that *the good is naturally, really, and essentially* the object of will ; but that which *appears good to every one*, is so *in a certain respect* ; for it is not good in reality, but according to some particular circumstance ; such for instance, as to plunder, is indeed naturally bad ; but to the plunderer, and according to some certain occasion, it is good. On this account it

* The depraved man may indeed be said to wish that which is evil ; but then he does not wish it so far as evil, but so far as it *appears* to him to be good, though it is not *really* so.

appears to be simply good ; and so far as it is good, it is also the object of will. So that it sometimes happens that apparent good is in a certain respect the object of will. To a worthy man, therefore, the truly good is the object of will ; but to a depraved man, that which is casual.

It is just so in bodies ; for to those who are healthful and in a good condition of body, things salubrious appear really so ; but to those who are diseased, they appear otherwise. In like manner also with respect to things bitter and sweet ; to those, indeed, who are in good health, such things as are naturally bitter and sweet appear to be so ; and similarly also with respect to things hot, and heavy, and other particulars ; but it is otherwise with those whose senses are diseased. Thus also it happens, in things good, and pleasurable, and bad. Real beings, indeed, and such things as are true, are the objects of a worthy man's thoughts ; but the contrary frequently occupy the thoughts of a depraved man. For to each particular disposition of the soul, there is a certain something which is peculiarly good and pleasant. And a worthy man differs from a depraved man in this, that he distinguishes the good from the pleasurable, and perceiving the truth in all things, becomes, as it were, the rule and measure of them. But depraved men not being able to see the truth, are deceived by pleasure, thinking that those things are good which are pleasant, though they are not so by nature. In like manner also they avoid things painful, which are neither naturally bad, nor to be avoided.

CHAP. VI.

THAT BOTH VIRTUE AND VICE ARE VOLUNTARY.

SINCE ends are objects of will, but those things which have reference to ends are deliberative and pre-eligible, it is evident that actions conversant with the objects of deliberation and pre-election, will be pre-eligible and voluntary. But actions of this kind subsist according to virtue; for they are conversant with the objects of deliberation and pre-election. Hence then virtue and vice are in our power; since the actions through which we accustom ourselves to virtue are previously chosen, and in our power. For if we are able to do good, it is also in our power not to do good; since those things which have negation, have also affirmation. And if it is in our power to do good, which is good, we shall also be able to omit doing it, which is base. And if it is in our power to abstain from evil, which is good, we shall also be able to do evil, which is base. But according to these actions we are rendered either good or bad; so that it is in our power to become either worthy or depraved.

To say, however, that no one is willingly depraved, or unwillingly blessed, is partly true and partly false; for the latter is true, but the former false, since depravity is by no means involuntary. For it has been already shown that man is the principle of his own proper actions. But those things of which the principle is in us, are in our power, and voluntary. Hence, therefore, every human action is voluntary, whether it be good, or depraved. But both private persons and legislators

confirm this opinion, by the conduct which they adopt. For they disgrace and punish those who do base things, unless compelled by others to do them, or, unless from being ignorant, they act ignorantly, of which they themselves are not the cause. Just as if a man intoxicated should do something base, being at the same time ignorant of what he does; for he also is the cause of his own ignorance. But legislators honour those who perform beautiful actions, as well in order to encourage others to good works, as to deter them from such as are base. Whence it is evident, that they justly think it is in our power to become either good or depraved, and on this account they endeavour to persuade them to actions of this kind. For no one who is endued with intellect would exhort another to do any thing which is not in his power, and which he could not do voluntarily; since no one would persuade another not to be hot, or cold; hungry, or any thing else, over which we have no control; for it is not possible, from an admonition of this kind, that any thing further should be effected, though we who are thus exhorted should be very desirous of it, since we must endure these things nothing the less. Similarly also if a man is unwillingly ignorant of any thing that it is not in his power to know, no one would urge him to be able to know it. But he who is the cause of his own ignorance, and through it commits any base action, is punished; for it appears that such a man is voluntarily ignorant, since it is in his power to be so or not. Just as he who is intoxicated or negligently ignorant of the law which he might easily learn; for he is the author of his own ignorance and depravity, and is willingly depraved. In like manner also we err in other things, of which we are ignorant, when at the same time it was in our power to learn them. And on this account we are punished by legislators; for it is in our power not to be ignorant

of this; namely, that we may avoid negligence, and learn to be attentive.

But if any one should be of such a disposition as not to be able to pay attention to these things, he will not on this account escape justice, but rather be punished; because living dissolutely and incontinently, he is himself the cause of his inability to pay attention to these things; from which course of life the many become wicked, unjust, and intemperate *. For men become unjust and intemperate not only from unjust and intemperate actions; but also when they do not propose to do evil, they live a dissolute life, and delight in luxury. For from such a course of life they fall into evil conduct, since by always accustoming ourselves to particular energies, as we have before observed, we become either depraved or good, or obtain some other habit; just as we see those who wish to become wrestlers, or to exercise any other action or contest, labouring and exercising themselves in those actions through which they may obtain their object. And none but a very insensible man will be ignorant that we may attain the habit of virtue and vice from energies. If, however, this be manifest to all, it is evident that every one will understand his own works and actions, whether they tend towards vice, or incline to virtue. But knowing what they do, they are willingly either good or depraved; since it would be altogether irrational to say that he who acts unjustly, or intemperately, is not willing to be unjust, or intemperate. For although a man being willing to become just and temperate, should not be able in consequence of being confirmed in long customs, he will thus become willingly base. For he who uses unwholesome food, and will not be persuaded by his

* The pious Mr. Law in his *Serious Call* very properly says, that more people are kept from a true sense of religion by a regular kind of sensuality and indulgence, than by gross drunkenness: more men live regardless of the great duties of piety, through too great a concern for worldly goods, than through direct injustice. .

physicians, and on this account becomes diseased, is willingly diseased; since it was in his power to use this diet or not; but when he wishes to be liberated from the disease, he is not able. For before he was diseased, it was in his power to preserve his health; but having lost it through an intemperate course of life, it is not in his power to restore it; just as any one is able to throw a stone into the sea, but when thrown, he cannot take it back again, although he threw it in willingly, since it was in his power to do it, or not. Thus also with respect to unjust and intemperate men; for before they had become depraved, and arrived at the habit, the habit might have been avoided; but having arrived at it, they cannot assume a different character. It is not, however, psychical vices alone that are voluntary; but with some men certain corporeal vices also take place voluntarily, through which they are upbraided. For no one in his senses would upbraid those who are naturally deformed; but such as vitiate their bodies through the omission of exercises, or through negligence or depravity, we consider proper objects of reprehension. Neither do we censure him who is blind either from nature, or disease, or a blow, but rather commiserate his condition; but we censure him who destroys his eyes through drunkenness, or any other depravity. It is evident, therefore, that those corporeal vices, which are voluntary and in our power, are to be reprobated, but by no means such as are involuntary. Thus it will be also in other things. For those actions which we punish, and for the sake of which punishments are inflicted, are all voluntary and in our power; but such as are not of this kind are involuntary. Vice, therefore, is voluntary.

This assertion, however, may appear repugnant to reason, because vice is produced from proposing some base end to works; but this takes place from thinking that it is good; but to think well, or the

contrary, is not in our power. But all men desire apparent good; and we ourselves have not dominion over this imagination. Hence vice is not voluntary.

To this we answer, that the same thing happens with respect to virtue, which is nevertheless voluntary. For no one is unwillingly blessed. For if ignorance of good is produced from a depraved habit, and a knowledge of it from a good one, it is evident that we voluntarily become both good and depraved; since we ourselves are the causes of the habit. If, however, the knowledge of the end does not arise from habit, nor from a deliberative tendency towards it; but is as a good sight, or any other natural faculty, which not being possessed cannot be received from another, nor acquired intimately, but must necessarily spring up, together with a judgment of this kind, if a proper judgment is to be formed, which is a perfect and true naturally good disposition:—If these things be true, vice will be similarly voluntary with virtue. For the knowledge of the end is in like manner present both with the depraved and the worthy man, whether, as we have said, it is known or unknown from habit, or subsists from nature. But if we say that virtue is voluntary because it is the end by nature, and is known by the worthy man, but the things which relate to the end may be chosen by him or not, what hinders but that vice may, in consequence of these things, be voluntary? For it is in our power to choose or not to choose such things as lead to a bad end. Again; if virtue is voluntary, because the knowledge of the end is produced from good habits, of which we in a certain respect are the con-causes, vice also will on this account be voluntary, because from base habits the end becomes known*.

* For *αγνοείται*, read *νοείται*.

CHAP. VII.

THAT ACTIONS AND HABITS ARE NOT SIMILARLY VOLUNTARY. ALSO CONCERNING
FORTITUDE.

WHAT virtue is, therefore, has been said in a general and summary manner; namely, that it is a medium between two vices, falling short of the one, and surpassing the other; and that it is a habit. We have further said from what things it is produced; and that we perform the actions and energies from which it is produced, after we have obtained virtue. It has also been shown that it ranks among the things which are in our power, and that it is voluntary. But it must now be asserted, that action and habit are not *similarly voluntary*, since we have shown that both are *voluntary*. We perform actions, therefore, knowing them particularly, and on this account have it entirely in our power to perform them or not, from the beginning to the end; and they are *properly voluntary*. But habit is not altogether known; for it is not known *per se*, but through the actions from which it is produced. We very well know indeed the actions whence we receive a habit; but not so with the habit. Just as in bodily disease, knowing the diet, we choose it; but the disease follows secretly. Habit, therefore, is said to be voluntary, because the energies from which it is produced are so, since it is in our power not to exert them.

But it is now necessary to discuss habits particularly, what each is, about what passions of the soul they subsist, and how they are produced; from which enquiries it will at the same time be manifest how many they are. And in the first place let us treat concerning fortitude.

Since, therefore, it is evident from what has been before said, that fortitude is conversant with fear and audacity, and that it is a medium between these passions, surpassing timidity, but falling short of audacity, let us consider to what particulars it is opposed.

Fear, therefore, is predicated with respect to things which are the objects of fear, and is opposed to them; but all apparent evils are universally objects of fear. Hence fear is defined to be the expectation of evil. We, therefore, fear every evil; as for instance, infamy, poverty, disease, privation of friends, and death. But fortitude is not opposed to all these; for a brave man is not conversant with them all. A brave man, indeed, fears those things which it is proper to fear; but it is not becoming to fear all these things, but only some of them; as for instance, it is becoming to fear infamy, and disgraceful not to fear it; for the former is the property of a modest, but the latter of an impudent man, notwithstanding a man of this kind is called brave metaphorically, because he is endued with something belonging to fortitude; that is to say, he does not fear every thing. For any one who is fearless is also a brave man. But, perhaps, it is not proper to fear either poverty or disease, and all such things as happen to us not from ourselves, or through vice. As, however, he who does not fear those things which ought to be feared is not brave, unless he be so called metaphorically; so neither is he brave who does not fear those things that it is not proper to fear, but is only said to be so according to similitude. For many who do not fear these things, but being liberal and possessing firmness with respect to the loss of riches, are timid in warlike dangers. But as he who fears the things which ought not to be feared is not brave; so neither is he brave who does not fear the things which it is proper to be afraid of. Thus, for example, he who fears insolence

towards his children, or his wife, is not timid; neither is he brave who does not fear this: this too is the case if any one about to be scourged should not be afraid, but bold. For those who do not fear the things which it is proper to fear are not brave. He, therefore, is a brave man who does not fear the greatest of dire things; for no one is capable of greater endurance than a brave man; but not always in a similar manner; for certain dire things, according to the manner in which they happen, are dreadful even to a brave man. For instance, death appears to be the extremity of evils, because it is the termination of life, and it is not possible for a dead man to become either good or bad. Hence death appears to be the most dreadful thing both to the good and depraved.

That death indeed which is produced from base causes is terrible to a brave man; that, however, which is the consequence of the most excellent causes, such as happens in war, is not so; on the contrary, it is very much the object of desire; but that which is the consequence of disease or shipwreck, so far as it does not happen for the sake of any thing venerable, is terrible to a brave man; but so far as it is painful, it is by no means an object of dread. Hence he may be called a brave man, who is fearless with respect to a worthy death, or to one that is not base, and sustains such a death as may suddenly approach. And that which happens in war is of this kind. For he who endures dreadful things which suddenly happen, affords a manifest proof of having attained the habit of fortitude. But he is properly a brave man, who endures the most excellent death; just as he is a brave man with respect to honours, who bears them in the best manner. For a brave man will despise honours bestowed by tyrants, as possessing nothing holy or stable; but with respect to such as are derived from well-governed

cities, he will not be so affected, considering them legal and equitable. There are sailors, however, who are fearless about death, though not in a similar manner to the brave man. For some of them appear to endure in consequence of despairing of their safety altogether; but others hoping through their experience to surmount the perils of the sea. Hence it is not possible to be properly brave in such things; for it is necessary that any one who is truly brave under circumstances of this kind, should possess a certain firmness and vigour of mind, or that the death should be venerable. But in a tempest, or disease, none of these things happen. For such a death is neither productive of any good, nor do we employ any vigour or strength of mind about it.

Further still; a brave man does not conduct himself similarly in all terrible circumstances. For certain things to some men are more terrible than to others. Thus some especially fear the loss of property; such as the lovers of riches; but others, who love glory more than all other things, fear infamy; and thus it is with respect to other particulars, of which some are feared very much, others in a less degree, and others not at all. But there are certain things which all men fear; such as the evils which surpass the condition of human nature; for instance, very violent thunder, or earthquakes, or inundations of the sea. For these are terrible to all men endued with intellect.

A brave man fears indeed; but as it is proper, as reason commands, and for the sake of the beautiful in conduct. For a worthy man will make this the end of his own passions and actions, and on this account practise every virtue. But the above-mentioned calamities are not alike dreadful to all men; but more to some, and to others less, as is the case with those adapted to the condition of human nature, which are not dreadful to every one. For instance, poverty, infamy, and the

like ; all which, as we have said, a worthy man will fear when, and as, it is proper. For a depraved man errs in this ; that he does not fear as, and when, and where, he ought. In like manner also when he is bold it is neither in a becoming manner, nor at a proper time. He, therefore, who is bold, and fears things, both for the sake of which, and when it is proper to be bold, or to be afraid, is a brave man, because he does both in an equitable manner, and as the definition of fortitude requires. For this is the end of every energy according to virtue ; namely, that it is produced conformably to the definition of the habit. As for instance, actions according to justice have this for their end ; to act conformably to the definition of the habit of justice ; and those which regard fortitude, to act according to the definition of the habit of that virtue. For the end of every action is the beautiful. But the definition of fortitude is the beautiful to a brave man, as is that of justice to the just man, and similarly with respect to other virtues. For this is the definition of actions ; namely, a subsistence according to habit. For that which is the boundary to any thing is the end of that thing. The brave man, therefore, is established in the becoming and appropriate.

Of those, however, who exceed the medium, he who exceeds by not fearing is anonymous ; for it has been remarked by us in the beginning, that there are many anonymous characters. Let a man of this kind, however, be called insane, or insensible of pain, or the common feelings of humanity ; that is, if he fears nothing, not even earthquakes and tempests, as has been said of the Celtæ*. He, however, who exceeds in being

* This name, though anciently applied to the inhabitants of Gaul, as well as of Germany and Spain, was more particularly given to a part of the Gauls, whose country, called Gallia Celtica, was situated between the rivers Sequana and Garumna, modernly called *La Seine* and *La Garonne*.

confident about things terrible is audacious; but an audacious man also appears to be arrogant, and a dissembler of fortitude; for he merely plays the part of a brave man, and wishes to appear to conduct himself like one in things terrible. In these particulars, therefore, he is able to imitate a brave man. And this because many audacious men are audaciously timid, for they will not endure terrible things even under the circumstances from which they became audacious. But he who exceeds in fearing is timid, because he fears those things which he ought not, and in an improper manner. The timid man also is deficient in confiding, but exceeds in being pained, and entertains hope with difficulty: for he fears all things.

But a brave man is the contrary; for he entertains good hope; since from hoping for things useful, confidence is produced. A timid man, therefore, an audacious, and a brave man are conversant about the same things; for they are conversant with the objects of fear and confidence, but not in a similar manner, since they subsist differently with respect to them. For the timid and the audacious exceed, and are deficient; but the brave man conducts himself moderately, and stops at the becoming. But the audacious are precipitate, and before being urged to encounter dangers, vehemently wish for dreadful things; but when surrounded by them, they revolt. Brave men, however, act contrary to this, being vigorous in operation, but quiet before they act.

As we have said, therefore, fortitude is a medium conversant with the objects of confidence and fear, and this in such a manner as is proper; because also the brave man chooses and sustains the becoming, and because he does not choose and sustain that which is base.

But to wish to die in consequence of poverty, or through love, is not the property of fortitude, but rather of timidity; for to avoid things

troublesome belongs to effeminacy and cowardice; since no one embraces a death of this kind because it is beautiful, but because it is a departure from an evil which he is unable to endure. But to be thus affected is a property of timidity. Fortitude, therefore, is that which we have shown it to be.

CHAP. VIII.

FURTHER CONCERNING FORTITUDE.

BUT other species of fortitude are predicated, and that in five ways. The first is political fortitude, according to which citizens, in consequence of the rewards and punishments prescribed by the laws, and on account of honours, sustain dangers for the sake of the city. And such men appear to be the most brave to legislators by whom the timid are dishonoured, and the brave are honoured. Such are those whom Homer celebrates in his poems; as for instance, Hector and Diomed.

Shall proud Polydamas before the gate
Proclaim, his counsels are obeyed too late,
Which timely followed but the former night,
What numbers had been saved by Hector's flight *?

And Diomed.

But ah, what grief! should haughty Hector boast,
I fled inglorious to the guarded coast †?

But this species of fortitude is similar to the before-mentioned, because just as that is produced for the sake of the beautiful, so likewise this

* Iliad. Book xxii.

† Iliad. Book viii.

takes place through a certain virtue. For through shame, and a desire of the beautiful, and through a flight from disgrace, the citizens conduct themselves bravely; since venerating the laws, and desiring honour, they sustain dangers. The second species of fortitude is that according to which men act bravely, being compelled by their governors to endure labours; and to conduct themselves bravely in danger; but this is worse than political fortitude, because it is produced through fear, and not through the love of what is good; and those who are brave according to it, do not avoid what is base, but what is painful. For they are compelled by their governors. Thus Hector.

On rushed bold Hector, gloomy as the night;
 Forbids to plunder, animates the fight,
 Points to the fleet; for by the gods, who flies,
 Who dares but linger, by this hand he dies;
 No weeping sister his cold eye shall close,
 No friendly hand his funeral pile compose.
 Who stops to plunder at this signal hour,
 The birds shall tear him, and the dogs devour*.

And although the generals should not be present at the battle, and oblige the soldiers to endure danger, but impress them with fear, through frequently chastising them if they desert the ranks, yet they act in the same manner. And thus they appear to be brave from necessity. But it is proper that fortitude should be chosen not through necessity, but because it is beautiful.

It appears also that skill with respect to particulars, is fortitude; and on this account Socrates thought it a science. Others, therefore, endowed with science in other things may be called brave with respect to those things; but soldiers only in warlike concerns. For it appears that there are certain deceitful circumstances in war which are espe-

* Iliad. Book xv.

cially seen by the soldiers in a body, and in consequence of others not knowing the particulars with which they are connected, they appear to be brave. For from this skill they are able to do mischief to their enemies, while they suffer none from them; they are able also to avoid their arrows and lances, while they easily strike their enemies. In consequence too of being able to use their arms well, and possessing such as are adapted to strike their enemies, and at the same time to suffer nothing dreadful from them, they fight as it were armed, against the unarmed. And in contests of this kind, those are not the most brave who fight the most, but such as are most robust, and in the most excellent condition of body, and who are most skilful. Such men, however, become timid when the danger is very great; and when they are abandoned by numbers, and the apparatus of war. For the merely skilful are the first that fly; but those who act bravely according to political circumstances, remain at their post to the last extremity, as it happened at the Hermæus. For the soldiers being arranged in order of battle fled, perceiving the danger greater than they expected; but the citizens continued even till death, since death appeared more eligible to them than safety by flight. The soldiers, however, exerted themselves strenuously so long as they thought themselves superior to and more numerous than their adversaries; but when they perceived their number less and worse disciplined, they betook themselves to flight, rather fearing death than disgrace. A man of this kind, however, is not brave. Whence Homer says,

And "Strength he to anger added."——
 And "His might he rous'd, and anger join'd to might."
 And "Strength from his nostrils dreadfully expir'd."
 ————"his blood boil'd."——

For all things of this kind seem to testify the excitement to, and impulse of anger. A brave man, therefore, does every thing for the sake of something beautiful; but is by no means impelled by anger; and he uses this coadjutor as an instrument. Those, however, who are called brave in consequence of the impulse of anger, do not act from worthy, but painful, motives; just as wild beasts, who are wounded or frightened do not use anger, but are rather led by it. In the same manner also some men before they are wounded or frightened show no impulse. Wild beasts likewise, when in a wood or a marsh, do not approach to, nor rush upon, any one. He is not a brave man, therefore, who being excited to anger, or any other passion in consequence of pain, rushes into danger, foreseeing at the same time nothing terrible. For thus an ass might be justly called brave when he is feeding, since even blows will not induce him to leave the pasture. Adulterers also do many audacious things through desire. Neither are asses brave, however, nor men who subject themselves to danger through pain, or anger, or any other passion. But the most natural and proper fortitude is that when we are excited to anger, but with a previous deliberative tendency, and for the sake of a good object. Those, however, who are angry through the before-mentioned causes are not brave, but mere bravadoes; for they are not impelled by, nor angry for the sake of any thing worthy, but through passion; and this not in a becoming manner, nor as right reason directs, but just as they are excited by passion.

All those, however, who entertain good hope *appear* to be brave; but all are not so *in reality*. For it is possible for men to entertain good hope, not through being fearless of things painful for the sake of good, but in consequence of frequently overcoming many things, and on this

account being confident that they shall not fall into evils. But these men appear to be brave, so far as they are similar to brave men according to confidence. Brave men are confident, however, through the causes before-mentioned; but these are so in consequence of vainly thinking they will not suffer any thing painful. Thus also men who are intoxicated entertain good hope, because they imagine that every thing that is pleasant will happen to them: hence when they meet with any thing contrary to their expectation, they give way. But a brave man sustains both approaching and apparently painful circumstances, either because it is good to endure, or base not to endure. On this account also among brave men, he is considered especially brave, who remains undisturbed and fearless in dangers that are very manifest, and immediately before his eyes. For he who has a foreknowledge of things painful, being previously prepared by reasoning and judgment, will endure them. But he who has not this prior knowledge, and afterwards endures them when they accede, has evidently arrived at the habit of fortitude.

But those also are called brave who being ignorant of evils which may occur, are impelled to dangers. And perhaps these do not differ from those who entertain good hope, except so far as the latter endure dire things for a certain time; but those who are ignorant of them when they know, avoid them; as was the case with the Argives when they encountered the Lacons, mistaking them for the Sicyonians.

CHAP. IX.

FORTITUDE FURTHER CONSIDERED : THAT A BRAVE MAN IS MORE CONVERSANT ABOUT THINGS TERRIBLE AND PAINFUL, THAN ABOUT THE OBJECTS OF CONFIDENCE AND PLEASURE.

WE have shown, therefore, that some men are really brave, but that others only appear to be so. Since, however, fortitude is conversant with confidence and fear, it is not similarly conversant with both, but in a greater degree with fear. For he who is undisturbed with respect to things dreadful, is more brave than he who is unmoved with respect to such as are the objects of confidence; since the contest of the former is greater than that of the latter; for it is more difficult to endure pain than to abstain from pleasure. Hence also fortitude is painful, because they are brave who endure things painful, and on this account they are praised; for although a brave man has pleasure in acting bravely, yet it is with reference to the end, which is pleasant; but at the same time it happens that his fortitude is obscured by the painful circumstances with which he contends. Just as is the case in gymnastic contests. For to combatants the end is pleasant; namely, a crown and honours; but to be beaten is attended with pain; since they are flesh and blood. To these indeed every labour is painful. Because, therefore, things painful are great, but such as are pleasant small, they appear to possess nothing of the latter. Something of this kind, however, also happens to brave men; for both death and wounds are painful to them, and on this account they suffer these things unwillingly. But they endure them either because it is beautiful to do so, or because it is base not to endure them. And they will be good and

brave; happy, and endued with the whole of virtue, in proportion as death and wounds appear to be painful. For to men of this kind death is especially grievous; since their life is of great consequence, because they live the most excellent life, and in such a manner as is properly adapted to man; and because death deprives them of much good. It would appear, therefore, that, in consequence of the magnitude of his pains, a brave man enjoys no pleasure; but to be thus grieved and tormented by them does not hinder him from being brave. For to be vanquished by, and recede from pain, is not the province of a brave man, though to be tormented and grieved is not inconsistent with the characteristic of fortitude; since by how much the more a brave man is pained, and being pained, endures for the sake of a good cause, by so much the more he will be properly brave. And this, because in all the other virtues, no one energy considered by itself is productive of pleasure*; but appears to the energizer to be pleasant only so far as it leads to a good end. With soldiers, however, it is not necessary perhaps to investigate the definition of fortitude very accurately. But they may be more useful for the purposes of war, who are not altogether partakers of fortitude, and are even deprived of other good qualities; since such men are more prompt to encounter dangers, and will even sacrifice their life for the sake of a little gain. For those are properly brave, who being prudent and worthy with respect to other things, love their life because it is good, but do not throw it away very readily. Sufficient has been said, therefore, about fortitude; and it will be easy, from what has been delivered, to form a definition of this virtue in a superficial manner.

* This is not the case, however, in the *theoretic* virtues; for their energy is felicity.

CHAP. X.

CONCERNING TEMPERANCE.

LET us now speak about temperance, since it is in a certain manner co-ordinate with fortitude, so far as both pertain to the irrational part of the soul.

That temperance, therefore, is a medium with respect to pleasures has been already said by us; but I say with respect to pleasures, because although it is also conversant with pains, yet in a less degree, and not in the same manner as about pleasures. But intemperance also is apparent in these passions.

Having shown, therefore, that temperance is conversant with pleasures, let us now define about what kind of pleasures. But of pleasures, some are corporeal, but others psychical; for there are psychical pleasures in ambition, and the love of learning; since both the ambitious man and the lover of learning are pleased with that which they love, at the same time suffering nothing from the body, but rather through the dianoëtic power. Men who are conversant with pleasures of this kind, however, are not called either temperate, or intemperate. And similarly with respect to such other pleasures as are not corporeal; for we think that those who delight in fables, and long stories, and who consume the day in casual and trifling conversation, are garrulous, but by no means intemperate; neither do we consider those intemperate, who grieve for the loss of riches or friends.

Temperance is not conversant, therefore, with psychical but with corporeal pleasures, though not with all of them. For those who are

delighted with the pleasures pertaining to the sight, such as colours, or figures, or pictures, are not called either temperate or intemperate; neither are those who love sweet sounds or songs, or pleasant odours. In all these, however, there are media, proper ways of indulging them, and excess and defect of the becoming; but at the same time we neither call those who preserve the medium temperate, nor those who exceed it intemperate. If, however, we do not call those intemperate, who delight in the pleasure of the smell of apples, of roses, or of frankincense; but we call those so, who are pleased with the smell of ointments and delicate food, this happens accidentally. For intemperate men delight in these things, because through these they recollect the objects of their desires. Thus also we see others, when they are hungry, delighted with the smell of food. Whence it is evident that those who are pleased with odours of this kind, are pleased accidentally, because the intemperate are pleased with those things which produce in them a recollection of their food, or other trifling things which give them pleasure. Neither man, therefore, nor any other animal, derives pleasure from the before-mentioned senses, unless through accident. But I mean the pleasure about which an intemperate, or a temperate man is conversant. For dogs, although they delight in the scent of hares, are not delighted merely on account of the scent, but because they expect food; since they pursue wild animals in consequence of the sense of smelling. In like manner also the lion is not pleased with the scent, or the lowing of the ox, further than as they afford him a prospect of food, because he knows by the voice that it is near; neither does he rejoice merely because he sees and finds a stag, or a mountain goat, but because he thus expects to obtain food.

Temperance and intemperance, therefore, are conversant with those

pleasures which we possess in common with other animals ; but these are the taste and the touch. Hence intemperate men appear to be in a certain manner brutal and servile, as being pleased with the same things as brutes, and incontinent with respect to them. Of these, however, they are more pleased with the touch than with the taste, or rather not at all with the latter, but with the former only. So that men are discovered to be intemperate in other pleasures, as well as in food and drink ; and they are not only delighted with those things that are the objects of taste ; (for it is the property of the taste to judge of flavours, as those do who examine wine, or prepare high-seasoned food) but rather with those that are objects of the touch. On this account also a certain person, named Philoxenus Erixius, being a glutton, wished that his throat was longer than a crane's, because he was delighted with the touch of delicacies. For the touch especially pervades through all the senses ; since they are all perceptible by a certain touch or contact. But intemperance is conversant about this same touch, which appears to be justly ranked among things disgraceful, because it happens to us not so far as we are men, but so far as we are merely animals. To delight in things of this kind, indeed, and very much to desire them, is beastly. Still, however, there are some liberal pleasures connected with the touch, of which an intemperate man is deprived, such as those produced by friction and warmth in gymnastic exercises ; since these are only partially applied to the body.

CHAP. XI.

CONCERNING DESIRE.

SINCE after temperance it is next in order to speak about desires, let us consider in how many ways Desire may be predicated. One species of desire, therefore, is common and natural, and another peculiar and adventitious. Common desire is to have an appetite for dry or moist food, when we are in want of either; but the peculiar and adventitious consists in an appetite for a particular quality of food. But this is neither natural nor common; since all men have not an appetite for the same things, nor in the same manner, but some for one thing and some for another. And even those who have an appetite for the same thing do not possess it similarly, but some in a greater, and others in a lesser degree. Hence, therefore, a desire of this kind is neither common nor simply natural; but adventitious, and devised by ourselves; although, indeed, after a certain manner, this also is natural, because each particular thing has a desire consequent to its own nature.

In natural desires, therefore, few err, and that in one way only, as when men indulge in them more than is becoming; for instance, when they eat immoderately, as is the case with gluttons, some of whom gratify this natural desire in a very unbecoming manner. Men of this kind, however, are extremely servile. But in adventitious and peculiar desires many err, and in various ways, since there are many species of these desires; for there are various kinds of food, of drink, of apparel, and other objects of natural desires. And on this account men err frequently with respect to them, either when they delight in

such things as are improper, or in a greater degree than is usual with the many. For those who exceed in all these are intemperate; since being delighted with things that are not proper, if at any time they admit even becoming pleasures, they are delighted with them more than is proper, and not in the same manner as the greater part of mankind.

CHAP. XII.

IN WHAT MANNER TEMPERANCE AND INTemperANCE ARE CONVERSANT WITH PAINS.

THAT intemperance, therefore, which is an excess in the indulgence of pleasures, is reprehensible is evident. With respect to pains, however, we do not say, as when we treated of fortitude, that not to endure, or bear, is timidity; so also with respect to temperance we do not assert, that not to endure is intemperance, or to endure temperance. But intemperance is conversant with pains when any one is grieved more than he ought, and in an improper manner, in consequence of not obtaining pleasures. Temperance also is similarly affected, when any one is grieved as it is proper, and in the things which he ought, and when the absence of pleasures gives him no pain. But the intemperate man covets every pleasure, or the majority of them, and is so far led by desire, as to prefer things pleasant, to every other consideration. On this account also he is grieved by every casual desire, for his desire is attended with pain. Hence it appears absurd to be grieved through pleasure, and that it should be productive of its contrary. As we have said, therefore, excess with respect to pleasures is intemperance.

But the defect, since it rarely occurs, is without a name. For those

who are deficient in the indulgence of pleasures, and desire them in a less degree than is becoming, are very few; since an insensibility of this kind is almost foreign from human nature; for even irrational animals distinguish their food, and delight in some pleasures, but by no means in such things as are destitute of pleasure. If, however, any one should think there is nothing pleasant, and should not understand the difference between pleasures and their opposites, he would be far removed from the condition of man. Hence the defect or excess about pleasures or pains is a vice.

But the medium is a virtue; namely, Temperance; for the temperate man is not very much pleased with those things which delight an intemperate man; but is rather grieved with every thing in which it is unbecoming to rejoice. Neither is he delighted with the objects of his delight more than is becoming, nor grieved at the absence of pleasures; neither does he covet them, nor desire any thing immoderately, nor more than is proper, and when he ought not. Such things, however, as contribute to health, or a good condition of body, being at the same time pleasant, or at least not productive of any impediment to health, and a good condition of body, all these he desires indeed, but moderately, and as he ought; for he who covets even desirable pleasures which are an impediment to his being, or to his well-being, surpasses the becoming. A man of this kind, however, is not temperate; but he whose desires are under the guidance of right reason.

CHAP. XIII.

THAT INTEMPERANCE IS MORE VOLUNTARY THAN TIMIDITY.

SINCE both intemperance and timidity are voluntary, let us inquire whether they be similarly so. It appears, however, that they are not, but that intemperance is more voluntary, for pain is the cause of timidity, since we become timid in consequence of the fear of pain; but pleasure produces intemperance. And of these two, pleasure is the object of choice, but pain the object of aversion; that, however, which we do as a matter of choice is more voluntary than that which is the object of aversion. Besides, pain alters and corrupts the nature of him who is afflicted with it, but pleasure produces no effect of this kind.

On this account, intemperance is more disgraceful than timidity. For since any one is praised or blamed according to the good or evil he does voluntarily, it is evident that evil or good are more praised or blamed in proportion as they are voluntary. Since also it is more easy to abstain from intemperance than timidity; for the custom by which vices of this kind are corrected, is dangerous in timidity; since the custom in war, and other terrible circumstances through which we divest ourselves of timidity, is not very far removed from dangers; but temperate customs are altogether free from danger. Hence also intemperance is more voluntary than timidity.

It may appear, however, that timidity is not similarly voluntary with the particulars about which it is employed; for timidity, that is to say, the habit itself, is void of pain, since no degree of pain obliges us to become timid; and hence it is more voluntary. But the works of

timidity which we perform through pain or fear, are performed in consequence of a certain necessity which drives us from our purpose, and persuades us to throw away our arms in battle, or commit some other disgraceful action; and on this account the particulars are less voluntary. But the very contrary happens with respect to intemperance; since no one covets that vice, nor wishes to be intemperate; but men very much desire to do the works of intemperance. Hence intemperance itself is less voluntary than the particulars about which it is exercised.

We also assign this name of intemperance to puerile errors, and call those children who commit them, intemperate; since faults of this kind have a certain similitude to the before-mentioned species of intemperance. But to inquire whether the one is denominated from the other, will contribute nothing to the elucidation of our present subject, unless it should be probable that the latter is more adapted to be named from the former; and that from puerile errors, the name is transferred to this species of intemperance. And this indeed not unaptly, but very appropriately; for as it is necessary to punish children desiring any thing base, and to compel them to moderate their appetites, thus also it is requisite to punish desire, when it increases too much. For a boy, if he is not led by a master, has too great an appetite for pleasure, and particularly on account of his age, falls from a becoming conduct; which desire, unless it be corrected by reason, widely extends itself, and from the increase of the energies of desire the reasoning power is also frequently expelled. Hence it is necessary that desires should be moderate, and in no respect contrary to reason. For we say, that those who are docile and obedient are also properly corrected; so that what opposes this disposition both with respect to boys and desires, is very

properly called intemperance. For as it is proper that a boy should live according to the precepts of his master, so likewise it is requisite that our desiderative part should be subject to the mandates of reason. Hence it is necessary that the desiderative part of a temperate man should accord with reason, since the mark at which they both aim, is the beautiful. The temperate man, therefore, desires those things which he ought, and as, and when, it is proper : and this also reason prescribes. And thus much concerning Temperance.

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING LIBERALITY.

LIBERALITY is a virtue of the desiderative part of the soul: and on this account we speak of it next to temperance. But liberality is a medium about riches, as when we neither spend more nor less than we ought; but as, and in those things in which it is proper, and for the sake of such things as are becoming. For a liberal man is not praised in warlike concerns, nor in those things in which a temperate man is praised; nor in judgments, as a just man; but in bestowing or receiving. But more especially in bestowing.

And we denominate every thing riches, the value of which is measured by money.

Liberality, therefore, is a medium about riches; and the excess is prodigality, and the defect illiberality.

But we do not only denominate the excess about riches prodigality, but sometimes also we call intemperate men prodigal, who spend much through intemperance, and we denominate this kind of vice, intemperance. On this account such men are the most depraved, having

many vices at the same time, and being corrupted both with respect to riches and pleasures. Hence they are not properly denominated by one name, signifying one vice. The prodigal indeed is one who has a certain vice, namely, that of wasting his property; for he is a prodigal who perishes by his own means; since riches affording the means of living, he appears to be in a manner destructive of himself, and the corrupter of his property.

We call, therefore, the incontinent, and those who spend intemperately, prodigal; but we call those only illiberal who adhere to riches more than is proper, and are deficient in liberality.

Since, therefore, every thing useful; as for instance, glory or food, may be used either well or ill, and wealth is of this kind, (since it is in a certain way useful in life) it follows that wealth may be employed both for good and bad purposes. But since he will use well each individual thing, who possesses the virtue belonging to that thing; he also will use wealth in the best manner, who possesses the virtue belonging to wealth:—and he is the liberal man.

The use of riches, however, is nothing else than to expend and bestow them; but to receive and preserve them, does not appear to be a use, but rather a possession. On this account the liberal man is more conversant with the expenditure, than the receipt of riches; and it is more adapted to him to know how he may expend in a becoming manner, for the sake of such things as are proper, and to whom it is proper, than how he may receive things proper, and from proper persons. As we have said, therefore, the liberal man is conversant with the use of wealth; and to give, is more a use than to receive. Further still, it appears to be more virtuous to confer a benefit, than to be benefited; and to perform worthy actions, than not to do such as are base. But

beneficence is consequent to giving, and the performance of worthy actions; to be benefited, however, and not to do such as are base, are consequent to receiving. For to receive whence it is proper, is to be benefited; and not to receive whence it is improper, is not to act basely. Again, that which is most praised is most adapted to virtue; but to give as it is proper is more praised, than to receive as it is proper; for good-will and praise belong more to the giver than to him who does not receive. Further still, virtue is employed about more difficult concerns, and it is more difficult to give well, than to receive well, or to refrain from receiving in a proper manner. For it is much more difficult to be profuse of one's own property than to return that of another. Hence to give worthily is more adapted to a liberal man, than not to receive, or to receive worthily; since we do not call those liberal, who do not receive whence it is proper, but those who give to whom it is proper; for the former appear rather just than liberal, and on that account are praised; but those who receive whence it is proper, are not praised. He, however, who does something difficult, and that for the sake of good, is praised; but he who receives whence he ought, sustains nothing difficult. Again, liberal men are beloved more than other worthy men, because they are useful to others; but utility does not consist in refraining from receiving improperly, but in giving well; and hence the liberal man appears to be more conversant in giving than in receiving. The liberal man, therefore, is one who gives to whom he ought, and for the sake of a worthy object.

For every action, according to virtue, is performed for the sake of the beautiful. It must also not only be performed for the sake of the beautiful, and to such persons as are proper, and when it is proper, and under such other circumstances as accompany a right gift, but

also it must be done pleasantly, and without pain. For he who gives with pain is not yet liberal; since though he does the work of a liberal man, he is not yet one, because he has not yet arrived at the habit; for if he had, he would not be pained; since the works, according to virtue, are either pleasant, or at least unattended with pain. But he who gives to those whom he ought not, or not for the sake of the beautiful, but for some other cause, is not liberal, and must be called something else. This also applies, as we have said, to him who gives with pain. For a man of this kind values riches more than beautiful actions; and on this account he is not liberal.

For the liberal man gives as right reason directs, but by no means receives from those, whom it is not proper to receive from; and not valuing riches, he will not solicit them. For he is not willingly benefited who loves to benefit; but will receive from the things that he ought, namely, from his own proper possessions, not because he thinks it beautiful to be rich, but because this is necessary, in order that he may give. On this account he does not neglect his own property, wishing through it to benefit others.

He also avoids giving casually, in order that he may give to those to whom he ought, and when and where he ought. But it is the mark of a very liberal man to surpass in gifts, so far as to leave but little for himself; since for a man not to pay attention to his own convenience denotes the greatest liberality. Moreover, a liberal man is not judged by the magnitude or multitude of his gifts, but according to the proportion which the things given have to the property of the giver. Hence then the habit of liberality is indicated; so that nothing hinders but a man may be more liberal who gives a little, if from small means, than he who gives much.

Sometimes also it happens that those who do not acquire riches by their own labours, but derive them from others, appear to surpass in liberality; as men of this kind are unacquainted with want, and therefore do not vehemently love wealth. To which we may add, that (after the manner of parents and artificers) men who obtain wealth by their own exertions are in a greater degree attached to the riches which their labours have acquired. But liberal men cannot grow very wealthy; for they are neither prompt to receive, nor provident to preserve their property, but more inclined to bestow it; and they do not value riches for their own sake, but for the sake of giving. On this account also we accuse fortune, because the liberal are not rich, though they deserve to be so. But this does not happen without reason; for how can he become rich, who does not endeavour to be so? As neither is it possible for a man to possess any thing else, who does not endeavour to possess it. On this account a liberal man cannot become rich, since he dissipates his own property, and does not collect riches from others.

Further still, he does not give to those whom he ought not; and when he ought not, lest by spending improperly he should find himself deficient in becoming expence, and should not give to whom, and when, he ought. For a liberal man, as has been said, is one whose expenditure is becoming, and in proportion to his property. But he who gives casually is a prodigal. Hence we do not call kings prodigal, although they should bestow much, and without measure; since the abundance of their possessions appears to exceed the multitude of their gifts, and their wealth surpasses their expence.

Since, therefore, liberality is a medium with respect to giving and receiving riches, a liberal man will both give and spend in the things which he ought, and as much as he ought; and both in small and

great concerns he will act equally pleasantly. He will also give and receive in an appropriate manner, since liberality is a medium about giving and receiving. Hence it follows, that he who gives well, will also receive well, and do both with pleasure.

But he will be pained, if he neither gives nor receives appropriately; and this moderately, ~~and as he ought~~. The liberal man also is one who readily communicates riches, and is pleasant in those communications which are conversant with riches, because despising them he is not very much afflicted when injured in his property. He would, however, be more grieved if he should not put himself to expence, on proper occasions, than if he did so when he ought to avoid it. For an unbecoming expence sometimes injures property :—a thing of this kind, however, does not give pain to a liberal man. But to avoid a proper expence is injurious to the becoming, and to virtue, and on this account is more grievous to him; so that he does not admit the admonition of Simonides urging the contrary. The prodigal, however, always errs with respect to pleasure and pain; for he is not pleased with those things in which he ought to be pleased, nor as he ought. But we shall treat of this more clearly in what follows.

CHAP. II.

THAT ILLIBERALITY IS A WORSE EVIL THAN PRODIGALITY.

LIBERALITY, therefore, is a medium, and the excess is prodigality, but the defect illiberality. Hence prodigality exceeds in giving and in not receiving, but is deficient in receiving; and illiberality exceeds in receiving, but is deficient in giving.

Both, however, being foreign from the becoming, illiberality is worse than prodigality. For in the first place, prodigality cannot continue long; but when the materials are consumed, it speedily fails; for wealth is soon exhausted among private persons, when they give immoderately, and receive nothing elsewhere. This, however, is by no means the case with illiberality. For the illiberal man does not become better if his wealth increases; but if it is exhausted by expence, he will be much worse. Moreover, it is possible, that a prodigal may be reclaimed by age, and through experience of the evils attendant upon prodigality, arrive at the medium from which he is not very far distant; since he gives and refrains from receiving, although he does neither as he ought, nor to those he ought; so that if he could only arrive at this point; namely, to give to whom, and as it is proper, he would be a liberal man, and would give to whom he ought, and refrain from receiving whence he ought not. On this account the prodigal does not appear to be a man of a base disposition; for it is not a token of a wicked and degenerate, but of a foolish mind, to exceed in giving, and refrain from receiving. Hence, therefore, the prodigal is better than the illiberal man; since from what has been said, the prodigal

benefits many persons; but the illiberal man, no one,—not even himself. But I call him prodigal, who exceeding in giving, and being deficient in receiving*, we suppose to be an extreme with respect to the liberal man. Many also are both prodigal and illiberal, alike exceeding both in receiving and giving; for these mixed characters are inclined to receive, in order ~~that they may spend~~, which they cannot easily do, since the means soon fail them, and they are compelled to resort to the assistance of others; but at the same time, because they pay no attention to the becoming, they receive from all quarters, and casually. On this account they desire only to give, but are not at all concerned about the manner of giving, or whence they ought to receive. Hence their gifts are not liberal; for they are neither worthy, nor bestowed for the sake of a worthy object, nor becoming. Sometimes indeed they load those with riches who ought to be poor, while they give nothing to men of worthy manners; but on flatterers, or such as afford them some other pleasure, they lavish much. Intemperate men, therefore, are usually prodigal; for not living according to reason, they are addicted to pleasure, and through being accustomed to great expence they become intemperate spendthrifts, and are very intemperate. The prodigal, therefore, when undisciplined, falls into all this depravity; but with discipline and care it is possible he may arrive at the becoming.

Illiberality, however, is incurable. For there is not any hope either from much experience, or a certain age, that an illiberal man will become better; since the experience derived from the occurrences of life, such as old age, or its attendant evils, (viz. impotence and misery) greatly increase illiberality. Besides, men are more naturally prone to

* For τῷ μὴ δίδοναι, the sense requires that we should read τῷ λαμβάνειν.

illiberality than to prodigality; for the bulk of mankind are lovers of riches, and illiberal. Those too who give are not very numerous, and prodigals are still fewer. On this account, therefore, prodigality is much better than illiberality; for it appears from what has been said, to approach nearer to the medium.

Independently of these considerations, illiberality is a multiform evil; for it shows itself in many ways. And since it is conversant with giving and receiving, some illiberal men are depraved with respect to giving, but others with respect to receiving; for there are some who are neither willing to give to, nor receive from any one; some of whom are thus affected through a certain sense of equity, and that they may not be compelled to do any thing dishonest; but others, through fear, lest they should some time or other be compelled to give, because they have received. Hence they delight neither to give nor receive.

But such as are deficient in giving may be called niggardly, sordid, rapacious: and among these may be reckoned the *skin-flint* *.

There are others again who exceed in receiving, such as those who do, and suffer every thing base, in order that they may receive, but neither as they ought, nor from whom they ought. All these may be called mean and paltry gainers. Such are panders, usurers, gamesters, sharpers, and other depradators; since all these, for the sake of gain, and that a little, subject themselves to great infamy.

For those who submit to infamy for the sake of great gain, and receive whence and as it is not proper, are not called paltry gainers, but depraved, impious, and unjust:—and tyrants, destroyers of cities, and despoilers of temples, come under this description; for the gamester

* *Κυμνοπρίστis* is literally a divider of Cumin seeds, and seems to have been used as a term of reproach to such persons as we in like manner *all skin-flints*.

receives whence he ought not, namely, from his friends, to whom he ought to give:—it is little, however, that he receives, and on this account he is a mean and paltry gainer. The public robber also subjects himself to great dangers, but for the sake of a small booty. And in like manner sharpers, and others of the same description.

Illiberality, therefore, is very properly said to be contrary to liberality, as well because it is more distant from it than prodigality (for it is more opposed to it, being a greater evil than prodigality) as because men err more abundantly about this than about prodigality.

CHAP. III.

* CONCERNING MAGNIFICENCE.

Thus far we have spoken of liberality, and its opposite vices. It will next follow to treat of magnificence; for magnificence is similar to liberality so far as it is conversant with riches, and with the expenditure of them. But it differs, because liberality is conversant with gifts, with receiving, and with expence; but magnificence with expence only. And liberality consists in the expenditure of a few things, and those trifling; but magnificence of great and many things, as the very name of magnificence, μεγαλοπρεπεια, evinces; for it is (δαπάνη τρεπουσα) a becoming expence, μεγαλει, with magnitude. But magnitude is not the same, as to expence, with all men; for the same expence is not becoming in all, but according to analogy. That which is fit for the president of a public spectacle is not becoming in the commander of a three-ranked galley; but to each that which is adapted to the magnitude of his rule,

in which he spends as it is proper, and in things that are proper; and such a man is called magnificent. For he who spends appropriately as well with respect to himself as to the receiver, but not largely, is not called magnificent, but liberal; and such is he who says, "I frequently give to a beggar;" but he who expends largely, and appropriately both to himself and to the receiver, is magnificent. Hence a magnificent man will be liberal, but a liberal man will not be altogether magnificent.

But the defect of this habit is called parsimony; and the excess vulgar ostentation and ignorance of what is elegant. Men of this kind are such as exceed in the magnitude of appropriate expence, not through magnificence, but by spending in those things which are not proper, and not in a becoming manner. We shall, however, afterwards treat of those vices which are on each side of magnificence. Let us now speak of magnificence itself.

The magnificent man, therefore, like the scientific man, contemplates all things according to reason, and arranges them according to an appropriate rule; and, though his expenditure is great, yet it is elegant and becoming. For the energies, according to habit, are consequent to the habit; and on this account, as we have said in the beginning, the habit is defined by the energies; so that the expences of a magnificent man will be great and appropriate, as well with respect to magnificence as to the work (which also will be great) for the sake of which he incurs the expence. And thus the expence will be adapted to the work, and the work appropriate to the expence; but if it be necessary that either should exceed, it will be the work: for ~~this is~~ more characteristic of the magnificent man. But the magnificent man incurs expence, in the first place, for the sake of the beautiful, which

indeed is common to every worthy man; and afterwards not investigating any thing with too much accuracy, he does it pleasantly and liberally: for the accurate investigator is parsimonious. But the magnificent man will attentively consider the work, how it may be effected in the best and most appropriate manner; and for the sake of this only he deliberates. Such a man too does not reason with himself respecting the expence that is proper for the work, and how he may avoid spending more upon it; and he by no means considers how it may be effected by very small means; for this is parsimony.

It is necessary, however, as has been said, that the magnificent man should be liberal, although the liberal man is not magnificent. For the magnificent man expends that which is proper, as it is proper, and when it is proper. And the liberal man also does this; but to incur a *great* expence for the sake of *great* objects is the property of the magnificent man. And frequently the magnificent man does not perform the same work, with the same expence, as the liberal man, but with one more magnificent. As for instance, when it is proper that divinity should be publicly worshipped, the liberal man makes a golden cup, and adorns it with precious stones; but the magnificent man builds a great and beautiful temple, or erects statues, or builds bridges, or effects something great and wonderful with the same expence; and this indeed is properly the work of the magnificent man; but that of the liberal man, is rather a possession than a work. For there is not the same virtue in a possession as in a work; but a work is more worthy and more honourable than a possession, such as gold and precious stones. the virtue of a work consists in its being great, and beautiful, and wonderful; all which are especially adapted to the magnificent man. For the virtue of a work is magnificence with magnitude.

But magnificent and honourable works are such as gifts dedicated to divinity, the apparatus of sacrifices and of temples, benefits to the commonwealth; or to furnish public spectacles, or three-ranked galleys; or, if it be necessary, to feast a whole city. It is not only requisite, however, that works should be magnificent, and the expenditure appropriate and magnificent, but that they should be adapted to him who performs them, and especially proportionate to his means; for a poor man cannot be magnificent; or, if he should attempt great works, he will act foolishly, because he will attempt things above his dignity, and above what is fit for him. In the next place, magnificence also appears to be becoming in those who frequently perform something great, or in those whose ancestors were magnificent. But of works, those are most becoming which are performed with a view to the honour of divinity, or the common advantage; for such are magnificent. Some of these works, however, are private; namely, such as are performed but once; as for instance, the celebration of marriages, the erection of buildings, and other things of this kind. For it is especially characteristic of the magnificent man to expend his wealth either for the public good, or for the honour of divinity; but least of all for his own advantage. A magnificent work is also of long continuance; for works of this kind are wonderful and beautiful.

It is necessary likewise in works to investigate the becoming in another way, and to consider what works accord with certain other works; for the same works are not adapted to divinity and to the commonwealth, nor are the same things proper for a temple and a sepulchre; so that the works of a magnificent man will be great and wonderful when compared with those of a similar nature. The buildings of sepulchres should be considered with reference to sepulchres;

of temples with reference to temples; of bridges with reference to bridges; and similarly in other things.

For the magnificent man does not only consider the magnitude which is proper to the genus of the work, because it is not the same thing to be great through expence simply, and to be great when compared with things of a similar kind; but these differ. For a ball and a beautiful jug are indeed small with respect to expence; but they are magnificent gifts of children, and are great when compared with childish gifts. Since, therefore, magnitude in genus differs from that in expence, it is necessary that the magnificent man should attentively consider both, and act magnificently, according to the magnificence adapted to each genus. For thus the work will be great, and wonderful, and beautiful; neither will it be easily surpassed by others of a similar kind. Such, therefore, is the magnificent man. But he who exceeds, and is vulgarly ostentatious; spends more than is proper, and not as he ought, nor in those things in which he ought; and on this account he is said to surpass the magnificent man; since for the sake of sordid and insignificant works, of which the expence should be moderate, he spends much and largely, and wishes to appear magnificent above what is decent and adapted to magnificence. Such are those who furnish a costly table; as when a man, through ostentation, prepares a wedding dinner, and ostentatiously gives money to who are present at the entertainment, as if it were for the public advantage; or, when in plays, he furnishes a purple curtain before the scenes, which before was composed of skins, as is done by the Megarensians.

Moreover he does not perform these things for the sake of the beautiful, but that he may display his wealth; for from this he imagines he will appear of great consequence. In those particulars also which

require much expence, he will spend but little; and in those things where small expence is requisite, he spends much. Such, therefore, is he who surpasses the magnificent man: and he is also called vulgarly ostentatious.

But he who is deficient, and is called parsimonious, is deficient in all things; for he incurs no expence for the sake of the beautiful. In the next place he deliberates how he may expend as little as possible, and frequently when he has incurred a great expence, then looking to the completion of the work, by a too accurate investigation, he leaves it imperfect through too little expence: and every thing which he does, is accompanied with delay and consideration; and thinking he spends more than is becoming, laments his great expence. These habits, therefore, namely, parsimony and vulgar ostentation, are truly vices; they are not, however, attended with disgrace, because they do not rank among things hurtful to others, nor are they very base, or shameful in themselves.

CHAP. IV.

CONCERNING MAGNANIMITY.

LET us now speak about magnanimity. Magnanimity, therefore, is conversant with great concerns, as the name implies. But let us consider about what great concerns. And it is evident that it is the same thing to speculate about magnanimity, and the magnanimous man; since to know a habit differs nothing from knowing him by whom it is possessed.

The magnanimous man, therefore, is employed about great concerns; but these are adapted to him; since being worthy of great things, he also judges that he is so. For he who deserves small things, and thinks himself worthy of such, is not denominated magnanimous, but prudent; since magnanimity consists in magnitude. The magnanimous man indeed has the same relation to a prudent, as a beautiful has to an elegant person. For he who is beautiful, possesses beauty accompanied with magnitude; but the elegant man with parvitude: hence the latter is said to possess symmetry, but by no means to be beautiful. Such, therefore, is the magnanimous man. But of the characters on each side of the magnanimous man, he who exceeds is arrogant; for he is arrogant who thinks himself worthy of great things when he does not deserve them. He, however, who is worthy of many things, and thinks he merits still more, is not altogether arrogant. But he who is deficient with respect to magnanimity is pusillanimous. For he who, being worthy of many things, thinks himself deserving of only a few;

or being worthy of a few, judges that he deserves still less, is pusillanimous. And of these, he is the more pusillanimous who, though deserving many things, is insensible of his proper desert. For how would he conduct himself were his merits but small and moderate? Of the characters, therefore, situated on each side of the magnanimous man, the one exceeds, and the other is deficient.

The magnanimous man, however, so far as he is employed about great concerns, appears to be placed at the summit; but so far as he always observes a becoming conduct, and investigates nothing either above, or contrary to what is proper, he holds a middle station.

CHAP. V.

MAGNANIMITY FURTHER CONSIDERED: ALSO IN WHAT THE MAGNANIMOUS MAN IS EMPLOYED, AND WHAT ARE HIS PECULIARITIES.

SINCE the magnanimous man is conversant with external goods, of which others judge him worthy in a manner adapted to his character, he will be wholly employed either about riches, or pleasures, or honour. But since he is conversant with the greatest human goods; (for he thinks himself deserving of the greatest things, and at the same time really is so) it follows that he will be employed about honour, which appears to be the greatest of human and external goods; and on this account we especially attribute honour to a divine nature. Hence the magnanimous man will be employed about honour and dishonour in a proper manner. And this indeed, independently of these arguments, is evident from induction: for we see that all magnanimous men

especially aspire after honour worthy of themselves. But the pusillanimous man is deficient with respect to himself; for he thinks less of himself, and also of the desert of the magnanimous man, than each is entitled to. . And the arrogant man, indeed, exceeds with respect to himself, since he estimates his merits too highly, but does not surpass the magnanimous man in loftiness of thought; for the magnanimous man not only thinks himself worthy, but really is deserving, of the greatest things. Hence it necessarily follows that the magnanimous man is the most excellent character, that he is transcendently good in his manners; that he is brave and just, and has every other virtue in its highest perfection. For he who considers all things as of small importance, and by no means worthy of himself, and is not deceived in this opinion, but judges truly, what can influence such a man to act basely or dishonourably? Or, indeed, how is it possible that he can so act? For such conduct is contrary to the characteristic of the magnanimous man. For how can a depraved man be worthy of honour? But if being depraved, he thinks himself worthy of honour, and is detected in base actions, he must appear ridiculous. For honour is the reward of virtue, and can be justly attributed to good men alone. So that the magnanimous man comprehends in his character all the virtues; and magnanimity is as it were the ornament of them all. It cannot indeed subsist without them, while it renders them greater, and more splendid; for it attributes to each what each deserves. On this account it is extremely difficult for any one to be magnanimous; for no man can possibly be so without the possession of *all* the virtues. But to possess them all, and in the highest degree, is extremely difficult. The magnanimous man, therefore, as we have said, is conversant about honour and dishonour. He is delighted also with *great* things, and such as are

effected by *great* means, as meeting with things peculiar to his character, of which he is worthy, or rather which are less than his desert. For no honour can be paid by men adequate to the worth of perfect virtue. If the magnanimous man is pleased indeed, it is because men pay him every honour that they are capable of; and in as great a degree as they are able. But he entirely despises casual honour, and especially when he is honoured on trifling occasions: as for instance, if any one should honour Achilles for playing well on the harp. With respect to dishonour also he is affected in a manner adapted to his character. As we have said, therefore, the magnanimous man is especially conversant about honour and dishonour. He likewise conducts himself properly about wealth and power, and all prosperous and adverse fortune; for in these he conducts himself moderately, and in a manner adapted to his character. Nor will any change of circumstances induce him to commit a base action; neither will he be immoderately delighted with prosperity, nor immoderately afflicted in adversity. For he does not consider honour as the greatest thing; neither does he conduct himself with respect to it as if it were an object of the greatest importance. But being thus affected with reference to honour, he will much more hold riches and power in contempt; for these are loved for the sake of honour; since those who possess them desire *through these* to be honoured. He, however, who holds honour in but little estimation, will much less esteem other things. On this account also magnanimous men appear to hold others in contempt, because they do not very much honour any thing pertaining to human concerns. But since prosperous events appear to deserve honour, these also will contribute something towards magnanimity: for that which transcends in things good is more honourable. The prosperous man, however, transcends

in these. On which account things of this kind constitute magnanimity; for the prosperous man considers himself worthy of great honour, in consequence of his good fortune, since he is honoured by some men on this account. In reality, however, no one is deserving of honour whose manners are not worthy. But he who possesses both virtue and external goods, is ~~thought more worthy~~ of honour than him who possesses virtue alone. He, however, who is merely fortunate and prosperous in external goods, but possesses nothing in common with virtue, is neither justly honoured, nor can he justly consider himself worthy of great honour; neither can he, conformably to right reason, be called a magnanimous man. For without perfect virtue, as we have said, no man can be magnanimous. On this account those who are fortunate are for the ~~most~~ part despisers, and insolent; for without virtue it is not easy to bear prosperity in an elegant and moderate manner. But such as are unable to bear prosperity in a becoming manner, fancy that they excel others, and thus despise all men. All their actions, however, are performed without judgment, and in a casual manner; for they wish to imitate the magnanimous man, though they are in every respect dissimilar to him. The magnanimous man despises indeed, but justly; for he thinks truly of himself, attempts great things, and dares to encounter great dangers; but he thus acts for the sake of good, being intent upon important affairs. Those, however, who are good, so far as relates to externals only, neither honour virtue, nor govern their conduct by its rules, but they despise others, and are desirous to assimilate the rest of their actions, as much as possible, to those of the magnanimous man: not possessing virtue, however, they are unable to accomplish their design.

But it is not the province of the magnanimous man to expose himself

to *frequent* dangers; for he does not precipitately encounter them, because he neither honours things of a casual nature, nor is willing to rush into dangers upon trifling occasions. He does not, however, refuse to venture into *great* dangers; and for the sake of certain mighty goods, he does not even spare his own life.

And he rejoices, indeed, when he confers benefits, but is ashamed when he receives them. For to confer benefits is the province of one who surpasses, but to be benefited of one who is surpassed. He also thinks greatly of himself, and is indignant at sustaining the lesser part. Having received benefits, however, he is desirous of repaying them, and will give more than he received, in order that he may render him who conferred them his debtor. The magnanimous man too appears to be always mindful of those whom he has benefited, but to forget those by whom he has received benefits; and this not because he is ungrateful; (for how can he who gives more than he receives be charged with ingratitude?) but because it is more peculiarly his characteristic, and better adapted to his character to confer, than to receive benefits. Hence he is mindful of those benefits he confers, because an employment of this kind is most excellent, and adapted to him. But this is by no means the case with respect to the benefits he has received; since he is desirous to excel at all times. He also hears the relation of the former with pleasure, but of the latter with pain. On this account likewise Thetis, in Homer, does not mention her beneficence to Jupiter, neither does she hold in remembrance the benefits she had conferred on him, but on the contrary relates the favours he has bestowed on her. In like manner also the Lacedæmonians, when they wished to gratify the Athenians, enumerated the benefits they had received from them. And this indeed is the peculiarity of the magnanimous man to

be indigent of nothing, or at any rate *very little*, but gladly to administer to the wants of others.

It is also the characteristic of the magnanimous man to conduct himself with greatness among dignified persons, and this because he considers none of those goods venerable, through which men in power think they ought to be feared by others. Among persons of a middling rank, however, he conducts himself moderately, because men of this description are more temperate and modest in their behaviour. Moreover to transcend those in an elevated rank is both difficult and venerable; and on this account it is adapted to the magnanimous man; but to surpass those of the middling rank is easy, and contains nothing great. Besides, it is not ignoble to behave with dignity among the former, though it is foolish to do so among those of mean rank. Just as if any one should display the strength of his body among the infirm, or such as are worn out with disease or old age. Further still; the magnanimous man does not anxiously seek after honour; for it is of small importance; neither is he willing at any time to place himself in a situation where others have precedence, lest a second place should be assigned to him, when he is worthy of the first. Nor is he prompt in acting, but slow and full of delay; for he always seeks to perform *great exploits*, and such as are for the sake of *great objects*, and whence great honour may be derived. But since these rarely occur, he performs but few things, and those great and splendid. He also *openly* loves or hates those whom he considers to be his friends, or his enemies; since he knows indubitably that he does both in a proper manner; and on this account does not fear infamy from the vulgar. For he pays more attention to truth and becoming conduct than to opinion; and hence he both hates and loves openly. Whatever too he either says or does,

he says or does openly; because, as we have said, he despises the opinion of the multitude. On this account likewise he speaks freely, and always what is *true*, unless perhaps he should employ dissimulation among the vulgar: he also speaks but little about himself, because he has no wish to be honoured by unworthy men. Neither will he live and associate with any one he may casually meet with; but only with a friend. For to associate and partake of the same table and house with one who is not a friend is servile, and the province of a flatterer. For flatterers are humble; and on the contrary all humble men are flatterers*. Further still; neither is the magnanimous man given to admiration, nor is he astonished at any casual occurrence; since he regards nothing as great, neither is he mindful of injuries. For he estimates the injuries he received from enemies as trifling, and incapable of *essentially* hurting him; and this in consequence of the magnitude of his virtue. Besides, to hold past events in remembrance, and these too such as were evil, is the province of a little soul, but it belongs to a great one to overlook them. For, as we have said above, he who by no means deigns to remember benefits he has received, because he thinks it neither great nor worthy of himself to be benefited, will much more be unmindful of the evils he has suffered from any one. Further still; he will not endure to relate either his own actions, or those of others; for he is neither solicitous about his own praise, nor that of

* Humility was not admitted by the great ancients into the catalogue of the virtues; because he who thinks meanly of himself must thus think from a consciousness of his own worthlessness; and it is no less absurd for a man to think *worse* of himself than he *really deserves*, than to fancy any other absurdity. It must be remembered, however, that the humility here alluded to is considered as pertaining to *man*, with reference to *man*; for it was always thought by the ancients most highly virtuous to estimate their most splendid attainments as nothing, when contemplating the transcendent excellency of a divine nature.—See *Comment. Simplic. in Enchirid. Epict. Cap. xxxviii.*

others. Again, neither will he make defamation his study. Hence he will not be given to praise or calumny; neither will he calumniate his enemies unless they be present; for to revile those who are absent is not the province of a great soul. But with respect to things necessary, or of small importance, he will not vehemently supplicate for, nor very much bewail the want of them. For how can he who considers nothing as great, and nothing in human concerns worthy of earnest pursuit, act in so ignoble a manner? But always preferring the beautiful in conduct to emolument, he properly thinks that what is worthy, though unproductive of advantage, is better than what is advantageous and profitable, and at the same time void of the beautiful. He is affected too in a similar manner with respect to his possessions; as for example, plantations, or domestics. For he will procure such servants as are upright and good, not such as tend to enrich himself. The motion of the magnanimous man also appears to be slow; his voice grave; and his speech sedate. For it is not possible that one who cares but for a few things should be in haste; since what the vulgar admire is considered by him as trifling: or that he should be very anxious who estimates nothing as great. For those men are hasty in their motions, and loud in their voice, who are very much astonished, or bestow much pains about any thing casual. Such, therefore, is the magnanimous man.

But he who falls short of this character is pusillanimous; and he who exceeds, arrogant. These characters, however, are not evil; for they are not malevolent, but only err so far as they depart from the becoming, and the medium.

For the pusillanimous man, while he is worthy of good things, is ignorant of himself, and deprives himself of what he merits; and he is

evil to himself, so far as he does not benefit himself in consequence of being ignorant of what is adapted to him. For if he knew this, he would aspire after it as being good. A character of this kind, however, cannot be called foolish, but ought rather to be denominated indolent. The pusillanimous man, however, not only injures himself in this particular, but in other respects; for through ignorance of himself, his manners become more depraved; and he refrains from worthy and noble actions, and from beautiful pursuits in consequence of thinking himself unworthy of them. In a similar manner also he abstains from external goods, believing them to be above his desert.

But the arrogant and foolish man, being also ignorant of himself, attempts things above his dignity; and not being adorned with virtue, studies the ornament of dress, graceful deportment, and the like; and thinking that through these he is a respectable character, wishes to appear to be a prosperous man. Moreover, he always endeavours to make his good fortune apparent, and always talks of his prosperity, as a thing from which he ought to derive honour.

Since, however, both arrogance and pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity, the latter is the more opposed, because it more frequently occurs, and is a worse evil. For as we have said, it corrupts the manners of its possessor, and diminishes his virtue. And though arrogance is base in itself, it does not render its possessor more depraved with respect to other things; for the arrogant man does not, in consequence of his arrogance, lose any of the good he possesses, but on some occasions rather attempts beautiful and good works, of which he thinks himself deserving. Again, arrogance does not always increase: for the arrogant man, through experience, obtains a knowledge of himself; since, for the most part, not receiving the honour which he

is in search of, he is compelled to be modest. Hence arrogance is easily laid aside, and is incapable of permanency: but pusillanimity always advances. For, as we have said, the disposition of the pusillanimous man being fixed in that which is worse, his opinion of his own merit decreases; but this produces more depraved manners; and in consequence of these, his opinion of himself becomes worse. And thus the progression of pusillanimity is constant. Neither does the pusillanimous man become better from experience. For easily accomplishing the works he undertakes (since they are insignificant, and less than he is capable of) he is in a manner ignorant of his own proper virtue. And as he seeks after honour less than he deserves, he is not troublesome to any one: hence also he is not amended by disappointments, as is the case with the arrogant man. On these accounts, therefore, pusillanimity is a worse evil than, and not so easily laid aside as, arrogance; and hence it is more opposed to magnanimity.

CHAP. VI.

CONCERNING THE MEDIUM IN AMBITION.

MAGNANIMITY, therefore, as we have said, is employed about great honours; but there is another virtue conversant with honours, which has the same relation to magnanimity, that liberality has to magnificence. For as magnificence differs from liberality by magnitude, and both being conversant with riches, so magnanimity differs from a virtue of this kind by being employed in great, while this is employed about small, honours.

For as in receiving and bestowing riches there is a medium, an excess, and a defect; so likewise we shall find the same in the desire of honour. For it is possible to desire honour more than is proper, and less than is becoming; and again, according to what is proper, and as right reason commands; since we both blame and praise many persons from their desire of honours. Whence it is evident that some men desire them as it is proper, but others the contrary. And some of these exceed, but others fall short of, the becoming.

For we blame the ambitious man, as one desiring honours more than is proper; but we blame the unambitious man, as not wishing to be honoured in worthy concerns.

But at one time we praise the ambitious man as being brave, and a lover of worth; and at another, the unambitious man as being modest and temperate; as we have said also above. For this will happen through the similitude of the extremes to the middle, and through the medium being anonymous, and on that account it is denominated from the extremes. And nothing hinders but the medium may be

either ambition, or want of ambition. For both the ambitious man, and the lover of riches, may be predicated in many ways; since also it is possible to love after many ways; for we may love something more than, or contrary to what, is becoming, or is proper. Wherefore also the name will thus subsist; and both he who loves as it is proper, and as it is not proper, may be called a lover of this or that particular. When, therefore, we praise any one, denominating him ambitious, we think indeed, that he exceeds in his desire of honour, though not in what is becoming, but only according to vulgar opinion. But when we blame an ambitious man, we denominate him ambitious as exceeding the becoming. In like manner also we praise or blame the unambitious man. The medium, therefore, consists in the desire of moderate honour, although it wants a name; for as in this there is an excess and a defect, it is necessary also that there should be a medium. Since also there are some who desire honour, either more or less, than is proper, it is necessary that the medium which we praise should be a desire produced according to the becoming.

And this virtue is without a name: but it appears, when compared with one extreme, namely, ambition, to be want of ambition; but when compared with the other extreme, namely, want of ambition, it appears to be ambition; and when compared with both, it appears to be both, so far as it partakes of both, which also takes place in the other virtues. For the middle always partakes of the extremes, and is denominating from their appellations. And so far as it recedes from one, it appears to incline to the other; but in this it is more apparent, because it is anonymous. Hence the extremes do not appear to oppose a medium, but rather each other; for want of ambition appears to be opposed to ambition.

CHAP. VII.

CONCERNING MILDNESS.

MILDNESS is a medium with respect to anger, of which the habit that exceeds is called angriness, but that which is deficient is without a name. Anger, therefore, is the passion which subsists about mildness, but the objects moving it are many and various.

He, therefore, who is angry as it is proper, when, and in those things in which, it is proper, is praised; and that is mildness. For it appears that he is mild, who is undisturbed and not led by passion, but himself leads it as right reason directs. He appears however to incline more to the defect, so far as he is not revengeful, but rather disposed to forgive.

But the defect is blamed whether it be called gentleness, or by any other name. For not to be angry in those things which are becoming, and not to be moved by contumelious behaviour, either towards ourselves, or our companions, is foolish and servile.

Excess, however, takes place in all those particulars; for when any one is angry beyond what is becoming with respect to the circumstances of place, of time, of subject, or of any thing else, he exceeds; nevertheless it does not always follow that he who exceeds, exceeds in every thing; for this is almost impossible; since evil, if it does not in some measure partake of good, cannot be sustained, but will corrupt itself; and if it were entire, it would become intolerable *.

* The truth of this assertion is abundantly proved by Simplicius in his very able Commentary on Eclirid. Epictet. ch. xxxiv.; to which the learned reader is referred, as being one of the most satisfactory accounts, now perhaps extant, of the real nature and origin of evil.

Those, therefore, who are disposed to be angry, are quickly angry, and in those things in which they ought not to be; but they quickly desist, which with them is the best conduct; and they are thus affected because they neither retain nor conceal their anger, but call it forth, and immediately revenge themselves. And having, through the impetuosity of anger, rapidly ~~taken vengeance~~ in such things as they are able, they are immediately pacified; but the quickly irascible are excessively vehement, and are angry with every thing and with every body, whence they derive their name from the extreme; but those who are bitterly angry, and are reconciled with difficulty, are angry in the extreme; for they do not immediately show their anger; but retaining, they hide it. These characters, however, desist from anger when they have retaliated evil to those who have injured them. For vengeance gives them pleasure, and on this account they are freed from pain; but when this is not the case, they sustain a weight, and carry about their anger. And this because they neither show their anger, nor admit of any consolation from their acquaintance: neither does any one admonish them. Whence they retain it until it dissolves, and wastes itself away: but this requires time. Men of this kind, however, are troublesome to themselves, and especially to their friends. Those also are called morose who conduct themselves harshly in things in which it is not proper, and when, and so far as it is not proper; and who are angry for a longer time than is proper, and are not reconciled, unless they retaliate to those who have injured them: but these men are troublesome to associate with, and burthensome to their most intimate companions. Mildness, therefore, is the medium; but angriness the excess: and the defect may be called a certain insensibility, stupidity, or inaptitude to anger. But both are opposed to the

middle. A disposition to anger, however, is more opposed than this inaptitude; for a disposition to anger is a worse evil than an inaptitude to it, because it occurs more frequently; (for those who are indisposed to anger are very rare) and because the unangry man may be associated with pleasantly, but the angry man is troublesome. Hence also it is a worse evil; for it destroys the mildness and mutual love of men. It is evident, therefore, that the good in anger is a certain middle and a virtue, but those things on each side which exceed, and are deficient, are evils; and, as has been said, the middle consists in being angry on proper occasions, and with proper objects. It is not possible, however, to define how far being angry, and in what things, we shall act becomingly, and what is the proper time, and place, and person to be angry with, and things of this kind. For as we said in the beginning, things partial and individual are indefinite; and different things are proper at different times, and nothing partial is permanent. But this only can be said, that the middle habit is laudable, and the excesses and defects in every passion are blameable; and those indeed who depart but a little from the middle are not altogether apparent, and on this account are not very blameable; but those who depart very much from the medium also appear to do so, and are very much blamed. Whence it is evident that we should adhere to the middle habit.

CHAP. VIII.

CONCERNING A FRIENDLY DISPOSITION, AND THE VICES ON EACH SIDE OF IT; NAMELY,
MOROSENESS AND FLATTERY.

THE habits about anger have been discussed. * There are other habits, however, belonging to the associations of men with each other, which take place both in words and actions. In these associations, therefore, some things may be praised, but others blamed. But since the medium is laudable, and the excess and defect are blameable, it is evident that there is an excess, a defect, and a medium in them. For those who wish to be entirely undisturbed by their associates, praise every thing, are desirous of appearing always pleased, and will not contradict them in any thing.

But others, acting diametrically opposite to these, are pained with every thing, and blame every body; nothing that is done pleases them, and they contradict every body, and upon all occasions.

Both these dispositions, however, are reprehensible; but he is praised who acts becomingly, and applauds and reproves such things as are proper, and is pleased with those that it is proper to be pleased with. He, therefore, who praises every thing is called a courtier and a flatterer; and he who is similarly indiscriminate in his reproofs, is called morose; but he who preserves the becoming* with respect to both, since such conduct appears to resemble friendship, may be called a friend. For such a medium has not any proper name, but is denominated from the similar: and a habit of this kind, when conjoined

* For το γινόμενον, read το δεον.

with love, resembling filial love, becomes friendship; for it differs from friendship inasmuch as that is produced without filial love. For a friendly disposition does not countenance words or actions, either through this kind of love, or for the sake of enmity, or with a view to blame them, but simply for the sake of the good, and because it has acquired such a habit: since conformably to this same habit, it conducts itself similarly both to the known and the unknown; to those to whom it is accustomed, and towards such as it has little or no commerce with. For it always praises and blames such things as are proper, and as much as is proper; except that it does not do this similarly in every thing. For in those things in which it is necessary to give pain, it is not proper to do so in a similar manner to the known and the unknown, and to those to whom a man is accustomed, and to those to whom he is not accustomed. But the like happens with respect to affording pleasure; for even here the same mode of conduct does not accord with every one; and hence the worthy man gives pain and pleasure to those about him, always regarding their good, and what is advantageous to them. For a habit of this kind is always conversant with those pleasures and pains which take place in the associations of men with each other; wherefore he will not be delighted in the same manner, as his associates are, with such pleasures as have not a reference to good, but will rather be indignant with those who are pleased with them; and for the sake of good rather prefers to be troublesome than pleasant, especially if pleasure should bring disgrace or great injury to him who procures it. For then he rather wishes to be pained and disgraced in a small degree, and to be freed from a greater pain and disgrace, than by being delighted a little, embrace a greater pain. He will not, however, similarly associate with the dignified and the

vulgar, but attribute that which is becoming to each. According to other distinctions also he makes a different association with those he meets with; and he praises each person as it is proper, and in like manner reproves in those things in which it is proper, and when it is proper: especially endeavouring to give pleasure, and choosing this for its own sake; but wishing to give pain in the least degree, and moderately, and not for its own sake, but for the sake of benefiting the party afflicted. For when he gives pain for the sake of some great pleasure, he does it moderately, always fearing to be troublesome. Such, therefore, is he who preserves the medium about pleasures and pains in these associations. He is not, however, denominated by any proper name, but may be called a friend, as we have said, on account of the similitude of his conduct to friendship.

Of the characters on each side of him, however, he who exceeds, if he praises all things without cause, and approves every thing, seeking only to be pleasant, may be called accommodating; but if he does this in order that any advantage may accrue to himself through riches, or such things as are produced by riches, he may be called a flatterer.

But he who is deficient is called morose and litigious, because he is offended with every body, and reproves every thing. And here also because, as has been said, the medium is anonymous, the extremes do not appear to be opposed to the middle, but to each other.

CHAP. IX.

CONCERNING TRUTH, AND THE VICES ON EACH SIDE OF IT.

THERE are, however, other habits conversant with these associations of men. For the association of men with each other is two-fold. The one subsisting about the words and works of those we meet with, and the other about the things belonging to our own: and the above-mentioned habits subsist about the former, but others about the latter. For any one speaking about himself, and his own actions, either speaks falsely or truly; and if falsely, he either says more or less than is true. If, therefore, he speaks the truth, and says neither more nor less of things than they really are, a habit of this kind is denominated truth; and he who possesses it, is called a man of veracity.

But dissimulation, boasting, and similar actions, are pursued by some persons, and for the sake of a particular object; as for instance, glory, wealth, or some other externals; but they are pursued by others without any view.

Some men, indeed, speak less of themselves than they deserve, and others again more; not because they wish to appear to do so, but because they are ignorant of themselves. This, however, very rarely happens; since, for the most part, if any one speaks or acts without any particular view, his words and actions, and, in short, the whole tenor of his life, correspond with his general character.

Since, therefore, the false is in itself blameable, but truth laudable, on this account the medium, namely, truth, here also is laudable; but the excess and defect, namely, things false are blameable: and of

these, boasting exceeds, but dissimulation falls short. We shall, however, discuss both more accurately; but, in the first place, let us discourse about the medium.

The man of veracity, therefore, is not him who merely speaks truth in compacts, or in other things of this kind, such as belong to justice or injustice; for this is the province of another virtue. But he is the man of veracity who is true both in word and life without compulsion, or the legal, the just, or any other political good, and who thus conducts himself solely in consequence of possessing the habit of such a virtue, and for the sake of good. He also says what is true respecting himself, and wishes what he says to appear to others such as it really is: but he will also be equitable. For the lovers of truth in those things which are not necessary, will much more love truth in those things that are necessary, because it is a political good; for if a man abhors a lie *per se*, because it is evil, how is it possible, when it brings disgrace also and is not only evil, but appears so to others, that he should not avoid it by every means in his power? Such, therefore, is the man of veracity; who also, since he shuns vice and disgrace, is a praiseworthy character. If, therefore, it were necessary to decline from the medium, he would verge to the defect, and not to the excess; for this appears to be more elegant than the other, because the excess is offensive.

But the boaster pretends to greater things than exist, both in words and deeds; and if he pretends for no particular cause, he will appear to be a depraved character, though he does not rejoice in falsehood: nevertheless he will appear rather an empty and vain, than a bad man. If, however, he pretends for the sake of such objects, as glory

or honour, he will not be very blameable ; but if he pretends for the sake of lucre, or such things as tend to lucre, he will be very base.

Boasting does not belong to any one of the natural powers of the boaster ; for if it did so, it would not be blameable, since it would not be among things voluntary, and in our power ; but it consists in pre-election, and on this account is base and blameable. For boasting is a certain habit : and the boaster is formed according to a certain habit, as also the liar, who pretends, not for the sake of glory, or riches, but only for the sake of the false itself.

Those, therefore, who boast for the sake of glory, pretend to things whence they may be reckoned praiseworthy, or happy ; but those who boast for the sake of gain, pretend to such as may benefit their neighbours. As for instance, the art of medicine or divination. For there are men who pretend to be physicians, or wise in divination, in order that appearing to be useful to those who employ them, they may derive advantage from them. Such, therefore, is the character of the boaster.

But the dissembler is one who pretends to things less than they really are. He, however, appears more graceful than the boaster ; for he does not pretend for the sake of gain, but avoids elation, and the appearance of greatness. He, therefore, who ironically refuses glorious things, as Socrates also did, appears to be an elegant person ; but he who not only refuses great and glorious, but also small things, and such as are evidently in his power, may be said to be delighted with vulgar and common affairs, and is contemptible. Sometimes also this character may be applied to the boaster, as it has been to the Lacedæmonians, with respect to their garments ; for a great defect, and

a great excess, are alike arrogant. But those who use dissimulation moderately appear graceful; and such are those who do not dissemble in things that are either very frivolous, or exceedingly manifest. Thus both the dissembler and the boaster are opposed to the man of veracity, but the boaster is more opposed than the dissembler; for boasting is a worse evil, as is evident from what has been said.

CHAP. X.

CONCERNING URBANITY, AND THE VICES SITUATED ON EACH SIDE OF IT.

SINCE life admits of a certain relaxation and rest from labour, and since in this remission there is a certain mode of living accompanied with jesting, it appears that it may be attended with a good and elegant method of conversation, and that one who requires a relaxation of this kind, may say such things as are proper, and in a proper manner:—this being the case, the like also happens with respect to hearing such things as it is proper to hear, as and when it is proper. For there is a difference in the manner of speaking and hearing these things. Whence it is evident that in a conversation of this kind, there is an excess, a defect, and a medium.

The excess, therefore, is called scurrility; and those who possess it, are said to be scurrilous and troublesome; for they exceed in the ridiculous, and rather endeavour to excite laughter, than to speak in a becoming manner, and avoid giving pain to the object of their ridicule.

But the defect is called austerity and rusticity; and those who possess

it are said to be rustic and rigorous, neither themselves saying any thing jocose, and being indignant with, and despising those who do so.

And the medium is urbanity; and those who possess it are called polite, or persons of good manners; for the motions of such characters appear to be the result of custom. When they joke, however, they do it elegantly, and as and when it is proper. For as motions characterize bodies; (for example, a motion upwards characterizes fire, and every thing light; but a motion to the centre characterizes heavy substances, and similarly with other things) so likewise from the external and apparent motions of man, the habits and manners of the soul are apparent. But since the austere are few, but those who delight in jests and ridicule very numerous, and since it appears that jesting is better than austerity,—on this account the scurrilous are said to be acceptable and pleasant. It is evident, however, from what has been said, that the scurrilous man does not a little differ from the polite man.

But those who are polite are also dextrous, and politeness may very properly be called dexterity; for it is the property of a dextrous man both to speak and hear such things as accord with a just and liberal man. And there are certain things proper for a man of this kind, both to speak and hear in the way of jest; for as the jest of a liberal person differs from that of a servile man, so likewise that of an educated, from that of an uneducated man. And this is evident from what takes place in comedies, as well ancient as modern; for in these comedies those who represent certain depraved and servile characters, think base things jocose and pleasant. But those who represent certain liberal, dextrous, and just characters, think those things which are said allegorically to be pleasant: but these do not a little differ from each other with respect to elegance. What, therefore, shall we say is the medium

in jesting? Shall we say it is he who ridicules well, and as it is proper for a liberal man, or he who does not give pain to his hearers; or shall we say that the facetious and pleasant man is the medium? And this will be the definition of the medium in jesting. It appears, however, to be indefinite; for all men do not hate the same things, neither are all delighted with the same things; but different things appear pleasant and painful to different persons. Moreover men in their associations with each other, say and do such things as are respectively pleasing to them; and a man utters such ridicule as he endures to hear; for he does not speak indiscriminately. Legislators also forbid certain things to be ridiculed; for some ridicule is attended with scurrility. Because, therefore, the things that we hate, or are delighted with, are indefinite; on this account it is difficult accurately to define the medium in jesting; but the liberal and elegant man conducts himself so as to be a law to himself. Such a man, therefore, is the middle, whether he be called a polite or a dextrous man.

But the scurrilous man very much loving the ridiculous, does not abstain from those things which excite laughter, either in deeds or words; and neither spares himself nor his hearers; and merely for the sake of exciting laughter, disgraces both himself and them, saying and doing such things as an elegant man would by no means say or do, and some of which he would not even endure to hear. But the rustic man is useless with respect to such conversations, for he is not pleasant himself, and is indignant with those that are so. Such a man, therefore, is blained, because relaxation and facetiousness are necessary to human life.

For there are three media in life with respect to the associations of men with each other. One indeed is conversant with truth, which has on

each side of it boasting and dissimulation; but two are conversant with the pleasurable; one of which is called friendship, which has on each side of it flattery and moroseness; but the other is urbanity and dexterity; on one side of which is scurrility, and asperity and rusticity on the other; but both the friendly, and the polite man, afford a certain pleasure to life.

CHAP. XI.

CONCERNING SHAME, AND THAT IT IS NOT A VIRTUE.

BUT shame is not a virtue; for it is not a habit, but rather a passion, which is evident from the definition; since it is defined to be the fear of infamy. For almost the same thing happens to the bashful man as to him who is afraid of terrible things; and the one blushes, as the other, who fears death, grows pale. But both in a certain respect appear to be corporeal, as well shame as the fear of dreadful things. Things of this kind, however, seem rather to be passions, and are not called habits. But shame does not accord with every age, but only with youth; for it is proper that young persons should be ashamed, because they err in many ways; and this because they are led by passion, and not by reason: for being restrained by shame they become better. On this account such young persons as are bashful are laudable; but no one will praise the elderly man because he is bashful; for it is not proper that he should do such things as require shame. Neither does shame belong to a worthy man, since it pertains to things disgraceful.

For as some things are base in reality, and others are not, but only appear so, it is proper that the worthy man should avoid both; but by avoiding things base, he will by no means be ashamed.

For it is equally absurd to think that it is the province of a worthy man to be ashamed in consequence of a base action, and to think that he who does act basely is a worthy man; since shame is produced from voluntary base actions. But the worthy man never commits such willingly.

It appears, however, that shame is not a virtue, but rather a passion; for it is not always laudable, neither can it be called worthy, simply, and *per se*, but from hypothesis: as for instance, if it should happen that any worthy person errs, he will be ashamed. But virtues do not subsist in this manner; for they are habits which are inherent in the whole soul.

And although there appears to be, and there really is, a certain medium between consternation and impudence, and the modest man is praised, but those who are impudent about disgraceful things, and such as are more ashamed than is becoming (who are said to be in a consternation) are blamed, nevertheless shame is not the more a virtue on this account. For virtue is a medium; but every medium is not a virtue; since they do not all reciprocate.

Neither is continence a virtue, but something mixed. We shall, however, discourse concerning this hereafter. Let us now speak concerning justice.

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING JUSTICE.

LET us now consider about justice and injustice; in what actions they are found, and in what kind of a medium justice consists; also of what things *the just* is a medium, and what lies on each side of it.

But we will pursue our inquiries after the same method with which we considered the other virtues.

We see then that all men denominate justice a certain habit, possessing which, we practise just things, and also perform and desire them. And such is the case with respect to injustice; for they denominate that injustice according to which we act unjustly, and wish for unjust things. But we advance these common opinions hypothetically, both about justice and injustice. And let justice and injustice superficially considered, be a habit by which we either do, or do not, desire just things: For it is always necessary that *to be willing*, should be added to the moral virtues; and it is impossible that they should be otherwise defined. For it is through being willing to be temperate and just, that a man becomes so: since in the sciences and powers of the

soul it is necessary to be able, but not so to be willing; for if any one is *able* to heal it is sufficient, and not being *willing* to do it does not impede *the habit* of the medical art; and similarly with respect to other things. But with regard to the moral virtues, the contrary takes place; for it is frequently possible for the unjust man to be able to do just things; but to be willing to do them is the property only of the just man. Whence also he is a just man who though unable to act justly, yet is willing, and possesses the habit of justice; and an unjust man subsists after the same manner. Further, every power and science is conversant with contraries; for by one science it is possible to know contraries; since there is one knowledge of health and disease, namely, medical knowledge; and by one power contraries are effected; but one habit is not productive of contraries; for as we do not perform both just and unjust things from justice, so neither are diseased motions the same with healthy ones. Contrary habits indeed are known from contraries; for if any one knows that firmness of flesh indicates a good habit of body, he will also know that laxity of flesh denotes a bad habit of body; but habits are known from externals; thus, for instance, health is a habit, but the subject is that which is healthful, and which tends to health. For if we know that what gives firmness to the flesh is healthful, we shall also know that firmness of flesh is a good habit of body; but this also for the most part is consequent to habits; for if one of contrary habits is predicated in many ways, the other of these may also be predicated in many ways; as for instance, if temperance signifies many things, intemperance also will signify many things. And if justice is homonymous, and is predicated in many ways, injustice will also subsist after the same manner. But it has been said for the most part, because there are some habits in which this does not happen; as

for instance, to love and to hate are contraries; but to love is not simply one thing; for it signifies both to love and to embrace with the lips; but to hate signifies only one thing, namely, enmity. This, however, seldom happens; but especially and for the most part one habit being predicated in many ways, the contrary will also be predicated in many ways.

Since, therefore, justice is predicated in many ways, injustice also will be multifariously predicated. But it appears that both signify one thing, because the things signified do not very much differ from each other; for that which is homonymous, and that which signifies many things, become evident, when the things signified differ very much from each other; as for instance, that is called *κλεις*, Clavicle, which is placed under the neck of some animals, and that by which we lock doors. For here, because there is a great difference in the things, the homonymous, and that which has an abundant signification, are evident. Since, therefore, both justice and injustice may be predicated in many ways, let us consider in how many ways an unjust man may be predicated; for hence we may also apprehend the significations of justice.

An unjust man, therefore, may be called one who does not obey the laws, who vindicates to himself more than he ought, and does not preserve equality; so that he will be just who obeys the laws, and preserves equality: And that will be *the just* which is legitimate and equal; but that will be *the unjust* which is illegal and unequal.

Since also the unjust man vindicates to himself more than he ought; but this possession of more than is proper subsists about a certain good, he also will vindicate to himself more than is proper about a certain good. But he investigates the good, not as good to himself, and in

order to make himself better; (for he does not seek it that he may become more temperate than others, or more skilled in medicine than a physician, or more liberal than a liberal man, nor any thing else belonging to things that are simply and essentially good, or that will make him good;) but he seeks to surpass others about such goods as are simply and essentially good, but do not make him better than he was, but frequently worse. Such are riches, power, and a good habit of body; for these become the occasion of a worse evil to a base man, as also other things attendant upon prosperity or adversity, which most men desire and pursue for themselves. It is proper, however, not to do so, but to desire those things which are simply good, and such as are profitable and beneficial, and do not render their possessors worse. But having the choice, they should prefer not good things simply, but those things that are good to themselves, and such as are able to make them better. But the unjust man desires for himself the goods of prosperity, and always seeks to possess more of them, and also chooses the least of the evils belonging to adversity; for he thinks that the least evil is a good. And because he who vindicates to himself more than he ought is always covetous of many good things, he also appears to be one who arrogates to himself more than he ought. But the unjust man is also unequal; for inequality is the general and common name of every species of injustice; since he who disobeys the law, and he who arrogates to himself more than he ought, are unequal.

But since he who disobeys the laws is unjust, and he who obeys them just, it is evident that every thing that is done conformably to the laws, is in a certain respect just; for those things which are defined by the legislative act are legal, and called just; since we say that every

thing legal is also just. Hence it happens that whatever the laws are conversant with, that also justice is conversant with.

Laws, however, are promulgated about every thing, attentively keeping in view the advantage of the polities, whether they orderly dispose a democracy, an aristocracy, or any other form of government, but directing every work according to every virtue, whether the works, for instance, be temperate, just, or brave.

For they order that a man shall not leave his rank, nor abandon his post;—and this is the property of a brave man. They also order that a man shall not commit adultery, nor act insolently;—and this is the work of a temperate man. Again, they order that no one shall strike or injure another;—and this is the property of mildness. In like manner with respect to what belongs to other virtues and vices, they order some things, and prohibit others. And indeed accurate and right law is conformable to right and accurate reason; but that law which is unexplored and fortuitous, not being altogether accurate and appropriate, both orders and forbids; but its injunctions are improper. It, therefore, both orders and forbids good and base things at the same time. For to order and prohibit is the scope of every law.

If, therefore, whatever is legal is also just, and in whatever the law is conversant, justice is also conversant, justice will comprehend every virtue; and it will be a certain perfect virtue, because it comprehends all the virtues, and it will be itself the whole of virtue. For in this alone justice differs from universal virtue, because the one is a habit with respect to itself only; but perfect justice is a habit not simply, but referable to another. *For to use all the virtues to the advantage of our neighbours, is justice.*

On this account it appears the most excellent of all the virtues, and neither Hesperus nor Lucifer are so bright and admirable as justice. Whence we proverbially say, that "*justice embraces every virtue in itself*;" and it is especially a perfect virtue, because it consists in the use of perfect virtue. For he who possesses it can also exercise virtue towards another, and not merely towards himself. For many indeed benefit themselves by the virtues, but are not able to make them serviceable to others. Hence the saying of Bias is beautiful, "*that the magistrate unmasks the man*." For the magistracy is nothing else than the communication of the virtues to others. And on this account, justice alone, of all the other virtues, appears to be a foreign good, because it does not seek its own advantage, but that of others;—either that of the public, or that of the governor. As, therefore, he who injures himself, or his friends by his depravity, is the worst of men; so he who does not use the virtues with a view to his own proper benefit, but to that of others, is the most excellent character. For this is a difficult task.

Truly, therefore, justice itself is not a part of virtue, but all virtue; and similarly injustice is not a part of vice, but all vice.

In what respect, therefore, universal virtue differs from this justice, has already been said.

CHAP. II.

CONCERNING PARTIAL JUSTICE.

BUT there is a certain other justice, which is a partial virtue; also a certain other injustice, which is a partial vice.

And the indication that there is this partial justice and injustice will be this:—he who energizes, according to other depravities, may indeed be called unjust, but can by no means be said to usurp to himself more than he ought; as, for example, he who throws away his shield through cowardice; or who slanders his neighbour through ill-nature, and because he cannot govern his anger or rage; or he who through illiberality is not willing to assist another with his money: for all these indeed are unjust, but by no means usurpations. The usurper, therefore, is conversant with a certain other kind of depravity, because he is neither conversant with any one of these, nor with all. He is blamed, however, as unjust. Hence there is a certain other partial injustice, as being a part of the whole of injustice; as also there is a certain partial unjust, as being a part of the whole of the unjust; viz. that which is done against the laws. Further, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain, and receives money for it; but another for the sake of pleasure, and incurs loss and expence from it, the latter may be called intemperate rather than a usurper; but the former an usurper, and unjust, but by no means intemperate. There is a certain injustice, therefore, which does not comprehend intemperance, and on this account it is not the same with universal, but with partial injustice.

Again, every base action is referred to some certain vice; as, for instance, to commit adultery is referred to intemperance; but to fly in battle, and throw away one's shield, to cowardice, and to revile and strike another, to anger:—but for a man to derive gain from the property of others, and such gain as is by no means fit for him, cannot be referred to any thing else than to injustice.

Whence it appears that there is a certain other partial injustice synonymous with the universal; for the very essence of each consists in the use of good with reference to another. The partial, however, differs from the universal, because the partial regards wealth or safety, or the pleasure arising from gain, or whatever else comes under the same denomination; but the universal regards every thing about which a worthy man is conversant.

Hence it is evident that justice may be predicated in many ways, and that there is another partial justice, besides universal virtue: but what this partial justice is, we shall now consider. We have demonstrated then that the unjust is the unequal, and that which is contrary to law; as the just is the legal and the equal. Universal justice, therefore, consists in that which is legal, and universal injustice in the illegal and unequal.

But since *the more* is not the same thing with the *unequal*, but the unequal is as a whole, and the more as a part (for that which is more, is also unequal; but every thing unequal, is not also more*,) there will also be another kind of injustice which regards the unequal, and the

* Whenever two things subsist in such a manner that the predication of one necessarily implies the existence of the other, but not *vice versa*; that, the existence of which is necessarily implied, is more universal and comprehensive than the other; e. g. *Animal* and *Man*.

species of the unjust will not be the same. But *partial* injustice will subsist about *the more*, and *universal* injustice about *the unequal*. That partial injustice, therefore, which subsists with respect to perfect injustice, as a part to the whole, is conversant with the more :—and this is called Usurpation. Hence we may know, in a superficial manner, what partial justice is. But let us discuss this subject still more accurately.

CHAP. III.

CONCERNING THE SPECIES OF PARTIAL JUSTICE.

As we have said, therefore, universal justice is a perfect virtue, and the use of the whole of virtue :—injustice also is an all-perfect vice. For universal justice is that which is conformable to the mandates of law. But, as we have before shown, law does not only enjoin the performance of every virtuous action, but also instructs citizens to become worthy, and to arrive at the habit of the whole of virtue ; for it is not the same thing to perform the actions of virtue, and to possess the habit of virtue. On this account it is one thing for a man to be a good citizen, and another to be a good man. For he is a good man who is endued with the habit of virtue ; but he is a good citizen who performs the works of virtue, through which the citizens may be benefited in common with himself ; and, in short, who does good to the citizens.

Whence some one may doubt how the erudition of the political art subsists, according to which a man is rendered good ; but we shall treat of this hereafter. Universal justice and injustice, therefore, are of this

kind. But concerning partial justice, and the just that is conversant with it, one species is in distribution, when it is proper to distribute riches or honours, or any thing else which is divided among the citizens. For in these there is the equal, and the unequal; the less, and the more; and on this account to divide and distribute as it is proper, is a species of justice; but the other is that which is corrective in contracts: and of this there are two parts, because contracts are divided into two parts; some being voluntary, and others involuntary. The voluntary are buying, selling, putting out money at interest, suretyship, lending any thing on hire (as when a man lets his house, or hires out his cattle) pledging, and hiring a slave or an artificer. And these are called voluntary, because he who receives and uses them, voluntarily returns them: for at first he received them willingly, and from one who willingly lent them; and hence they are called voluntary. But of the involuntary, some are called clandestine, and others violent. The clandestine are such as theft, adultery, witchcraft, prostitution, deceiving the slave of another, insidious destruction, and bearing false witness: but the violent are such as blows, bonds, death, plunder, mutilation, slander, and contumely. Contracts of this kind, however, are called violent, because he who is unjust with respect to these things, secretly and violently receives either riches or pleasure. This man, however, meets with his desert in a court of justice, either through a fine, or death, or being tormented, or disgraced. There are two species of justice, therefore, the one respecting distribution, and the other which respects contracts. But of that which is conversant with contracts, one part respects such as are voluntary, and the other the involuntary. We shall, however, treat more accurately about each.

CHAP. IV.

CONCERNING THE EQUALITY AND PROPORTION IN JUSTICE, AND OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE SPECIES OF THE JUST.

THE JUST, therefore, is the medium, the equal, and the proportional; and justice is effective of the middle, of equality, and proportion. The just also is a medium, because it is between the more and the less, and between that which is above the becoming, and that which is below it, as is the case with all the virtues. And this is *common* to justice with respect to the other virtues; but the equal is *peculiar* to justice, because it imparts to each that which accords and is adapted; and that which it gives to the receiver is the equal. For things which accord are equal; and that which is adapted, after a certain manner, accords. Besides, since injustice is inequality, and the unjust is unequal, we may fairly conclude that justice is equality, and the just is the equal, since it is the medium of the more and the less; for in whatever action there is the more and the less, it is necessary also that there should be the equal; and indeed without any reasoning, it appears to all men that the just is the equal.

But it is proportional, because, according to distribution, it makes the things distributed proportional to the receivers; and the things given have the same relation to each other as the receivers have to each other. As for instance, if *Achilles* is double in virtue to *Ajax*, the honour paid by a just man to *Achilles* will be double to that paid to *Ajax*. And so far as it is a medium it belongs to many things; for those that are external to the middle (being near and remote, and this more and less so) are many.

So far, however, as it is equal, it belongs to two things; namely, to the receiver, and the gift; for the equal being a relative, always belongs to two certain things; but so far as the just is proportional, it will have four terms at least; for proportion is always of four, being the equality of two ratios. But ratio is in two terms; so that it is necessary that proportion should be in four. As for instance, the ratio may be two-fold or three-fold; and in this case the habitude is of two things; namely, of that which is double, and of that which is half; as 20 is to 10; so that it is necessary there should be two terms in one ratio. But if we assume the same ratio in two other terms, as, for example, in 12 and 6, we make a proportion, and it will be as 20 is to 10; so is 12 to 6; and thus proportion will always be in four terms at least. But it is also possible to be in more.

It also frequently happens that we assume three terms, and make proportion; e. g. as 20 is to 10, so is 10 to 5; but because we assume 10 twice, they again become four. And this proportion is called *continued*; but the other, having four terms, is called *disjunct*. Mathematicians, however, call both *geometrical* proportion, because there is also another proportion, which is called *arithmetical*.

Arithmetical proportion is when A exceeds B, as much as B exceeds D. But the distributive just subsists according to geometrical proportion. Let us, however, inquire the cause. Suppose the thing to be distributed is honour, and *Achilles* and *Ajax* the persons to whom it is to be distributed: here it is necessary that honour should have the same ratio to honour, which *Achilles* has to *Ajax*; and alternately the honour of *Achilles* should be to *Achilles*, as the honour of *Ajax* is to *Ajax*. Or, if you had rather unite them, *Achilles* being honoured, has the same ratio to *Achilles*, which *Ajax* being honoured has to *Ajax*:—and alternately,

Achilles being honoured has the same ratio to *Ajax* being honoured, as *Achilles* has to *Ajax*. Now all this proportion is adapted to the distributive just, which it is not possible to find in arithmetical, but in geometrical proportion alone. And the geometrician shows that all these species of proportion are found in geometrical proportion; but that it is not possible to discover them in arithmetical is evident from hence. Let there be four numbers in arithmetical proportion, 4. 3. 6. 5. Here 4 exceeds 3, as much as 6 exceeds 5; but if you join them, the proportion will not be arithmetical; for if you join 6 and 5, the product will exceed 5 by 6; or if you join 4 and 3, it will exceed 3 by 4. And so indeed things disjunct are in arithmetical proportion; (for there is the same excess of 4 and 3, as there is of 5 and 6) but being joined there is no longer proportion*; for 11 exceeds 5, more than 7 exceeds 3.

Hence, therefore, the distributive just is analogous according to geometrical proportion, and this not according to conjunct, but disjunct†, proportion. For it is necessary there should be four terms in number; since it is not possible that the thing given, and the receiver, should be one and the same. And this species of the just is proportional so far as it is conversant in distributions, as when each receives that which is according to his desert, whether it be honour or wealth, or any thing else that is to be divided; whence peace and order are produced in

* In geometrical proportion, when four terms are proportional, they will also be proportional when conjoined; and this is called *composition of ratio*. Thus, if as A is to B, so C to D; then by composition, it will be as A + B is to B, so C + D to D. This, however, will not be the case in arithmetical proportion, as is evident from the instance adduced by Aristotle.

† That is to say, though the distributive just subsists in geometrical proportion, yet it is not that proportion which is formed by composition of ratio, but which subsists in four terms simply considered.

commonwealths. But from the contrary, seditions, contests, and accusations, are produced, as when those who are equal, do not receive the equal, or the unequal do receive it. But that he who distributes with justice, seeks proportion, is also evident from this. For all men think that to be the just, which is according to the desert of each. Again, all men do not say that the desert, through which any one is honoured, is the same; for the *democratic* say it is liberty; but the *oligarchic* call it wealth; and the *aristocratic*, virtue*. Since, therefore, desert is various, if any one wishes to distribute honour with justice, according to the desert of each, he will not make an *equal*, but a *proportional*, distribution.

The just, therefore, is proportional, as we have said, but the unjust is without proportion: as when distribution takes place according to the more and the less than desert, which also happens in other works of injustice. For he who injures seeks to have more good, than he

* The ancients divided government into six principal species, namely, a Kingdom, an Aristocracy, a Timocracy, a Democracy, an Oligarchy, and a Tyranny, which they defined as follows:

1. A KINGDOM, is that species where one man governs, and he is the best of men.
2. AN ARISTOCRACY, where more than one governs, but at the same time they are the best: in these two species, therefore, the good of the governed is the sole object of the governors.
3. A TIMOCRACY, where the many govern, but honours are conferred on the wealthy.
4. A DEMOCRACY, opposed to a Timocracy, where also the many govern, but those poor. Hence these two species are inferior to the two former, since worth in the governors is not a necessary condition to constitute these forms of government.
5. AN OLIGARCHY, the opposite to an Aristocracy, is where a few govern, and those the worst.
6. A TYRANNY, opposed to a Kingdom, is where one man governs, and he is the worst of men. It is evident, therefore, that these two last forms of government are the worst possible, since the governors rule solely with a view to their own individual advantage, and consequently will not hesitate to oppress the governed by every means, however cruel and base, that can, even in the most distant degree, tend to promote it.

who is injured; but he who is injured has less; and the contrary takes place with respect to evil; for here he who does an injury, has a less evil; but he to whom it is done, a greater, because the lesser evil is preferred to the greater, and the lesser evil is sought as a greater good. Such, therefore, is the distributive species of the just. Let us now speak of the other species.

CHAP. V.

CONCERNING THE CORRECTIVE SPECIES OF JUSTICE, AND ITS PROPORTION.

THE second species of the just is *the corrective*, which is conversant with mutual contracts, whether they be voluntary or involuntary, or attended with improper secrecy or violence. And this has a certain proportion also, not indeed geometrical, according to which the first species, namely, the *distributive*, subsists, but arithmetical proportion. For the distributive just, making distribution among the citizens from things common, gives to each that which is due to the desert of each, and according to that which he contributes to the public; since all men are not alike, neither do all similarly contribute. On this account they do not receive things *equal*, but such as are *proportional*. But the corrective just, which is conversant with mutual contracts, has for its bounds him who does an injury, and him to whom it is done: and it gives to each, not the proportional, but the equal. For that equality which an unjust man destroys by depriving him who is injured of some good, and transferring it to himself, this the just man restores by

inflicting a fine on him who did the injury, equal to the loss sustained by the sufferer, and thus he gives the equal to both. Hence four terms being produced, namely, the person who is injured; he who does the injury; that which the former suffers from the latter; and that which the latter suffers from the judge, arithmetical proportion is produced; for in *that* in which he who does an injury surpasses him to whom it is done, in *that* the judge makes the latter surpass the former; and thus it is that the corrective just is a certain image of this kind of proportion. For although he who takes any thing away may be an equitable man, and he from whom it is taken a depraved man, it will make no difference with respect to this species of the just; neither if he who commits adultery be a base man, and he who is injured in consequence of it, an equitable man. But equality is uniformly the object of investigation in the corrective just. For each is regarded so far only as he suffers, or does an injury; and whatever the latter gains from the former, whether it be pleasure, or wealth, or glory, and on this account surpasses him, this the judge restores to the sufferer, either by fining, or disgracing, by severely punishing, or even inflicting death upon him who does an injury. In this species of justice, however, it is possible to perceive the same kind of proportion in another manner, if we make the terms continued; for it is, As he who does an injury, is to him to whom it is done; so is the judge, to him who does it; since he who commits an injury suffers things from the judge equal to those in which he injured the other.

Since, therefore, injustice introduces the greater and the lesser, both in things good and evil, although contrariwise, (for he who seeks the greater good, chooses the lesser evil; but justice is equality, and the equal is a medium between the greater and the lesser) it is evident that this

species of justice is a medium between loss and gain. But let every thing which he sustains, who suffers an injury, be called *loss*; and every thing derived from doing an injury, and improper usurpation, be called *gain*, whether any one wishes to be unjust with respect to riches, or fame, or any thing else. The corrective just, therefore, is a medium between loss and gain. On this account also when men are engaged in controversies they resort to the judge, thinking by this mean that as neither can gain any thing, so neither will be subject to loss, but that each will receive a certain medium. For we should think that the corrective just is as it were something animated. But they call this a medium, since through this they may partake of the medium. Some persons, however, call in not one mediator only in their controversies, but two or three; whence it appears that they seek a medium, it being as it were the same thing to seek a medium, and to seek the just. The just, therefore, is a medium:—for the judge also is a medium, introducing the middle and the just, and taking away the inequality from injustice. As in the line AB unequally cut in D , if any one wishes to divide it equally he will take away from the greater BD , the excess by which it surpasses the lesser DA (*i. e.* CD) and adding AC to DA , he will make DA equal to CB , and thus find the bi-section of the line AB *. The like will also happen with respect to the inequality of injustice. For the corrective just taking away from the gain of him who did the injury, that which is as it were an excess with respect to the party injured, and adding it to him, will

* Thus in numbers, let AB be 8, and let it be unequally cut into 6 and 2, *i. e.* into BD , DA . In this case CD will be 4; and if AC , *i. e.* $CD + DA$ be added to DA , viz. if $4 + 2$ be added to 2, the sum will be 8, or the whole line, and consequently BC must be equal to DA , and so $BC + DA$ be the half of the line.

effect equality and a medium. On this account also it is called (*δικαιον*) the just, because it is *διχα*, i. e. divided into two, as if any one should say *δικαιον*: hence also (*δικαστης*) a judge is denominated, as if he were called *διχαστης*, a separator into two.

In like manner also in a line when it is cut into two, because ~~one~~ of the equal right lines is a middle, according to arithmetical proportion, between the greater and the lesser; so also the just is a medium between loss and gain; that is to say, between the greater and the lesser good or evil; for it is less than the greater, and greater than the lesser: but that what we have said is the case with respect to a line is evident. For *BD* surpasses *DA* by *CD*; but *CA* surpasses *AD* by the same *CD*; so that the lines *BD*, *CA*, *AD*, are in arithmetical proportion. But *CD* is the middle, which is equal to *CB*, which is less than *BD*, but greater than *AD*, surpassing and being surpassed by the same *CD*. It is further evident, however, from hence that the just and the equal is a proportional medium between gain and loss, according to arithmetical proportion. Let there be three right lines equal to each other, *AA*, *BB*, *Cc*.—Cut *AA* in two in *E*, and *Cc* in *F*: then let *AE* be taken from *AA*. But it is evident that *Cc* will be greater than *EA* by *CF*. Then add that which is taken from *AA* to *Cc*, and make *Dc*; but it is evident that *DC* is greater than *EA* by *Dc + cF*. If it is required, therefore, to restore the equality of the extreme right lines, we shall effect it through *BB*. For by adapting *cD* as a rule, we take away the excess; but adapting it to *AA*, we add the deficiency, and thus the extremes will be again equal to each other; but the same *BB* restoring the equality, is a medium of *DC* and *EA* in arithmetical proportion; for *DC* surpasses *BB* by *Dc*; but *BB* surpasses *EA* by *Dc*. But it is evident from the preceding

arguments, that the same thing also happens in the corrective just, and likewise with respect to the arts. For they then subsist in a proper manner when we have need of them, and our want of the artists is as great as the labour and loss, which they sustain in the exercise of their respective arts. For it is thus that artists are able to live, by supplying their indigence from the wants of those who employ them. If, however, the endurance of those who labour in and exercise arts, were not so great as what those suffer who employ the artists, but much less—if this were the case, nothing would prevent the abolition of all the arts. On this account the middle and the equal is a proportion between loss and gain.

These names indeed, that is to say, *loss and gain*, are properly predicated in voluntary contracts; they are nevertheless transferred to such as are involuntary. But the simple predication of *to gain*, is the possession of more than any one had before; and in like manner with respect to *loss*, it is having less than a man had at first. Merely to have property, however, is not denominated either loss or gain, but a certain medium; and hence the just is a middle between gain and loss. I say, however, that these names are predicated in involuntary contracts, when any one receives as much as he had previously to his doing or receiving an injury. For gain in voluntary contracts being permitted by law, is neither unjust, nor subject to correction.

CHAP. VI.

THAT RETALIATION IS NOT A SPECIES OF JUSTICE, UNLESS THE RETALIATION BE
PROPORTIONAL.

THE Pythagoreans indeed say, that retaliation is just when any one suffers the same things which he does ; and the verse of Rhadamanthus tends to the same thing.

“ When punishment is equal to the deed,

“ The law is just.”

This retaliation, however, does not accord with any species of *the just*. For neither is the distributive nor corrective just of this kind, since it is not possible in distribution that a citizen should always receive the same benefit from the public, which he has afforded to it. For if he should destroy a tyrant, how can he suffer the same thing ? But it is frequently at variance with the corrective just. For if any one should strike a magistrate, it is not just that he should be punished with blows only, but much more severely ; and if any one, being a magistrate, should strike a magistrate, it would not be just to make him suffer a punishment equal to that of one who is not invested with the same authority. If also any one should involuntarily and ignorantly injure his neighbour, it is not just that he should be injured in a similar manner.

It is possible, however, that a retaliation of this kind may be just in reciprocal communions ; as for instance, in acting well or ill to one another, or in mutual contracts respecting the arts, except that it is not necessary that the remuneration should be equal, but proportional. For

he who strikes a magistrate destroys the order of a polity, and he should not be merely beaten, but put to death. And he who violates his neighbour's bed, ought indeed to be severely punished, though not in the same, but in a proportional, manner; for if he who acted thus wickedly were not so punished, the polity would be servile and tyrannical; or if he were retaliated on, it would be absurd and base. In like manner also with respect to favours, and conferring and receiving benefits; for it is necessary that both he who confers, and he who receives, a benefit, should pay proper regard to the equality of the polity, and not only return a favour, but even be the source of a repetition of favours; since unless this were the case, the mutual intercourse would be destroyed, by which the polity and its concord are held together. On this account also a temple of the Graces is placed in every city, in order that they may be honoured through acts of gratitude. But it is not possible that the favour should be the same as the remuneration, but proportional; for one man gives to another that of which the receiver is in want, and the former receives from the latter that of which he stands in need; and thus, while he himself rejoices, he is also the cause of rejoicing. If, however, he receives the same that he gives, in what does the favour consist? Hence also to confer or receive a benefit, does not consist in giving or receiving the same thing, but according to proportion.

But this will be more evident from what follows: remunerations and communications are certain communions; but communions belong to things of which we have need, since every one endeavours to partake of that which he wants: we have need, however, of things dissimilar. For no one is in want of himself, or of the things belonging to himself, or of those which he is able to procure; but such as he neither has,

nor is able to procure, of these he endeavours to become a partaker from his neighbour. For the shoemaker has not need of a shoemaker, neither has the physician of a physician; but each mutually stands in need of the other. Hence it is evident that favours belong to things dissimilar. Remunerations and communications, therefore, are not the same; but in order that they may subsist according to the just, equality according to the proportional must be adopted. For a shoemaker will give a shoe to an architect, but he will receive from him such things as contribute to a house, proportionally to the favour. A physician also will give some things to a husbandman, but receive others from him according to proportion; since it happens that the work of the one is more honourable than that of the other. For the shoemaker does not give the architect a pair of shoes for a house; but adds as much by way of retribution as may compensate the loss sustained by the architect in building the house. Were it otherwise, the contracts would be unequal, and the favours anomalous. It is necessary, therefore, that equality should be preserved in favours, but nevertheless according to that proportion which a diametrical conjunction effects; for a diameter is a conjoined right line, extending from one angle of a parallelogram to the opposite angle. Let there be four terms in the form of a square; viz. the architect, the shoemaker, a shoe, and a house. Place the architect at A, the shoemaker at C, the house at B, and the shoe at D. Since, therefore, the shoe is placed under the shoemaker, as D under C, and the house under the architect, as B under A, the shoemaker, in mutual communications will be conjoined with the architect, as A is conjoined with D; but the shoemaker to the house, as C with B, and thus there will be a diametrical communication; not indeed according to the same things, but according to such as are proportional.

Hence it is necessary that exchanges should have a ratio to, and be commensurate with, each other; for there are some things perhaps which it is not possible to barter, because they are mutually incommensurate; as for instance, the work of a piper, and that of an architect. On this account money was assumed which is able to effect a barter with respect to all works, and to measure their value; since from money we know how many shoes a house is worth, or how much food, or any other commodity. For unless the value of each is known, it would not be possible that either barter or communication should be effected; since not to give or receive *ad valorem* is neither exchange nor communion.

It is requisite, therefore, that there should be one common measure of all things, by which we may be able to estimate them, and through which we may know the value of each. But indigence is the natural and true measure of all things; for as far as any one is in want of another, so far he is willing to communicate with him; and unless a man stands in need of the things belonging to another, or not in the same, but in a less degree than the other wants what belongs to him, there will be no exchange; but if he is in need of them, he will give his own goods, and receive those of the other. Indigence, therefore, by nature and in reality, is the measure of things; for this collects every thing into one. But money is established by (*νομος*) law, and compact, and hence it is called (*νομισμα*) money, because it is not established by nature, but by ourselves, and it is in our power to alter it, and render it useless. Money, therefore, as we have said, is the measure of the value of things; and though indeed it is useless in itself, yet it is, as it were, a substitute for the supply of indigence. The respective value of each work being known, therefore, through this measure, exchange will be equal and proportional.

But the proportion will be reciprocal; for it will thus be possible to equalize the exchange. Mathematicians however say, that things are reciprocal when it is, As A is to B, so is C to D; and as A is to C so is B to D. If, therefore, the things bartered, and those who barter them, subsist in this kind of proportion, the exchange will be just. For let the shoemaker be placed at C, and the husbandman at A, the shoes at D, and the corn at B. But suppose that the husbandman has a double ratio with respect to the shoemaker: if, therefore, the corn is double the value of the shoes, and it is, As the husbandman is to the shoemaker, so are the shoes to the aliment or corn, the shoes must be double the value of the corn, and thus they will equal the worth of the corn. But unless the barter be made in this manner, it will not be proper to place them in the form of proportion, since it will not be possible to equalize them. For if it should be, As the husbandman is to the shoemaker, so is the work of the husbandman, which the shoemaker receives, to the work of the shoemaker, which the husbandman receives, there will be no equality; but when they subsist *reciprocally*, then the exchange and communication is properly made.

It is manifest, however, that indigence holds polities together, and produces communions and unity, being as it were one identical thing; for when men are not in want of each other, neither mutual exchange nor communication takes place; or when one man stands in need of another, but the other is not in want of him, then also they are in a similar manner uncommunicative. As also on the contrary, communication may take place when any one has what another wants; and the latter wants those things which the former is able to give.

But since it frequently happens that the husbandman stands in need

of the work of the carpenter, but the carpenter is not in want of that of the husbandman,—in this case, money is assumed in order that there may be no impediment to barter and exchange; and the husbandman gives money to the carpenter, and receives from him his work, which ~~money~~ indeed is as it were a guarantee to the carpenter, because, when he wants those things pertaining to the husbandman, through it he will receive from the husbandman such things as he has need of; and thus also by means of the future wants of the carpenter, barter and communication will be effected. Money indeed is almost every thing in capacity that one man can want from another, and it will always be requisite, though not in a similar degree at all times. For in a fertile season there is a great dearth of money; but not so when there is a scarcity of provisions; for in the former case, no one would choose to give much money for a little corn. At the same time, as may be collected from what we have said, the want of money is more permanent than that of other things; and hence it is necessary that all things should be properly estimated, since it will thus be possible always to effect barter and communion. For by measuring and estimating all things through the medium of money, equality is produced. And from equality we may effect exchange; but it is not always possible to produce equality without money. For there are some works of art that differ so much from one another, that they are altogether incommensurate, and have no ratio with respect to each other, whence it is impossible to find equality in them. But because each is in want of each, in consequence of this indigence, one common measure is assumed, namely, money, which measures them all. Money, however, does not measure things *natural and in reality*; (for it is not a part of the things measured) but

by a law and compact of our own, and thus becoming a medium of things incommensurate, renders them commensurable and equal. But this will be more evident from the following diagram. Let A be a house, and B ten minæ, and C a bed. And let the house be worth five minæ, and the bed one. Thus B = ten minæ, will be ten times the value of the bed; but twice the value of the house. Hence the house is the half of ten minæ. Since, therefore, the house is the half, but the bed a tenth of the same thing, and the half of ten is fivefold, it follows that the house is worth five times as much as the bed. Hence the house is commensurable with the bed, through the medium of money, which becomes the common measure. But if it is commensurable, it may also become equal. For if the value of the bed be increased five times, it will be equal to the house. What the unjust and the just are, therefore, has been said, both according to distribution and correction, that is to say; *the distributive and the corrective just.*

CHAP. VII.

THAT JUSTICE IS A MIDDLE BETWEEN INJURING AND BEING INJURED.

THESE particulars being thus defined, it is evident that a just action is a medium between doing and receiving an injury. For here there is *the more* and *the less*, since to do an injury is nothing else than to possess *the more* when the equal should be preserved: but to be injured on the other hand, is to possess *the less*. And justice is a medium, though not after the same manner as in the other virtues; since every other virtue is a medium between two vices, exceeding the one, but falling short of the other: as temperance lies between insensibility and intemperance: fortitude between timidity and audacity: and the other virtues in a similar manner.

Justice, however, does not subsist between two vices, neither is it opposed to them, but to injustice only. Nevertheless it is a medium, because since injustice introduces inequality, this virtue seeks equality, and is productive of it. But the equal is a middle between the greater and the lesser, and on this account justice is a medium. Injustice, however, is an extreme, because it belongs to extremes. Justice is a habit also according to which a just man by previous and deliberate choice becomes practicer, and a distributor, of the just; so that he appoints a law to himself to distribute in an appropriate manner, both to others and himself: and if it should be necessary to lay down a rule of distribution to others, he does not impart more of the good to himself, but less to his neighbour, in such distribution; or on the other

hand, if it be something injurious that is to be distributed, he will not give himself the lesser, and his neighbour the greater share, but he will in both cases give the equal according to proportion. In like manner also he prescribes a law to others of effecting equality in distributions. And such indeed is justice.

But injustice is entirely the contrary; for it is an excess and defect of advantage or injury, without regard to proportion. For in distributions the unjust man surpasses his neighbour in things advantageous, but falls short of him in such as are hurtful: and when he distributes to another, then also he does it without proportion, except that he does not make the same persons surpass or fall short of the same, but in a casual manner. Hence in injuries there is excess and defect, and the greater and the lesser. And to do an injury is the *greater*, but to suffer one the *lesser*, of which the middle is the *equal*, that is to say, *the just*.

CHAP. VIII.

IN WHAT MANNER A MAN MAY ACT UNJUSTLY, AND STILL NOT BE UNJUST.

WE have discoursed universally, therefore, concerning justice and injustice; also concerning the just and the unjust, and defined the nature of each. But since there are certain unjust actions, in which, though the agent acts unjustly, nevertheless he is not unjust, let us now investigate what those actions are. In the first place, however, we will show that certain things may be done unjustly, and still not be unjust; as for instance, a man may steal, or commit adultery, and yet be neither a thief nor an adulterer. For if any one should steal a sword from a maniac, lest he should wound himself, such a one steals indeed, but nevertheless is not a thief. So also if any one commits adultery for the purpose of enriching himself, he commits the crime indeed, but still is not an adulterer, but a lover of riches. If also a physician should deceive a sick person, in order to preserve him, he deceives, yet he is not a deceiver. It is manifest, therefore, that certain things may be done unjustly, and yet not be unjust according to that particular injustice, the work of which he accomplishes. But let us consider in a general way what these unjust actions are. They are such then as a person does unjustly, not for the sake of the end which is adapted to that particular injustice, of which the action is performed, but for the sake of some other end, whether it be good or base; and though, according to this, he acts unjustly, nevertheless he is not unjust. For a physician may deceive without being a deceiver, since it is not his end to deceive, but to preserve his patient. In like manner also a person stealing a sword from a maniac, does not seek to receive *the more* for

himself, and to gain secretly from his neighbour, as a thief would do; but the end he has in view is the preservation of the maniac. Every action, however, receives its form and definition from the end, and through this also its name; since a name is a concise definition. For we do not say that a general, who frequently prepares Helepolides *, or other warlike engines, for the purpose of besieging a town, is an architect or a carpenter :—he performs the works indeed of the architect and the carpenter, and is said to build; but because he has not the end of an architect in view, but that of a general, he is not an architect, but a general, and is called by that name. Thus also he who violates his neighbour's bed, but does not deliberately intend to do so through intemperance, but through a love of money, is not an adulterer, but a lover of riches. It is possible, therefore, for a man to act unjustly, and yet not be unjust according to that particular injustice of which he does the deed; but he is either not at all unjust in the same manner as the physician above-mentioned, or he acts unjustly according to a different species of injustice, in the same manner as the adulterer: and how this happens has been already explained. It is also possible, in another manner, for a man to act unjustly without being unjust, when he involuntarily acts unjustly; as for instance, a man in the night not knowing a thief, and killing some other person, acts unjustly indeed, but nevertheless is not unjust.

* The *Helepolis* was first invented by *Demetrius*, son to *Antigonus*, who having taken *Rhodes*, with several other towns, by the help of this engine, was honoured with the surname of *Poliorectes*. We have several descriptions of it left by *Vitruvius*, *Plutarch*, and *Diodorus*, who, though differing in other points, are thus far agreed, that it was a machine of prodigious bulk, not unlike the Ram covered with the shroud, but vastly bigger; and of far greater force; that it was driven both with ropes and wheels, and contained several other smaller engines, out of which stones and other missive weapons were cast.—*Potter's Antiq.* Vol. ii. p. 95.

CHAP. IX.

CONCERNING THAT SPECIES OF THE JUST, WHICH IS NOT PROPERLY JUST.

WE have spoken above concerning retaliation, and shown after what manner it is just. There is another species of the just, however, which is not properly just, such as *the paternal* and *the despotic*; for these are not properly *the just*, but in a certain respect similar to the political just. But I call that the paternal just which it is proper for a father to exercise towards his children; and that the despotic just, which it is necessary for a master to use towards his slaves. The distributive and the corrective just, therefore, are properly and truly *the just*, which is the political, and which, as we have said, subsists either in geometrical or arithmetical proportion. For in whatever things there is *the just*, in these also law is established. But law is established in those things in which an injury may be either done or suffered; for law and justice are a separation of *the just* from *the unjust*. And these are adapted to citizens; for each may injure the other by wishing to usurp to himself a larger portion of things simply good, while he gives a less to his neighbour; and contrariwise in the division of such as are pernicious. On this account we do not permit a man to govern a city following his own impulses, but we make the laws the governors, in order that he may neither govern for his own sake, nor impart to himself, in the distribution of things good, a larger share than he ought, but such as is proportional; since if he acts otherwise he will be a tyrant. For a governor wishes nothing else than the preservation of the just, that is,

the equal and the proportional; since, as we have said, he does not govern for his own sake, but for the advantage of others. Hence we denominate justice a foreign good, and on this account large rewards are assigned to good governors. And these consist of public honours and gifts; but he who is not satisfied with rewards of this kind, endeavours after a tyranny. The political just, therefore, for this reason, is properly called *the just*; but the paternal and despotic are not so. For no one can act unjustly to himself, or to a part of himself, neither does any one deliberately intend to injure his own possessions; but a child is as it were a part of his father, so long as he lives under him, and is subject to his providential care. In like manner also a slave is of advantage to his master so far and so long as he is a slave. No one, however, forms stratagems against his own interest. But in the cases above adduced, it is neither possible that the unjust, nor the properly just, *i. e.* the political just, can subsist, but merely something resembling it. For, as we have said, the political just subsists in those things in which there is law. But with a father and a child, a master and a slave, there is no law, as appears from our preceding arguments, because there can be no injustice: there is law, however, in those things in which there is an equality of governing and being governed. Hence it appears that the just rather subsists between a man and his wife than between him and his children, or possessions; for this is the *æconomic* just, and more similar to the political just, though at the same time it is different from it.

CHAP. X.

CONCERNING THE NATURAL AND LEGAL JUST; AND IN WHAT EACH OF THESE CONSISTS.

OF the political just one part is natural, but the other legal : and that is called the natural just, which every where possesses the same power, and which appears to all men to be just. Such, for example, as for him who has received a loan to return what he has borrowed, since it appears just to all men that every one should be in possession of his own. But the legal just is that which before it is legalized is indifferent, and appears to be neither just nor unjust ; but after it is legalized, it is just ; as for instance, to sell a slave for one mina ; for before the law respecting this was ordained, the sale of slaves, so far as regarded the price, was indifferent, and rested wholly on the will of the master. After this law was established, however, it was no longer indifferent ; but the just consisted in selling him at a fixed price. Particulars also are of this kind ; such, for instance, as public decrees ; as when it seemed fit to the Senate and the people that Demosthenes should receive a crown, or that Themistocles should be called Olympius ; for these things, before they were decreed, were indifferent ; but being decreed, they appeared to be just.

But there are some who think that there is nothing just by nature, and that every thing is legally so, since all things natural are immutable ; for fire every where, and at all times, heats, as well in our country as in Egypt ; but every thing just is mutable ; for to borrow, and not return that which is borrowed, appears just to some persons ; and similarly in other things. To these arguments, however, we shall

reply, that every thing just is not entirely mutable; for although, among men, every thing just should be mutable, it is necessary that the just should be immutable with the gods. Hence there is a certain natural just. But now even among men of upright and sound minds, the just, which is called natural, is immutable. If, however, the just should not appear immutable to diseased or perverted minds, it is of no consequence to our present argument; since neither does he who says that honey is sweet, speak falsely, because it appears otherwise to those who are diseased. The natural just, therefore, appears just to some men, but not just to others.

Among men of the most remote antiquity, however, who possessed sound intellect, the just was considered to be natural; but among those of later date, whose intellects are vitiated, it appears to be contrary to nature. It is evident, therefore, that nothing prevents the just from being natural, although some do not think it is so. But since both the legal and the natural just are mutable in the way we have described, in what manner are they to be distinguished, and how are both mutable? The distinction, however, is manifest. For the just itself must be examined *per se*, whether, being immutable, it contributes to the advantage of all men; or, if being dissolved, it can introduce any thing hurtful; and if it has these conditions, it is the natural just. But if it has not these conditions, it is the legal just. For it might also happen that all men used the left hand instead of the right, although it appears that the right hand is better than the left: but things legally just, that are preserved by compact, resemble those measures which are different in different places. For the measures of wine and corn are not always equal; but where men buy these commodities, they make the measures greater; but where they sell them, less. After this

manner also just things subsist which are not naturally just, but are rendered so by human institutions and compact, for they are not the same every where; since neither is there one polity to all men, though there is one polity every where, which is naturally the most excellent; in the same manner as the naturally just is every where *one* in all well-governed polities.

The actions also which are performed in such polities subsist in the same manner as universals with respect to particulars. For the things that are done are *many*; but the just or the legal, is *one*; since this is universal. For men do not order that *this particular* brave man should be honoured, and with *this particular* honour, but they simply enjoin that *every* brave man should be honoured.

CHAP. XI.

CONCERNING THE MEANING OF THE WORDS (ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ) DIKAIŌMA, (ΔΙΚΑΙΟΠΡΑΓΗΜΑ) DIKAIŌPRAGĒMA; AND (ΑΔΙΚΟΠΡΑΓΗΜΑ) ADIKŌPRAGĒMA.

Dikaiōma, however, differs from (δικαίον) *dikaion*, the just; and (ἀδικημα) *adikēma*, an injurious action, from (ἀδίκον) *adikon*, the unjust. For the just is that which is simply and universally contemplated, whether it be the legal or the natural just; such, for instance, as that a homicide should be put to death. But when the just of this kind is exercised in particulars, such as that some particular homicide should be put to death, and in some particular manner, it is then called *Dikaioma*: and the like also takes place in *adikon* and *adikēma*. Every just action, however, is called *Dikaiopragēma*, whether it be the punishment of injustice, or the

reward of virtue; but the revenge attendant upon injustice is properly *dikaïoma*. But we shall hereafter show how many species there are of *dikaïopragma* and *dikaïoma*.

We shall now, however, observe, that since just and unjust actions subsist in the manner above-mentioned, a man acts justly or unjustly when he performs either of these voluntarily; but when involuntarily, he does neither essentially, but accidentally. For actions considered by themselves are neither just nor unjust, since the definition of *adikopragma*, which consists in the voluntary, does not accord with those actions; for they are involuntary. But because the equality of justice, or the inequality of injustice, happens in these, on this account they are called unjust or just*, according to accident, and those who perform them are said to act according to *adikopragma*, or *dikaïopragma*; but when the work is voluntary *per se*, then it will be *adikema*, and *adikopragma*:—without the voluntary, however, the thing that is done will be unjust, but the action will not be *adikema*; since the man who thus acts is not unjust, although he does unjust things. For as we have shown in the former part of our discourses, it is possible that unjust things may be done, and still the agent not be unjust; since a man is then unjust, when the action is in his own power, when he is not compelled to the commission of it by any one, and when he knows, or at least is not ignorant of all the circumstances attending it. Such, for instance, as to beat any one, and for the sake of something. These things, however, we have defined in our discourse about the voluntary and the involuntary. The like also takes place with those that act

* The word *δίκαιοι* is supplied as being necessary to the sense of the context.

justly; for a man is then just, and his work is essentially *dikaiopragema*, when it is done voluntarily. For he who returns a deposit through fear, neither acts according to *dikaiopragema*, nor is he just; but is said to be so according to accident. These things, however, must be discussed in a still more accurate manner.

CHAP. XII.

CONCERNING ACTIONS ACCORDING TO (ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑ) ADIKĒMA, AND THOSE THAT ARE UNFORTUNATE; ALSO CONCERNING SUCH AS ARE PARDONABLE, AND SUCH AS ARE UNPARDONABLE.

SINCE damages are sustained in the mutual communions of men, some indeed are voluntary, but others involuntary: and of the latter some are called errors, and others misfortunes. It is an error then when one man causes damage to another involuntarily, but is yet in a certain respect the cause of the damage: as for instance, if any one shooting an arrow in a public road, in which it happens that a man is passing, should kill him; for thus he will kill the man unwillingly, though by shooting an arrow in a place of that kind, he is the cause of the man's death. But it is a misfortune when a damage happens contrary to all expectation: as if any one shooting an arrow in a desert place, and it should happen that he kills a person passing by. For here the damage happens contrary to reasonable expectation and opinion; and he who caused the damage contributes nothing to it, unless by accident, but the whole cause of the person's death would be external to him.

Of voluntary actions, however, some according to *adikema* are said to proceed from pre-election, but others not so. Actions indeed that are previously consulted upon proceed from pre-election; as when any one, considering and deliberating, damages another for the sole purpose of doing him harm. But such as arise from some particular passion, and are not previously deliberated upon, do not proceed from pre-election; as for instance, when a man, being constrained by anger, suddenly does harm to his neighbour, or being oppressed by poverty, steals, not indeed wishing to do ill for the sake of committing evil, but in order that he may relieve his own indigence. Each of these, however, as well that which arises from pre-election as that which does not, is called *adikema*.

But of persons thus acting, he who does harm to another designedly is unjust and depraved. He who does so, however, in consequence of being excited by passion, whether it be a natural one, as anger or pain, or a necessary one, as hunger or fear, such a man will be neither unjust nor depraved.

Hence also he who repels an injury is distinguished by the judge from him with whom it originates; but he is not said to begin who is enraged, but he who provoked the anger, and the latter is accused as an unjust man, since he thus becomes the cause of the damage. On this account also he who begins the injury, denies that he did begin it; but he who repels it, acknowledges the damage which he received from the other, but at the same time calls it defence and retaliation, because he is not internally excited by anger but by him who does the injury. For in these cases, controversies do not take place in the same manner as in voluntary contracts, since in them the action admits of a doubt; for instance, if a man should receive a deposit or a loan, and not return

it, and this should be proved, he would immediately be declared depraved and unjust, unless he denied the receipt of them through forgetfulness. But here the action is acknowledged and manifest, since he who acts from the impulse of anger acts manifestly. It may be doubted, however, whether, when a man strikes another, he does it justly or unjustly. Hence he who begins the injury, and at the same time does it designedly, is thought to be unjust, and on this account does not acknowledge that he did begin it; but the other, who is provoked to anger by him, does not think himself unjust, and on that account acknowledges the injury.

It will be evident, however, from what follows, that a man who injures another by such actions as proceed from anger, or any other passion, and not from depravity, is not unjust according to these actions; but he who injures another designedly is unjust and base, not only in the corrective just, but in the distributive just, if he does not distribute according to equality and proportion. In like manner also he will act justly in both these species of the just, who does that which is just, not through any passion, but for the sake of good; for he who is moved by passion, whether it be pain or love, and at the same time acts justly, does just things indeed, but nevertheless is not just.

But since of the involuntary actions, according to *adikema*, some obtain pardon, and others do not, let us consider what actions of this kind are pardonable, and what are not so. Such errors, therefore, as a man commits both ignorantly, and through ignorance, are pardonable; but such as he commits ignorantly indeed, and not through ignorance, but through some passion which is neither natural nor human (such as are fear, or pain, or hunger, or any other necessity) but in order to gratify luxury, as those who desire to drink very

delicate wine, or to feast on partridges,—these are unpardonable. A man may err, however, both through ignorance and ignorantly; as for instance, if he is ignorant that it is wrong to drive away his father, and if by reason of the night, not knowing that it is his father, he should drive him from his house. For he who does not know *the universal* is said to act *ignorantly*; but he who does not know the *particular*, is said to act *through ignorance*. And he who has no knowledge of either is said to err both ignorantly and through ignorance, who also is pardoned. But a man acts ignorantly, and not through ignorance, when though ignorant of the universal, as that it is wrong to steal, yet he nevertheless steals, not because he is ignorant, but through depravity, and a passion which, as we have observed above, is neither necessary nor natural.

CHAP. XIII.

THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A MAN TO SUFFER AN INJURY VOLUNTARILY.

It may seem, perhaps, that we have not made a sufficient distinction in our discourse concerning the just and the unjust. For since to do an injury is opposed to suffering one, and we have divided the former into the voluntary and the involuntary, the latter will be subject to a like division, which also was the opinion of Euripides; for in the following words, he says, that a man may suffer an injury voluntarily:—
 “To speak briefly, I may kill my mother, both of us being willing; or, I being unwilling, and she willing.”

For since the doing and receiving an injury are opposed to each

other, it is necessary that the whole of the former should be voluntary, and the whole of the latter involuntary; or since the former is divided into the voluntary and involuntary, it is necessary that the latter should be in like manner divided in order that the one may be opposed to the other. It would appear, however, that acting justly, and being dealt justly by, are subject to the same conditions; but it would be absurd to think that the whole of receiving an injury, or of being acted justly by, is voluntary: for it frequently happens that a man obtains justice contrary to his will, as when he is punished in consequence of acting unjustly. On this supposition also a man may voluntarily receive an injury: this, however, is not true; for every one suffers an injury against his will. But at one time a man obtains justice involuntarily, and at another voluntarily; for he who does an injury and is punished, obtains justice, though involuntarily; and he who suffers an injury, and receives reparation for it, also has justice done him, but voluntarily.

What has been said, however, with respect to obtaining justice, is sufficient; but the assertion that no man can suffer an injury voluntarily, must be discussed more perspicuously.

And in the first place we shall adduce those arguments, whence it may seem to be inferred that it is possible for a man to suffer an injury voluntarily. For since to commit an injury voluntarily is the same thing as to cause damage to another unjustly, knowing at the same time both the damage, and the person who sustains the damage, not being ignorant also of any of the attendant circumstances; and further being internally excited, and not compelled by any external force;—the sustaining of an injury voluntarily will be nothing else than to suffer a damage contrary to what is just, knowing at the same time

both the damage, and him who inflicts it, and also all the circumstances relating to it, when he who suffers it, though able to repel, nevertheless endures it.

But that this takes place is evident ; for the intemperate man sustains damage from another, and knowing all the attendant circumstances, endures it, though at the same time it is in his power to avoid it. Hence, therefore, an injury may be suffered voluntarily. Again, the intemperate man causes damage to himself, and that willingly ; whence we may conclude, that for a man to receive an injury from himself voluntarily is the same thing as to suffer that which is unjust. But a man does suffer unjust things willingly ; for the more equitable in distributions, willingly receive less than their desert, which indeed is unjust, but nevertheless voluntary ; and hence they are voluntarily injured. The fact, however, is contrary to this ; and it is impossible for any one to suffer an injury voluntarily. For a man is then injured when he suffers any thing unjust against his will ; but to suffer any thing contrary to the will, is contrary to the definition of the voluntary ; so that it is not possible for any one, not even an incontinent man, to will an injury to himself, since even he wishes well to himself, and in short cannot endure to be injured. He endures the injury of incontinence, however, because he imagines that he does not suffer any detriment : he thinks also that it is proper to do those things which may benefit him, though he does such as are detrimental to him, fancying that they are not so. Hence it is not possible for any one to sustain an injury voluntarily : and thus also the contrary arguments are dissolved. For a man commits an injury when he does harm to another willingly, and that in opposition to the will of the person injured. In like manner also a man is injured when he sustains any

thing unjust contrary to his will; but to suffer unjust things voluntarily, is not to be injured. For as we have before shown, to commit an unjust action is not the whole of acting unjustly, neither is he who does unjust things always unjust; so neither is every one injured who suffers unjust things. But as the physician who deceives his patient, or the man who steals a sword from a maniac, acts unjustly; nevertheless neither is unjust, because each looks to the preservation of the diseased person, and is not the cause of harm, but rather of advantage to him: thus also he who in distribution assigns less to himself than his desert, does not injure himself although he suffers something unjust; for he does not endure a less share than he deserves, with a view to his own injury, but rather that he may benefit himself by gaining the reputation of being moderate and equitable. In the next place, even though he should sustain damage, he is not injured, since he does not suffer that which is unjust contrary to his will; for this it is that constitutes the suffering of an injury. For he who exchanges one thing of great value for another less valuable, is not injured; as in the instance adduced by Homer of the voluntary exchange made between Glaucus and Diomed.

Brave Glaucus then each narrow thought resign'd,
(Jove warm'd his bosom, and enlarg'd his mind,)
For Diomed's brass arms of mean device,
For which nine oxen paid a vulgar price.
He gave his own, of gold divinely wrought,
A hundred beeves the shining purchase bought.

IL. Book vi.

Since he gave them willingly; but he who is injured suffers a damage involuntarily. Hence it is not possible for a man to be injured voluntarily, though he may voluntarily sustain a loss.

CHAP. XIV.

WHETHER HE WHO DISTRIBUTES UNJUSTLY DOES A GREATER INJURY THAN HE WHO RECEIVES UNJUSTLY.

BUT let us now discuss this question;—whether he who distributes unjustly, and not according to proportion, or he who receives more than is due to his desert, commits the greater injury? It appears, however, that he who thus distributes does an injury *essentially*, but the receiver, *accidentally*; for he commits an injury essentially, who does it willingly. But a man acts willingly when the cause and the principle of the action are with himself: the principle of distribution, however, is with the distributor; and hence he who distributes does a greater injury essentially than he who receives, since, as we have said, the principle is not with the receiver. For he who does unjust things is not said to commit an injury, unless according to accident; just as when the hand, or a sword, or a stone, is said to commit a murder, the principle of the murder is not with them, neither do they perpetrate it from themselves; for though they effect unjust things, they are not by any means unjust. But he who distributes unjustly, if being ignorant of the law, he forms a judgment foreign from the legal just, does not do an injury according to the law, neither is the judgment unjust; he may, however, commit an injury according to another species of the just, I mean the natural just: for the legal just is one thing, and the natural just another. Thus, for instance, let us suppose it is established by law, that those who strenuously contend in contests should have *the more* in distribution, and that he who distributes, being ignorant of the law, should think such persons

worthy only of an equal portion with others: in this case, therefore, he would not act unjustly according to the legal just, since he is ignorant of the law: but he who does unjust things through ignorance, does not act unjustly. Since, however, it is a natural law that those who benefit should be reciprocally benefited, and a man though not ignorant of this in consequence of its being natural, yet transgresses, he, according to this, is unjust; but if he transgresses knowing both the law and the natural just, and judges unjustly, and gives *the more* to him who ought not to receive it; he not only makes the receiver usurp more than is proper, but he himself does the same thing. For he who acts unjustly, whether he be influenced by friendship, by enmity, or a bribe, is equally the cause of an action according to *adikema*, since he also is an usurper, either of favour with respect to a friend, or of vengeance to an enemy, or of money; and on this account also he partakes of the *adikema* with him who receives the undue proportion: just as if some one should unjustly convey land for the sake of a bribe to him who ought not to have it, such a man would be said to co-divide the land with the receiver, although he would not receive land, but money: thus also he who acts unjustly in distributions with a view to the gratification either of himself or his friend, partakes of the usurpation, and is equally concerned in the action according to *adikema*. He also who receives has indeed an undue proportion, and acts unjustly; he does not commit an injury, however, unless he persuades the distributor, either by bribes, or some other inducement. But he who distributes and possesses *the more* after the manner we have mentioned, is also unjust.

CHAP. XV.

THAT IT IS NOT EASY FOR EVERY ONE AT ALL TIMES TO BE EITHER UNJUST OR JUST.

THERE are some persons, however, who think that it is easy to act either unjustly or justly; and that it is possible, whenever they are willing, to become either just or unjust: but this is not the case. For though to perform just or unjust actions, to give money, or strike a neighbour, are indeed easy, and may be done by any one at pleasure, yet to possess the *habit* of justice or injustice, which requires time and exercise, through which habit a man is said to be either just or unjust, is not in our power so as that together with the will it is easy for us to obtain it.

In like manner they think that the knowledge both of the just and the unjust is easy, and that to know these things is no great mark of wisdom, because it is not difficult to understand *those things* which the laws prescribe: they say, however, that *these* are just; but they are not so unless it be according to accident. For law thus simply observed, and thus casually perfected, and by any one, is not at all times just; but then it is so when it is observed in a proper manner, and when, and by whom, it ought. To know these things, however, according to each particular law, is more difficult than to know what contributes to health; for here it is easy to know that there are such things as honey and wine; hellebore, and burning; puncturing, and cutting; but to know *how* it is proper to apply each of these towards the attainment of health, and to whom each is adapted, and the proper time, is as great a work as to become a physician.

On this account also they think that a just man may be able to act unjustly, not only in a no less degree than an unjust man, but even in a greater, through being able to do unjust things, since he may have it in his power both to strike a person who has done him no injury, and to take away the property of another. A brave man also may throw away his shield, and betake himself to flight; but simply to do unjust things is not to act unjustly, neither is it cowardice to commit cowardly actions, unless according to accident. But to do these things in conjunction with habit,—this indeed is to act cowardly, or unjustly; as when any one, not being simply willing, but because he is influenced by the passion of cowardice, flies; or possessing the habit of injustice, acts unjustly. In the same manner also to act medically, and give health, does not consist in cutting, or in administering, or not administering medicine, but in doing these things, as, and when, it is proper, possessing at the same time a medical habit. We have defined, therefore, both the corrective and the distributive just, concerning which we proposed to treat, and shown what each is essentially, and how each subsists.

Let us now consider how *the just* subsists with respect to *the equitable*, and *Justice* with respect to *Equity*, adding this only to our discourse about the just, that both the distributive, and the corrective, consist in those things which partake of such as are simply good; for instance, wealth or glory, in which excess and defect are found; since it is possible to exceed, or fall short of the becoming, both in glory and in wealth. For in things that thus subsist, equality and proportion are investigated; and those who partake of such things have need both of the distributive and the corrective just. Among the gods indeed inequality has no place; neither in them is there excess or defect; and hence

they have no need of justice of this kind. Neither is there among men who are entirely depraved, and corrupted by luxury, or any other depravity; for in those who are to be cured of disease, it is necessary that there should be a certain sound part, in order that the physician may recal health from that part. Those, however, who are entirely corrupted are incurable:—whence also the just has no subsistence with those who are entirely depraved and corrupt; but it has with those who both will, and do, just things as far as human power permits, and who again err so far as it belongs to man.

CHAP. XVI.

CONCERNING EQUITY, AND THE EQUITABLE.

IT now follows that we should discourse concerning *Equity* and the *Equitable*, and show how the former subsists with relation to *justice*; and the latter with respect to *the just*; since all these are not the same, neither are they different in genus. For so far as the equitable is more laudable than the just, so far also the equitable appears to be better than the just man. But further, we transfer this comparison to other things, when it is necessary to praise certain virtues; for we say, that one is more equitable than another, not meaning that it is more just, but that it is better: and according to this, equity appears to be something different from justice. Again, following reason it appears absurd to say, that if the equitable is different from the just, it is still laudable.

For if it be laudable, it is also just, since every thing laudable is just ; and justice is a perfect virtue, as has been shown above. But if it be not just, neither is it laudable : or if the equitable be laudable, the just is not so. From these arguments, therefore, a doubt is raised. Both, however, are rightly urged, as well that which asserts that the just is the same, as that which asserts that it is different ; and yet these are not in opposition to each other. For the equitable is also just, and even better than a *certain just*, and it is not better than *the just*, as being heterogeneous, but as being a part of another homogeneous part. And since the equitable and the just are both worthy, the former is more worthy than the latter. The occasion of this doubt, however, is as follows :—the equitable is just, but not according to law ; for it is not comprehended under law, but is a correction of the legal just. The cause, however, of this correction is, that every law determines universally. In some particulars indeed it is not possible that it should accord with right reason, because law is definite, and looks to something definite ; but particulars are indefinite, and subsist differently at different times. For instance, law *universally* orders that every stranger, scaling the walls of a city, shall be put to death ; some stranger, however, may ascend the walls, strenuously exerting himself for its benefit : if, therefore, we should put this law in force against such a man, and sentence him to death contrary to right reason, we should also do what is just. The like also happens in many other cases. This error, however, is neither in the law nor in the legislator, but in the very nature of things. For law, since it is impossible to embrace every particular, particulars being indefinite, assumes that which most frequently occurs ; and regarding that, promulgates its decrees. And the legislator leaves

the law indefinite, not because he is ignorant of the offence, but because it is not possible that the nature of things, which subsist differently at different times, should be subject to definition. For the matter of practical things is indefinite, and undergoes many mutations. On this account, legislators attentively regard those things which happen for the most part; for it seldom occurs that a stranger scales the wall of a city, in time of war, for the purpose of benefiting, but very frequently for the purpose of destroying it.

Since it is necessary, therefore, to know how law of this kind should be enforced, and when, and to whom, it is requisite also that there should be a certain habit according to which we may be able to correct errors of this kind. But this habit is Equity, according to which the defect of law is supplied, the error is corrected, and the definition is added, which it had lost, in consequence of not knowing every particular. For the equitable man says, that every stranger ascending the walls of a city should be put to death, provided he does it with an insidious design; but if he should do this, strenuously contending for the good of the city, let him not only be thought worthy of preservation, but also of rewards: and the legislator himself would say the same if he were present; and, if it were necessary, would establish it by law. After the same manner also the equitable man will correct other similar laws. On this account Equity is not only just, but even better than a certain species of the just; not than the universal indeed, but the legal just, which errs in consequence of its universality; and it is the very nature of equity to correct law, so far as it errs and is defective on account of this universality. This too is the cause why every thing which is done justly is not conformable to law, because laws belong to the universal and things that happen for

the most part ; and hence the decrees become necessary that magistrates make in particular cases, which subsist differently at different times ; but of those things which are indefinite, the rule also is indefinite. Just as a leaden rule is used in the Lesbian building, which is bent to the figure of the stone ; for after the same manner also decrees are changed conformably to circumstances.

It has been shown, therefore, what the equitable and equity are, that they are just, and how they subsist with relation to the universal just, and what species of the just they excel. It is also manifest from hence who is the equitable man : for he is one who deliberately chooses, and does the things which we have mentioned, is not accurately just in that which tends to the worse, but rather relaxes from the accurately just, although it has the law in its favour. And this habit itself is equity, which is a certain justice, and is no other than, nor a different habit from, justice.

CHAP. XVII.

THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR A MAN TO INJURE HIMSELF.

BUT let us speak more fully concerning the suffering an injury, whether it can at any time be voluntary. Since, therefore, with respect to justice and injustice, one kind of justice, as we have shown, is a universal and perfect, and another a partial, virtue; and the like division takes place with respect to injustice as a vice, it is evident that a man cannot injure himself either according to universal or partial injustice, although it may seem to be possible. On this account, since the law does not order a man to kill himself, it is contrary to law to do so, since law forbids that which it does not order. But that which is illegal is unjust, and he who kills himself acts unjustly: he, however, who commits an injury, does it to some one; but it is evident in this case that he does it to himself, and also voluntarily: he is, therefore, voluntarily injured. Further still, he who does harm to any person contrary to law, not for the purpose of taking vengeance, or retaliating an injury, but as the author of the damage, voluntarily acts unjustly, especially since he both knows the damage and him who is damaged, together with all the attending circumstances. He, however, who destroys himself through rage, does not revenge himself, and at the same time both knowing himself, and the damage, and all the circumstances relating to it, voluntarily acts unjustly: but if he voluntarily acts unjustly, he is also injured voluntarily. Hence it would seem that a man may voluntarily injure himself according to the universal

species of injustice, which is contrary to universal justice, this being the use of the whole of virtue ; since for a man to destroy himself through anger, is contrary to the law which prescribes mildness. But it has been shown above, that this is impossible ; for the definition of suffering an injury, is contrary to the definition of the voluntary.

The contrary opinion, however, is true so far as it asserts that he voluntarily commits an injury who destroys himself ; but so far as it asserts that he injures himself, it is false. For he is not injured, (since the evil does not happen contrary to his will,) but the city, which suffers the loss of either a general, or a common soldier, or an architect, or, in short, a citizen ; and this contrary to its will. On this account the city, as being injured, inflicts a punishment on him by such means as are in its power ; for it does not suffer the body of the offender to be buried.

We have shown, therefore, that, according to universal injustice, an injury is not suffered voluntarily. But, according to partial injustice, which consists in usurpation, how is it possible that any one can injure himself ? For if to do an injury, according to this species of injustice, is nothing else than to possess more than another, he will have more than himself, who injures himself ; but if more than himself, he must also have less ; and the same person will, at the same time, both add to, and take away from, himself, which is impossible ; since it is necessary that this species of the just should have relation to two persons at least. For thus it is possible both to add and take away, and also to injure and be injured.

Again, it is necessary that the commission of an injury should precede the endurance of it, and also that it should be committed voluntarily, and with a premeditated design ; for he who retaliates be-

cause he has suffered, does not appear to do an injury. It is necessary, however, according to this reasoning, that he who injures himself should both do, and suffer an injury, (because the same person both does and sustains the injury, and at the same time both injures and is injured. Hence it is requisite that this species of injustice should relate to many persons, and therefore it is not possible for a man to injure himself. Besides, he who acts unjustly, is no other than he who acts according to *adikema* in particular instances; and without recurring to particulars, it is neither possible to inflict an injury, nor in short to do any thing else. But theft, insolence, blows, and house-breaking, rank among particulars. No one, however, steals from himself, or breaks into his own house, or is insolent to, or strikes himself. But, in short, the assertion that any one injures himself, or suffers an injury, voluntarily, is proved to be false from the definition of suffering an injury, which is to endure unjust things contrary to a man's will.

CHAP. XVIII.

THAT IT IS A WORSE EVIL TO DO AN INJURY THAN TO SUFFER ONE.

It is evident, however, that it is bad both to do, and suffer, an injury, since both are departures from the medium;—to do an injury indeed is a greater, and to suffer one a lesser, deviation from it; but to act justly, according to *dikaiopragma*, is the medium and the equal, in like manner as the salubrious in medicine, and a good condition of body in gymnastic, are also the equal and the middle. It is bad, therefore, both to commit and suffer an injury; but worse to do one; for this is both base and blameable; and it is base either according to perfect vice, which is universal injustice, or according to partial vice: it is also done either voluntarily, and with a deliberate intention, which is *perfectly* to do an injury, or it is done voluntarily, but not with a deliberate intention, which nearly approximates to, but is not, a *perfect* injury; for not every thing voluntary is either noxious to one's neighbour, or unjust. It is indeed an evil to suffer an injury, but it is not blameable, unless any one suffers it through his own depravity or vice. Hence, therefore, it is a less evil to suffer, than to do, an injury. Nothing, however, prevents it from proving a worse evil accidentally, since it frequently happens that to suffer an injury becomes the cause of a greater damage, than to do one. For example, if any one being enraged in consequence of sustaining an injury, should burn the house of him who inflicted it, and it should thereby happen that the whole city should be burnt. Notwithstanding this, however, it is a greater evil to do an injury; for nothing is itself worse than itself through any

accidental circumstance; since neither is a pleurisy a less evil than a lame foot, because it may happen that some one being thus lame, may be captured by the enemy, and put to death.

That which is properly just, therefore, and that which is properly unjust; and both justice and injustice are what we have described them to be. It is said, however, that there is another just, which is not properly *the just*, but only according to metaphor and similitude; namely, that which a man exercises with respect to his own property; as a master towards his slave, or a father towards his child; according to which also the soul is said to be just or unjust towards the parts of herself, and the rational is distinguished from the irrational part; for the former governs, and orderly arranges; but the latter is governed, and is orderly arranged; to which also some directing their attention, think that a man may injure himself, or do himself justice, because at one time reason follows the irrational part, and at another contends with it, as when a man does any thing in opposition to his natural appetites; and these two parts subsist in the relation of the governing to the governed. *The just* also in these has the same relation as the governor to the governed. Let justice, therefore, and the other ethical virtues, be after this manner defined.

THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

BOOK VI.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING RIGHT REASON:—THAT WHAT IT IS REMAINS TO BE DEFINED.

SINCE in our preceding discourses we have laid it down as a fundamental principle that there is a medium which is laudable and most excellent in every passion and action, and that it is proper that this medium, but neither excess nor defect, should be the object of choice; and since we have also said that it is that medium which right reason prescribes, let us now consider what right reason is, and how it is to be defined.

For in every habit about which we have before treated, as also in other actions and habits, there is a certain scope towards which he who is endued with reason, looking and placing himself under its guidance, increases those things which are less than the becoming, but contracts such as exceed it, whether they be passions or actions, or any thing else, which admits of intention or remission. This too is a rule and boundary through which the medium may be known, which we say is produced according to right reason, and lies between excess and defect.

It is necessary, therefore, that those who intend to understand the medium, should know its rule and definition. But this is right reason.

Simply to say, however, that the middle is produced according to right reason is true indeed, but by no means perspicuous ; since it is still immanifest to those who are unacquainted with right reason. For in other actions and pursuits also in which there is science, it is true indeed to say that it is neither proper to labour more nor less than is becoming, but in a moderate manner, and as right reason prescribes. It is not possible, however, to learn the becoming from this alone ; for neither does any one know what things are medicinal or salubrious, and what are proper to be administered to a sick person, if he merely hears that those are salubrious and medicinal, which the medical art, or the physician, possessing a medical habit, prescribes. For though the assertion is true, the thing investigated is no less immanifest.

After the same manner also with respect to the media of the soul, it is not only necessary to make a true assertion, but one that is manifest :—this, however, is to determine concerning right reason, both what it is and how it is defined. Let us, therefore, assume a more exalted exordium about right reason.

CHAP. II.

THE DIVISION OF THE RATIONAL PART OF THE SOUL ;—AND WHAT THOSE PARTICULARS ARE IN US WHICH HAVE DOMINION OVER ACTION.

HAVING, in our preceding discourses, divided the virtues of the soul, we said that some are ethical, such as pertain to the passive part; but others dianoëtic, which pertain to the dianoëtic part of the soul. Since, therefore, we have discussed the ethical virtues, it now remains to speak of the others, in which we shall discover right reason, first premising our former observation, that there are two parts of the soul; namely, the rational, and the irrational.

But now dividing the rational part, we say that this also has a two-fold division :—one through which we know things necessary, which always subsist after the same manner, and which have not a various subsistence; but the other through which we know things contingent, and such as subsist differently at different times.

For since the objects of knowledge are different, and dissimilar in species, it will also follow that there are different species of knowledge. For it is indispensably requisite that knowledge should be similar to the thing known; necessary knowledge to a necessary object; and contingent knowledge to one that is contingent; for contingent knowledge is that which is not always verified; and knowledge is false when the object known does not subsist in the same manner as when it was first known; but that which does not subsist as it did at first, pertains to things contingent, and such as subsist differently at different times. The knowledge of things contingent, therefore, is contingent; and on

the same account that which pertains to things necessary is necessary. For all knowledge is produced according to similitude and affinity, since there is a certain adaptation and contact between that which knows and the thing known.

Since, therefore, knowledge is two-fold, one indeed *necessary*, but the other *contingent*, let the former be called *scientific*, and the latter *ratiocinative*, or *deliberative*. For to reason and deliberate are the same thing, deliberation being conversant about things contingent, and no one deliberating about such as have not a various subsistence; since it is necessary that things which have not a various, should have a sameness of subsistence; and these are neither moved nor changed by deliberation. Since, therefore, the deliberative part of the soul is conversant with things contingent, and we say that the ratiocinative is conversant with the same things, these parts will be the same. The deliberative part of the soul, therefore, will be a certain other part of the rational nature.

But since our present discourse is about the dianoëtic virtues, that is, such as reside in the ratiocinative dianoëtic part, and the parts of the rational nature are the scientific and deliberative, it is our business to investigate the dianoëtic virtues in those parts of the soul. Let us, therefore, consider which is the best habit of each of these; for this habit will be the virtue of each. But since virtue is contemplated in its own proper works, we must consider what particular works are adapted to the scientific, and what to the deliberative part.

There are three things, therefore, in the soul, which have dominion over actions and truth. Intellect and sense have dominion over truth, because each is knowledge; but knowledge has truth for its end. Appetite has dominion over action; since the principle of every action consists in it, and it is the cause of every work. For intellect

knows what is proper to be done, but the excitement to the action is produced from appetite: sense, however, is not the principle of any action. And this is evident from irrational animals; for it is not possible that merely being endued with sense, they should possess action; since action is an energy in conjunction with deliberation. Hence sense is not the cause of any action, but intellect and appetite are the principles of all actions: the former indeed teaching us what are proper to be done, but the latter exciting us to the performance of them.

But pursuit and avoidance have the same relation in the orectic, as affirmation and negation have in the dianoëtic, part; so that since ethical virtue is a pre-elective habit, but pre-election is a deliberative appetite, (for pre-election is to will and choose the object of deliberation) it is altogether necessary, if pre-election be good and worthy, that such things should be chosen as are worthy, and also that the will of rightly directed appetite should tend to good. Pre-election, however, cannot choose good unless assisted by deliberation: hence it is necessary that deliberation should assert truth, but pre-election embrace it; that appetites should pursue good; and that what deliberation asserts, appetite should pursue. The dianoëtic part of the soul, therefore, *i. e.* the ratiocinative and deliberative, and the truth which subsists according to it, is called practical, because it has the practice of good for its end, and the truth which it embraces is its work, which truth is conversant with good and evil; but the work of the contemplative, and not of the practical, dianoëtic part, is truth and falsehood, and has the knowledge of truth for its end; for this is the business of the whole dianoëtic part, so far as it is dianoëtic. But he who energizes both dianoëtically and practically has for his work that truth which accords with worthy action, and with appetite which subsists rightly and worthily.

CHAP. III.

THAT PRACTICAL DIANOËTIC ENERGY IS THE PRINCIPLE OF PRE-ELECTION.

PRE-ELECTION, therefore, is the cause and principle of action, though not the final, but rather the efficient, cause; since we do not act for the sake of pre-election; for we deliberately intend a thing before we do it, but the end is subsequent to the action. Appetite and reason, however, are the principles of pre-election, and this is deliberation. But one part of the rational part of the soul is ratiocinative and deliberative, which investigates truth indeed though not essentially, but for the sake of doing good. Hence then, because reason and appetite are the principles of pre-election, it is not possible that pre-election should exist without the dianoëtic energy, and ethical habit; for from the latter the appetite of good or evil is produced.

So far, however, as the dianoëtic energy is contemplative, it is not the principle of any thing, for it is not the motive of any thing; but so far alone as it is practic of the above-mentioned things, it is the principle of appetite, pre-election, and action. Further still, the principle of the effective, is the practical dianoëtic energy itself; for the effective differs from the practical, since the latter has good for its end; viz. to do that well which is good; and it looks as far as to this, that it may do well the things which present themselves to appetite. But the effective is to do those same good things well, and has human felicity for its end; the end also of the practical dianoëtic energy is essential, but the end of the effective relative; for it is referred to man, and investigates that which is beneficial to man. Since, therefore, that

which the practical dianoëtic energy has for its end, and of which it is the principle and cause, I mean the practice of good; this the efficient has for the principle of its proper end, (for human felicity proceeds from good actions;)—on this account also it is called the principle of it.

But since the dianoëtic energy is the principle of appetite, and appetite of pre-election, pre-election will be either orectic intellect, or dianoëtic appetite or desire. These things, however, can alone subsist in the rational animal; and such is man.

CHAP. IV.

CONCERNING ART, SCIENCE, PRUDENCE, INTELLECT, AND WISDOM; AND IN WHAT RESPECT SCIENCE DIFFERS FROM THE REST.

SUCH, therefore, is pre-election. But the objects of pre-election, that is to say, those of which we are able to make a previous choice, are contingent, and of these, such as are future; for no one deliberates whether it is proper to do things that are past: neither does any one make previous choice of those which he does not deliberate upon; since, as we have shown in our discourse about pre-election, the objects of deliberation are also the objects of pre-election. For no one would deliberately choose to overthrow Troy, whence Agathon rightly says,

“ All things to God are possible, save one,
 “ That to undo, which is already done.”

And thus indeed these things subsist. Let us, however, discourse more accurately about the work of both the scientific, and the deliberative,

dianoëtic part of the soul; for truth, as has been demonstrated, is the work of each; but this being shown, the virtue of them will also be manifest; for the virtue of each consists in its own peculiar work, since to effect a peculiar work well and worthily, constitutes virtue. The habits, therefore, according to which each part is able to verify its own proper truth, as much as possible, are the virtues of each.

Assuming a more elevated exordium, therefore, let us again speak about these habits. Since our present discourse is concerning truth, we must inquire in how many ways the soul is able to enunciate truth in affirming and denying; and how many habits there are according to which we may enunciate truth. They are five in number; namely, Art, Science, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intellect; for we shall omit *Hypolēpsis**, and Opinion, as asserting truth only contingently. For of the before-mentioned five powers, intellect and science never deceive, since their very being consists in the enunciation of truth from necessity. Art, however, prudence, and wisdom, sometimes deceive, not indeed through themselves, but through the irregularity of their subject matter. For a doctrine is then said to deceive essentially, when falsehood is collected from its own rules; but if this doctrine subsists sanely with respect to its peculiar rules, but the things subsisting differently at different times, produce the false, not the doctrine itself, but hypolepsis and opinion may be justly called false; and the objects of knowledge always subsisting after the same manner, hypolepsis and opinion are deceived. Whence it is evident that the doctrine does not deceive essentially; as for instance, to fancy that the sun is no more than a foot in diameter, or that the moon possesses light from herself; for

* *υποληψις*, i. e. a definitive conception of that which is contingent.



since these luminaries always subsist, as they have subsisted, it is the opinion and hypolepsis, or conjecture about them that deceives.

There are five powers, therefore, that enunciate truth, as we have said: let us, however, consider what each is; for although they resemble each other, (since many things are common both to art and science, and again to science and wisdom, and similarly with the rest) nevertheless to those who accurately regard them they will be found different, and the definition of each is also different.

Science then is the knowledge of things *necessary*; for we say that a thing is scientifically known which cannot subsist otherwise, and of which the truth is stable with us in consequence of its permanency: for truth conversant with things contingent is not thus stable, since after they are known, they are changed, and we are frequently ignorant that they no longer exist; so that neither the definition, nor the truth concerning them, is stable, but subsists differently at different times: but that of which the knowledge is stable and firm, is necessary, and always subsists alike. Things perpetual, however, are of this kind: hence it is necessary that the object of science should be perpetual, and that science should be the knowledge of things perpetual.

Further still, every science is didactic, or capable of being taught, and the object of science may be learned.

But every thing doctrinal, and every discipline are produced from pre-subsisting knowledge, as we have shown in our Analytics:—hence there are principles of every science. Some of them indeed have their principles immediate and indemonstrable, which are proved by induction; such are the principles of geometry; but others originate from demonstrable principles, which are proved by syllogism from another more elevated science; and such is the optical science, which employs

the demonstrations of geometry as principles. Induction, therefore, is as it were the principle of indemonstrable principles*, which, though universal, are known from particulars. But syllogism, which gives credibility to the demonstrated principles of certain sciences, possesses both universal principles and indemonstrable conceptions. The principles of science, therefore, are universal and common conceptions, from which, being assumed as hypotheses, we syllogize, and to which, not syllogism, but induction, gives credibility; from which science, another, which is said to be under it, is demonstrated. Hence every science is demonstrated from self-credible and ultimate principles.

Science, therefore, is a habit demonstrative from things that have an essential subsistence; and this so far as they are essential, and it receives its completion from such things as are first, and the causes of the conclusion, as we have defined in our Analytics. For when any one believes certain hypotheses, and the principles of a thing are known to him, he is then able to know it scientifically; since if he should not know the principles, and the propositions are not more evident to him than the conclusion, he will possess science according to accident only; for a man of this kind does not scientifically know through himself, and through his inherent knowledge of principles, but perhaps merely in consequence of hearing them from others; for if he should thus know the conclusion through the principles, he will know the principles more than the conclusion; since that through which a thing is known, is more known than that thing. Let science, therefore, be defined after this manner.

* That is, Axioms.

CHAP. V.

CONCERNING ART.

LET us now discourse about art. For of the things that are contingent, and subsist differently at different times, some are effective, but others practic; and the former are such as *effect* is conversant with, but the latter those about which *action* is conversant. Effect indeed is that, the work of which is posterior to the making; but since effect is different from action, the *practical* habit in conjunction with reason, will be different from the *effective* habit in conjunction with reason. They are not so far different, however, as to be comprehended under each other, as are the partial and the universal, but in the same manner as *horse* and *ox*. For action is not reduced under effect, since it is not effect; neither is effect reduced under action, for it is not action. This is evident, however, from the definition of each; for there is one definition of action, and another of effect. But art is a habit *effective* in conjunction with reason, such as the architectural art; but prudence is a habit *practic* in conjunction with reason, as will hereafter be shown. Art, therefore, differs from science, since it is conversant with things contingent:—it differs also from prudence, because it is effective, and not practic; for every art is a habit effective in conjunction with true reason; and a habit of this kind is art; for they are convertible.

But every art is conversant with the generation of those things which may, or may not, be produced. As for instance, the building art is employed about the production of a house, and the shipwright's of a ship, which may or may not be produced, except that it is not

conversant about the production of every thing contingent; but about those only of which the principle of generation is in the maker, and not in the thing made, as is the case with natural productions; for in things which are produced according to nature, the principle of generation is in the things themselves; and they are indeed contingent, but not artificial: for they have not the cause of their subsistence externally, as is the case with a house with respect to an architect, and of a ship with respect to a shipwright.

Art and fortune, however, are nearly conversant about the same subjects; for fortune has its being in those things, the cause of whose subsistence is external; since if things casual had the principles of their subsistence in themselves, they would not appear paradoxical; but now they are on this account objects of wonder, because the cause of them is not only external, but originates whence no one would expect it to originate; for digging the earth may frequently become the cause of acquiring wealth, since any one digging for the foundation of a house may by chance discover a treasure. This, however, is contrary to expectation, because digging is not the essential cause of acquiring wealth; since if it were so, every one who digs would be rich, but only an accidental cause; for accidental causes are not expected to become the causes of the things which they produce; since any one forms expectation about a thing which is comprehended either in his reason, or power, or energy; but things subsisting according to accident are not of this kind. In a certain degree, therefore, art and fortune are conversant about the same things. I say in a *certain degree*, because they are conversant about things contingent, and such as subsist differently at different times. The cause of these, however, is not essential, but accidental. Art, however, is the essential cause of things artificial.

Art, therefore, as we have said, is a habit effective in conjunction with true reason about things contingent, of which the cause is in the efficient; but the privation of art, on the contrary, is a habit effective in conjunction with false reason, about things contingent which have a various subsistence.

CHAP. VI.

CONCERNING PRUDENCE.

LET us now speak concerning Prudence; and our discourse indeed about it will become perspicuous if we contemplate who those are whom we call prudent. It appears then that he is a prudent man who is able to deliberate well about such things as are good and beneficial to himself, not indeed regarding partial good, such as health or strength, or any thing else tending to these; but simply to live well, and to pursue such things as contribute to felicity, which is the human end. And that this is the case is manifest; for we denominate those prudent who orderly arrange their own peculiar actions towards some good end, who deliberate well about them, and as it were practise those things which are unconnected with art, in order to be able through them to arrive at a worthy end; so that, in short, he will be a prudent man who is deliberative, provided it be concerning things contingent.

For no one deliberates about things necessary, and such as cannot possibly subsist otherwise; neither concerning such as simply may happen to take place, but which do not take place by his means; for in like manner no one deliberates about these things, but about those

only which are capable of being performed by himself. It is evident, however, from what has been said, that prudence not only differs from art, as we have shown, but also from science, because science is conversant with things necessary; but prudence about such as are contingent, and have a various subsistence.

For prudence is a true habit practic, in conjunction with reason, about human good and evil. But it differs from art, as we have said, because action is one thing, and effect another; for the end of an effect is contrary to the effect; and the ship-building art is one thing, but a ship another. The end of an action, however, is not always different from the action; for sometimes the action itself is its own end, as when it is performed well and beautifully; for the end of one who rides on horseback, is to ride well and gracefully. Prudence, therefore, is a habit conversant about the good and evil of man.

On this account we think that Pericles, and such kind of men, are prudent, because they are able to survey both what is good for themselves and for others; and we also think that economists and politicians are men of this kind.

This also is evident from (σωφροσύνη,) the name of temperance; for (σωφρων,) a temperate man, preserving the good belonging to himself, is said to be the saviour of prudence (την φρόνησιν λεγεται σωζειν); and temperance *as saving prudence*, is called by this name. For the intemperate man corrupts no other knowledges by pleasure, except prudence alone, but neither science nor art, nor any other of the powers above enumerated; since pleasure does not prevent us from knowing that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles, which knowledge belongs to science:—neither does it prevent us from knowing how a ship should be built, or to do any thing else pertaining to art; but it only perverts practical affairs, about which prudence is conversant; for the

principles and causes of practical things are the ends for the sake of which they are done. The end, however, of every thing practical is the proximate good of the agent, of which, if he is ignorant, he perverts the thing done. But a man is ignorant, when being corrupted by pleasure or pain, or any other passion, he imagines that pleasure is good, and thinks that the end itself is appropriate, and directs his actions towards it; and thus he corrupts his own good, which is the end and the appropriate principle of actions. For vice is corruptive of the principle; and on this account, since the intemperate man corrupts prudence, he who preserves it is called (*σωφρων*) a temperate man; and hence it is necessary that prudence should be a habit in conjunction with true reason, practical with respect to human good. It is evident, therefore, from these arguments, that prudence is different from science and art, and the other knowledges above enumerated.

Further still: there is both virtue and vice in art; for it is possible that there may be a good or a bad artist. Of prudence, however, there is neither a vice nor a virtue, (since it is impossible that any prudent man should be depraved;) for prudence is a virtue; but there is not a virtue of a virtue, since there is not a medium of a medium. Again, he who willingly errs with respect to art, so far as he is an artist, is better than one who errs unwillingly. This, however, is not the case with respect to prudence, but the contrary; for he who willingly corrupts prudence, is worse than him who does it unwillingly. It is manifest, therefore, that prudence is a certain virtue, and not an art; but it is a virtue of the *doxastic* * part of the soul.

* The *doxastic* part of the soul, or that which *opines*, is the power which knows the *universal* in sensible particulars; as that *every man is a biped*, and also the *conclusion* of the *dianoëtic* power, as *that every rational soul is immortal*: but in both these it only knows *that* a thing is, but not *why* it is.

For since the rational parts of the soul admit of a two-fold division, that is to say, into the dianoëtic, and doxastic or deliberative, the latter is conversant with things contingent, about which prudence is also conversant. But prudence is not only a habit in conjunction with true reason, in the same manner as art is when the artist does not perform those things which are the objects of art; (for though he should not effect any thing, nothing prevents his being an artist, neither does any thing hinder art from being a habit in conjunction with true reason;) but there is every necessity that prudence should be practised at all times. For the subjects and the matter of art are not always present to the artist. But the subjects of prudence are never wanting to the prudent man: for with respect to the passions of the soul, and human actions, and the communions of men with each other, as well as other things, about which every virtue and prudence are conversant:—with respect to these; it is impossible that they should subsist otherwise than in human life. Hence also there is sometimes an oblivion of art, but never of prudence. And thus much concerning Prudence.

CHAP. VII.

CONCERNING INTELLECT.

LET us now discourse concerning intellect, about what objects of knowledge it is conversant. Since, therefore, science is the knowledge of universals, and of things which subsist from necessity, in conjunction with reason and demonstration, but demonstration has principles which it is requisite should be laid down by the scientific man previously to the demonstration, let us inquire to which of the before-mentioned knowledges it belongs to know principles of this kind, whether it be to science, or art, prudence, or wisdom, or intellect. It cannot, therefore, be the province of science; for science is demonstrative; but principles are indemonstrative. Neither can it belong to prudence or art; for these are conversant with things contingent; but principles are not of this kind. Further still, it cannot be the province of wisdom to know principles; for to know things demonstrable, is wisdom; but principles are immediate.

It remains, therefore, that intellect is the knowledge of principles; and this is the intellect by which we know the principles of science.

CHAP. VIII.

CONCERNING WISDOM.

WISDOM admits of a two-fold predication; for one kind is *partial*, but the other *universal*. And partial wisdom is the virtue of every art, according to which we pronounce this or that artist wise with respect to his own art: as for instance, we say that *Phidias* was a *wise* sculptor, because he was an *excellent* sculptor; and that *Polycletus* was a *wise* statuary.

But universal wisdom is that according to which we do not pronounce certain men wise with respect to one thing only; as Homer says in his *Margites* *.

“ The gods nor miner him, nor ploughman made,

“ Nor *wise* in ought besides.”——

Whence it is evident that wisdom will be the most accurate of the sciences, whether we speak of partial or universal wisdom; for the former is the very same thing as accurate science and art; and the latter, because it is universal, is more accurate than the others, inasmuch as it is more definite. Since, therefore, wisdom is something universal, it is requisite that a wise man, who is essentially such, should not know some things that may be known, and be ignorant of others. On this account a wise man will not only understand such things as are demonstrable, but also the principles whence the demonstrations originate, and will give

* This work is now lost.

the reasons which they admit. Hence wisdom will be intellect and science; and thus also it will be the most honourable science, as having principles, as it were, for its summit: for both things demonstrable and principles are comprehended in the definition of it; which is not the case with other sciences; since in the definition of these the knowledge of principles is not assumed, but only of things demonstrable.

Wisdom, however, differs from prudence, because prudence is political, but wisdom is the most worthy of the other sciences; for prudence is not the most worthy; since that is most worthy which is conversant with the most excellent object. But prudence is conversant with human goods; man, however, and the goods of man, do not form the most excellent object. Further still, he is a prudent man who discovers his own peculiar good; but the same thing is not good to all men; for the same thing is not salubrious and beneficial to every one. That which we call prudent, therefore, is not the same among all men, but that which is [truly] called wise is so; for *the wise* is also an object of scientific knowledge; but for a triangle to have angles equal to two right is an object of scientific knowledge, and one and the same thing appears to all men to be such; just as the same thing is a right line, and the same thing is white in the apprehension of all men. But that which is prudent, not only among men, but also among other animals, consists in an individual contemplating and performing his own good, whence also they say that some wild beasts are prudent; that is, such as appear to possess a providential power about their own life. It is manifest, therefore, that wisdom and prudence will not be the same thing; for if men should call the practice of things beneficial to themselves wisdom, there would be many species of wisdom; since the things advantageous to every one are many; just as medical skill is not

the same with respect to every animal, because different things are salubrious or noxious to different animals. But if any one should say that man is the best of animals, and that on this account the political science, that is to say, prudence, is the most worthy, just as wisdom is, it would make no difference; for there are beings much more divine by nature than man: such as are the natures from which the universe is evidently composed, I mean the natures from which the world consists.

It is evident, however, from what has been said, that wisdom is intellect and science about things the most honourable by nature, which are such as are necessary, and always subsist after the same manner.

On this account, *Anaxagoras* and *Thales*, and such kind of men, were called wise, but by no means prudent, because they were ignorant of those things which were conducive to their advantage, and such as are useful to life:—but they knew things illustrious, and wonderful; difficult, and divine. Wisdom, therefore, is conversant with these things; but prudence with human affairs, and such as are objects of deliberation. For we say that this is especially the work of a prudent man, namely, to deliberate well; but no one would deliberate about things necessary, and such as cannot possibly subsist otherwise; neither about such as have not practical good for their end. But wisdom has universal truth for its end; and it has for its subject a universal object of science, and the principles of every science.

Prudence is also conversant in particulars; for the prudent man knows, and that universally, what good pertains to man; but he also knows the particulars which arise from necessity, what certain things it is proper for this or that man to do, and on this or that particular occasion. For he is practical:—but action is conversant with particulars.

On this account those who know particulars only, are more *practical* than those who know universals: and, in short, in all things the experienced are more able to *act* than those who know universals. For if any one should know that light animal food is easily digested, and salubrious, but should be ignorant what kind of animals afford this food, he would not, through this mean, be able to give health; but he who knows that the flesh of birds is light and salubrious, would more readily effect this purpose. Since, therefore, prudence is practical, it is necessary to possess a knowledge of both universals and particulars, but more especially of the latter; for it is not possible to be practical with the knowledge of universals only. What therefore wisdom is, and in what it differs from prudence has been shown.

CHAP. IX.

PRUDENCE FURTHER CONSIDERED.

LET us now speak further concerning Prudence. Prudence, therefore, belongs both to universals and particulars, as being architectonic; for he who knows universals, has the relation of an *architect** to the experienced man.

Of prudence, however, simply considered, one kind is ethical, as when any one seeks his own good only, which is properly called *prudence*; but the other has for its end the good of a city, which is called

* That is, of a *master artist*; Aristotle here using the word *architect* in this sense. Just as by the *architectonic*, he means the *master*, science.

political prudence; and it is the very same as prudence, properly so called; but differs from it in definition, so far as they are employed about different subjects.

But of political prudence one kind is, as it were, architectonic prudence, which is called legislative; but the partial is comprehended under it, and is called political. By the political, however, I mean the practical and deliberative, which are conversant about decrees and actions; for decrees are practical, not indeed in the same manner as the first kind of prudence, the architectonic, but as the last, which is properly practical. Hence men of this kind alone are called political men, and that about which they are employed, a polity, because these alone among prudent men are practic, in the same manner as manual artificers; for it is only these who are properly practical; since architects, merely by directing actions, are said to be practic; but nevertheless they are not properly so.

It appears, however, that it is *properly* prudence, when any one investigates his own good solely, which investigation has a common name, and is *peculiarly* called prudence. But of the other kinds of prudence, that which is conversant about domestic affairs, is called economic; but of that which is conversant with the government of a city, one part is called legislative, and the other political: and of the political again, one part is said to be deliberative, but the other judicial.

Prudence, therefore, properly so denominated, that is to say, for a man to know what is good and beneficial to himself, is a certain knowledge, as well as political prudence; but it is not entirely the same with political prudence. And on this account men think that he is

prudent who seeks his own good only ; but he who is politically prudent, is employed in a multitude of affairs. Hence *Euripides* also says,

“ How can the name of *wise* to me belong,
“ Who might have mingled in the martial throng ;
“ Unvexed with business, and exempt from care,
“ Taking of spoils my honourable share ;
“ Yet chose by over-anxious thoughts to move
“ The direful hate of all-commanding Jove ?”

On this account too prudence, peculiarly so called, is denominated ethical ; and a man is peculiarly called prudent who investigates his own good only, and thinks it is requisite to do that alone without any further inquiry.

But perhaps it is not possible for ethical prudence to subsist without the economic, nor the economic without the political prudence ; for a man cannot well and orderly dispose his own domestic affairs when either his house, or the city, are in a bad condition ; since it is difficult for any one who associates with many depraved persons to avoid destruction. But if he associates with no one, and leads a solitary life, how will he know his own good ? For it is immanifest, and both doctrine and consideration are necessary towards a knowledge of it. Neither of these, however, can be produced without experience ; but experience belongs to those things which subsist in the communion both of a family and a city, and without these no one will be either experienced or prudent. Hence youths may become mathematicians and wise in things of this kind, but they do not appear to be prudent. And the reason of this is, because prudence is conversant with particulars, which are known from experience : but a youth is not experienced, since experience requires a length of time. It must, however, be

considered in the next place, how young persons become mathematicians indeed, but by no means wise men, or natural philosophers. Shall we say it is, because the principles of physics and of wisdom are assumed from particulars? For it is impossible that wisdom, which is conversant with things necessary and perpetual, should be properly directed without experience; since from things that are known to us and to sense, we are led to such as are above sense. For without knowing what may happen to this or that natural subject, it is not possible that a universal reason should be concluded about it, or that science should be produced. Again, without physical science, it is impossible to arrive at wisdom; for after physics we know things that are above nature. To know particulars, however, belongs to experience; but experience is the work of a long time. Hence it is not possible that young persons can be either natural philosophers or wise. But the principles of mathematics are assumed independently of matter, and on this account they have no need of the knowledge of particulars; for they do not survey the circle or number in matter, (in which, as we may say, every thing has a multiform and indefinite subsistence;) as the natural philosopher considers things natural; but they abstract them from the matter, and survey them by themselves. Nothing, therefore, hinders young persons from being mathematicians. For with respect to the principles of natural subjects, and in short physics, though they speak of them, nevertheless they have neither any accurate knowledge of, nor belief concerning them. They admit, however, the credibility of the principles of mathematics; for they have a knowledge of these because the reasonings employed in them are definite. Since, therefore, it is evident that experience is the cause of ethical prudence; but that experience

cannot be produced without political communion, and political communion cannot subsist without political prudence, it is manifest that ethical prudence cannot subsist without the political. Again, since error about actions arises from ignorance, either universal or partial, (for he who is ignorant universally that waters of great specific gravity are bad, and indeed even he who knows this, but is ignorant particularly that such and such waters are of great specific gravity, errs in like manner, for both would use bad water) it is evident, that in order to avoid error, it is not only necessary to know that such and such waters are of great specific gravity, but also that waters of that description are bad. Particular or partial prudence, therefore, has need of universal political prudence, and it is impossible that ethical prudence should subsist without the political; as neither can partial knowledge avoid error without universal knowledge.

Hence it is evident that prudence is neither science nor intellect. It is not science indeed, because it is conversant with particulars which are posterior by nature; but science belongs to those universals which are first by nature. Neither is prudence intellect.

Further still, it is even opposed to intellect; for intellect is conversant with things first and indemonstrable. But prudence is conversant with things last, about which not science, but sense, is employed. I do not, however, mean those things in which each sense is peculiarly engaged, such as the objects of taste, or smell, or hearing; since prudence does not judge of juices, or exhalations, or of sounds, but simply of particulars. For sense alone knows these things, and hence we say that prudence is conversant with those objects, about which sense is also employed. As for instance, to know whether it is proper

that a particular city of the Athenians should wage war against a particular city of the Corinthians, is the province of a prudent man ; for prudence is practical, but action belongs to particulars.

After this manner also mathematicians know the sensible triangle, not so far as it is opposed to the sight or the touch, but simply so far as it belongs to particulars and things partial, which are known the last ; since he who thus knows, stops at these, and inquires no further. For to those who begin from particulars and sensibles, the knowledge of universals will be the last ; but when the knowledge proceeds from universals, the objects of sense will be known the last. To know particulars, therefore, so far as they are objects of sense, and are opposed some of them to the taste, but others to the hearing, some to the touch, but others to the sight, is the province of sense, and not of prudence. But to know these things so far as they are beneficial or detrimental to human good, this is the province of Prudence.

CHAP. X.

CONCERNING GOOD-CONSULTATION.

HAVING discussed wisdom and prudence, intellect, art, and science, and shown what each is, and in what they differ from each other, let us now speak concerning good-consultation, intelligence, and upright decision; what each is, and in what each differs from the before-mentioned five habits, which are conversant with truth.

And in the first place let us speak concerning good-consultation; for it has a great alliance with prudence, which we have just discussed, so that our discourse about good-consultation will be conjoined with that concerning prudence. In the first place, therefore, it is not investigation; for investigation is more widely extended than good-consultation, since not only he who consults well, but also he who consults ill, investigates; and not only things contingent, but also things necessary, about which science is conversant are investigated: thus, for instance, it is investigated by science, whether a triangle contains angles equal to two right; and whether the moon is spherical: hence good-consultation is not the same thing as investigation.

Again, good-consultation is not science. For the scientific man does not investigate about things of which he has a scientific knowledge; but he who consults well does investigate. For *good-consultation is counsel* *; but counsel is an investigation of what it is proper to do. He also who consults, investigates and reasons about actions, how they may

* Because *counsel* being more universal, comprehends *good-consultation* in itself.

be well and rightly performed ; so that good-consultation is an investigation, but science is not of this kind. Good-counsel, therefore, is not science.

Further still, neither is good-consultation right conjecture ; for right conjecture is produced without any certain time, or reasoning, or meditation ; for rightly to understand a thing proposed, and that immediately without meditation, is right conjecture. But good-consultation is not of this kind ; for counsel is produced from time, and that slowly. Hence the multitude say, that it is necessary to perform things that have been consulted upon, quickly ; but to consult, slowly. Again, sagacity is different from good-consultation ; for sagacity is an assignment of the medium without consideration ; that is, of the cause of the thing proposed ; but good-consultation subsists together with consideration, for sagacity is a certain right conjecture. Good-consultation, therefore, is not sagacity ; for right conjecture is to speak directly to the point on every subject proposed ; but sagacity is a ready assignment of the cause of the proposed object of inquiry ; as for instance, why it is better to be governed, than to govern in oligarchies ;—because it is more secure. For these reasons then good-consultation is neither right conjecture nor sagacity.

Neither is good-consultation, opinion : for since there are many species of opinion, good-consultation is no one of these. For of opinions, some are conclusions of the dianoëtic part of the soul demonstrated from necessity ; as for example, if any one should opine from demonstration, that a triangle has angles equal to two right, he would have a necessary opinion. Some opinions, however, are collected from sense, whence also some are frequently false. But all opinions have truth for

their end; and rectitude of opinion is truth. Good-consultation, however, has for its end either the welfare of him who consults, or of him to whom the counsel is given, because it frequently happens, even through falsehood and deception, that those who consult well, act rightly.

Again, there is no other rectitude of good-consultation, but it is itself rectitude of counsel; for if he who consults badly errs, he who consults altogether well, consults according to right reason.

Further still, good-consultation is neither rectitude of opinion, nor rectitude of science, but of counsel, as the name also evinces. For of science there is no rectitude; since science cannot err, so as to be in want of rectitude.

But rectitude of opinion, as we have said, is truth. Opinion, therefore, is not good-consultation, nor science; neither is it rectitude of opinion, nor rectitude of science. Again, however, good-consultation is an investigation according to right reason; but opinion is the discovery of a certain conclusion, and is conversant with something definite; and good consultation consists in investigation, but opinion in discovery; and so far good-consultation is inferior to the dianoëtic energy. For the dianoëtic energy affords the reason of that which is perfected and discovered, together with the appropriate cause; but the very essence of good-consultation consists in investigation; since he who consults, whether it be well or ill, investigates and reasons about something; and he investigates indeed with reason, but does not yet form a conclusion. Opinion, however, is not a thing of this kind; for it is not investigation, but a definite enunciation. Good-consultation, therefore, is neither science, nor right conjecture, nor opinion. But since there is rectitude

of counsel, let us inquire what counsel is, and with what he who counsels is conversant. And as we have already treated concerning counsel, as well as the objects of it, let us now speak about rectitude.

Rectitude, therefore, is predicated in many ways. For even those who have a bad end in view, and who investigate things directly tending to such end, counsel rightly; and this kind of counsel is rectitude. Those also who propose a good end; and tend towards it, but yet do not investigate things which tend to this end, more than others, but such as are different from them, as is the case with those who collect a true conclusion from false propositions, or from such as have not a necessary subsistence;—even these err with respect to things tending to the end; but yet, because they tend to a good end, they counsel rightly: and a counsel of this kind is rectitude.

Moreover good-consultation is a rectitude, which is properly called rectitude of counsel, according to which we tend to a good end, and investigate those things through which we may be able easily and in the most eminent degree to obtain the end.

Good-consultation, however, is neither the first nor the second species of rectitude; for the first is bad counsel, but good-consultation is good counsel, as the very name implies. But the second species of rectitude investigates that which is proper, but not the means of obtaining it; neither does it counsel in a proper manner with respect to those things which regard the end, about which, as we have before said, counsel is conversant. So that so far as it tends to good, it has a right tendency, but so far as it tends to the end through inappropriate means, it has not a proper tendency. Hence then good-consultation will not be a rectitude of this kind.

Further still, neither is good-consultation that counsel which is effected

in a long time, or in a time longer than is becoming. For good-consultation is rectitude of counsel alone, which proposes something advantageous; as when we give counsel about those things that are proper, as we ought, and for as long a time as is proper.

But since with respect to the end, one kind is universal and the last, and the other partial and the last, the former being that towards which every human action tends; but the latter, that towards which certain actions are directed, good-consultation also will have a similar subsistence. For one kind is universal, which is right and good counsel with respect to things tending to the last end, which is a life according to virtue; but the other is partial, which tends to a certain particular end, which end is not the last, but yet leads to the last end.

Since, however, it is the province of prudent men to give counsel, it is necessary to add prudence to the definition of good-consultation. So that it may be defined as follows: *Good-consultation is rectitude with reference to that which is advantageous to a certain end, of which prudence is the true hypolepsis. With reference to that which is advantageous, indeed, in consequence of that good-consultation which tends to a good end, though not at all through proper means; that is to say, actions, occasion, and manner. But to a certain end, of which prudence is the true hypolepsis, in consequence of depraved consultation which investigates things pertaining to, and consequent to the end, but is at the same time directed to a bad end, of which prudence is not the true hypolepsis.*

CHAP. XI.

CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE*.

THUS much concerning good-consultation. Let us now discourse about intelligence. It is from intelligence, therefore, and privation of intelligence, that we pronounce men intelligent, or the contrary.

But neither science, opinion, nor prudence, is the same thing as intelligence; for intelligence is neither science nor opinion; since if it were, all men endued with science, as well as all who form opinions, would be intelligent.

This, however, is not the case: but intelligence is not even any one of the sciences; for instance, it is neither the medical science, nor geometry; for if it were, it would be conversant with things salubrious, and with magnitudes.

In short, it is neither conversant with things necessary, nor with such as always subsist after the same manner:—neither is it properly conversant with any one of those things which may happen to have a various subsistence.

But it is universally conversant with such as any one may doubt about or deliberate upon, and which admit of a certain consideration, counsel, and investigation. Hence intelligence is conversant with the same things as prudence; for it is occupied about such as are contingent, which we ourselves have the power to do, or not to do.

* This word is to be taken in its large acceptation, since it is to be understood in the same manner as when we say of a man, that he is *intelligent*; and not as merely signifying *intellectual energy*, which is the proper meaning of the word *intelligence*.

Hence it is not entirely the same thing as prudence ; for prudence merely directs towards what end it is proper to incline, and what it is necessary to do in order to obtain that end. And this is its work,—to arrange in an orderly manner those things which ought to be done. But to form a judgment of the things which have been ordered by prudence, and to know that it is proper thus to act, is intelligence.

For the *rightly intelligent* does not differ from the *merely intelligent* man ; since the intelligent man also counsels this very same thing ; namely, together with a right and proper knowledge, to form a judgment of the things ordered by the prudent man.

Intelligence also, and right intelligence, are the same thing, and are neither prudence, nor the possession of prudence. But intelligence does not consist either in receiving or possessing prudence ; since to receive prudence is to learn that which a prudent man knows. Intelligence, however, forms a judgment of the same things. Intelligence, therefore, is not the same thing with the receiving or possessing prudence.

But as he who hears science from another, and understands it well, is said to possess a joint knowledge with the speaker ; so he who knows, and rightly judges of the things ordered by the prudent man, is said to be co-intelligent, and is not only denominated an intelligent, but also a rightly-intelligent man, because he properly understands them. For the right and the proper are the same. And the name is assumed from this cause ; namely, that when one person speaks, and another hearing, understands well what is said, such a person is said to learn and be co-intelligent.

CHAP. XII.

CONCERNING UPRIGHT DECISION.

LET us now speak concerning upright decision. This also is conversant with things contingent, in the same manner as prudence, good-consultation, and intelligence; and on this account let us discourse about it.

Upright decision, therefore, is that according to which we are said to think rightly, and according to which the right judgment of the equitable man is said to be decisive. What an equitable man, however, and equity are, has been discussed in some of our former discourses.

But that upright decision is this, is manifest; for we say, that an equitable man is especially inclined to pardon; and the equitable man is one who pardons *certain offences*.

Pardon, however, is the upright and properly critical decision of the equitable man; for pardon is right judgment and equitable decision: and that is called right judgment which is the judgment of truth. If, therefore, pardon is the judgment and upright decision of the equitable man, and some persons are said to be inclined to pardon according to upright decision, it follows that the decision, according to which we are disposed to pardon, is the judgment of the equitable man.

All the habits, therefore, that are conversant with truth, tend to the same thing, and have the same subjects about which they are employed. For prudence also, and intellect, good-consultation, intelligence, and upright decision, are conversant with particulars and things partial, in which there is action. But when I speak of intellect, I

mean the *practic* intellect, which has particulars and sensibles for its principles. For the same man, when he does such things as tend to a good end, is also called prudent; but when he deliberates about them in a proper manner, he is a good counsellor; and when he arranges, and effects, knows, and rightly judges of such things as tend to a good end, and performs them in a proper manner, he is intelligent; but when he forms a right judgment of the actions of others, and sometimes pardons those whom he thinks deserving of pardon, he is then an upright decider, and one disposed to pardon.

But every judgment of the equitable man is conversant in common about all the good actions of others; for that which is called equity, which is corrective of the legal just, and respecting which we have before spoken, judges the laws established by others; and pardon and upright decision decree rightly concerning the actions of others. All these, however, belong to the equitable man. But it also happens that among all human actions it is these only which the equitable man judges of, and about which he makes decrees; for equity is conversant with the legal just; but upright decision, with things practical, when they are performed by others. *Practic* intellect is also conversant about the same things; for since intellect is a knowledge of principles, particulars are the principles of actions; and since of the objects of contemplation, of which truth is the end, definitions, immediate reasons, and common conceptions, are the principles, it follows that *theoretic* intellect is the knowledge of definitions, and of first and immoveable reasons [or, in other words, axioms.]

But *practical* intellect is the knowledge of things last and contingent; that is to say, of practical particulars. So that practical intellect belongs to things last, but theoretic to things first. For immediate

reasons, and definitions belong to things first, and particulars to things last. Immediate reasons [that is, axioms] indeed are first to nature, but last to us; but particulars are first to us, but last to nature. Things, however, which are last to nature, are the principles and causes of the end of that which is practicable; for from sensible particulars we learn to do those things which are beneficial both to ourselves and others, and through these we arrive at the investigated end. Collecting also certain universal reasons * from these particulars, we become prudent with respect to the actions in human life. Hence it is necessary that a politician should have a knowledge of particulars; but this kind of knowledge, since it is produced without a medium, is intellect. For intellect is the knowledge of things immediate, and of principles.

Hence a knowledge of this kind appears to be something natural; since it is not produced from any particular doctrines or disciplines, but subsists from nature. And not only intellect, but prudence also, intelligence, and upright decision, appear to be natural; for all these originate from the natural knowledge of intellect, and are conversant about the very same things as intellect; that is to say, particulars. But this is not the case with wisdom; for no one is wise by nature, because doctrine and discipline are requisite in order to become wise; and we think that prudence, upright decision, intellect, and intelligence, are the concomitants of age. For we say, that this or that particular age is endued with intellect, upright decision, and prudence, nature being as it were the cause of these; but we do not assign wisdom to any particular age, (since it is possible for a youth, and even a lad, to be wise, and not for an elderly man only,) as is the case with prudence, and

* *Reasons*, in this place, signify *maxims*, which are to the *practic* intellect, what *axioms* are to the *theoretic*.

the other intellectual powers which we have enumerated. For experience belongs to elderly persons, without which no one can be prudent, or possess intellect, or intelligence, or upright decision.

But I mean *practic intellect*. For intellect, as we have said, is both *theoretic* and *practic*. It is also a beginning and an end. It is a beginning indeed so far as it is a knowledge of first principles, and called *theoretic*; for it is the principle of demonstration. But it is an end so far as it is a knowledge of particulars, is conversant with sense, and is denominated *practic*; for demonstrations are conversant with particulars; and these are the things demonstrated: he also who demonstrates, ends in these, descending from universals.

But this intellect, which is produced from experience, is found in more elderly men; and hence it is proper to give credit to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions which are advanced by experienced and elderly or prudent persons, no less than to demonstrations themselves; because through possessing an eye from experience, they see the principles of actions; namely, practical particulars, through which they know what things are beneficial, and make them the subjects of hypothesis, both to themselves and others.

CHAP. XIII.

CONCERNING PRUDENCE AND WISDOM; IN WHAT RESPECT THEY ARE USEFUL, AND WHICH IS THE BETTER OF THE TWO.

WHAT prudence and wisdom are, therefore, about what each is conversant, and that they belong to the dianoëtic part of the soul, has been said.

But some one may raise a doubt about them;—in what respect they are useful, and in what they are beneficial to mankind.

For wisdom speculates none of those particulars from which man derives felicity *, since felicity is conversant with action; but wisdom is not the cause of any production; since it has not practical good for its end.

But prudence is the cause of action, and tends to practical good: it does not, however, appear altogether necessary towards the possession of virtue. For to worthy men embracing principles from custom, it happens that these principles are stable; for they are habits. And men become nothing the more practised of these in consequence of knowing things beautiful and just; as neither do we become more healthful, or obtain a better condition of body, from well knowing things salubrious, and such as contribute to a good condition of body; but by the possession of health, and a good condition of body: for a pugilist does not

* Aristotle here treating concerning the ethical and political virtues, means by this assertion, that wisdom speculates none of those things from which the *political felicity* of man consists; for the felicity resulting from wisdom is something more divine than this, as is shown in the Tenth Book of this work.

become more pugilistic from knowing what it is to box well, and in a proper manner; since he does not box merely from knowing, but from possessing the habit of a boxer. The like also takes place with respect to a wrestler, and a racer; for he also who uses gymnastic exercises is gymnastic through habit, and not from knowing things contributing to a good condition of body, and such as pertain to gymnastic exercises. But by things contributing to a good condition of body, and those that are adapted to gymnastic exercise, and healthful, I do not mean such as are effective of a good habit of body or of health, but such as a man in a healthy and good condition of body performs, in consequence of possessing the habit of health and a sound body. Just, therefore, as with respect to the before-mentioned habits, those who possess them do not become better through knowing them; so likewise a worthy man does not become more worthy with regard to virtue through prudence. But if prudence affords no assistance to worthy men towards the attainment of virtue, and it remains that prudence renders those who are not worthy better, it follows that it is not absolutely necessary that those should be prudent in order to become worthy. For those who are instructed in virtue through learning it from others, and who are persuaded by them, may also become worthy: just as when we wish to be healthy, we do not learn the medical art, but resort to physicians, and nothing prevents our acquiring health. These then are the doubts which some one may raise with regard to prudence and wisdom, in what they contribute to the advantage of mankind, and in what they are useful.

Further still: it is necessary that this also should be investigated about the habitude or relation of these with respect to each other, namely, which is the better of the two. For it appears that wisdom is

better than prudence, so far as it is the knowledge of things necessary; but it appears that prudence is better than wisdom, so far as it is the principle of action; and on this account has more authority than wisdom, which is theoretic only; for the practical habit governs, and orderly arranges every thing.

Such then are the doubts concerning wisdom and prudence. But let us now discuss these doubts, and in the first place in what they are useful. First, therefore, although virtues of this kind were of no utility, it is nevertheless necessary that they should be chosen *per se*; for each is a virtue of both parts of the dianoëtic part of the soul, as we have said. But virtue is something eligible.

In this respect also they are useful towards the acquisition of felicity, though not as the medical art towards the acquisition of health. But as things salubrious are conducive to health, so wisdom and prudence are conducive towards felicity. For universal felicity is all-perfect virtue; but wisdom and prudence are a part of the whole of virtue; so that these are a part of human felicity, and to possess them, in conjunction with the other virtues, is to be happy according to the whole of felicity.

Again, prudence is useful towards the performance of every worthy action, and through it every worthy work is perfected; for ethical virtue disposes the will to a good end, and directs it to a right object; but prudence investigates those things which contribute to a good end; it also deliberates through what means it may obtain that end in the most becoming, easy, and proper manner. But since there are four parts of the soul, the nutritive part, which has for its principle the appetitive power, is not conversant with a virtue of the kind we have been speaking about, I mean ethical virtue, for it has not dominion

over any one action : but that which is not the principle of action, cannot possess a virtue of this kind. That, however, which affords good nourishment, and such other things as are consequent to it, may be called the virtue of the nutritive part, when the nutritive part subsists well ; as for instance, with beauty or magnitude, which are not properly virtues ; for these are not produced from pre-election, neither can they be chosen ; but they are called virtues metaphorically : and thus much by way of digression. Let us, however, further discuss the subject before us ; namely, that although wisdom and prudence should not be able to contribute to any thing else, we have nevertheless shown that they appear to be worthy of great regard.

But we will further show, and in a more perspicuous manner, that prudence tends to render men more worthy, and more practicable of worthy and just things. In order to which let us resume our discourse from what we have lately said, beginning from thence. For as we have asserted, certain persons may do just and prudent things, and yet be neither just nor prudent ; such as those who through fear, and unwillingly do those things which are ordained by law, or who perform some just action through ignorance ; as if any one ignorantly should punish him who does an injury, instead of him who is injured ; or, as if a man should do a just thing from any other motive, whether it be riches or pleasure, and not because the action is just *per se*. As, therefore, we do not call men of this kind just, although they may do just things, so as it seems, we reason with respect to every virtue. And he who does good, and acts virtuously *per se*, and for the sake of good, he himself at the same time previously choosing it, and that not unwillingly, is truly the worthy man. For he who is compelled by another to do good, does indeed that which he does for the sake of good, which

he who compels him, compels him to do for the sake of good; but he is neither a worthy nor a good man, because he does not do good from previous choice and willingly. The habit of virtue, therefore, which harmonizes the orectic part of the soul, that is, the irascible and desiderative powers, produces a right pre-election; for each power desires and previously chooses good from a good habit. It is necessary however that a worthy man should not stop at the mere possession of the habit of virtue, but that he should do those things from which the habit will become stable in the soul; that is to say, worthy actions. The knowledge of actions of this kind, therefore, cannot be received from the habit of virtue, since this only produces the appetite for good in the soul; but to know what things it is proper for a worthy man to do, is the province of another power.

Let us then speak more clearly concerning this power. There is a certain power, therefore, which is called skilfulness; and this is its property,—to be able to perform the things proposed, which contribute to the object in view, and to obtain it. If, therefore, the object of pursuit is worthy it will be laudable, but if depraved it is full of craft, and hence we call both skilful and crafty men prudent. Prudence, however, is not the same power as skilfulness, although it does not subsist without it; for prudence is the virtue of this power. Ethical virtue, therefore, is not perfected without prudence, and prudence cannot be produced in the practico intellect without the other ethical virtues. For those who syllogize about practical things, that is to say, those which we perform syllogizing, have the ends of actions for principles; since we syllogize from ends whether the actions be good or bad. But we do not know principles of this kind, that is to say, ends, without the habit of ethical virtue; for we place a depraved end under a depraved

habit, and direct our actions to it, in the same manner as to a good end. It happens also that the knowledge of things practical is not prudence; for prudence is employed about the good of man. Hence it is necessary that a prudent man should establish good for his end, and on this account it is not possible that prudence should subsist without the other ethical virtues, or that a man should be prudent who is not also good. Thus, therefore, it appears that prudence has no subsistence independently of the other ethical virtues.

It is also evident that neither can virtue subsist without prudence; for such as is the relation of prudence to skilfulness, not as being the same with, but similar to it, (for skilfulness is a physical aptitude of the soul; but prudence is the virtue of an aptitude of this kind) such also is the relation of ethical, to physical virtue.

For every ethical virtue appears to all men to be in a certain respect physical; since we are just, and temperate, and brave, and possess other virtues immediately from our birth.

Let us, however, investigate further, and not imagine that these are properly virtues.

For these also subsist with children and wild beasts, and sometimes even become pernicious in consequence of being present without intellect; and as it happens to a strong body in motion, that if it falls, it falls violently, when it is moved without employing the sight; so likewise it happens that habits of this kind, devoid of intellect, are depraved; but when exercised in conjunction with intellect, they are good, and are then properly called virtues. And these same habits without intellect are not properly virtues; but in conjunction with intellect they become properly virtues. So that just as in the doxastic part of the soul there are two species, namely, skilfulness and prudence; so likewise

with respect to the ethical part, there are two species; that is to say, physical virtue, and that which is properly virtue. And of these, that which is properly called virtue is not produced without prudence. Whence it is said that all the virtues are so many kinds of prudence.

Socrates maintaining this doctrine, in one respect said rightly, but erred in another. For so far as he thought that all the virtues were different kinds of prudence he was wrong; but so far as he thought they did not subsist without prudence, he said well.

As a proof of which all men even now, when they define virtue, say, that it is a habit and conversant about certain things; also adding, according to right reason: but right reason is that which is according to prudence. It appears, therefore, that virtue cannot subsist without prudence.

Further still, virtue is not only said to be a habit according to right reason, but also in conjunction with right reason. Right reason, however, with respect to these things, is prudence.

Socrates indeed thought that every virtue was a species of reason; for he said that all of them were sciences. But we say, that they are habits in conjunction with reason; since that which subsists according to reason, differs from that which subsists in conjunction with reason. For a man performs something according to reason, both when he is excited by another, and when he regards the end, in the same manner as nature produces according to reason; but he acts in conjunction with reason, when he acts from knowledge; and, regarding the end, operates according to reason. On this account, to the words *according to reason*, it is necessary to add the words in *conjunction with reason*. But reason is prudence, as we have said.

It is evident, therefore, from the before-mentioned arguments, that

a good habit cannot properly subsist without prudence, nor prudence without virtue.

Hence also if any one introduces an argument from the contrary, it may be solved. For it appears that prudence may be separated from ethical virtue. For the same man is not so naturally adapted to all the virtues as to be able to possess all of them, and at the same time in conjunction with prudence; so that he will possess the one, but will not yet have acquired the other; and hence it appears that the virtues are separated from each other.

This, therefore, takes place in the physical virtues, but not in the ethical, according to which a man is said to be simply good: for they all subsist in conjunction with prudence, which is but one virtue.

Prudence, therefore, is practical and useful towards the exercise of all the other virtues. But it is to be sought *per se*, because it is a virtue of the best part of the soul; that is, of the rational part; and for the sake of this part alone, it is needful. For no one in short who is depraved can become good according to his best part; but now no one virtue can exist without prudence; since there is no right pre-election without prudence, as neither is there without virtue, as we have shown. For virtue excites to a good end, and prepares us to aspire after it; but prudence causes us to do those things which tend to the end.

Prudence, however, has no dominion over wisdom, because wisdom is produced through prudence. For in consequence of being prudent, we seek wisdom; and prudence investigates the end of wisdom, as well as such things as tend to wisdom: yet thus subsisting, it is not better than wisdom; for wisdom is a virtue of a better part of the soul than prudence, since the latter belongs to practico, but the former to theoretic intellect. But if prudence surveys wisdom, but does not use it towards

the attainment of its own end (just as architects use the arts subject to them,) nevertheless it investigates how it may be obtained. On this account, however, prudence has no authority over wisdom, as neither has the medical art over health; for it does not govern health, but is exercised for the sake of health. Hence wisdom is better than prudence; just as health is better than the medical art, because the latter is practised for the sake of the former. But if prudence gives command, nevertheless it does not command the wise man, but him who has not yet arrived at virtue, but no longer so to him who has obtained virtue. For neither does the political art, because it gives orders about every thing in the city, on this account rule over the gods.

THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

BOOK VII.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING CONTINENCE.

AFTER what has been said about the ethical and dianoëtic virtues, we must speak concerning continence, and that virtue which is above human nature, and something heroic * and divine. For neither continence, nor the virtue which transcends human nature, is homogeneous with the before-mentioned virtues; and on this account we shall speak of these peculiarly, after the others above-mentioned, assuming another beginning. That neither of these, however, is co-ordinate with the virtues treated of in our preceding discourses, will be evident from what we are now about to say respecting them. But of the things which deserve blame, and are to be avoided, there are three species; namely, vice, incontinence, and brutality.

And the contraries to these are as follows:—ethical virtue (which has been discussed) is contrary to vice; continence to incontinence;

* The characteristic of *heroic virtue* consists in intrepidly attempting, and happily executing, things of the most sublime and arduous nature.

and to brutality is opposed that virtue which is above man, and called heroic, according to which some among men are said to become divine. Just as Homer introduces Priam, speaking of his son Hector:

“ Unlike the progeny of mortal man,

“ He seems the offspring of a power divine.”

Thus speaking of him, in consequence of the transcendency of his virtue.

And this is the habit opposed to brutality. For as brutality is not such a vice as is opposed to the virtues, (since it is not a human vice; and, in short, it is not a vice; for neither is there virtue nor vice of a brute, because brutes neither act in conjunction with reason, nor contrary to reason) so neither will divine and heroic virtue be properly virtue; for virtue is called human good; but this is something divine. But there is no virtue of a god, for divine good is something more excellent than virtue. And as a habit of this kind is rare, so its contrary, namely, brutality, which is especially found among the barbarians, is also rare. A brutality of this kind, however, is not only produced through an exceedingly depraved habit, but likewise from disease, and bodily defects. Such a disposition, therefore, shall be a subject of our future discussion. Having before spoken about , when we treated of the ethical virtues, we shall now speak concerning incontinence, effeminacy, and luxury, and of their opposites; namely, continence and endurance. But these are not the same with the above-mentioned vice and virtue, neither are they entirely different in consequence of being heterogeneous. For so far as the continent man chooses good, and follows reason, continence accords with virtue; but so far as desire opposes reason, and he always contends with desire, in consequence of not possessing the habit, it is not virtue. By a parity of reasoning,

however, incontinence is not vice, according to that vice which is opposed to the ethical virtues. For he who is depraved according to another vice, having the habit of depravity, commits base actions, the reasoning power not opposing him. But the incontinent man is vanquished by desire, the reasoning power at the same time drawing him towards good; and on this account incontinence is not of the same species as vice. But because incontinence is both contrary to reason and voluntary, it communicates with vice.

We will, however, speak of these in the same manner as we treated of the others; for we will exhibit the apparent arguments concerning them, of which confuting those that do not accord with truth, we shall give stability to such as are especially probable: and thus our discourse about them will be manifest.

But it appears to all men that continence is a good; and that endurance is among things worthy and laudable. Incontinence, however, is the contrary. The following also is asserted concerning continence. In the first place, that the continent man is the same with him who perseveres, and is immoveable in a certain reasoning, and that perseverance in reasoning constitutes continence; but that incontinence and the incontinent man subsist contrariwise. Secondly, that the continent man, when he knows that his desires are depraved, desists from them, and follows reason; but the incontinent man, when he knows that his actions are depraved, is not obedient to reason in consequence of pursuing pleasure. Thirdly, that the temperate man is also a continent man, and one who endures; but the intemperate man, the contrary. Fourthly, that every continent man is temperate. But some assert, that in like manner every incontinent man is intemperate, and that every intemperate man is incontinent. Others,

however, are of opinion, that these differ from each other. Fifthly, that it may happen that a prudent man may be skilful, and at the same time incontinent. Sixthly, that those who are prone to anger are called incontinent, and also those who are vehemently desirous of honour or gain. These, therefore, are nearly all the assertions respecting continence and incontinence, which we shall discuss separately, beginning with the first.

CHAP. II.

THAT PERSEVERANCE IN OPINIONS SIMPLY IS NOT CONTINENCE.

If continence were perseverance in every opinion, there would be a depraved continence when any one persevered in a false opinion. It is supposed, however, that continence is a thing laudable and good. Simply to persevere, therefore, in a present opinion, is not continence.

In like manner also upon this hypothesis not all incontinence will be base, and to be avoided; but there will be an incontinence which is good, as when a man does not persevere in a false opinion; just as *Neoptolemus* being persuaded by *Ulysses* to speak falsely, did not persevere in his opinion, but spoke truth; or if any one being deceived by a person with whom he is conversing, and opines falsely, does not persevere in those opinions; since a man of this kind is not to be blamed: but an incontinent man is culpable. He who perseveres in an opinion, therefore, is not continent: neither is he who departs from it incontinent. In short, incontinence, together with folly, would be virtue,

if to desist from opinion, and not to persevere in apparent good, were incontinence. For if any one from folly should think that intemperance is good, but not persevere in that opinion, he would be temperate:—thus also the incontinent man would be worthy, which is false; for it appears to all men that incontinence is blameable. Further still; he who is able to desist from an opinion is frequently better than him who has not this power; but the incontinent is not better than the continent man. He, therefore, who perseveres in an opinion is not a continent man, neither is he incontinent who relinquishes one.

But that he who is able to desist from his opinion is better than one who cannot do so, is evident. For he who through being deceived follows wrong courses, because he thinks they are good, is better than him who knows that they are wrong, and still pursues them. For a man who is deceived, if he is afterwards persuaded, may become good. But the man who follows such courses, and at the same time knows that they are base, has not power to desist from evil. Since how can a man desist, who is incapable of being persuaded? For he who knows that which it is necessary to know, and knowing, still acts incontinently, is obnoxious to the proverb, "*When water suffocates, what need is there to drink?*" It is evident, therefore, that perseverance in a present opinion is not continence, neither is the departure from it incontinence.*

CHAP. III.

CONCERNING THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCONTINENT MAN, IN WHICH, WHEN POSSESSED,
HE DOES NOT PERSIST.

BUT let us investigate the second object of inquiry. For a doubt arises how any one judging properly concerning the things which he does, should act incontinently. Some say, that an incontinent man does not know that what he does is wrong, and that he possesses no science with respect to his actions; just as Socrates said that it is not possible, when science is inherent, that any thing else should have dominion, and lead a man about like a slave: but this assertion is contrary to things manifest. For that some men are incontinent, and that he is an incontinent man who knows what is good, but tends to the contrary, is evident. On this account we must investigate whether every man who commits a depraved action, acts through ignorance, and in what manner this ignorance is produced. Others, however, imagine that the incontinent man knows what he does, and has no science of his actions, but merely opinion. It is not possible, however, that a man possessing science should be vanquished by pleasure; for nothing is more powerful than science. Hence they say, that the knowledge of the incontinent man is opinion: but if it be opinion, and not science, neither will the incontinent man have a firm knowledge of any thing; on the contrary, his knowledge will be slender and imbecile, just as it is in those who doubt; and this being the case, pardon will be granted to the incontinent, who do not persist in things thus known, while

they are led away by violent desires. Incontinence, therefore, will not be base; for pardon is not given to actions which are depraved, blameable, and to be avoided. Such, however, is incontinence.

Since, therefore, the knowledge of the incontinent man is neither opinion nor science, it may appear to be prudence; for this remains, and is a firm knowledge: but this also is absurd. For if it were granted, a man would be prudent and incontinent at the same time. No one, however, will say, that it is the province of a prudent man to do base things willingly. And since it has been shown in our former discourses that the prudent man is practical, that he is conversant about particular actions, and that he necessarily possesses the other virtues consequent to them, the knowledge of the incontinent man is not the result of prudence. It has been shown, therefore, that the incontinent man cannot have knowledge according to the above-mentioned modes. We must inquire, therefore, after what manner he possesses knowledge, which we shall presently consider more accurately.

CHAP. IV.

THAT THE CONTINENT MAN IS NOT A TEMPERATE MAN, NEITHER IS THE TEMPERATE
A CONTINENT MAN.

LET us now consider the third object of inquiry, namely, whether the temperate, can be a continent man; and also the fourth, whether the continent, can be a temperate man. This, however, will be manifest to those who admit the definition of the continent man. But he is one who resists strong and depraved desires; the continent man, therefore, has strong and base desires; but if the temperate were the continent man, he also would have those desires, which is contrary to the definition of temperance. For temperance does not consist in this,—that desires should be obedient to reason. Moreover the temperate man is delighted with his actions; for otherwise he would not be a temperate man: but the continent man, since he contends with, and opposes desires, is not delighted. For delight consists in tranquillity. Further still, terrible things happening suddenly, and before a man can use his reason with respect to them, do not affright him who possesses the habit of fortitude. In like manner also he who has obtained the habit of temperance is not excited by pleasurable things, and this before he has considered and opposed his reason to them. The continent man, however, is not of this kind; for continence has been said to consist in the use of reason with regard to these things, and in opposing them. For if the desires of the continent man be good, continence, which prohibits the use of them, will be a base thing. But if they be imbecile, and not base, continence will be nothing

venerable : now, however, it appears to be so. And if they be base and imbecile, there will be nothing great in subduing things of this kind ; so that continence will be nothing great. It remains, therefore, that the desires of the continent man are base and powerful ; and on this account neither will the temperate be the continent man, nor the continent the temperate man.

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CHAP. V.

THAT THE PRUDENT, IS NOT THE INCONTINENT MAN.

BUT it is evident from what has been said, that the prudent, cannot be the incontinent man. For since temperance is consequent to prudence, because every ethical virtue is so, but the temperate cannot be the continent man, by a much greater reason he cannot be the incontinent man. But if this be the case, neither will the prudent, be the incontinent man.

CHAP. VI.

IN WHAT MANNER IT IS PROPER TO PROSECUTE THE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING
CONTINENCE.

LET us now investigate the sixth subject of inquiry, namely, if continence and incontinence are conversant about wealth and opinion, and, in short, about every object of desire. If this be the case, and he who is prone to each of these is incontinent, we must investigate who is simply the incontinent man; since he is not the incontinent man who is thus affected about all things. For no one is incontinent according to every species of incontinence; so that we must investigate who is properly the incontinent man. Such then are the inquiries and doubts concerning continence. Of these, however, it is necessary to solve some, but to leave others; for the solution of doubt is the discovery of the thing investigated.

In the first place, therefore, let us consider whether incontinent men act incontinently knowingly, or otherwise; and after what manner they possess knowledge. In the next place, about what things continent and incontinent men are conversant. But I mean whether about every pleasure and pain, or only about certain pleasures and pains definitely; also whether the continent man, and he who endures, differ from each other; and let us also consider such things as are consequent to these investigations.

The principle of these inquiries is to investigate in what the continent and incontinent man differ from each other; whether according to the subjects about which they are conversant, or according to the manner

in which they are related to these, or whether according to both particulars.

After this we must consider whether or not incontinence and continence are conversant about every thing pleasurable. For neither incontinence nor continence, nor the simply incontinent man, is conversant about all these particulars, but only such as the intemperate man is conversant with. Nor are they affected towards them similarly with the intemperate man, but after another manner. For the intemperate man, judging corruptly, and thinking it is good always to pursue the pleasurable, in consequence of this, tends to it; but the incontinent man follows desire, notwithstanding it is opposed by reason.

CHAP. VII.

AFTER WHAT MANNER THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCONTINENT MAN SUBSISTS.

THAT the knowledge of the incontinent man, therefore, is opinion, to which his actions are opposed, and not science, makes no difference with respect to the argument. For this must be investigated, whether he possesses a firm or a doubtful knowledge of good. But it frequently happens that opinion is so firmly inherent, that it does not differ from science in opposing desires; and some persons as firmly believe in their opinions, as scientific men believe in the knowledge which they derive through science. Thus *Heraclitus* fancied that he knew, with scientific accuracy, the things which he opined; as for instance, that there is no such thing as motion, and other notions which he maintained. He,

therefore, who acts contrary to such an opinion of good, differs nothing from him who possesses the science of good, and at the same time tends to the pleasurable. For they are in like manner depraved, so far as each is similarly hostile to strong argument; hence the doubt before raised, namely, how it is possible that he who knows good, should choose evil, cannot be thus solved. But we must inquire how it may be solved in another manner.

We must say, therefore, that to know scientifically, and to know according to science, is two-fold. For a man is said to know scientifically, who both possesses science and uses it. Just as if any one being a geometrician geometrizes, he is then said to know scientifically; and he possesses science, but does not use it, who being a geometrician composes orations, or effects any other thing which does not pertain to a geometrician. As it would be wonderful, therefore, for a geometrician, when geometrizing, to collect false conclusions; but it would not be at all so if when composing orations, he should not perceive when any one speculates figures ungeometrically; after the same manner also the thing takes place with the incontinent man. For if the incontinent man knows scientifically, and both uses science, and speculates according to it, and at the same time should tend to the contrary of the things which he has a scientific knowledge of, it would be wonderful; but if he does not use science, although he possesses it, it is not a fit subject of wonder.

Further still, when any one, possessing science and using it, yet does not use it perfectly, it is nothing wonderful if in this case he is a depraved man. For since he who knows scientifically, thus knows that which he demonstrates according to two modes of propositions, namely, the universal and the particular; if he does not use both,

that is to say, if he uses the universal, and not the particular, it is no wonder if he is depraved. For instance, any one may scientifically know that such a thing is base, and that it is improper to do a base thing, and, therefore, that thing ought not to be done. But since both propositions are in the soul, when any one is moved by desire to something base, it happens that he uses the universal proposition, that evil ought not to be done, and he then speculates according to it; but the particular proposition, that this or that thing is bad, he knows indeed, but he does not use it, neither does he perceive it in energy; and on this account proceeds to depravity like one deprived of sight. This, however, is nothing wonderful. For although he uses the universal proposition, nevertheless he is not able to act according to science, since he does not also use the particular proposition; for this has dominion over actions. Thus if any one knows that dry things are to be used, but is ignorant that this particular thing is dry, he will not on this account use dry things the more:—thus it is also with these particulars. And if any one uses, and contemplates, the universal, but does not use the particular, he will derive no benefit from science. Particular propositions, however, differ from each other; since, the universal being known, there is every necessity that some particular proposition should be known, but others not. For when the universal subsists in such a manner as to comprehend him who syllogizes, or that which is of a similar species, the particular is then known, together with the universal proposition. For instance, hellebore is noxious to all men; he who reasons is a man: hellebore, therefore, is noxious to him. Here the particular is known, together with the universal proposition; for it is not possible for a man to be so far ignorant of himself as not to know that he is a man. The like also happens when the universal proposition

comprehends things of a similar species; for neither is it possible to be ignorant of these. When, however, the universal proposition comprehends any certain thing, it is not then necessary, the universal being known, that the particular should be known also. For example, all hellebore is noxious; this is hellebore; this, therefore, is noxious. In this case it is not necessary that the particular proposition should be known, in consequence of the universal being known. The incontinent man, therefore, either does not possess a knowledge of a particular proposition of this kind, or possessing, does not use it. But to use, and not to use, differ so much from each other, that we think him to be an absurd person, who uses science, and at the same time errs; and we are astonished if any one should be thus affected; but we are by no means surprised if any one not using science should err.

Again, those who know scientifically do not only differ in this, namely, that some both possess and use science, but others possess it indeed, and do not use it; but they also differ in the very possession of the thing itself; for those who know scientifically, do not similarly possess the sciences; since some one may possess, and yet not possess science*; as in the case of one asleep, or insane, or intoxicated with wine. After this manner also those who are under the influence of passions, possess science; for they are intoxicated with desires, and insane through anger. And just as with those who are insane, or intoxicated with wine, their bodies also are changed and evidently altered by these passions; for both their colour and their countenances are altered. Some of these, however, are perfectly insane. It is evident, therefore, that the science of incontinent men is similar to that of the intoxicated and insane.

* That is, a man may possess science in capacity, but not in energy.

If also they employ the words of science, they will not even on this account appear to be dissimilar to the above-mentioned characters. For those also who are intoxicated, recite the demonstrations and verses of *Empedocles*, just as boys newly taught, connect words indeed, but do not understand before they are accustomed to them, and until the words become as it were natural to them, which requires a long time: so that we must consider that those who act incontinently speak like players, who, representing persons in plays, repeat verses indeed, but understand nothing of what they recite.

Further still, after the same manner also any one may physically discover the cause through which incontinent men, knowing good, do not embrace it; for there is a universal opinion, and a particular opinion, which latter is conversant with sensibles. But when from the universal and partial we collect any other opinion, it is necessary, if the opinion be theoretic, that the dianoëtic power should assent, and believe that it thus subsists. If, however, the opinion be practical, it is necessary to act immediately unless some one prevents. For instance, it is a theoretic opinion that hellebore is noxious, or that honey is sweet, which, if we collect, we shall believe only, but not act. But it is a practical opinion, that a sweet thing ought to be tasted, which, if we collect, we shall both act and taste. When, therefore, opinions are both universal and particular, they order some particular thing to be done. For example, that it is proper that this thing should be tasted, because this thing is sweet; and it is proper that that which is sweet should be tasted. Science, however, and universal reason, order that it should not be tasted; but by chance also a desire of the thing being inherent, the thing collected* from these subsists in energy, and he who

* That is, the inference made from universal and particular opinion.

collects, uses it. The universal, however, forbids that it should be tasted; but desire, in conjunction with opinion, leads us to the thing to be tasted. For it is possible to excite each of the senses, I mean that the proper senses may be excited by desire: for instance, the sight, if the object of sight be pleasurable, is attracted towards it, and also the taste to the object of taste. Hence it happens that incontinence is produced from reason, and from an opinion contrary to reason. But opinion is not contrary to right reason essentially, but through desire. For opinion does not, by its own proper power, govern right reason, (since it is impossible that opinion should surpass science) but by the power of desire, which changes and alters the body. Incontinence, however, is ~~produced~~ from reason, together with opinion opposing right reason, through desire.

On this account it is said, that brutes cannot be incontinent, because they do not possess reason, which desire opposes, but merely a certain phantasy and recollection of particular things.

But how the ignorance of the incontinent man is dissolved, his desires being extinguished, and again how a man possessing scientific knowledge, and energizing according to science, becomes incontinent, admits of the same solution which was given with respect to one intoxicated or asleep. But to understand this is the province of physiologists.

When the incontinent man, however, is under the influence of passion, he either does not in any respect possess, or scientifically know the minor proposition, which has dominion over actions, namely, that this particular thing is bad; or he possesses it in the same manner as those who are insane or intoxicated, recite certain verses and demonstrations. • To which we may add, that neither is the minor

proposition itself by itself scientific, in the same manner as the universal and major proposition.

So that, as it seems, that very thing happens which Socrates investigated. For passion is not produced when science is present, which appears to be properly so called, and is universal; for desire has no dominion over this, but over that proposition which governs actions, which is the minor, and is conversant with particulars. For he who acts, corrupts this which is employed in actions: and it is this proposition, and not the universal, which is drawn aside through passion. Thus much concerning the knowledge of the incontinent, whether they altogether know good, and how knowing it, they act incontinently.

CHAP. VIII.

WHO THE SIMPLY INCONTINENT MAN, AND ALSO WHO THE SIMPLY CONTINENT MAN IS.

AFTER what has been said, we must consider whether any one is simply incontinent without addition, or whether all are so partially; for instance, whether they are incontinent of anger, or of renown; and if there be the simply incontinent man, we must say about what subjects he is conversant.

That all continent as well as tolerant * men, therefore, both simply and partially considered, and likewise the incontinent and effeminate are conversant with pleasures and pains, is evident.

Of pleasurable objects, some indeed are necessary, and others not

* There is no word in the English language, but *tolerant*, which sufficiently expresses the Greek *καρτεριος*. What Dr. Johnson therefore says of *tolerance*, may also be said of *tolerant*, that it is a very good word, though seldom used.

so, but eligible and pleasant *per se*. By the necessary, however, I mean either those, without which it is not possible that the universal human species should subsist, such as marriage; or the individual, such as food, remission from labour, sleep, and things of this kind. But by the not necessary, I mean the eligible and pleasurable *per se*, and not in consequence of being to the subsistence of man; such as wealth, honour, victory, and things of this kind:—this being the case, it happens that there are excesses in both species of pleasures, as well in those that are necessary, as in those that are eligible *per se*, when any one uses them more than is becoming, and than right reason ordains that they should be used.

He therefore, who exceeds with respect to pleasurable objects which are not necessary, is not said to be incontinent simply without addition, but incontinent of glory, or incontinent of wealth, as being different from him who is simply and properly incontinent; but is denominated incontinent through a certain similitude to him; just as a man conquering in the Olympic Games, differs from man simply considered; for although the difference between them is small, yet there is a difference, and this in consequence of the addition.

That the incontinence about pleasurable objects, which are not necessary, is different from incontinence, is manifest from this; namely, because incontinence, simply considered, is culpable; and it appears to be not merely an error, but a vice, either properly or relatively. The incontinence, however, which takes place with addition, is not to be blamed in the same manner as a vice. Those, therefore, who exceed with respect to such pleasurable objects as are not necessary, are said to be incontinent with addition.

But those who exceed in necessary and corporeal pleasures, reason

at the same time not judging and assenting thereto, but on the other hand opposing them, and who immoderately follow those pleasures, about which we say that both the temperate and the intemperate man are conversant, but who fly from pains more than is proper; as for instance, hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and all those particulars in which the taste and the touch are employed:—such men are said to be incontinent; not with addition, but simply.

This, however, is also evident, because intemperate men are so-called in consequence of exceeding in things of this kind; but this is by no means the case with those who exceed in pleasurable objects which are not necessary.

For because it happens that the temperate, and the continent, the incontinent, and the intemperate man, are conversant about the very same corporeal pleasures, we place the temperate man in the same class with the continent man, and the intemperate with the incontinent man.

Nevertheless they are not similarly affected with respect to these pleasures. For the intemperate man pre-electively tends to desire; but the incontinent man not pre-electively, but in opposition to right reason. Hence we rank the incontinent in the same class with the intemperate man, and the continent in the same with the temperate man; and we say, that they are conversant about the same things; but we by no means assert this of him who does not conduct himself incontinently about other pleasures which are not necessary. If, however, the incontinent man is conversant about the same pleasurable objects as the intemperate man, still the intemperate man is more to be blamed, inasmuch as he is more enslaved by his desires; for the incontinent man is subdued by very vehement desires; and it cannot be

otherwise since he acts in opposition to right reason. But the intemperate man is subdued by trivial and imbecile desires, because right reason does not oppose them. He also seeks excessive pleasures, and flies from moderate pains. And if, when moderate desires excite him, he thus tends to excess, what would take place if he experienced the desire of youth, and violent pain from the want of necessities?

CHAP. IX.

CONCERNING BRUTALITY, AND THE INCONTINENCE PERTAINING TO IT.

AGAIN, with respect to pleasurable objects, some are good by nature, others naturally evil, and others have an intermediate subsistence. And the pleasurable objects which are good by nature are those which we seek *per se*, and not for the sake of any thing else; such as renown, victory, and health. But those that are evil by nature are such as eating human flesh, and drinking human blood, and intemperance contrary to nature. Those, however, which have an intermediate subsistence, are such as in themselves are neither good nor evil, but conducive to some particular good; such as food, garments, and marriage. When, therefore, any one seeks those that are good by nature, and such as have an intermediate subsistence, he is praised, provided he does not exceed right reason, but seeks them in an appropriate manner.

For excess is not laudable in all things; but excess in those things

which are good by nature, though blameable, is not depraved *, since, as we have said, the things pursued are good by nature, and are sought for their own sake; it is, however, wrong, and therefore should be avoided. For in the loving of children, which is good by nature, it is proper to avoid excess; and not act like *Niobe*, who contended with the gods about her children; or like *Satyrus*, who invoked his father as if he were a god; since these persons appeared to be very insane.

But an excess of this kind is not incontinence; for incontinence is not only to be avoided, but also ranks among things blameable. It is, however, called incontinence, in consequence of a certain similitude which it has to incontinence which subsists with addition, as we have said; such as incontinence of gain, or incontinence of honour: ~~and a~~ man is called incontinent not simply, but incontinent of honour, or of the love of children, or the like: just as we call him a bad physician who treats his patient contrary to science; and him a bad actor who does not accurately imitate the character he represents; but we do not call them simply bad, because a perversion of this kind is not vice, but has a similitude to it with addition. Excess, therefore, about things good and pleasurable by nature thus subsists. But the excesses of the intermediate goods are depraved and blameable, because goods of this kind do not possess any particular mode of subsistence from themselves; but from the end, with a view to which they are arranged, they are either good or evil. On this account, if they are arranged with a view to a depraved end, they are depraved; but they are so arranged when pursued with excess. For he who exceeds in the use of food, or garments, and other necessary goods, and who uses them contrary to right

* For ψεκτον μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ μοχθηρὸν, read ψεκτον μὲν ἐστὶν οὐχ μοχθηρὸν.

reason, arranges them with a view to intemperance : and hence excess in all these is depravity. But the incontinence of certain things, simply considered and without addition, is conversant with the same particulars as temperance and intemperance.

Merely the excess, however, in things naturally evil, and at the same time pleasurable, is not depraved, but simply the habits conversant with these, which are brutal, and not pleasant by nature. For of pleasurable objects, some are naturally so to all animals; such, for instance, as food, sleep, and the like. Some things, however, that are pleasurable by nature, are not pleasant to all animals; such as any particular kind of food; for example, to eat grass or flesh is pleasurable to some animals only. Others are by no means pleasurable by nature, but are so either through custom, or bodily defect, or natural depravity; and these are naturally evil.

And it is about these that brutality is conversant; such as the instance related of that woman who cut open pregnant women, and devoured the children; or the instance of those savage men about Pontus who are delighted to feed upon raw fish or flesh, and who exchange their children with each other to furnish a banquet; or, as Phalaris did, who eat his own child. Such then are the things that are evil, and afford pleasure, though they are not pleasurable by nature, but appear to be so through natural depravity. Some, however, are pleased with these in consequence either of bodily defect, or insanity, or some other disease. Through insanity indeed, as was the case with him who being insane, eat the liver of his fellow-slave; or he who slew his mother, and eat her: but through disease, as when any one eats coals or dirt. Brutality, however, is produced from custom, when any one accustoms

himself from the earliest periods of life to unnatural pleasures, and delights in food with which no man is pleased, who does not exceed the bounds of nature, and who does not act intemperately from unnatural intemperance. Among these may be ranked him who delights in plucking out his hair, or biting his nails: but these habits also are produced through natural depravity.

Such men, therefore, as through natural depravity are delighted with those things which are evil by nature, are not incontinent; for they do not in so acting oppose right reason. In like manner also neither are those incontinent who are thus affected, either from custom, or disease, or insanity. But by being pleased with things of this kind they entirely exceed the bounds of vice.

If, however, a man at one time subdues, and at another is subdued by these kind of desires, he is not said to be incontinent simply, but with addition; neither is he said to be continent simply, but with addition. For example, he is said to be continent, or similarly incontinent, in a *brutal* manner. For brutality is not, like continence simply considered, conversant about the same pleasurable objects as intemperance; since intemperance and continence, simply considered, are similarly conversant about natural pleasures; but brutality is conversant with those that are contrary to nature.

But every vice that exceeds, whether it be folly or timidity, intemperance or moroseness, is partly brutal, and partly diseased. For he who is naturally so affected as to be frightened at every thing, even at the noise of a mouse, is timid with the timidity of a brute. But he is timid from disease, who through disease is terrified at a cat. And with respect to folly, those are brutally foolish who are most irrational by

nature, and live from sense alone, as is the case with some tribes of remote barbarians; but those are foolish from disease who labour under epilepsy or insanity.

It is possible, however, to possess these habits, and yet not to be vanquished by them: just as if *Phalaris*, when desiring to eat his son, should have subdued his desire: but it is also possible to be vanquished by them.

We do not, therefore, call such-like incontinence and continence simply incontinence and continence; but we denominate them with an addition, as we have before observed, brutal or diseased incontinence; and also a continence of a brutal vice, or of a diseased vice: but that alone is simply incontinence which is conversant with human intemperance.

We have shown, therefore, that incontinence and continence are alone conversant with the same things as intemperance and temperance, and that about other pleasurable objects there is a certain other species of incontinence, which is metaphorically, and not properly so called,

CHAP. X.

THAT THE INCONTINENCE OF DESIRE IS MORE BASE THAN THAT OF ANGER.

LET us, however, inquire whether the incontinence of desire, or the incontinence of anger, is the more base: the former indeed appears more base than the latter. For he who is enraged is not entirely obedient to reason, but in a certain respect is both obedient and disobedient to it; just as is the case with hasty servants, who run away before they have heard the whole of their orders, and thus err in the execution of them; or like dogs, who bark at a noise alone before they know whether he who approaches be a friend or not. Thus also anger, through its natural heat and impetuosity, only hearing reason, but not hearing its mandates, rushes to vengeance. For the reasoning power, and the imagination, merely show that one man acts insolently towards another, or despises or injures him; but anger, as it were syllogizing, whether it be proper to act with hostility to a man of this kind, is immediately enraged. Thus, therefore, in a certain respect anger follows reason; but desire, if sense, or the reasoning power when corrupted by sense, only says, that some particular thing is pleasant, rushes immediately to the enjoyment of it. Hence anger follows reason in some respect, but desire does not. On this account he who is incontinent in desire, is more base than him who is incontinent in anger; for the latter, after a certain manner, is subdued by reason; but the former is vanquished by desire.

Besides, it is a lighter evil to follow those appetites which are more agreeable to nature, than those that are less so; for it is more deserving

of pardon. But incontinence of anger is more natural than incontinence of desire. I speak, however, of unnecessary and excessive desires; such, for instance, as a thirst for riches or renown. Hence incontinence of anger is a more tolerable evil, than incontinence of desire; but that what is the more natural, is the more pardonable, is evident. For one who was accused of beating his father, excused himself by saying, that an anger of this kind, and its attendant incontinence, were natural to him; since his own father, and even his grandfather, committed the same fault; and that his own son, when he became a man, would also beat him. A certain person likewise, being forcibly dragged about by his son, commanded him to stop at the gate; for "I," said he, "dragged my father no further than here." It appears, therefore, that some excuse is admitted for these actions when any one is naturally inclined to them, and they render the accusation more tolerable.

But that incontinence of anger is more natural than incontinence of desire, is manifest; because simply to be angry, is more natural than to desire things not necessary. For anger is implanted by nature for the preservation of nature, in order that it may shake off what is injurious; and to this it tends. But this is no longer the case with the desire of things not necessary; for the preservation of nature does not depend either upon victory or honour. On this account also it is more common to be angry, than to desire things not necessary; for the former is present, as well with all men as with all animals; but the latter not even to all men. And since to be angry is more natural than such kind of desires, the excess of anger also will be more natural than the excess of desire:—hence then the incontinence of anger is the

more natural, and on this account less base than the incontinence of desire.

Further still, of unjust men the more insidious are the more unjust. Desire, however, is more insidious than anger; and, therefore, more unjust. But that it is more insidious is evident; for it accedes secretly, and not suddenly, as is the case with anger, and the actions of angry men are more apparent. Those, however, who desire are not altogether apparent; for being analogous to thieves, they desire as it were secretly and fraudulently; and, on this account, tend to the objects of their desire by a certain theft and fraud. Whence also Homer calls Venus fraudulent, and ascribes the Cestus to her, insinuating the variety of desire; to which the following verses tend:

“ In this was every art, and every charm,
“ To win the wisest, and the coldest warm;
“ Fond love, the gentle vow, the gay desire,
“ The kind deceit, the still reviving fire,
“ Persuasive speech, and more persuasive sighs,
“ Silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes.”

IL. Book xiv.

So that if desire of this kind is more unjust than anger, the incontinence conversant with desire, will be more base than the incontinence of anger; and it is properly incontinence and intemperance, which are properly vices.

Again, no one pursuing absurd desires is pained, but every one who is angry is pained; and he is more blamed who is delighted in doing evil, than he who is pained in so acting. For he who is pained appears to suffer a certain punishment for the errors which he has committed; and on this account is less blamed. He, therefore, who pursues absurd

desires is more blamed, and that justly, than he who is angry. Hence then incontinence of desire, is a worse evil than incontinence of anger; for those things with which it is more just to be angry are themselves more unjust. It is evident, therefore, from what we have said, that incontinence of desire is more base than incontinence of anger; and that both continence and incontinence are conversant about corporeal desires and pleasures.

CHAP. XI.

IN WHAT RESPECT CONTINENCE, TEMPERANCE, ENDURANCE, AND THE VICES OPPOSED TO THEM, DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER.

LET us now speculate concerning the difference between temperance, continence, and endurance; also concerning the difference between intemperance, incontinence, and effeminacy, which respectively oppose these virtues. For of corporeal pleasures some are human, others brutal, and others morbid. Human pleasures indeed are such as man is naturally delighted with, and they are as many as man delights in, whether they be good, or whether they be bad, according to human vice: such, for instance, as wealth or food, or renown or marriage. For he who is pleased with, and pursues these, either as it is proper, or who falls short of, or exceeds reason, but does not exceed or fall short of his own nature, such a man is delighted according to human pleasure: but brutal pleasures are those which, both according to quality and quantity, fall from the condition of human nature. And excess

takes place about human pleasures when they surpass themselves; and when they exceed the limits of human nature they are brutal: but morbid pleasures which are such as arise from disease or insanity, exceed human pleasure, and are contrary to nature. In short, as we have before observed, when we spoke about brutal pleasure, the habits conversant with the before-mentioned pleasures are nearly of a similar nature.

Temperance, however, and intemperance, are conversant with human pleasures only, because we do not say that brutes are either temperate or intemperate, unless, perhaps, metaphorically, but not properly; and even then we call them so by comparing one with another. For these also differ in a certain degree with respect to corporeal pleasures; and some are more, but others less, delighted with them: they are not, however, properly called either temperate or intemperate, because they by no means possess reason, but are entirely separated from it, in the same manner as insane persons.

On this account, brutality is a lesser evil than human vice, which also is more terrible; for human vice corrupts the most excellent characteristic of man, that is, reason; but brutality by no means does this; for it does not possess reason: just as an inanimate evil is a less evil than one that is animated; for an evil, which possesses a self-motive principle, is much more noxious than one which has not this principle; since an immoveable evil is more tolerable than one that is moved, inasmuch as it has less power. As, therefore, an animated, is worse than an inanimate evil, because it possesses in itself a principle, that is to say, soul which moves it; so likewise a rational evil, because it more especially possesses a principle, is more injurious and worse

than an irrational evil ; for a bad man will do infinitely more evil than a brute : and thus much for these things. Let us now proceed to the proposed subjects of inquiry.

There is, therefore, a peculiar habit about each genus of the above-mentioned particulars. As we have observed, however, not only temperance, but continence also, and endurance, and the opposites to these qualities, are conversant about human pleasures and pains. But I call the human pleasures and pains, about which temperance is conversant, such as pertain to the touch and the taste. Some persons, however, are more subdued by these than the generality of mankind, and tend more towards them ; as in the instance of the depraved few ; but others vanquish those by which the multitude is subdued. And since there are pains and pleasures which they vanquish, and by which they are subdued, those who vanquish pleasures are continent, and those who are subdued by them, incontinent : those also who vanquish pains in such a manner as not to be excited by them, are tolerant ; and those who are subdued, and easily excited by them, are effeminate. For the most part, however, men are neither tolerant nor effeminate, but have an intermediate subsistence, although they verge more to the worse of the two. The like also takes place with respect to other habits. We must, however, more accurately distinguish these.

For since some pleasures are necessary, and others not so ; (but with respect to these it has been already stated what pleasures are necessary, and how far they are so) and since neither excesses nor defects are necessary, and pains and pleasures subsist similarly, he who pursues excessive pleasures, or always seeks such as are naturally great, or who exceedingly seeks those that are moderate, not being in any respect

violently drawn by them, but inclining to them with previous choice, not for the sake of any thing else, such as renown or wealth, but merely for their own sake,—such a one is intemperate: for it necessarily happens that a man of this kind does not repent after the enjoyment of pleasure, and on this account is incurable. For he who never repents is incurable, and such is the intemperate man. But he who seeks things of this kind less than is proper, is diametrically opposite, and is insensible. He, however, who pursues the middle course, is temperate; and not only he is a temperate man who pursues corporeal pleasures in the manner we have said, but in like manner he is an intemperate man who flies from corporeal pains, not being subdued by them, but from previous choice. Of those, however, who tend to pleasurable objects without previous choice, one man tends to them for the sake of pleasure, but another in order that he may avoid the pain arising from desire. Hence they differ from each other; and he who pursues pleasurable objects for the sake of shunning pain is effeminate; but he who does this through pleasure, is incontinent. The incontinent, however, is opposed to the continent man, and the tolerant to the effeminate man; for endurance consists in opposing, and continence in subduing, since it is one thing to resist, and another to vanquish: just in the same manner as to conquer, is different from the not being subdued. Hence continence is better, and more eligible than endurance: for it is better to conquer than not to be subdued. It appears also that intemperance is worse than incontinence. For it is evident to every one that he who pursues pleasure from previous choice, and this either not desiring, or quietly desiring, and not so as to be tyrannized over by desire, is worse than him who is tyrannized

over by very vehement desires. But the first is the intemperate, and the other the incontinent man; hence then intemperance is worse than incontinence. The continent and the tolerant man, therefore, differ after this manner; and thus also continence is more eligible than endurance, and incontinence is more tolerable than intemperance.

CHAP. XII.

WHAT KINDS OF INCONTINENCE AND EFFEMINACY ARE PARDONABLE.

BUT we must still further define these. The continent man, therefore, is one who vanquishes, and the tolerant man one who opposes his desires, and is not subdued by them; but he who conducts himself weakly with respect to such things as the many oppose and are able to bear, is effeminate and delicate: for delicacy is a kind of effeminacy; just as when a man will not lift up his trailing garments, lest it should subject him to some fatigue; and thus imitating a person enervated through disease, does not imagine that he is wretched, though at the same time he resembles a wretched man. The like also takes place in continence and incontinence; for there are pleasures and pains so great and vehement, that he who is subdued by them is in a certain respect thought worthy of pardon; since it is nothing wonderful to be subdued by such pleasures and pains; just as Philoctetes, whom Theodectes, the poet, introduces in his poems, being wounded by a serpent, overcame his pain for a certain time, and at length complained aloud; or

Cercyon, whom the poet Carcinus introduces enduring the insolence of his daughter Alopè for a certain time, was at last subdued by grief: and as those who endeavour to suppress laughter burst forth violently, which happened to Xenophantus. It is not wonderful, therefore, to be subdued by very vehement desires. But if any one is subdued by such pleasures and pains as the many are able to resist, and is not able to resist them, and this not through any particular nature of his race (as the kings of the Scythians are naturally effeminate, and as the female is naturally more effeminate than the male) or through disease, but in consequence of a base and depraved habit, such a man is unpardonable. He also who is very much given to childish amusements is effeminate, although he appears intemperate; for those who vehemently seek after relaxation are effeminate, since diversions are a certain relaxation and rest from labour; and he who is very much addicted to amusements, exceeds according to a certain remission, and is said to be a man immoderately addicted to amusements.

CHAP. XIII.

CONCERNING THE SPECIES OF INCONTINENCE, AND THAT INTemperance IS A WORSE
EVIL THAN INCONTINENCE.

THERE are two species of incontinence; the one is called rashness, but the other imbecility or weakness. For those who before they have deliberated do not yield to passion, and are afterwards subdued by it, are incontinent according to imbecile incontinence; those, however, who have not previously deliberated, but being immediately led away, are subdued, are incontinent according to rash incontinence. For some men foreseeing, and previously exciting themselves and the reasoning power, are not subdued by ~~passion~~; just as those who being previously rubbed and tickled are not afterwards affected by it. But persons of acute feelings, and such as are melancholic, are especially incontinent according to rash incontinence: the former indeed, through quickness, do not wait for the judgment of reason; but the latter, through being very fantastical, and following their imagination; and on this account they are vehemently excited, and not converted to reason.

But, as we have observed, every incontinent man is also repentant; for 'when desire is extinguished, reason being then in a sound state, he sees the absurdity of passion, which is followed by repentance. The intemperate man, however, is impenitent; for reason in him is not in a sound condition; and on this account he is unable to see that it is base to be so. Hence the incontinent man is curable, but the intemperate man is incurable. For the same thing does not take place, as what we observed above, since we then spoke as exercising the subject of

inquiry by probable arguments. The truth, however, is as follows: Intemperance is similar to a dropsy and a consumption, which are constantly troublesome to the patient; but incontinence to an epilepsy, which sometimes leaving him, is not continually troublesome. Intemperance indeed is at all times disgraceful; for the intemperate man always fancies that it is proper to act intemperately, but the incontinent man not always, but only when he falls into vehement desires:—in short, intemperance and incontinence belong to a different genus; for the latter, as being disgraceful, lies concealed, but the former is not concealed; since the incontinent man knows that it is a base thing to yield to his passions. Intemperance, therefore, is worse than both species of incontinence.

Of these species of incontinence, however, weakness is worse than rashness; for those who are incontinent, according to weak incontinence, are subdued by lesser, but such as are so, according to rash incontinence, by greater passion; since it is manifest that passion is not vehemently hostile to those things which it is able to effect and deliberate upon. But rash men, in consequence of being unable to deliberate, plainly show that they are urged by great desires; and, in short, it is more disgraceful to be subdued when previous deliberation is exercised, and a man is as it were armed, than when he does not previously deliberate. For the incontinent man, according to weak incontinence, is similar to one who is easily intoxicated with a little wine, and even less than the generality of people can drink without being so affected.

That incontinence, therefore, is a vice is evident; though not simply a vice like intemperance, but in a certain respect. For so far as, in a degree, it deliberately chooses evil, being actuated by passion, it is a

vice; but so far as it does not entirely imagine that it is proper to follow passion, it is not a vice. And it resembles the Milesians, of whom Demodocus revilingly says, "the Milesians are not indeed foolish, but they act as if they were so." After the very same manner also incontinent men are not intemperate; but they do the deeds of the intemperate.

And since the incontinent man pursues corporeal pleasures contrary to right reason, not being persuaded that they are good, and ought to be pursued; but the intemperate man believes that it is proper to pursue them; the first may be easily converted, but the latter not so. For virtue preserves the principle of actions, which is the good and the end for the sake of which a thing is done; but depravity corrupts this principle. For through virtue we arrive at the good, but are separated from it ~~through~~ through depravity. But an end of this kind is not known through reason and demonstration; just as neither are the principles * of mathematics known from demonstration. Virtue, however, which has a right opinion about this end, is either something natural, or the effect of custom; for a knowledge of this kind is produced in us either from nature, or good custom.

He, therefore, who knows the good, which ought to be made the end of actions, and does those things which tend to it, is temperate; but he who proposes a bad end, and directs his pleasures to that, is intemperate. He, however, who proposes a good end, and fancies it is proper to direct his actions to this, but through passion departs from right reason, not because he really thinks it is becoming to pursue such

* That is, axioms and definitions.

kind of pleasures, but merely errs in those actions,—such a man will be neither temperate nor intemperate; but in consequence of such actions, he is worse than the temperate, and better than the intemperate man, because he exercises reason. For the first is in a certain respect base, but the intemperate man simply so. There is a contrary character, however, to the incontinent man, namely, the continent, who does not, through passion, depart from ratiocination: whence it is evident that continence is a worthy, but incontinence a base habit.

CHAP. XIV.

WHO IS ESSENTIALLY CONTINENT, AND WHO IS ACCIDENTALLY SO.

LET us now investigate the doubt before raised, whether he who perseveres in every kind of object previously deliberated upon, be continent, or he only who is steadfast to a right one; and in like manner with respect to the incontinent man. He, therefore, is said to be continent according to accident, who persists in every kind of pre-election; but he is said to be essentially so who perseveres in a right pre-election, and in true reason. In a similar manner also, a man is called accidentally incontinent who persists in every opinion; but he is said to be essentially so, who does not persevere in a right opinion. For if any one searches after, and makes choice of a thing, not itself for itself, but for the sake of something else, he seeks for this according to accident; but that for the sake of which he seeks this, is sought for by him essentially.

For he who seeks for riches for the sake of renown, seeks for riches according to accident, but essentially for renown. The like also takes place in the particulars we are discussing; for he who perseveres in a good opinion, and in a right pre-election, chooses the good itself, because it is good, and hence is essentially continent. But he who persists in a pre-election that is not right, and in a false opinion, perseveres in consequence of thinking that what he makes choice of is good; (but he thinks so because there is in it some obscure vestige of good) and on this account embraces a pre-election that is not right, and a false opinion, as if they were right and good. Since, therefore, he does not make choice of, and persist in, these *per se*, but for the sake of good, he is not essentially, but accidentally, a continent man. The like also happens with respect to the opposite characters; for one who does not persevere in every kind of opinion, is in a certain degree incontinent; but he is simply so who does not persevere in a right one; for that which is simply what it is, and that which is essentially so, are the same.

CHAP. XV.

THAT THE OBSTINATE AND OPINIONATIVE ARE NOT CONTINENT.

THOSE who are called obstinate, persevere indeed in a certain opinion, and sometimes deliberately make choice of a true and good one; they are not, however, continent; but just as prodigals resemble the liberal, and as daring men are similar to the brave, so likewise the obstinate resemble continent men, and are as it were convinced with difficulty, and not easily changed. So far, therefore, as they persevere, they are like continent men: continent men, however, are changed by a certain reason and persuasion; but obstinate men are not changed by reason. But many of these are led by desire and pleasures. Those, however, who are opinionative, ignorant, and of rustic manners, are obstinate; the ignorant and the rustic are so in consequence of not knowing the principles whence it is possible to be persuaded; but the opinionative are not to be changed either through pleasure or pain; for they are delighted when they are not subdued by the persuasions of those who endeavour to argue with them, and are pained if they are no longer masters of their opinions, in the same manner as if those opinions were legal decrees; and on this account the opinionative have a greater resemblance to incontinent, than to continent men; for like the former, they do not follow reason, but passion.

There are some persons also who either persevere in true opinions, or who do not persevere in false ones through pleasure, who are not base, because they either persevere or not through laudable pleasure.

Just as Neoptolemus acted who did not follow the persuasions of Ulysses, and deceive Philoctetes, thus acting through a worthy, and not a base pleasure. For he who does any thing simply through pleasure, is either intemperate, base, or incontinent; and he who does it for the sake of disgraceful pleasure, is reprehended.

CHAP. XVI.

CONCERNING INCONTINENCE, HOW IT SUBSISTS WITH RESPECT TO TEMPERANCE; AND AFTER WHAT MANNER THE INCONTINENT MAN SOMETIMES APPEARS TO BE PRUDENT.

SINCE continence is a laudable habit, it will be a medium between two vices, falling short of the one, and exceeding the other. Incontinence, therefore, exceeds continence, but the habit which falls short is anonymous; it is that, however, according to which some persons are delighted with corporeal pleasures less than is becoming; and these deviate from right reason. For the incontinent man does not persevere in right reason merely through being delighted with corporeal pleasures more than is becoming; but he who is deficient with respect to these, acts contrary to right reason, because he seeks after pleasurable objects less than is proper. The continent man, however, perseveres in right reason, and does not depart from it for the sake of either trifling or great pleasures. But since continence is conversant with laudable and worthy objects, the habits on each side of it are necessarily base, and contrary to continence. But because the habit which falls short is anonymous, and seldom occurs; (for those who delight in corporeal

pleasures less than is becoming are very rare.)—On this account, incontinence only appears to be contrary to continence, because we do not frequently find persons insensible to pleasure.

But the continent man is also called temperate, and the incontinent intemperate, and *vice versâ*, according to similitude; since we denominate many things by one name through a certain resemblance which they respectively bear to each other. For the temperate and the continent man are conversant about the same objects, and neither do any thing contrary to right reason, although desires do not act hostilely to the temperate, but they do so to the continent man: moreover the temperate man is not delighted contrary to right reason, but the continent man is delighted with, though he is not led by pleasures. In like manner also the intemperate and the incontinent man are similar, so far as they are subdued by the same pleasures; but they differ, because the former fancies that it is proper to pursue these pleasures, but the latter does not.

Similarly likewise the incontinent are denominated prudent, according to a certain resemblance they have to prudence; since some incontinent men are skilful; and skill resembles prudence. For the skilful are similar to the prudent in a knowledge of the becoming; but these only *know* what is becoming without deliberately choosing to act, and do not act. On this account the prudent man is worthy; but the incontinent man, although he be entirely skilful, is nevertheless base and reprehensible.

For although he knows the becoming, yet he does not know it like the prudent man speculating in energy, and employing science, but conducts himself with respect to prudence similarly to one asleep, or intoxicated with wine, as we have observed above. In consequence of

this resemblance, however, the skilful incontinent man is denominated prudent, and is similar to the prudent man. And since the simply incontinent man is not altogether base, but only partially so, neither is he unjust, for he is not insidious. Since also he does base things willingly, at the same time knowing that they are base, that they tend to a base end, and that it is proper to do better things; on this account he is in a certain respect base, and in a certain respect not base; for his conduct is base, but his judgment is equitable.

With respect to the unworthy man, however, who is intemperate in corporeal pleasures, both his actions and his judgment are base; but the incontinent man errs only in one of these particulars; since he is incontinent either according to imbecile or rash incontinence; but both these are base according to action only. For the rashly incontinent man does not deliberate; but the imbecile incontinent man so far deliberates as that it is not proper to follow disgraceful desires: the intemperate man, however, is corrupted both in action and judgment. Hence the incontinent man is similar to a city which decrees every thing that is becoming, has excellent laws, and subsists well in that respect, but uses no one of these; just as *Anaxandrides* revilingly observed:

“ The State decides, but its own laws neglects.”

On the other hand, the intemperate man resembles a city using laws indeed, but those base. All continence, however, as well as incontinence, are conversant about the excesses of the habits of the multitude; for the continent man overcomes those things by which the many are subdued; but the incontinent man is subdued by those which the many vanquish.

Rash incontinence, however, to which the melancholic are subject, is more difficult to be cured than imbecile incontinence, inasmuch as incontinent men deliberate, but do not persevere. In like manner also the naturally incontinent are more difficultly cured than those who are incontinent through custom; for custom is more easily changed than nature. On this account also it is difficult to alter custom, because it resembles nature, as Evenus says:

“ By long attention custom is produced,

“ And is at length, as nature to mankind.”

What, therefore, continence and endurance, incontinence and effeminacy are, and how these habits subsist with relation to each other, has been said.

CHAP. XVII.

CONCERNING PLEASURE.

LET us now speculate concerning pleasure and pain; for it is the province of, and adapted to one who philosophizes about the political art; since, as we observed in the beginning of our discourse, the political art pertains to a master, or architectonic, end. But the end is the good and the most excellent, by which, as by a rule, we distinguish good from bad actions; for we denominate those things good which tend to that end; but such as lead us from it, bad. Since, therefore, pleasure appears to some to be good, but to others bad, and to others again

that it is the most excellent end, it follows that a politician should investigate concerning it. Further still, this investigation is necessary in the discussion of the virtues and vices; for, as has been already observed, virtue and vice are conversant about pleasures and pains, and it is fit that he who speculates about the virtues should also speak concerning pleasure; because some assert, that felicity subsists in conjunction with pleasure, on which account also they denominate a man (*μακαριον*) blessed, (*απο τς χαιρειν*) from rejoicing. Let us, however, in the first place, give the opinions of others on this subject.

It appears then to some persons that pleasure is not by any means good, either essentially or accidentally; for they do not think it possible that the same thing should be both good and pleasure. To others it appears that pleasures are for the most part bad, but that some are good. Others again, although they are of opinion that every pleasure is good, yet they by no means admit that pleasure is an end. Such then are the opinions of others concerning pleasure.

CHAP. XVIII.

THAT NO ONE PLEASURE IS GOOD.

BUT let us relate the reasons on which this assertion is founded. Those, therefore, who say that no one pleasure is good, thus endeavour to support their argument. Every pleasure is a sensible generation into nature * ; for the generation into nature of plants not being sensible, is not pleasure. If, therefore, generation be pleasure, but generation is imperfect, and that which is imperfect is not good, pleasure will not be good ; since that which is already produced, not that which is about to be produced, is good. For generation is not homogeneous to the ends in which it terminates ; since building is not homogeneous to a house.

Further still, the temperate man avoids those things that ought to be avoided ; for he is worthy ;—but he avoids pleasures. Pleasure, therefore, is not good. Again, the prudent man pursues good ; but he does not pursue pleasure ;* for he pursues that which is void of pain, not the pleasurable. Pleasure, therefore, is not good. Further still, pleasure is an impediment to prudence ; and by so much the more, by how much the greater is the pleasure ; for no one engaged in great pleasures is able to understand any thing. Again, every good is the work of art ; but pleasure is not the work of any art. Hence, therefore, it is not good. Further still, brutes and children, since they have irrational

* By a *sensible generation into nature*, which is Plato's definition of *corporeal* pleasure, is meant a replenishing of the indigence of nature ; *generation* supplying, as it were, what is wanting in the nature of the thing that is the recipient of pleasure.

tendencies, pursue pleasures; but that which is sought after by beings irrationally moved, is not good.

It seems, however, that every pleasure is not good, because some pleasurable things are noxious, and others productive of disease, and because certain pleasures are base and disgraceful.

It appears also that pleasure is not an end, because it is a generation and certain motion; but an end is a boundary to which motion tends. These, therefore, are nearly all the arguments advanced concerning pleasure. Of these, that which asserts that some pleasures are good, and others bad, is true; but the rest are false; and we shall endeavour to confute them, beginning with the first.

CHAP. XIX.

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS THROUGH WHICH IT APPEARS THAT PLEASURE IS
NOT GOOD.

• THAT it does not necessarily follow from the above assertions that pleasure is not good, nor the most excellent, will be manifest from hence. For since good is predicated in two ways, the one indeed simply, essentially, and properly, as for instance, virtue; but the other not simply good, but good to a certain person or thing; just as to steal is good to the plunderer; it follows that every nature and habit, motion and generation, will be either simply good, or good to some particular person or thing. In like manner also with respect to evil; for of motions, generations, and habits, some are simply bad, but others to a particular person or thing, and to a depraved character. Again, some of these are always bad to some particular person or thing, but others only after a certain manner,

and for a short time. Every vice indeed is simply bad; but a thing is bad to some particular person or thing, as when we say that temperance is bad to the intemperate man, and this **always**, and in every mode; but a thing is bad to a particular person, though not **always**, as to act incontinently is bad to the incontinent man; for when desire is extinguished it appears bad, since he is then no longer under the influence of passion. As, therefore, every motion and generation are thus divided, and some are simply bad, but others only with respect to some particular person or thing, and as pleasure also is motion, it is evident that not every pleasure is bad. For it is possible to be pleased with such things as are proper, as when any one is delighted with virtue or wisdom. It is also possible to be pleased with bad things; and, in short, a man may be delighted in the manner we have universally defined.

Again, of the good one kind is habit, as when a man possesses the habit of justice; but the other is energy, as when a man effects something. Energy, however, replenishes the defective habit of energy, but natural habit preserves it; just as health indeed is inherent, but is preserved through salubrious food. The energy itself, however, which preserves habit, by whatever name such energy may be called, is indeed pleasurable, though not essentially, but according to accident. For pleasure itself is not the same thing as the replenishing the indigence of habit, but pleasure is consequent to this; since if the replenishing of a natural or customary habit were pleasure, this would be true of every pleasure. It is not, however, the case. Pleasure, therefore, is not a sensible generation into nature. For a sensible generation into nature is the replenishing of natural indigence. And thus the argument of those who collect that no pleasure is good, is solved.

But that not every pleasure is a replenishing, is manifest from this, namely, because some pleasures subsist without pain or desire; but it is not possible that there can be a replenishing of this kind without these. For the pleasures which consist in the contemplation of the sciences, are unindigent and without pain; since science, when it is ingenerated in the soul, having been previously absent, produces pleasure by its presence, but by no means gives pain by its absence, since neither is the absence of science indigence. For indigence* was not present, and afterwards perished, when science first dawned in the soul. But there are corporeal pleasures also which subsist without indigence and pain. For we are not only delighted with feeding when we are in want of nourishment, but there are certain foods also which delight us even after that want is supplied; since we are not pleased with the same things when empty as when full; but when full, we are delighted with those pleasures which are properly so called, and such as afford pleasure to every one: before we are full, however, we frequently take delight in casual, and even opposite kinds of food. Whence also it appears that of pleasures, some are simply such, but others to a particular person or thing. For as is the relation of things pleasurable, such also is that of the pleasures resulting from these. It has been shown, therefore, that not every natural pleasure is a replenishing, and that not every replenishing is pleasure. For the replenishing of health, which is a natural habit produced from diet, is not pleasurable. It cannot, therefore, be rightly said, that pleasure is a sensible generation into nature. On this account it does not necessarily follow from these kind of arguments that pleasure is not good.

* Indigence, generally speaking, always subsists in conjunction with corporeal pleasures; for there are very few corporeal pleasures unaccompanied by desire; and desire is want.

CHAP. XX.

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENT ADDUCED TO PROVE THAT PLEASURE IS NOT THE MOST EXCELLENT.

THOSE also who assert that pleasure is not the same thing as the most excellent end, do not reason *necessarily* *. For if it be not possible that pleasure can be an end, it is requisite that there should always be something better than pleasure; that is to say, the end; since the end of every thing is better than that which is referred to the end, which is itself the most excellent, and the best. It is not necessary, however, that there should be always something better than pleasure; for pleasure is not generation; since, if it were, the end of generation would necessarily be better than pleasure; neither is it always contemplated in generation, but it is an energy, and an end: it is not contemplated, however, in the composition of habits; (for instance, when any one does just things, and places the habit of justice in the soul, not being yet just) but in the exercise of habit, as when any one having become just, afterwards uses the habit of justice. On this account there is not an end of every pleasure; but some pleasures are themselves an end. For such energies as lead to the perfection of nature, are not themselves an end; as for instance, the energy according to the medical habit, has health for its end; it is evident, however, that such as do not lead to natural perfection, but are themselves natural perfection, have not any other end, but are themselves the ends of other ends; just as when

* And, therefore, not *scientifically*, because all scientific reasoning is accompanied with necessity, science being the knowledge of things eternal and necessary.

any one energizes according to the perfect habit of virtue. For an energy of this kind is the end of other ends, and is not itself directed to any other; whence also not every pleasure, although it be an energy, has an end, since energy belongs to a natural habit. Hence it is not right to say, that pleasure is sensible generation; but we must assert it to be the energy of habit according to nature. Hence in the definition, for *sensible* we must substitute *unimpeded*; and thus pleasure will be *the unimpeded energy of habit according to nature*. But it has been shown in the eighteenth chapter, that not every pleasure is a generation into nature; so that a definition of this kind is defective. Further still, however, neither is every pleasure sensible; for the pleasure in contemplation is not so; but energy also has sensible generation; and there is no pleasure which is not unimpeded. But the assertion that it is according to nature, comprehends every habit, both the natural, and that confirmed by custom; for a habit, established by custom, is also according to nature, since we are naturally adapted to such kind of habits, and on that account possess them. He, therefore, who energizes without impediment according to a particular habit, is delighted; and this is pleasure. It appears to some persons, however, that generation is pleasure, because they fancy that pleasure is the properly good, and the most excellent; but they imagine that the properly good is energy; and that energy and generation differ nothing from each other. This, however, is not the case; for generation is not the same thing as energy; since generation is a path from the non-existence to the existence of habit. But the most excellent energy is that which subsists according to perfect habit, after the assumption of habit.

CHAP. XXI.

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENT ADDUCED TO PROVE THAT NOT EVERY PLEASURE IS GOOD; AND FURTHER STILL, WHAT THOSE ARGUMENTS ARE THROUGH WHICH IT APPEARS TO BE BAD:—ALSO, A DEMONSTRATION THAT PLEASURE IS NECESSARILY THE MOST EXCELLENT THING.

NEITHER is it necessary that every pleasure should be bad, because some pleasurable things are productive of disease. For if this were the case there would be bad salubrious things, because some of these are impediments to the attainment of wealth, since there are many things subversive of great riches; but they are not on this account bad. For all contraries to a particular good are not bad; since contemplation is sometimes injurious to health, but it is not on this account bad. Neither, therefore, is pleasure bad, because some pleasurable things are productive of disease.

Moreover neither is pleasure bad because some pleasurable things are an impediment to prudence and contemplation. For the pleasure of prudence is no obstacle to prudence, neither is the pleasure of art an obstacle to art; but appropriate pleasure rather increases each habit: the pleasures, however, which impede these habits are foreign from them, and obstacles so far as they are unadapted. But this is no token of depravity, since, as we have observed, contemplation may be an obstacle to health, because it is not an energy adapted to health; still, however, contemplation is not on this account bad.

Neither is it bad because it is not the work of any art; for thus every energy would be bad, since no energy is the effect of art; but art

produces power, and power energy. For the art conversant with piloting a ship is the cause of the ability to do this; and this ability is the cause of an energy according to the piloting art. To which we may add, that pleasure is frequently produced from some particular art; for the arts of preparing perfumes, and of cooking, are productive of pleasure.

The argument, however, asserting that temperate and prudent men avoid pleasure, and pursue a life void of pain; but that children and brutes pursue pleasures, is solved by what we have said in the eighteenth chapter. For since of pleasures some are simply good, but others not simply good, children and brutes pursue, and the temperate man avoids the latter, and wishes for those only that are unattended with pain: the prudent and the worthy man likewise avoid those corporeal pleasures which are accompanied with desire and pain; (and this is the case with *corporeal* pleasures) they also avoid the excesses of those with which the intemperate man is conversant: and hence the temperate man avoids them; but both the temperate and the prudent man pursue pleasures that are simply such, which are the pleasures of the temperate man, and the energies of laudable habits; such for instance, as of temperance, justice, or contemplation.

Since, however, with regard to pain, one kind is good, but another bad, and to be avoided; and of that which is to be avoided, one kind is to be avoided *per se*, as the pain arising from virtue*, but another only in a certain respect as that resulting from some particular loss, which is to be partially avoided, because it is an impediment to contemplation;—since this is the case, it is evident there is every

* That is to say, a man should always avoid feeling pain from acting virtuously, because a truly worthy man is always delighted, and contented with his virtuous actions.

necessity that with respect to pleasure contrary to pain, one kind should be avoided simply, but the other only in particular instances: for it is necessary that the simply good should be contrary to the simply evil, and the partial good to the partial evil. The solution of *Speusippus*, according to which he endeavours to solve this argument, does not agree with truth; for, he says, that just as the greater and the lesser are contrary to the equal, and as the contraries on each side of the virtues subsist with respect to them, after the very same manner also pleasure and pain are opposed to privation of pain; pleasure indeed as the greater, but pain as the lesser; and that privation of pain is good, but both pleasure and pain are evil. An argument of this kind is altogether improbable; for pleasure does not appear to any one to be an evil, since no one will say that pleasure, so far as it is pleasure, is evil.

Nothing prevents pleasure from being good and most excellent, because some pleasures are bad; for among sciences *so called*, there are many bad, yet nothing hinders science *itself* from being most excellent. Perhaps, however, it is not only possible, but also necessary, that pleasure should be the most excellent, and most eligible of all things; for if there is an energy of every habit; and felicity and that which is most excellent, are an unimpeded energy of a good habit, either of one, and that the most excellent, or of every good habit; but pleasure is an unimpeded energy of a habit according to nature,—it necessarily follows that felicity, and that which is most excellent, are pleasure; and some pleasures being base is no obstacle to this assertion.

It is evident, however, that pleasure should necessarily be an unimpeded energy; for it is requisite that it should be perfect: but no impeded energy can be perfect. On this account, as has been observed in the beginning of these discourses, the happy man requires external

goods in order that his energy may not be impeded. But those who assert, that a man whose life is unequal, (from diversity of fortune) and who falls into great calamities is happy, provided he be good, either willingly or unwillingly, say nothing to the purpose. For the happy man requires corporeal goods; that is to say, health and long life; he also requires things necessary for the body, and the smiles of fortune. Hence some persons fancy that the prosperous and the happy man are the same, because a man cannot be perfectly happy without prosperity; but they are not the same. For it is necessary that the happy man should be worthy; but not all prosperous men are worthy:—sometimes also prosperity is injurious to virtue; and, if it be excessive, it confounds the worthy man, which cannot be justly called prosperity, for its very being consists in contributing to felicity; and from this both the definition and the name are assumed *. Hence if it does not contribute to felicity, it cannot be justly called prosperity; but it is manifest that *the unimpeded* must necessarily be added to the energy of the happy man: and pleasure is this; namely, unimpeded energy. Felicity, therefore, is a certain pleasure. But it is further manifest that pleasure is a most excellent thing, because brutes and men, and all sensible beings pursue it; for all exclaim that pleasure is good and most excellent, on which account they tend to it.

“ Its fame by crowds of human kind extoll’d,
 “ Will ne’er completely perish.”——

All beings, however, do not pursue the most excellent pleasure, since neither do all possess the same habit, nor the same nature: but all

* *ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑ*, prosperity, is a compound of *εὖ*, good, and *τύχη*, fortune; and *εὐδαιμονία*, felicity, is a compound of *εὖ*, good, and *δαίμων*, demon. But good fortune is the gift of a good demon; so that the happy man is one who is favoured by a beneficent demon; and

beings pursue pleasure, although some pursue that which is good, and others that which is bad. Perhaps, however, no being pursues bad pleasure, or, in short, seeks or aspires after any thing bad ; for no being pursues that which it may fancy it investigates, and which it may say it pursues ; but all things pursue the most excellent pleasure ; for all beings naturally aspire after good, because something divine is naturally inherent in all things, and all things tend to that pleasure which is good, and properly so called, notwithstanding corporeal pleasures appear to be properly pleasures, because they are most frequently resorted to, and all beings partake of them. Hence these only are known, and these alone are fancied to be pleasures. But since these pleasures are not good, nor properly pleasures, it is said that no pleasure is good. It is evident, however, that pleasure is necessarily good.

For unless pleasure, and the energy according to it, be good, it is not possible that the happy man can live pleurably ; but it is necessary that the happy man should live in conjunction with pleasure. It is not possible, therefore, that pleasure should not be good. But that if the happy man lives in conjunction with pleasure, pleasure will be good, is evident from this ;—nothing that is evil, or not properly good, can be mingled with felicity ; for why does the happy man pursue it if it be not good ? For if pleasure be neither good nor evil, neither will pain be good nor evil : pain, therefore, will not be a thing to be avoided. And if this be true, why does the happy man avoid it ? For he would not avoid it unless it were an evil. It is not possible, however, that the happy man should not avoid pain ; since it is necessary that a happy life should be the most pleasurable : but this is impossible unless the energies of the happy man are pleasurable. For how can it be otherwise the most pleasurable ? but if pleasure is neither an evil, nor that which is not good, it will be good.

CHAP. XXII.

SOLUTION OF THE DOUBT WHY EVERY PAIN IS TO BE AVOIDED, SINCE NOT EVERY PLEASURE IS GOOD.

SINCE there are certain good and eligible pleasures, but certain others are bad; for instance, those corporeal pleasures about which the intemperate man is conversant; some one may doubt on what account every pain is bad, and to be avoided; for the pain opposed to worthy pleasures is necessarily bad, but that which is contrary to depraved pleasures is good, since the good is contrary to the bad. But if this pain be bad, it may appear that corporeal pleasures are good.

With respect to these assertions, however, we reply, that corporeal pleasures are good, so far as they are not evil; for that which is not evil, is good; since this is true to a certain extent. For those pleasures which do not exceed, are good after this manner; and hence the pains, contrary to these, are not good. And since of habits some exceed the most excellent, and the becoming, but others do not; necessary habits, such as the nutritive, and others that are necessary, and, in short, corporeal habits, exceed; for these may be used more than is becoming; but those that do not exceed, are such as being extended, surpass not the becoming, but are always good; and such are contemplative habits.

But since pleasures are consequent to habits, it necessarily follows that some pleasures must exceed the becoming, and that others will not. Such, therefore, as surpass the becoming are depraved, and both the intemperate and the incontinent man are conversant about these.

With respect to the contrary pains, however, the intemperate man is not conversant with such as are excessive, but he pursues transcendent pleasures, and avoids trifling pains. Hence it is evident that the pains which are opposed by the intemperate man to excessive pleasures, are not excessive, but moderate, and such as no worthy man would avoid, because neither can they be called pains. But to him who pursues an excess of pleasures, it appears painful to use them moderately, and according to reason. The doubt, therefore, is solved as follows: the pains opposed to commensurate (that is moderate) pleasures are not good; for commensurate corporeal pleasures are good, so far as they are not evil; but the pains opposed to excessive pleasures are moderate, not being indeed pains, and on this account are not to be avoided. Hence every thing good is contrary to that which is to be avoided; and base pleasures are contrary to worthy pains, and worthy pleasures to pains that ought to be avoided.

CHAP. XXIII.

WHY CORPOREAL PLEASURES APPEAR MORE ELIGIBLE THAN CONTEMPLATIVE PLEASURES.

SINCE it is proper not only to speak the truth, but also to assign a reason why the contrary, namely, the false, appears to be true (for this will give credibility to the truth, since when the cause is apparent, through which the false has the probable appearance of truth, and its fallacy is demonstrated by argument, it produces a more firm belief of the truth)—since this is the case, we must say why corporeal pleasures appear more eligible than such as are properly good and worthy.

In the first place, they appear so because they are remedies to, and easily expel, corporeal pains, especially if such pleasures be great and transcendent; and they are pursued during the period of corporeal pains, because they appear to be powerful remedies, and to liberate us easily from the pain produced by the indigence of pleasure :—in the next place, because they are pursued by those who are incapable of enjoying other pleasures. But the many fancy that they are more eligible; and hence that which they seek for, appears to be something good and eligible. Some of these, however, not only endeavour to satiate natural desires, but also to accumulate such as are adventitious, and as it were prepare for themselves certain thirsts, in order that they may be perpetually delighted. But even this, if it does not exceed reason and moderation, is not hurtful, for moderate pleasures are not injurious to the body, neither are they reprehensible. If, however, the pleasures that are pursued exceed these bounds, and are hurtful, they

are depraved : but the use of commensurate pleasures is not reprehensible, because it is necessary that man should enjoy pleasure, in consequence of the *natural life* being always in labour, and requiring a certain pleasure, as a relaxation. For the *animal* always labours, as is manifest from physical arguments ; since they assert that to see, and to hear, are painful, though through custom they do not appear so. On this account, man has need of pleasure ; but he who does not enjoy contemplative, necessarily resorts to corporeal pleasures. Those, therefore, who use them moderately, and in such a manner as not to corrupt the body, are not to be reprehended.

Similarly also the pleasures pursued by youth, like those pursued by intemperate men, are such as are conversant with the nutritive part, nature exciting them in order that they may increase ; and they are excited in the same manner as those who are intoxicated with wine. For the former always eating, drinking, and sleeping, possess a vigorous desire for these pleasures, just as the latter are always thirsty. Hence the period of youth is pleasant, because it is always engaged in things necessary in conjunction with desire. In like manner also the melancholic naturally have vehement appetites, and constantly require a remedy ; for their bodies are always stimulated in consequence of their temperament. These, therefore, seek pleasures, and for the reasons we have assigned. But, in short, every corporeal pleasure is sought after in order to expel corporeal pain ; for pleasure drives away pain, not only that which is opposed to it, (as for instance, the pleasure of the nutritive power drives away the pain of that power) but also some other, if the pleasure be strong. From these causes corporeal pleasures are pursued, and hence they become intemperate and depraved.

But contemplative pleasures are those which pain does not precede ;

for in these we are not pained before we are delighted, as is the case with corporeal pleasures: contemplative pleasures, however, do not surpass the becoming. Neither can we contemplate more than is proper; but these pleasures are always laudable, because whatever is pleasurable in them is pleasurable by nature, and not through accident. By things accidentally pleasurable, however, I mean those that afford remedies to corporeal indigence and pains; such, for instance, as food. For food acts as a remedy to the nature of him who is hungry, which in this respect is diseased; and it introduces what is wanting when nature is not indigent, nor diseased in the other, that is the nutritive part; but possesses this part well, and energizes, that is, desires, according to it. For things of this kind are pleasurable through accident, because they are pleasures in consequence of being a remedy. Not those things, however, which supply the indigence of nature are pleasurable by nature, but such as produce its action;—and such are the objects of contemplation, for they perfect the energy of the soul.

But because we are not simple essences, and do not live from soul alone, on this account the objects of contemplation are not always pleasurable to us, since neither do we always seek things accidentally pleasurable; but sometimes contemplative and sometimes corporeal pleasures. For when we incline to body, we rejoice in the latter; but when we look above body, we investigate things pleasurable by nature; since the pleasures of the soul contend with those of the body; and those things, with the performance of which the soul is delighted, are to the body, contrary to nature.

When, however, in consequence of meditating about virtue, the body follows the soul, then the body indeed is not delighted with those things with which the soul energizing is delighted, because they are not sensible; nevertheless it does not on that account suffer pain.

Hence also to those beings whose nature is entirely simple, the same action is always most pleasant; for God always rejoices in one simple pleasure, although He is immutable, and on this account appears not to be affected by pleasure. For pleasure is energy; but energy appears to belong to motion alone. This, however, is not the case; for there is also an immoveable energy, and pleasure consists rather in rest than in motion.

According to the poet indeed "change is the sweetest of all things;" but this is not the case with a perfect, good, and most excellent nature, but merely with a composite nature, in consequence of its imbecility and depravity. For as a wicked man easily changes, so likewise a depraved nature always requires change; since it is neither simple nor equitable. Concerning continence, therefore, and incontinence, and pleasure and pain, what each of them is, and after what manner some of these are good, and others evil, has been said. It now remains to discourse about friendship.

THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

BOOK VIII.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP.

IT now follows that we should treat concerning Friendship, since it is either a certain virtue, or consequent to virtue. For the virtue, which has an intermediate subsistence between moroseness and flattery, with the addition of such love * as exists among relatives (as has been shown in the eighth Chapter of the fourth Book) is friendship, which also is the concomitant of perfect virtue: for true friendship, as we shall presently show, is found among worthy men alone. Hence in a treatise concerning the virtues, it follows that this also should be discussed, since it is a thing most necessary to life. For no one would wish to live without friends, even though he possessed all other goods; since those who possess wealth, and power, and dominion, appear to have especial need of friends. For what advantage is there in a happiness of this

* The verb *σπεργειν* properly signifies the love of parents for their offspring; but is also used by Aristotle, and other writers, to signify the regard which subsists among relatives in general.

kind without the capability of conferring benefits? but men cannot confer benefits, if they have not friends; for the greatest and most laudable beneficence is that which is exercised towards friends. How indeed can the happy man abide in, and preserve, his felicity without friends? For by how much the greater is his felicity [derived from externals] by so much the more is it insecure. But it is not the happy man only who has need of friends, but also the unfortunate and poor; for all men fancy that friends are their only refuge. And friendship is not only advantageous in every fortune, but also in every age. For friends conduct youth in the path of right reason, in order that they may not err through inexperience of what is good:—they also minister to elderly persons, and supply the deficiency of action arising from the imbecility of age: moreover they add to the good actions of those who are in the flower of youth, and it renders their works better,

“ When two in concord meet.”

For we are more capable of understanding and acting in conjunction with friends; and friendship is present with us by nature. For begetters naturally love the thing begotten; and this happens not with men only, but also with birds and most other animals. Moreover this is not the case with the begetter and the thing begotten only, but also with kindred things, though much more especially with men. Hence we praise the philanthropic, as effecting something pertaining to human nature. It may be observed also among travellers, how familiar and friendly every man is to man. For those who remain in their own country receive the traveller, and minister to him with pleasure:—the traveller also, if he only meets with men, is very much delighted. Friendship likewise first constituted cities, and is always the bond of their union: legislators

also, when constituting cities, pay more attention to friendship than to justice. For justice is investigated for the sake of concord: concord, however, is something similar to friendship; but sedition resembles hatred, which legislators always endeavour to expel from cities. Besides, when citizens are friends with each other, there is no want of justice in the city; but when they are just, they still have need of friends, since they agree better together with friendship than with justice.

Further still, that which is especially just appears to be friendly; for when any one preserves a just conduct in every thing towards his neighbour, even though it may be necessary to hurt him in some particular, he is nevertheless a friend. Hence legislators investigate friendship more than justice; and it is necessary to produce perfect concord. But it not only is necessary, and tends to some other good, but also is itself, through itself, beautiful and laudable. For we praise the lovers of friends, and abundance of friendship appears to be one among the number of things beautiful: some also say, that a friend not only differs in no respect from a good man, but that both are the same.

CHAP. II.

WHAT FRIENDSHIP IS; AND THAT THERE ARE THREE SPECIES OF FRIENDSHIP.

SUCH, therefore, is friendship; but the doubts entertained about it are not a few; that is to say, whether or not friendship be a similitude, and friends similar; or, whether it be contrariety, and those who possess it, contrary. Some establish it as similitude, and consider friends as similar, whence they say, that "like tends to like, a jackdaw to a jackdaw," and so forth. Others, however, say, that friends are contrary, and bring the argument to that which is more universal and natural, as *Euripides*, where he says,

"Earth, when she's dry, rejoices in the rain,
 "And venerable heav'n with rain when fill'd,
 "On earth delights to fall."——

Heraclitus also is of this opinion when he says, that "that which opposes is advantageous; that the most beautiful harmony is produced from things different; and that every thing originates from strife." *Empedocles*, however, with many others, asserts a contrary opinion about friendship, and says, "that the similar aspires after the similar." But it does not belong to our present investigation to bring the argument to certain universal and physical reasonings, and simply to investigate how contraries aspire after contraries, or similars after similars.

We shall, therefore, consider such particulars only as pertain to human nature, and such human affairs as tend to manners and passions;

for these are the subjects of our present discussion. Let us then inquire whether friendship is produced in all men, or in good men only, but never in the depraved; also, whether there be many, or only one, species of friendship. For it does not follow, because friendship admits the more and the less, that on this account there is only one species, since things different in species also admit the more and the less. For essence and accident, which are different in species, admit the more and the less, since they are not similarly beings*. So that those who *fancy* there is only one species of friendship, because it admits the more and the less, do not found their belief on a firm basis. We have, however, already spoken concerning these particulars.

Such then are the things to be investigated; and these will become manifest if the discourse about the object of friendly love † is rendered perspicuous. For we do not love all things; but such only as are naturally adapted to be loved, and these are objects of love. But the good, the pleasurable, and the useful, are objects of love. The good, therefore, and the pleasurable, are beloved for their own sake; but the useful for the sake of the good, or of pleasure. For that is useful through which good or pleasure is produced: so that good and pleasure are objects of love as ends; but the useful, as being directed to the end.

But let us consider how the good is an object of love, whether that good, which is simply good, or that which is good to the lover; for

* See the categories of Aristotle, in which one of the characteristics of *substance* or *essence* is shown to be the impossibility of receiving *the more and the less*. *Substance*, however, when compared with *accident*, may admit the more and the less; for *substance* has *more*, and *accident* *less* of being. But one substance is not more substance than another.

† το Φιλικον properly signifies the object of *friendly love*; and in this sense it is used in the present book by Aristotle; though in other places it is used to signify the object of love in general.

these sometimes differ from each other; and the simply and properly good is one thing; but that which appears good to some particular person or thing, another. The pleasurable also differs in a similar manner; namely, that which is simply pleasurable, and that which is so to some particular person or thing. Are both, therefore, objects of love, or is it not manifest that things which merely appear to be good and pleasurable, are objects of love? In like manner also things useful, which tend to such as appear good and pleasurable, are objects of love. Not every thing, however, that appears to be pleasurable and good, is an object of love; but such only as seem to them to be good, and pleasurable, and useful.

Hence the good is simply an object of love; but that which is good to some particular person, is an object of love to that person; and that which is apparently an object of love, is what seems to be good to some particular person. The like takes place also with respect to the pleasurable and the useful.

Since, however, there are three things that are the objects of love, through which love is produced, friendship does not take place in every thing that is beloved. For we love things inanimate, through some one of these three objects of love: but friendship is not a thing of this kind. For *reciprocal love, and a mutual wish of the person loving, and the person beloved, to promote the good of each other, constitute friendship.* He, however, who loves wine, for instance, is not reciprocally loved by the wine, neither does he wish good to it; for this would be ridiculous; and if he wishes it to be preserved, it is not for the sake of the wine itself, but for his own, in order that he may enjoy it; but we wish good to a friend for his own sake. Hence the love that we have for things inanimate, is not friendship.

Further still, neither if any one should love a man, and wish well to him, does it necessarily constitute friendship ; for reciprocation of love is similarly necessary : and if this does not take place, he is not said to be a friend, but a certain benevolent character.

But it may happen that some persons may secretly love and wish well to each other, apprehending that they are good, useful, and worthy : no one, however, can say that these characters are properly friends, because they do not know that they are beloved, nor that they are thus affected towards each other. Nevertheless they may be said to be mutually benevolent. Neither, therefore, is a love for things inanimate, or even that for men, friendship, if it be defective with respect to any one of the requisites we have mentioned. But friendship then subsists when men are benevolent to each other, either for the sake of the good, or the pleasurable, or the useful, and when they wish well to each other, at the same time not being ignorant of their mutual love.

What, therefore, friendship is has been said ; and from that it is also evident that there are three species of friendship. And since there are three things through which friendship is produced ; that is to say, the pleasurable, the good, and the useful, and these differ from each other in species, friendships also will be equally numerous with the objects of love. For it is possible that a friendship may be produced according to each object of love, if the love is reciprocal, and not concealed.

Again, mutual good wishes may also produce friendship ; for so far as we love a thing, we wish good to that thing. There are three species of friendship, therefore, namely, one according to the good, another according to the pleasurable, and the third according to the useful.

CHAP. III.

CONCERNING FRIENDSHIPS, WHICH SUBSIST FOR THE SAKE OF UTILITY, AND OF PLEASURE; AND THAT SUCH ARE IMPERFECT.

LET us, however, investigate each species. Those, therefore, who love each other for the sake of utility, do not mutually love each other for themselves; but for the sake of something good or pleasurable, to which they may conduce; and they are attached no longer than they can derive advantage from each other. Those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, act in a similar manner; for they do not love simply because they are pleasant, but because they are mutually agreeable; since if they were pleasant to others only, they would not be loved. But both those who love for the sake of utility, and those who love for the sake of a pleasurable object, do not love simply for the sake of a good or pleasurable object, and because he who is loved is a worthy and pleasant man; but because he is useful and agreeable to those by whom he is loved. Hence it is evident that friendships of this kind depend on accident. For he, who is loved, is not loved merely because he is any particular character, but because one person of this kind affords something good, and another pleasure; and such friendships are easily dissolved. For those who are pleasant and useful, are not so always; since we are delighted with different things at different times, and that which is useful at one time, is not so at another.

The cause of the friendship, therefore, not being permanent, the

friendship itself cannot be permanent, but is dissolved; since it subsists with reference to this cause, which also it has for its end. But a friendship of this kind, which is easily changed, appears to be very prevalent among elderly persons; for these neither vehemently nor continually pursue the pleasurable. Hence they are deficient in that species of friendship which subsists according to pleasure; but always investigating that alone which is advantageous, are friends according to the useful. And this is the case not only with elderly persons, but with such young persons also as seek advantage rather than pleasure. Such characters, however, do not very much live together; since they are not always delighted with each other. For they are pleased with each other only ~~when~~ when they are of mutual advantage, or afford hopes of being so, but not ~~at~~ any other time: and not being mutually agreeable, neither can they associate together. It is said, however, that hospitable friendship is of this kind, ~~since~~ since it subsists for the sake of advantage.

But the friendship of youth, for the most part, subsists for the sake of pleasure; ~~since young persons~~ since live according to passion, especially pursuing that which ~~is~~ is pleasant; and not future advantage, but present pleasure. For, living according to sense, they very much rejoice in that which is present, and it allures the senses. With change of age, ~~however,~~ the objects of pleasure also change; and hence they rapidly ~~become~~ become friends, and as quickly cease to be so; for the object of delight being changed, their friendship is also changed. Young persons likewise are amatory as living according to passion and pleasure; for love subsists for the most part according to these. Hence they love rapidly, and as quickly cease to love, because they are not governed in loving

by any reasoning or judgment, but swayed by passion. Still, however, they wish to pass their time, and live together; for hence their friendship originated, and pleasure requires a familiar intercourse. The friendships, therefore, that subsist according to pleasure and utility are imperfect; and not essential, but accidental.

CHAP. IV.

CONCERNING THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH SUBSISTS FOR THE SAKE OF GOOD, AND THAT THIS IS PERFECT.

THE friendship, which subsists for the sake of good, pertains to good men, and is perfect, both according to virtue, and in itself. For worthy men mutually wish each others' welfare, because they are themselves good, not through any thing else, but through themselves. Those, however, who wish good to their friends, *not for their own sake*, but for *the sake of those friends*, are *truly friends*; for they love them, and wish well to them for their own sake; and not with any other view, or accidentally. And a friendship of this kind is stable and firm; since it is permanent as long as friends are good and worthy, and delight in such characters. For virtue is stable; and both are simply good, as well in themselves, as to their friend; since those who are good, are good both in themselves and to each other.

In like manner also they are advantageous and pleasant; since those who are simply and essentially worthy, are also pleasant to each other. For each rejoices in his own actions; and, on this account, is also

pleased with those of others, when they resemble, or are the same as his own. But the actions of good and worthy men are the same and similar; whence it is evident that worthy men are pleasant both to themselves and to each other. Hence a friendship of this kind is stable; for the peculiarities which other friendships possess, and which are needful to friends,—all these this friendship alone comprehends in itself; for together with the good, it follows the pleasurable, and the useful: and it is such a kind of good, as to be good, not only in itself, but also to him who loves. The pleasurable and the advantageous also subsist in a similar manner; not as being so, merely in themselves, but likewise to him who loves. Similitude also is a source of pleasure to friends of this kind. This same friendship too especially embraces both pleasure and advantage; and other friendships are denominated from their resemblance to this; for it is the most excellent, and those things, which are effective of it, are especially and properly objects of love. It is not unreasonable to suppose, however, that such friendships are rare, since those who are thus good are few. But a friendship of this kind not only requires virtue and good morals, but also time and custom. Hence the proverb that “*friends cannot know each other till they have eaten a peck of salt together.*” Neither is it possible that they can approve of, and love each other, before it is manifest that each is beloved by each; and before this is mutually believed. Those who suddenly perform friendly acts, wish indeed to be friends, but are not so unless they become mutually friendly by long time and custom; and also believe that they are beloved. The wish of friendship, therefore, may be immediate; but friendship itself cannot be so. Hence, as we have said, this friendship is perfect both according to time and other

circumstances; and is produced according to all the objects of love. In like manner also one friend receives from the other that which it is proper for friends to receive. For, both being worthy, they are similar; and alike pleasant and friendly to each other.

CHAP. V.

THAT IMPERFECT FRIENDSHIPS ARE DENOMINATED FROM THEIR RESEMBLANCE TO PERFECT FRIENDSHIP.

THE friendship which subsists through pleasure, as well as that which subsists through utility, is homonymous to perfect friendship. For that which is *properly* pleasurable and useful, is good; and good men are especially agreeable and useful to each other. Among those also who are said to be friends according to similitude, friendships are permanent so long as they mutually impart the same thing to each other; for instance, if each is useful, or pleasant to the other; or the one is useful, but the other agreeable. It is not only necessary, however, to impart the same thing to each other, but also from the same object, if they intend to remain in friendship; for instance, if they impart pleasure to each other, it should be from the same manners; just as the festive gratify each other with festivity; and not as a lover with respect to his mistress. These, indeed, impart pleasure to each other, though not after the same manner, for the lover delights in the sight of his mistress; but his mistress in the attention that he pays to her. Sometimes, however, when the flower of beauty withers, friendship also ceases; since

the pleasure in which it originated, no longer remains. For then neither is the lover delighted with the sight of his mistress, nor does he pay attention to her. Many persons of this kind, however, continue in friendship, if from custom they approve the manners of each other, and those manners are similar. But those who do not mutually impart the same thing, but one imparts pleasure, and the other something useful, do not continue in friendship; and then although they mutually love each other, yet they love in a less degree. In short, those who are friends for the sake of utility, when they no longer feel the advantage resulting from such friendship, cease to love, and are disunited; since they were not the friends of each other, but of advantage. It may happen, therefore, that depraved persons may entertain a friendship of this kind; that is to say, either for the sake of pleasure or utility; and that both a depraved, and an equitable man may be so far friends. For through these a depraved man may love both a depraved and a worthy character; and contrariwise, a worthy, may love a depraved man. Some intermediate character also may love each of these; since a worthy, frequently requires the aid of a depraved man. For it is possible that a man may be a good pilot, or an excellent general, though not worthy in his manners; yet nothing prevents a worthy man from having occasion for his services; and hence it is not impossible for such a character to be pleased with those that are depraved.

Some persons too are discordant in their manners; but, when disputing and philosophizing, are skilful in the developement of truth, and what is good, and then they become agreeable to worthy men. Those, therefore, who are loved in this manner, are not loved for themselves; but either for the sake of the pleasure, or utility they afford. But good men only are loved by the worthy, *themselves for*

themselves; and a friendship of this kind is indissoluble, because it is approved by length of time, and confirmed custom.

With respect to those, however, who are thus tried, it is not easy for him who has proved them, to believe any thing bad. On the contrary, it is the province of a friendship of this kind to give credit to, and place confidence in each other in the most important concerns; never, at any time, to injure each other, and likewise to observe such other particulars as are investigated in true friendship. In other friendships, however, nothing hinders but that men may calumniate and injure each other; and be themselves exposed to similar disagreeables in consequence of not preserving equality. Hence neither are such persons *properly* friends, though men are accustomed to call them so, either because they have need of them; just as cities denominate their allies friends; or for the sake of pleasure, as children call each other so from custom. On this account we also denominate them friends; but not in the same manner as we call good men friends. For we do not consider them homogeneous; but call them friends according to similitude:—and hence we say, there are many species of friendship.

The friendship indeed which is primarily and properly friendship, is that of good men, so far as they are good; but the rest subsist from similitude. For the pleasurable, so far as it is a certain good, unites the lovers of pleasure, as being pleasurable; since that which is so is a certain good to such characters; and it resembles the good, because it appears good to them:—the useful also appears good to him who uses it. Hence friendships of this kind are said to subsist according to the similitude of true friendship. But a mixed friendship, compounded from utility and pleasure, does not often occur; so that of friends, one loves for the sake of a pleasurable, but another for the sake of a useful object:

for the bond of their union is accidental : but to rejoice in, and love the same things, unites friends. On this account, Speusippus* loves Plato, because both love Socrates, and rejoice in his welfare : friends are also united because both love pleasure, or that which is useful. In mixed friendship, however, they do not delight in the same thing ; for one delights in a pleasurable, but another in a useful object ; nevertheless they may accidentally love the same thing. For each may be mutually delighted with each ; they may even pray together for their mutual welfare ; and yet not for the sake of each other, but in order that it may afford either pleasure or advantage to themselves.

On this account such a friendship but rarely occurs, because that which is *common in this friendship*, is *one* merely from accident ; and that which is *one from accident* does not very much unite.

* There is evidently an error in the original. For *Socrates*, therefore, it appears we should read *Speusippus* ; as he was contemporary with Plato, his immediate successor, and one of his best disciples. The reasoning in this sentence obviously shows the necessity of some alteration, and none seems more likely to be correct than the above.

CHAP. VI.

THAT FRIENDS LIVING, AND ASSOCIATING TOGETHER, ARE RENDERED FRIENDS IN ENERGY.

SINCE friendship is divided into these species, even depraved men may be friends, but they are so either through pleasure or advantage, being in this respect similar to each other. But good men are friends through themselves; since inasmuch as both are worthy, they love each other. These characters, therefore, are *simply, properly, and essentially* friends; but the others are so *accidentally*; and in consequence of a similitude to these, possess the name of friendship.

As, however, with regard to the virtues, some men are said to be good according to habit, but others according to energy; (for some persons possess the habit of justice, but being impeded by external circumstances, do not energize according to that virtue, and others actually do just things, according to the habit of justice, which they had received:)—this being the case, the very same thing also takes place in friendship. For those who live together, rejoice in the welfare of each other, and each imparts to each every good in his power. Those, however, who are asleep, or separated by distance of place, cannot perform friendly offices to each other in energy; but they are disposed to energize in a friendly manner.

For places considered simply, do not dissolve friendship; but only the energy of friendship.

But if friends are for a long time absent from each other, it appears that there is an oblivion of their friendship; whence it is said,

“The want of converse friendship oft dissolves.”

But elderly persons, and those of austere manners, cannot, as it seems, be friendly; since, in these characters, pleasure is not of long continuance; and it is not possible for a man to associate and pass his time with one who is destitute of pleasure: for no one would choose to pass his time with a doleful or unpleasant person. It appears too that nature avoids the painful; but always pursues the pleasurable. If, however, it is not possible to live with a man, neither can he be a friend; since custom and mutual intercourse constitute friendships.

For those who are cordial, but do not live together, are rather benevolent, than friends to each other.

Nothing indeed is so much the characteristic of friends as living together; since neither can those who are friends through advantage, avoid a familiar intercourse; for being indigent of, they mutually require the services of each other, which it is not possible to enjoy without familiar intercourse. Neither can those who are friends through pleasure, by a much greater reason, subsist without intimate converse. Nor again can even those who are *properly* friends, and who may be considered as blessed; for though they are not indigent of each other, they are mutually agreeable. Hence it is impossible that they should not wish to pass their time together; for it is not fit that the blessed should lead a solitary life; but, on the other hand, it is necessary that they should rejoice in the same things in conjunction with each other. This, indeed, constitutes the social friendship of youth, when they are intent upon the same object.

Friendship, however, is especially the property of worthy persons, as we have frequently said; for that which is simply and properly good and pleasant, appears to be amiable and eligible; but that which is

good to one, is the object of love and choice to both. But a worthy man loves a worthy man, both because *his good is simply and properly good, and good also to his friend*. Hence it follows that a worthy man is an object of love according to both modes; and, on this account, there is every necessity that worthy men should wish to live together, rejoicing in each other as being similar and simply good, and as being good to each other.

CHAP. VII.

CONCERNING FRIENDSHIP, AND THE LOVE WHICH SUBSISTS AMONG FRIENDS.

SINCE friendship is a virtue, and a certain passion and habit are contemplated in every virtue, let us investigate what is the passion, and what the habit in friendship. Friendly love, therefore, appears to be similar to passion, but friendship to habit. For passion is that which takes place without a previous and deliberate choice; but habit is produced in conjunction with this choice, and is that according to which we energize, together with pre-election. On this account, friendly love and kindness are exercised towards things inanimate, and such objects as cannot return that regard. But this is passion; for we are kind without judging or reasoning; neither is it the effect of deliberate choice, but of impulse only, which is entirely a passion. Friendship, however, is kindness towards those we love, and this is a passion in conjunction with pre-election; for we judge that it is proper to love the person whom we do love, and are excited to it, not only by external

circumstances, but also by our very selves, and by the reasoning power. But excitement, accompanied by reasoning and pre-election, arises from habit. Friendly love, therefore, is a passion; but friendship a habit. —

Further still: friends wish for the welfare of those whom they love for their own sake, not according to passion, but habit; for this does not happen irrationally, but while deliberating how it may be effected. But to wish well to those we love, for their own sake, is a part of the definition of friendship. Friendship, therefore, is a habit. Again, a man loves a worthy friend, because he is good to him; for when a friend is *good*, he is *good* also to his friend. Each, therefore, loves each as a good intimately allied to himself, and they mutually wish for the welfare of, and are similarly agreeable to, each other.

In short, they equally reciprocate all good offices; for equality is called friendship. But these cannot be performed without a previous and deliberate choice. Pre-election, however, arises from habit: and hence friendship is a habit. But friendly love, since it is destitute of pre-election, is altogether a passion.

• CHAP. VIII.

THAT A MAN CANNOT BE A FRIEND TO MANY PERSONS; ALSO WHAT KIND OF FRIENDSHIP SUBSISTS AMONG MEN IN POWER.

ALL friendly offices, therefore, and those that are adapted to friends, take place in the friendship *only* of worthy persons. But with the austere and elderly, a less degree of friendship is produced, by reason of their being more morose, and taking less delight in familiar association: for association and living together, appear to be the productive causes of friendship. On this account young, but not elderly, persons rapidly become friends; for it is not possible to become a friend to one in whom we can neither delight, nor with whom we can pleasantly live. But this does not very often happen with elderly persons, since they afford but little pleasure. For the very same reasons neither do men of severe manners become friends; and persons of this description are benevolent towards, because they wish well to, each other through mutual want, and receive from each other, that which each requires from each. Nevertheless they are not mutually friends, because they do not pass their time together, neither do they delight in each other; both which appear to be especially friendly and productive of friendship.

A worthy man cannot be a friend to many according to perfect friendship; as neither is it possible to love many women at the same time. For *perfect friendship* is a certain transcendency of friendship; but this is naturally adapted to subsist towards *one*; since it is scarcely possible that many persons should vehemently delight in the very same

things; neither is it easy for the many to be good and worthy. In short, much time, long custom, and accurate experience of each other, are requisite to a friendship of this kind. All these, however, are ~~difficult to be~~ obtained; but it is possible to love many according to other friendships; for a man may be studious to please many for the sake of advantage, and may captivate many through pleasure, since the many delight in these things, and form attachments for the sake of them; neither do they require a long time to obtain an accurate experience of their friends; but immediately acknowledge their attachment, either through the advantage or pleasure it affords them. Perfect friendship; therefore, is that which subsists according to the good; but the other friendships; namely, those that subsist for the sake of advantage, and a pleasurable object, are friendships according to similitude.

And of the friendships subsisting according to similitude, that arising from a pleasurable object more nearly resembles the true; as when friends mutually afford pleasure to, and delight in each other, or in the same things. Such indeed are the friendships of young persons; for the friendship derived from pleasure is more liberal than that which springs from advantage; since the latter belongs to traders, and illiberal persons.

Further still: true friendship requires the pleasurable, but by no means the advantageous; since the blessed do not stand in need of things advantageous, but of such as are pleasant. They wish, indeed, to live with certain persons, but they cannot pass their time with the sorrowful, for they can endure sorrow only for a short time: but no one can long bear to be pained, neither could any one endure even good itself, if it were painful to him. On this account, worthy men seek for agreeable friends, who are both good in themselves, and good

to them; for thus it is necessary that whatever is present to them should be present also to their friends. Hence the friendship according to pleasure, is more similar to perfect friendship than that which subsists for the sake of advantage.

Men in power, therefore, do not make use of the same kind of friends as those who seek for advantage or pleasure; for some are useful, and others pleasant to them. These qualities, however, rarely meet in one and the same character. And the reason is this: the useful and the pleasant are found in perfect friendship, which pertains to worthy men only; but persons in power do not look for such characters; since they neither inquire for men whose virtues render them agreeable, or who are useful to worthy purposes. They employ the festive and facetious indeed to afford them pleasure; and the skilful for their advantage, as being capable of performing what they are ordered; but these qualities very seldom meet in the same person. As we have said, however, the character that is at the same time both agreeable and useful is the worthy man, who does not become the friend of one who surpasses him, unless it be in virtue, and then he ranges himself under the worthy man by whom he is surpassed, and thinks him better than himself. For thus the worthy man becomes equal to him who surpasses him in power; analogously surpassing and being surpassed. And being equalized, he will be a friend; but he will not be so unless they are thus rendered equal. And since men in power are not very often good characters, on this account, neither are worthy men often their friends.

CHAP. IX.

CONCERNING PLEASURABLE AND USEFUL FRIENDSHIPS; THAT IN A CERTAIN RESPECT THEY ARE, AND IN A CERTAIN RESPECT THEY ARE NOT, FRIENDSHIPS; ALSO CONCERNING THE FRIENDSHIP SUBSISTING ACCORDING TO TRANSCENDENCY.

ALL the above-mentioned friendships are founded in equality; for friends mutually give to, receive from, and wish the same things to, each other; or they exchange one thing for another, the equal for the equal; as for instance, pleasure for advantage:—which friendships, as we have said, exist in a less degree, and are of a shorter duration than others.

Of friendships, however, those that subsist for the sake of a pleasurable or useful object, appear to be friendships in some respects, but not in others; for so far as they are similar to *perfect friendship*, they are friendships; but so far as they are dissimilar to it, they are not friendships. They are similar indeed, because perfect friendship comprehends both the good, and the useful; but they are dissimilar, because perfect friendship is blameless and stable. The friendships, however, that subsist through utility and pleasure, rapidly change, and in many other respects differ from the true. All these friendships, therefore, subsist according to similitude and equality.

But there is another species of friendship, namely, that according to transcendency; such, for instance, as subsists between a father and his son; and in short, between elderly and young people, or between a husband and his wife; and, in a word, between all who govern and the governed.

These, however, differ from each other; for there are not the same

friendships between parents and their children, as between governors and the governed. Neither is the friendship of a father towards his son, the same with that of a son towards his father; nor that of a man towards his wife, as that of the wife towards her husband. Hence friendships do not only differ in this respect, but there is also a difference between friendly love, and the reciprocation of that love. For the virtue, and the work of each of these friends, are different; since the things through which they love, and are loved, also differ. On this account, both the love subsisting among friends and friendships are different. In the first-mentioned friendships, therefore, stability is effected, because friends impart the same things to each other; but that is not the case in the present instance; for the father does not require the same things from his son as the son requires from his father.

Neither is it necessary that equality should be preserved between them in these respects; but when each receives from the other such things as it is proper that the one should give, and the other receive, their friendship will then be stable and equitable.

It is also necessary that the friendly love subsisting according to transcendency, should be analogous; since it is proper that the better and more useful character should rather be beloved than love; and similarly with others. For it is requisite that a certain equality should subsist among these, since this is the bond of friendship.

But equality takes place to a certain extent, when friendly love subsists according to *desert*; and the just is also preserved in this equality. Equality, however, does not similarly subsist in just things, and in friendship; for in the former the equal according to *desert*, is the primary object of investigation, and is analogous to the receivers. But the equal according to *quantity*, is secondarily investigated; for if

the distribution be proportional and according to desert, it will be just; and although it may very much differ in quantity, the ratio of the just will still be preserved: if, however, it were equal according to quantity, ~~and not proportional~~, it could not be just. But with regard to friendship it is otherwise; for in friendship the equal is investigated, first according to quantity, and next according to proportion.

For if men very much differ from each other, and the separating interval is great, and one eminently excels the other in virtue, in opulence, or any thing else, they will not be friends; since they are neither able, nor willing to be so. This, however, is more apparent with respect to ourselves, and divinity. For because God supereminently surpasses us in every thing good, on this account friendship has no place between Him and us*. This also is manifest in the friendship between kings and subjects; for neither do they consider persons very much inferior to them worthy to be their friends, nor are worthless characters thought deserving of the friendship of the most excellent and wise. Hence it is not possible that those who very materially differ from each other can be friends; but they may be so when the transcendency is not very great.

It is not possible, however, to speak definitely, or to assign any accurate ratio as to the *quantum* of this transcendency. For when many things are taken away from one friend, so that the other surpasses him, it may happen that their friendship may still remain; and also that it

* That is to say, friendship, in the *strict* sense of the word, has no place between man and divinity. For what equal reciprocation of love can there be between natures so immensely different from each other? So far, however, as a good man is *similar* to divinity, according to this similitude he is called the friend of God. Thus Abraham was called the friend of God.

may be dissolved when the distinction becomes very great, as is the case with respect to divinity, and ourselves.

Hence some one may doubt whether friends wish the most important goods to each other; for if they did, they would pray ~~that their friends~~ might become gods. But this, if granted, would dissolve their friendship; so that if they wished the greatest good for their friends, they would also wish that they should not be their friends. This, however, is contrary to the definition of friendship. Further still: not being friends they would be no longer valuable to each other; and, therefore, they do not pray for goods of this kind.

To this we must answer, that a friend prays for the welfare of his friend for his own sake; if, however, it be necessary for his own sake, it is also requisite that he should remain a friend, in order that he may be benefited by the friend for whom he prays; but he will continue a friend if that friend still continues to be a man, and does not become a god. A friend, however, will wish the greatest good to his friend that human nature is capable of, though not every good perhaps, as is the case with the wishes of the greater part of friends; for each especially wishes his own welfare.

CHAP. X.

WHETHER FRIENDSHIP CONSISTS RATHER IN LOVING, OR IN BEING LOVED.

THE multitude, through ambition, appear rather to wish to be loved than to love. On this account the many love flatterers, and delight to live with them, because while they surpass these flatterers, they at the same time appear to be their friends. But it is pleasant to the ambitious man to surpass his friends; for flatterers pretend to be subdued by every one they live with; and on this account seem rather to love, than be loved. To be loved, however, seems to approach near to being honoured; and this is what the multitude aspire after.

But those who seek for honours do not seek them for their own sake, but according to accident; since it appears that they value honour for the sake of something else. The vulgar indeed, when honoured by their superiors, value honour on account of the hope it inspires them with; for they fancy they shall obtain what they want from those who honour them, and delight in the honour they receive as a pledge of future advantage. But more equitable men, and those who are desirous of being honoured by the worthy, pursue honour, because they wish that the best opinions may be firmly entertained of them: and they establish good opinions of themselves from the decision of those who honour them; and hence they delight in honour. These, however, believe themselves to be good.

Honour, therefore, is sought through some other object; but to be loved is sought *per se*; for it is essentially pleasant and lovely. On this account, friendship, which is eligible *per se*, may appear better than

honour. For since friendship consists in loving, and being loved, if each be eligible for its own sake, it is evident that friendship is also eligible *per se*. To be beloved, however, is not only eligible *per se*, but also to love; and this by how much the more the latter is ~~better~~ than the former.

Whence we may collect that friendship consists more in loving than being loved. As a proof of this, mothers delight in loving their children, without seeking for a return of that love. For some commit their children to the care of, or suffer them to be brought up by others; and not being known to, they are not beloved by their children; but they knowing their children, love them, although they are not solicitous to be loved by them in return, if both these are not possible: on the contrary, they seem satisfied if they see their children well taken care of. But since friendship consists more in loving than in being loved, and we think the lovers of friends are praise-worthy, to love appears to be the virtue of friends.

Hence when this love is founded on worth of character, men become firm friends, and the friendship of such men is stable. Thus, however, they will become equal friends if they love each other according to their mutual worth, since they will so far become equal. And equality is friendship.

CHAP. XI.

CONCERNING THE STABILITY OF FRIENDSHIP; AND WHENCE LOVING, AND BEING LOVED,
ORIGINATE.

THIS similitude is particularly and properly found among worthy men; but is scarcely perceptible among the depraved. It is discovered, however, more with those who are influenced either by pleasure or advantage; for worthy characters are similar to themselves, since they do not—easily change, neither do they delight in different objects at different times, but always in worthy works. For virtue is stable, because it is a habit; and on this account worthy men are always similar to each other, and persevere in friendship. Neither do they require any thing improper, nor suffer themselves to be made instruments of to base purposes; but, as one may say, they prohibit every thing base. For it is the characteristic of good men, neither to act erroneously themselves, nor permit their friends to be subservient to vice. On the other hand depraved men are also depraved in this respect,—they do not always delight in the same things; and hence are neither always similar to themselves, nor to their friends; and their friendship is of short continuance, because they delight in the depravity of each other. Useful and agreeable men, however, preserve more of this similitude; for the objects investigated by such characters are more stable; and they are similar to themselves and to each other, because both investigate either the advantageous or the pleasurable, so long as they can mutually derive pleasure or advantage. Such, therefore, are the friendships arising from similitude.

It appears likewise that friendship is maintained from contrariety, which also subsists for the sake of utility ; as for instance, when a poor man becomes the friend of a wealthy, or an ignorant, of a well informed man. For a man who wants to obtain a certain object, ~~will ask for it,~~ and give something else in return to him who is able to afford what he wants : and the lover and his mistress may be referred to this species of friendship ; as may the friendship between the deformed and the beautiful. On this account lovers frequently appear ridiculous, when they fancy themselves worthy of a similar reciprocation of love from the objects of their love, though the one is deformed, and the other beautiful. For if they be similarly objects of love, they will require attentions corresponding to their desert, and it will be just that they should be similarly loved ; but if this is not the case, they appear ridiculous. Hence it seems that friendship may exist in contraries, because the deformed love the beautiful, the poor the wealthy, and the unlearned those who are endued with science. Things also that are naturally dry aspire after moisture.

But a friendship of this kind, that is to say, of contraries, is not essential, but accidental ; for those who use it are not contrary, so far as they love each other ; but there is some accidental circumstance in which they are so. For a poor man loves a wealthy one, because he is advantageous and useful to him ; but a serviceable and useful man is not essentially contrary to him who uses him ; since, if it were so, every man of this kind would be contrary to him who uses him. This, however, is not the case ; neither is the common soldier contrary to the general, nor the preceptor to the pupil. The lover also loves his mistress, because she is agreeable to him : but that which is pleasant, is not contrary to the person pleased, although it *may happen* that they are

contrary. That which is naturally dry, however, does not seek the moisture which is contrary to it, but a medium between both; for the desire is directed to good: and the medium is good. But let us lay aside the consideration of these particulars, since they are not altogether pertinent to our present discussion.

CHAP. XII.

CONCERNING POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP.

It appears, as we have before observed, that both friendship, and the just, are conversant about the same things. For the just is investigated in the mutual communions of men with each other; and these produce friendship. For both sailors and soldiers, and, in short, others who engage in the same actions and pursuits, seek to preserve just dealings towards each other, and are mutually friends: they also communicate together in the same degree that they love, and act justly towards each other. Hence the proverb rightly says, "All things are common among friends." For friendship consists in communion. These communions, however, are different; for to brothers and familiars all things are common; but to others, certain things only, and those definite; to some more, and to others less. But friendships subsist analogously in communions; for in conformity to these they are greater or lesser. In like manner also just things are analogous in friendships. For the same conduct is not just between brothers, as with a father towards his

son; or between citizens, or strangers, towards each other; but it is different; and there is the more and the less, according to the friendship subsisting between each. Moreover, it is not similarly unjust to deprive a stranger and a fellow-citizen of his property, or to deny assistance to a brother, and one who is no natural relation, when both stand in need of succour; or to do violence to a father, and any other person. For the just is naturally adapted to be increased together with friendship, as subsisting in the same things, and being equally extended. It is also more base to act unjustly towards a warm friend, and one with whom we have constant and friendly communion, than towards a person with whom we are less nearly connected.

But all communions in which friendship and the just subsist, are parts of the political science; for political communion takes place for the sake of interest; through which polities were at first constituted, and still continue to subsist. Every communion, however, is established for the sake of benefiting the community; for through communions we obtain things useful and convenient to ourselves; and we associate together for the sake of these advantages, in order that we may procure certain things necessary to the enjoyment of life. Legislators also pay attention to the benefit of the public, and say that the just is that which conduces to common advantage. Hence other communions, both as wholes and parts, aspire after this object;—for instance, sailors aspire after the advantages that may be derived from navigation; such as wealth, or any thing else. Those also who fight together under the same standard are desirous of acquiring those things that are profitable in war, such as wealth, or victory, or a city: the like also takes place among tribes and the populace.

Some communions, however, aspire after a pleasurable object, and

appear to be formed for the sake of pleasure; such as the communion arising from the celebration of sacred festivals, or societies instituted to promote good fellowship; the one indeed for the sake of sacrifice, and the other of sociability; but both chiefly subsist for the sake of a pleasurable object. These also are parts of the political science; since by this science they are so arranged as to be subservient to public advantage. For the political science does not merely investigate what is *immediately* beneficial, but even that which is not so at the moment, provided it may *ultimately* prove advantageous; since it does not aspire after what contributes to present benefit only, but that which will prove so to the latest period of life. Hence it introduces sacrifices, public meetings, pleasant societies, and relaxations from labour. For after the fruits of the earth are collected, public meetings are appointed; and sacrifices, consisting of certain first fruits, are performed; since at these times men are very much at leisure. Through such associations too, divinity becomes propitious, a circumstance manifestly advantageous to them; and by this relaxation they become invigorated, and able to engage again in profitable labour.

Whence it appears that every communion, whether founded in pleasurable or interested motives, has advantage for its ultimate end; and on this account they are all parts of the political science. Friendships also are conformable to these same communions; and both are subject to the same division. Such likewise as are the communions, such will be the friendships.

CHAP. XIII.

CONCERNING THE THREE SPECIES OF A POLITY.

LET us now speak concerning political communion, of which there are three species, namely, a *Kingdom*, an *Aristocracy*, and a *Timocracy*, the last of which most men are accustomed to call a polity subsisting from the distribution of honour through the medium of wealth; and hence it is properly called a *Timocracy*.

Of these polities a Kingdom is the most excellent, and a Timocracy the worst. These, therefore, are the polities: but of polities, a Tyranny is the degeneracy, and, as it were, corruption of a Kingdom; for though both are monarchies, yet they very widely differ. A *Tyrant* regards his own advantage; but a *King* that of his subjects: and he is not a king who is not sufficient to himself, and who does not excel in every good; for a man of this kind has no occasion to appropriate to himself the property of those whom he governs. On this account, when engaged in government, and performing the common duties of his office, he does not regard his own advantage, but solely that of the governed; for he does not procure things beneficial to himself from the public purse, but from his own proper revenue. And he who acts otherwise, is more like an elective monarch than a king. Hence a tyranny is the contrary to a kingdom; for a tyrant pursues his own good, and that in a much greater degree than an elective monarch; and as to its difference with respect to a kingdom, it is very evident that it is worse. On this account also a tyranny is contrary to a

kingdom, because the *latter* is the *best*, and the *former* the *worst*, of all governments. For the worst is contrary to the best.

A Royal government, therefore (when it does change) gradually changes to a tyranny; since a tyranny springs from a depraved monarchy; and a depraved king becomes a tyrant. Hence the degeneracy of a royal government produces a tyranny; but an oligarchy springs from a corrupted aristocracy; as when those employed in such a government divide the public property among themselves contrary to their desert, either entirely, or in most cases; and when they commit the sovereign rule of the city to the same men, in order that being accustomed to them, they may make them instruments of converting the public property to themselves. Whence it happens that the management of affairs is intrusted to but a few, and those depraved, instead of equitable characters. But the degeneracy of a timocracy produces a democracy. For if they border closely on each other, since a timocracy also is willing that the many should govern, and considers all equal who are invested with honour derived from wealth. A democracy, however, is but a small corruption, since it does not much deviate from the form of a timocracy; and accords more with, than differs from, that species of government. It differs from it so far as honours are venal, but partakes of it so far as it tends to promote equality; for it considers all who are honoured as equal, whether they be selected from the wealthy, or the common people.

CHAP. XIV.

CONCERNING THE SIMILITUDE OF THESE SPECIES OF POLITIES.

SUCH, therefore, are the changes which chiefly take place in the forms of political communion. For each at least changes into that which is opposed to it; and easily suffers such a mutation.

But there are resemblances to, and, as it were, paradigms of these in domestic society; since we may see in families the images of a Regal government, of an aristocracy, and of the rest. The communion subsisting between a father and his son is the image of a kingdom, since a father takes care of his children. Hence also Homer calls Jupiter *father*. For a kingdom wishes to be a paternal dominion, which being exceeded by the Persians, they produce a tyranny; since they govern their children like slaves. But a Tyranny is the government of slaves, since the exclusive advantage of the master is always sought for by slaves. A government of this kind, however, is erroneous with respect to children; but that approaching to Royalty is proper and becoming. For since a son differs from a slave, it is necessary that the government of each should be also different. The communion, therefore, between a father and his son is similar to a kingdom; but that between a man and his wife to an aristocracy; for the man rules according to desert, as being the superior character; and the power will be aristocratic when the husband usurps to himself such things as are adapted to him in that character, and entrusts to the wife those concerns that are within her province. But a communion of this kind exceeds the bounds of an Aristocracy, and changes to an oligarchy, when the husband usurps to

himself absolute power in every thing; for he does this contrary to his desert, and not so far as he is the superior. Sometimes, however, wives govern, as when they are heiresses, and on this account exceed their husbands in wealth and power. For here, as in oligarchies, not virtue, but wealth and power, produce a government of this kind. Such, therefore, is an aristocracy and an oligarchy in families.

But the communion between brothers is a Timocracy; for they are equal, except so far as they may differ in age. Hence if the difference of age * be great, their friendship is no longer fraternal, but resembles that of a father towards his children. And a Democracy chiefly takes place in those families that are without a master or head; since here all are equal. This is the case likewise in families where the ruler is imbecile, and every one acts from his own authority.

* Difference of age in a *fraternal* communion, produces the same diversity with respect to honour, as difference of wealth effects in a *Timocracy*.

CHAP. XV.

CONCERNING THE FRIENDSHIPS THAT SUBSIST ACCORDING TO EACH SPECIES OF POLITY.

THESE then are the communions in political and economic society. But it appears that friendship is attendant on all these, and that it is equally extended with the just.

In a Regal communion or society therefore, friendship is transcendent if the king, excelling in acts of beneficence, benefits his subjects, and takes care of them; and is himself good, in order that they may conduct themselves well, acting in this respect like a good shepherd. Whence also Homer calls Agamemnon the shepherd of the people. But a friendship of this kind is paternal; for this also is transcendent, though it differs in the magnitude of the benefits conferred. For the father confers the greater benefit, since he is the cause of his son's being, which appears to be the greatest that can be bestowed:—moreover he is the cause of his nourishment and education: but the same benefits are afforded by ancestors. For by nature a father rules his son, the first-born their juniors*, and a king his subjects. All friendships of this kind, however, are founded in transcendency. On this account also parents are honoured; but the just consequent to this friendship, is not equal, but consists in transcendency. For the just towards a father transcends that towards a son; since it is requisite to attribute according to desert: and in this friendship consists.

* Aristotle probably alludes in this place to the most ancient of all governments, that of a *dynasty*, in which the eldest of the family governed the rest.

Transcendent friendship, however, is not only attendant on a Royal, but also on an Aristocratic communion. For here also friendly love subsists in a greater degree towards the superior character. And the friendship of a husband towards his wife is of this kind; for a conjugal communion is an aristocracy in a family; since the husband rules according to virtue, and it is proper that the greater portion of friendly love should be attributed to the better character. In like manner also the just here consists in transcendency.

But the friendship of familiars, which consists in equality, is attendant on a timocratic society, such as subsists among brothers; for familiars, properly so called, are equal, and of the same age. Persons of this kind, however, for the most part, pursue similar studies, and adopt similar customs. Those also who live under a Timocracy do the same thing; for the citizens wish to be equal, and equitable; and each governs, and is governed in his turn with reference to the equal. But friendship and the just subsist from equality: both, therefore, are thus the concomitants of sound politics, and well-constituted societies.

In degenerate communions, however, as the just subsists but in a small degree, so likewise there will be but little friendship.

But since a Tyranny is the worst of all corrupted governments, so likewise friendship will either find no place in it, or else in a very small degree. For as in this there is nothing common between the governor and the governed; so likewise there will be no friendship.—Neither will the just have any subsistence; but as is the relation of the artist to his instrument, and of the soul to the body; such also will be the relation of the master, the slave, and of the tyrant, to those whom he governs. For although the instrument is benefited by the artist, and the body by the soul, still there is no friendship between them.

For no friendship can subsist towards things inanimate; neither is any justice due to them from those by whom they are used; as neither is any justice due to an ox or a dog*. After the same manner neither is there any friendship between a master and his slave, or between a tyrant and his subjects, that is to say, so far as they are slaves; since there is nothing common between masters and slaves. For *a slave is an animated instrument, and an instrument is an inanimate slave*; so far, therefore, as he is a *slave*, no friendship is entertained for him; but so far as he is a *man*, this is possible.

There is indeed a certain just conduct due from every man to every man who is capable of partaking of the laws, and sacred institutions; for the participation of the laws renders men just towards each other; but the communion that is founded in just conduct also introduces friendship. Friendship, therefore, may subsist between a tyrant and his subjects, so far as they are *men*. Hence under such a government, both friendship and just conduct will be very latent.

In a democracy, however, it is more frequent; for where all are equal, many things are common.

* That is to say, no justice that is attended with reciprocation; for the justice of friendship is reciprocal.

CHAP. XVI.

CONCERNING THE FRIENDSHIPS OF FAMILIARS AND KINDRED; AND THAT WHICH
SUBSISTS IN FAMILIES.

As we have said, therefore, every species of friendship consists in communion; and it does not appear that the friendship of kindred and familiars only so subsists. For social friendships subsist according to agreement, and a certain compact; and those between tribes, and persons sailing together are of this kind. With these likewise hospitable friendship may be classed.

But the friendship of relatives and familiars does not subsist from mutual consent, or a certain compact: the former, indeed, is held together by natural ties, but the latter by those arising from equality of age, and earnestly engaging in the same pursuits.

Let us, however, first speak concerning the friendship subsisting among kindred; but this is multiform, and wholly suspended from paternal friendship. For through an intimate alliance with a common father or progenitor, brothers, and, in short, other relatives, love each other. Parents indeed love their children, as being a part of themselves; but children love their parents, as springing from them; and brothers love brothers, as having the same origin. Parents, however, know better that their children spring from them, than the children know that they spring from their parents. And the cause, and the begetter, are more intimately allied to the thing begotten or made, than the thing made is allied to the maker, or the thing begotten to the begetter. For that which is derived from any thing, is the peculiar property of that from

which it is derived ; just as the teeth and the hair are the peculiar property of their possessor ; but the possessor is not the peculiar property of the teeth and the hair. Hence neither is the cause by any means the peculiar property of the thing caused, nor that which springs from any thing, of that from which it originates ; neither has it any alliance to it ; or if it has, this alliance is less than that of the thing produced to the producing cause. Children also do not love their parents so much as they are beloved by them ; the truth of which becomes evident from time. For parents love their children as soon as they are born ; but children their parents some time after ; that is, when they have acquired understanding and sense. On this account also the love of mothers exceeds that of fathers for their children, because their love for them has a prior subsistence. Parents, therefore, love their children as themselves ; for children springing from them are, as it were, their other selves, differing only in being separate ; but children love their parents as being the source of their existence.

But brothers love each other as naturally springing from the same source ; for sameness with regard to parents also produces sameness in brothers towards each other ; just as sameness of root connects the branches of a tree : hence it is said they spring from the same blood, the same root, and so forth. For each is the same, though subsisting in things many and divided. But the being brought up and educated together also greatly contributes to friendship ; for equal age loves equal age ; and the being accustomed to each other, renders them familiar : whence also fraternal friendship is assimilated to the friendship of familiars. Cousins, however, and other relatives, derive their alliance from brothers ; for in consequence of springing from the same stock, they are *in a certain respect* the same with each other. And of kindred some are more closely, but

others more distantly related, according as they are nearer to or more remote from the origin of their race; for those who are distantly related do not very much associate together, in consequence of their communication being diminished by progression from its source. But the friendship of children towards their parents, and of men towards God *, subsist as towards something good and pre-eminent; for divinity and parents are beneficent as conferring the greatest benefits; namely, existence, nourishment, and education; but that of relatives towards each other subsists in equality.

A friendship of this kind, however, has more of the pleasurable and the useful than that which subsists among persons who are not related; and by how much the more common is their life, by so much the more they will communicate with each other. But this is especially the case with fraternal friendship; for every thing occurs in this that happens in familiar friendship, and in a greater degree. On this account, if brothers are worthy men, and of similar dispositions, their attachment will be stronger than that between familiars; since they are more nearly allied, more similar to, and love each other, in consequence of having the same origin:—their manners also are more similar, because they are born of the same parents, and are similarly educated:—experience likewise resulting from time is here greater and stronger. The greatest friendship, therefore, pertaining to kindred, subsists between brothers; but other friendships of consanguinity are analogous to the degree of relationship.

It appears, however, that a natural friendship subsists between man and wife; since man is more naturally adapted to propagate his species,

* Properly speaking, there is no friendship, because there can be no *reciprocal* benevolence, between God and man. *Friendship*, therefore, in this place signifies *communion*.

than to maintain a political character; and this, by how much the more a family is prior to, and more necessary than, a city, and the increase of our species is more common to us as animals, than government: for the former is inherent in all animals, but the latter in man only. All other animals, therefore, associate for the sole purpose of propagating their species; but man, not for this alone, but to promote the comforts, and procure the necessities of life. For the employments of the husband and wife are at once distinct, and different duties are allotted to each. Thus, therefore, they mutually succour each other, appropriating their individual property to the common advantage of both. Hence it appears that the useful and the pleasurable are found in conjugal friendship; and if the parties be worthy, it will possess the good also in conjunction with virtue; for there is a virtue pertaining to each. And if each be worthy according to the virtue respectively adapted to each, they will on that account also delight in each other: but children appear to be the bond of conjugal friendship. Hence those who are without these pledges are more liable to separate; for children are a common good to both; and that which is common holds together those who are partakers of it.

CHAP. XVII.

CONCERNING THE ACCUSATIONS THAT TAKE PLACE IN THE FRIENDSHIPS FOUNDED ON UTILITY.

BUT to inquire after what manner man and wife, brother and brother, and, in short, one friend and another, live together, is the same thing as to inquire how *the just* subsists in these respective associations; for as we have frequently said, the just is attendant on all these communions analogously with the degree of friendship subsisting in each. It appears, moreover, that the just exercised by a friend towards another friend, and a stranger, or towards a brother, a familiar, or a fellow student, is not the same.

Since, however, there are three species of friendship, namely, one subsisting for the sake of the good, another of the pleasurable, and a third of utility, and since according to each, some are friends in equality, and others in transcendency, (for men become friends, and are similar, either through some good, pleasurable, or useful object)—since this is the case, the nature of their friendship will depend on the worth or depravity of their characters.

But it is proper to love our equals according to equality, and to equalize all other things; and that the unequal should love, and be loved, analogously to the transcendency or deficiency of their several characters or qualifications.

Nevertheless it is reasonable to suppose that accusations and complaints among friends take place in the friendship founded on utility alone, or at least principally in that. For virtuous friends benefit each other promptly and cheerfully; since to do this is the province both of

virtue and friendship. But in virtuous friendship there are neither accusations, nor hostilities of contending friends; for no one hates the man who loves and benefits him: on the other hand if he is grateful, he also in his turn will recompence his benefactor. If, however, one exceeds the other in benefits, and obtains the object he aspires after, he will not accuse his friend; for each desires the good, and to confer benefits.

Neither is it possible for those who are friends, through pleasure, altogether to hate each other; since they respectively obtain what they wish for if they delight in passing their time together. For it would be ridiculous that a man should accuse his friend with whom he is ~~not~~ delighted, when he has it in his power to be delighted by living with another. Hence neither the friendship subsisting for the sake of the good, nor that through pleasure, are subject to accusations and complaints. But among friendships, that alone which is founded on utility is liable to accusations; for in this, men always using each other for their own advantage, require more than they are entitled to, and imagining they receive less, complain that they are not rewarded according to their desert. For those who confer benefits are not able to supply persons of this description with so much as they require; since the party benefited requires more than the benefactor is able to bestow.

It appears also, that as the just is two-fold; for one kind is not promulgated, but the other ordained by law; so likewise with respect to friendship subsisting according to utility, one kind is *moral*, but the other *legal*; and the latter is exercised when one person gives something to another, from whom he expects a certain and definite return; but the former takes place when a man gives something to another as a friend,

and at the same time thinks it right that the equal, or even more, should be returned, though not in any certain or definite manner. Accusations and complaints, however, are attendant on both these kinds of friendship: but more especially when one friend introduces legal, and the other ethical utility; since such friendships are speedily dissolved. For if one confers a pecuniary benefit, and thinks himself worthy to be similarly benefited, and that he ought to receive as much as he has given, but the other benefits in some other manner, it is not possible that they should continue in friendship.

Of legal utility among friends one kind is altogether mercenary, but the other more liberal: for to refrain from giving, unless an immediate return is made, is altogether sordid; but to be backward in receiving is much more liberal. A compact of this kind also is established in order that something should be considered as a debt, for some other thing received; for the debt is definite, and not ambiguous. But delay of reimbursement is more liberal, and renders the contract much more friendly: on this account law-suits seldom take place among these, nor do they sue each other for debt; but think it right to love those who faithfully preserve their contracts. He, however, who confers a benefit according to ethical utility, does not regard security, but acting as towards a friend, gives him something, or benefits him in some other manner: but he thinks he is deserving of the equal, or even more, since he has not made a gift, but a loan. Not receiving, however, at least not as if he had lent, he thus accuses the man who does not make a return, but accuses him as a friend. This happens indeed because all or most men wish for what is beautiful in conduct, but deliberately choose that which is advantageous. But to confer a benefit without expecting a return is worthy: to receive one, however, is profitable. Hence

characters of this kind seek the advantageous; but not obtaining it, wish to appear worthy.

Friends of this description, who confer benefits in order that they may receive others in return, should benefit those ~~they are able~~ as much as possible, and recompense according to desert; for it is not proper to draw the unwilling by violence to true friendship, but rather to be indignant that they have been improperly benefited; since it has not been done by a friend. Hence they will voluntarily endeavour to cancel the base benefits they have unwillingly received in consequence of not knowing the benefactor: this also they will effect by making retribution if they are able; and immediately discharge the debt, ~~as if~~ — a special agreement had been made for that purpose. If, however, they have not immediately the power to do this, they will agree to discharge it as soon as they are able. But if they should be wholly incapable of returning what they have received, neither should the giver require any thing from them. Hence, if possible, they will restore it immediately. Every man, however, before he is benefited, ought to consider by whom, and for what purpose, in order that he may know whether it be proper to accept or refuse the obligation.

CHAP. XVIII.

CONCERNING THE MEASURE OF RETRIBUTION IN FRIENDSHIP FOUNDED ON UTILITY,
AND FURTHER CONCERNING THE COMPLAINTS IN THE FRIENDSHIP THAT SUBSISTS
ACCORDING TO TRANSCENDENCY.

With respect to the retributions of friends towards each other, there is ~~some~~ doubt. For since small advantages accrue to some who confer great benefits; and, on the other hand, great advantages to those who ~~confer~~ small benefits (for a man by doing many things, though he incurs but little expence, may benefit his friend, and it may happen otherwise) let us inquire whether it be proper that those who return favours should regard the advantage, or the measure of the benefit received. For those who are benefited say, that they have received such things from their benefactors as it was trifling for them to give, and which they might have received from others, by this assertion depreciating the benefits. On the contrary, benefactors say, that they have benefited to the utmost of their power, and have bestowed such things as could not be received from others, both in dangers and in necessities bordering on dangers. It may be doubted, however, whether it be proper to measure retribution by the advantage of him who receives, or by the good intention of him who confers a benefit: but this doubt does not similarly apply to every species of friendship. In that founded on utility, the retribution should be analogous to the advantage of him who is benefited, or even exceed this; since thus it will be still better. For it is the person benefited who is in want, and his benefactor supplies his wants, as one who will receive an equal recompence. As

much assistance, therefore, will be afforded as is due, or even more than this; and, in short, it is fit that the retribution should be measured by the advantage of the benefactor, because through this he is a friend.

But in virtuous friendship there are neither any accusations, as in the above-mentioned friendship, since each is willing to refer the benefits to his own advantage; nor are the retributions measured by the advantage of the parties benefited, but by the deliberate choice of the benefactors: for all the authority of virtue and manners consist in deliberate choice. Since, therefore, the virtuous love each other for virtue's sake, and measure the retributions by deliberate choice, such a friendship is free from all accusation and complaint; but other friend-ships are always full of both.

Such also is the friendship subsisting according to transcendency, when the superior loves the inferior, or the more useful, the less useful character. For he who excels thinks he is deserving of *the more*; the superior indeed because he is better, but the more useful as being more useful. For say they, if each friend were to contribute as much as is in his power, and refrain from receiving according to his desert, the friendship would become a certain service. On this account they say it is not proper to obtain merely an equal, but a larger portion of the advantages arising from friendship. For as in the purchase of merchandise, those who lay down the most money expect to receive the greatest quantity of the commodity, so likewise persons of this kind think themselves entitled to the greater portion of the advantages of friendship. Such then are the expectations of those that excel; but those who are surpassed say that such things are not adapted to superior friends, but the contrary; since it is the province of a good friend to succour those who require assistance. For say they, what is the

advantage of a worthy or powerful friend, if we experience none of the goods of a friend? After this manner, however, they accuse each other; and each party thinking he deserves more than he receives, their friendship is easily dissolved.

But it seems that each judges rightly of his own merits; for it is proper that the more should be attributed to each from friendship, though not of the same thing; but to him who transcends the greater portion of honour should be paid, and to him who is in want should be given a greater share of those things of which he is indigent. For honour is the reward of virtue and beneficence; but gain, or any thing else of which a man is in want, is the subsidy of indigence.

The like also appears to happen in governments; since honour is always paid to those who confer benefits; and a man is not honoured who contributes nothing to the public service. For that which belongs to the public in common, is given to him who contributes to the public good; and honour belongs to the public. It is scarcely possible, however, at the same time to obtain riches from, and be honoured by the public. But an indigent man receives money from, but is by no means honoured by, the public; since no one is content to suffer a diminution of both wealth and honour; and resigning one, he receives the other. On this account he who suffers a diminution of wealth for the sake of the common good, receives honour from the public; but he receives riches from the public who makes wealth his sole object. For, as we have said, retribution according to desert equalizes and preserves friendship. After the same manner also we should conduct ourselves towards unequal friends, and he who is benefited either in money or virtue, should in return honour his benefactor; but the return that he makes will be to the utmost of his ability.

Friendship, however, investigates *the possible, not what is due to desert*; for all are not able to recompense their benefactors according to their desert; since it is not possible in all things to find what is due to desert. Thus, for instance, in the honours to be paid to divinity and parents, ~~no~~ one is able to reverence them according to desert; but he who reverences them to the utmost of his power, and as far as is permitted to him, appears to be a worthy character. Hence it does not seem lawful for a son to abandon his father, or refuse obedience to any of his ~~com-~~mands. For the son is always the debtor, and on this account ~~should~~ ^{he} always be grateful, since he can give nothing equivalent to the benefited he has received from his father. It may be lawful, however, ~~for the~~ father to abandon his son; for benefactors may abandon those whom they have benefited. But perhaps no father would forsake his son unless he were incorrigibly depraved; for exclusive of the impulse of natural friendship, it is at the same time human not to refuse assistance. A depraved son, however, sometimes hates his father, or at least does not very much endeavour to assist him. For the many are willing to be benefited, but refrain from conferring benefits as not being attended with profit. And thus much for these particulars.

BOOK IX.

CHAP. I.

ON THE PRESERVATIVES OF FRIENDSHIP.

LET us now discourse further concerning friendship, and add what is necessary to our preceding discussion. In the friendships, therefore, that subsist according to equality, friends should mutually make equal returns to each other; but in those subsisting according to inequality, as we have already said, the return should be analogous; since proportion equalizes friends in political communions. For the shoemaker does not receive shoes for shoes, but that which is a proportionate equivalent, as has been more fully explained in the fifth Book. The same thing also applies to the weaver, and similar artists; for political communions are preserved by giving and receiving analogously those things in which one person abounds, but of which another is in want. In political communions, money is the common measure to which all things are referred, and by which we measure both what we give and receive. In ethical and friendly concerns, therefore, there is nothing

by which we can measure things dissimilar. On this account communions between persons dissimilar, are always attended with accusations ; and such is the communion of lovers.

For sometimes a lover accuses his mistress, ~~because loving violently,~~ his love is not returned, though at the same time perhaps he is unworthy of the reciprocation. But it frequently happens that a person ~~beloved~~ complains of the lover, because at first he promised every thing, ~~but~~ afterwards performed nothing. Complaints of this kind, however, occur, when one party loves for the sake of pleasure, and the other of advantage ; but afterwards neither altogether afford what was expected from them ; and since the friendship was contracted with a view ~~to~~ these objects, when they are not present, the friendship is dissolved. For they did not love each other ; but the things which each could impart, and these not being stable, perish together with their friendship. But those who mutually love each other, and the manners of each other, are worthy and steadfast in friendship ; for they love each other for themselves alone, and not for the sake of any thing else : and these remaining as they were, preserve also their friendship. But dissimilar friends are discordant when they obtain other things from their friends, and not such as they desire ; for when a man does not obtain what he wishes for, he resembles one who receives nothing. Just as a certain person ~~who~~ promised a harper that by how much the better he sung, by so much the greater should be his recompence ; but in the morning when the harper demanded the fulfilment of his promise, his employer replied that he had paid him for pleasure, with pleasure *. If, therefore, each had been willing to receive pleasure, the compact

* It would seem here that the pleasure produced by the harper's expectation of reward was considered as an equivalent for the pleasure he had imparted by singing to his harp.

would have been sufficient; but if the one sought for delight, and the other gain, and the one received that which he sought, but the other did not, the contract was not well observed. For men, in order that they may receive what they want, impart what they possess.

CHAP. II.

CONCERNING WHOSE PROVINCE IT IS TO ARRANGE THE RETRIBUTION IN BENEFITS
CONFERRED WITHOUT COMPACT. AND FURTHER CONCERNING VIRTUOUS FRIENDSHIP,
AND THAT FOUNDED ON UTILITY, IN BOTH WHICH THERE IS NO COMPACT.

IN dissimilar friendships, therefore, the analogous and degree of merit or desert, are investigated. But a doubt arises whether he who first gave, or the receiver, is the proper person to estimate the value of the retribution; since the former appears to permit the latter to do it, as was the case with *Protagoras*. For he did not require any definite remuneration from his disciples for teaching them; but ordered them to reward him according to what they thought the value of his instructions entitled him to, and with such he would be content. In communions of this kind, however, some persons are satisfied with proportionate remuneration, agreeing with Hesiod.

“Men rest contented with the price of toil.”

But mercenary characters and sordid traders seek the more; and sometimes before they have received money, promise that they will immediately impart something; but neither return the money, nor perform

any of their promises; and they are justly accused, because their deeds are surpassed by their promises. On this account also the sophists did not teach before they had received wages for teaching; and for this reason, because, as their doctrines were vile, no one would give money for the sake of learning them. Promising, however, to teach important things they received the reward, but taught the most vile doctrines. These men, therefore, since they received wages for what they did not do, are very properly reproached.

In communions, however, where no contract of retribution or ministrant offices exist, those who benefit their friends for their own sake, and bestow their own property on them, are worthy characters, and shall be without reproach. Such a friendship subsists according to virtue, and retribution should be made by deliberate intention; for this is the province of a friend and of virtue, as has been shown in our preceding discourse. Such also is the communion pertaining to philosophy; for a teacher of philosophy does not demand money, or any definite honour from his disciple, since there is not any thing of equal worth with philosophy, neither in money nor in honour; but the deliberate intention of the pupil is regarded; and such works and retribution as are in his power are considered sufficient, in the same manner as the just subsists with respect to divinity and parents. It is thus, therefore, that those who are serviceable to their friends for their own sake estimate the value of retribution.

With respect to retributions that are made for any particular purpose; as for the sake of utility or pleasure, men make and receive them in such a manner as appears to be mutually valuable, since thus their communion will be void of accusation. If, however, this does not take place, neither will it be possible that both should judge of the

appropriate retribution; but either one only, or perhaps neither. If this be the case, it will be necessary that retribution should be made according to the judgment of the person benefited. But if the one should say he is content that certain things should be given instead of something else, and the other imparts these, the one indeed will give what he contracted to give, and commute the service, either by pleasure, or some other advantage; but the receiver will not complain of the things which he thought fit to receive. This conduct, however, is not only necessary, and frees the communion from molestation, but is also just; since if a man obtains that which he wishes for, he is not injured. Hence this kind of conduct appears to be observed in traffic. For the buyer of a commodity fixes a price, estimates it by the advantage or pleasure it may afford him, and says that the thing he is bargaining for is worth so much. Among some nations also there is a law which ordains that no judicial proceedings shall be instituted about voluntary contracts; and that in communions of this kind there shall be no other judge, nor any other law; but that all differences shall be decided by the person in whom trust is reposed, and by whom such contracts are used. For they think that he who was intrusted in the first instance to estimate the retribution, will judge more justly than he who reposed that trust; since the latter will decide against the receiver. But no one is judged worthy of belief in his own cause; for in general men think that their property, and the things which they give away, are of great value. But he who is appointed to estimate the remuneration of the benefits he has received, if he should afterwards afford trouble to him who has made him a partaker of his property, as to one not worthily commuting, he may be able to judge rightly, availing

himself of the original contract, which the one had made, and the other agreed to. For he does not impart as much as he now thinks they are worth, after having received them, but as much as he valued them at before he had received them.

CHAP. III.

IN WHAT, AND TO WHOM, RETRIBUTION IS TO BE MADE.

HAVING said thus much, we must now inquire whether we should in all cases make retribution to, and obey those most honoured by, and most dear to us, or whether there are certain things in which we ought rather to make retribution to those who are less honoured by, and less friendly to us, than to those who are more honoured by, and more dear to us. For instance, whether a father should be obeyed in all things without regarding the time and nature of his commands; or whether not always; as if a son be diseased, whether he should obey his physician, or being engaged in warlike concerns, the general should not be obeyed, rather than his father: or, whether we should not elect a warlike man to be the leader of an army, rather than a friend or a father? In like manner also it may be inquired whether it is more proper to be serviceable to a friend or a worthy man; or to gratify a familiar or a benefactor, having been benefited by each, when it is not in our power to perform good offices to both.

It is not easy, therefore, to determine all these questions particularly

and accurately. For they admit many all-various distinctions, and differ from each other in many ways, as well in magnitude and parvitude, as in worth and necessity; since all things are not similarly small, or great, or worthy, or necessary. But sometimes it appears much more necessary to serve a friend than a worthy man: at another time, however, it seems better to benefit a benefactor than a friend, and vice versâ. Hence it is impossible to assign an accurate reason about these particulars to each inquiry.

It is evident, however, that we should not make retribution in every thing to the same person. For it is more just to return benefits to benefactors (I mean for the most part) than to gratify familiars. In like manner we ought rather to pay a debt to a common creditor than to a familiar.

I say for the most part, because it sometimes happens that the contrary is more just. For example; if any one should be taken prisoner by robbers, we should inquire whether one who redeems him should be redeemed in his turn, be he whom he may; or, whether the price of redemption should be given to him who demands it as his due, though he has not been taken prisoner; or, whether in preference to all these a father should be redeemed from captivity? For it may appear that a man should rather ransom his father than himself. On this account it has been said, that *generally and for the most part* a debt should be paid in preference to gratifying a friend. But if it should be so much more necessary and worthy to gratify friends, as to exceed the bounds of just conduct towards benefactors, we should incline to that; since if a benefactor is a depraved man, it is not always just to recompense him: thus, for instance, if a worthy, should lend any thing to a depraved

man, since the former does not lend to the latter, so far as he is that character. For the depraved person, knowing that he will receive what he lends, from the good man, grants a loan; but the worthy man, not expecting a return, does not act unjustly by refusing to lend to the other. If, therefore, the good man truly estimates his character, (namely, that he will act depravedly in this case) and does not return the favour, he will still act reasonably by refusing to trust him. If, however, he should not be depraved, but the good man fancies that he is so, and on that account does not make an equal return, his conduct, even in this instance, will not be very remote from the just; for it is not just that a depraved man should receive from a good one the same things which he has imparted; since that which a worthy person gives to a depraved man is not equal, even though the very same thing be mutually imparted. For the value of a gift is enhanced by the worth of the giver; and on this account it has been said that we should always rather make retribution to benefactors, than gratify friends. As we have frequently observed, therefore, the discourses concerning passions and actions, since they subsist differently at different times, must be consequent to these passions and actions. Hence it is not possible to assign any definite and accurate reason to each particular.

It is evident, therefore, that retribution should not be similarly made to every one, neither should we make retribution to a father in all things; just as neither do we sacrifice all things to Jupiter. And since we owe certain duties * to parents, others to brothers, but others again to benefactors and familiars, we ought to make a proper and appropriate

* The reader is referred to Simplicius on Epictetus, ch. xxxvii. for a most admirable Treatise on Duties in general.

retribution to each. Almost every one, however, *appears* to do this. For not benefactors, or familiars, but kindred, are invited to celebrate nuptials; since there is a communion among these, both in their race and actions. It is also thought especially proper that relatives should attend funerals. It would appear likewise that we should supply our parents with food, and do this with greater care than to ourselves; since it is necessary to preserve the being of our parents, to whom we are indebted for our own. We should also honour them as we honour the gods, though not with every kind of and all-various honour *. For we should not render the same honour to a father, and to a mother; neither should we pay to either the same that we render to a wise man, or a general; that is to say, the honour with which we honour a wise man, or a general; but we should render paternal honour to a father, and to a mother that which is adapted to her character as a mother. To every elderly man also we should pay the honour due to his age; that is, such as it is proper for a youth to render to an old man: for instance, by rising from our seat, and resigning it to the aged, with other similar marks of attention and respect. But to familiars and brothers, we should allow freedom of speech, and free intercourse; the same also should be permitted to kindred, to persons of the same tribe or society, to fellow-citizens, and all other connections: in short, we should endeavour to return to every one that which is his due, surveying the familiarity of each with ourselves, or his use or virtues; and by these estimating the honours and communions towards each. It is easy, therefore, to judge of the retribution due to relatives; for we may know without difficulty what returns are proper to kindred, or

* Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's. Luke xx. 25.

fellow-citizens, or persons of the same tribe, or, in short, to those of similar manners. But to discover an appropriate retribution to strangers, and those whose manners are dissimilar to our own, is a more laborious task. We must not, however, on this account desist from reasonable endeavours, but determine about each particular, as the case may require; and under all circumstances, observe a becoming conduct.

CHAP. IV.

WHETHER OR NOT FRIENDSHIPS OUGHT TO BE DISSOLVED.

It must now be investigated whether or not friendships ought to be dissolved; for there is a doubt, if it be proper for one who both loves and is beloved, to dissolve friendship.

We answer, therefore, that with respect to the friendship founded on utility, or that subsisting for the sake of pleasure, when the object of neither is attained, there is nothing absurd in their being dissolved; for when men no longer enjoy the pleasure and advantage for the sake of which they were friends, it is reasonable to suppose they will cease to love each other. But when men, loving each other for the sake of something useful or pleasurable, pretend to love each other on account of their manners, and for the sake of good, and the friendship between them is on this account dissolved,—if they then complain they act unjustly, and are very properly subject to reprehension. For as we said in the beginning, friendships of this kind are full of complaints, when men do not mutually love and are not mutually beloved.

by each other similarly and for the same object, and when they fancy that they are not beloved in the same degree that they love, but are deceived; for then the deception being detected, they accuse each other. When, therefore, any one deceives himself, and takes it for granted that he is loved on account of his manners; but at the same time neither says nor does any thing that is proper to one loving another through his manners,—he may then justly accuse himself. But when a man deceives by false pretences, it is just to accuse the deceiver, and even more so than one who adulterates the current coin of his country; and this by how much the more the vicious conduct in such an instance is employed about things more truly valuable. Hence it happens that those who are friends either for the sake of pleasure or advantage, may in this manner justly dissolve their friendship.

But if any one should love another on account of his manners, and because he thinks him a good man; but he should afterwards turn out depraved, or even appear to be so to the one who loved him,—in this case ought he still to consider him an object of love, or should their friendship be dissolved? to this we answer, that it is not possible for one who does not at least *appear* worthy to be an object of love; since that which is an object of love is good; but that which is depraved is not even just. For it is not proper for any one to be a lover of depravity, nor to assimilate himself to a depraved man. But if he loves such a character, there is every necessity that he should be assimilated to him: for we have said that the similar loves the similar.

Ought such a friendship, therefore, to be immediately dissolved? or, is it not proper to dissolve all friendships immediately, but such only as through excess of depravity admit of no remedy? to this we answer, that to persons who are mentally diseased, if they admit of correction,

remedies ought to be applied; and that friendship with them should not be dissolved, because it is proper to aid every endeavour, and rather to preserve their virtue, than their property; since virtue is better than property; and to aid friends in effecting this, is a more friendly part than to preserve their wealth. But if it is necessary that he who is able should expel poverty from the house of his friend, how much more just will it be, and, in short, how much more adapted to the offices of friendship, to restore him to virtue; since virtue was the foundation of their friendship? Hence it will be better, still to love a friend although he should become depraved, and endeavour to correct him. If, however, under such circumstances, a man should immediately dissolve the friendship, he would not appear to act unreasonably; for he was not the friend of a depraved, but of a good man. But when the worthy man ceases to be so, no injustice is done to any friend by dissolving the connection. The good man, therefore, being unable to preserve his friend in virtue, in consequence of his departure from it, abandons the friendship he entertained for him. If, therefore, a friend, from a worthy, should become a depraved character, it will then be necessary to dissolve the friendship.

If, however, among friends one should become more worthy than he was before, and should much excel the other in virtue; but the other remains unaltered, in this cause ought the former to use the latter, or by renouncing him, dissolve the subsisting friendship? But it is evident that a dissolution of friendship especially takes place where there is any great disparity either of years, or other circumstances. Suppose, for example, two boys entertaining a mutual friendship in consequence of parity of age, and engaging together in the same studies and amusements, and one of them arriving at manhood should prove a worthy

character, and be manly in all other respects; but the other retains his youthful character and manners;—when this happens, how can they be friends, since they neither approve of, nor are delighted with, nor grieved at, the same things? For the one does not afford any gratification to the other; and this because when either acts, he does not perform any thing that is agreeable to his friend. And further, they are incapable of living together, without which, as we have said, no friendship can exist.

Is it necessary, therefore, for the worthy man so to conduct himself towards the other, as if he had never been a friend; or to hold their former intimacy in remembrance; and just as we think it proper that friends should rather be gratified than strangers, so likewise that it is proper to attribute more to those who once were friends, than to those whom we never used as such? to these questions we answer, that some preference is due to them in consequence of former friendship, unless indeed it has been dissolved through excessive depravity.

CHAP. V.

CONCERNING FRIENDLY OFFICES; AND THAT A FRIEND CONDUCTS HIMSELF SIMILARLY BOTH TOWARDS HIMSELF AND HIS FRIEND; BUT THAT A BAD MAN IS NOT IN ANY RESPECT DISPOSED IN A FRIENDLY MANNER TOWARDS HIMSELF, OR TOWARDS OTHERS.

AND thus indeed friendships may be opportunely dissolved. Let us, however, say something further about friendship itself. *Friendly offices, therefore, and those things which constitute friendship, appear to be regulated by, and have as a principle that which every man owes to himself. For friends seek the same things from each other as each seeks from himself.*

On this account he is defined to be a friend who wishes the welfare of his friend, and promotes his good for his own sake; or who is solicitous that his friend may live and survive for his own sake; just as mothers are affected towards their children. For they wish for the life and welfare of their children for their children's sake; and though it often happens that they are not beloved, or even known by them, nevertheless they pray for their welfare and felicity. Those also who have been offended or neglected by their friends are similarly affected, and continue to love them. For they wish all manner of good to them for their own sake, without any expectation of partaking of it themselves. Again, a friend is defined to be one who is grieved or rejoices together with his friend; which same thing especially happens with respect to mothers. For these reasons also the definition of friendship is derived from the definition of those who possess it; and that of temperance from the definition of the temperate man. Such, therefore, are the definitions

of friendship and friends. But these are assumed from what every man respectively owes to himself, as we have already noticed.

And *a worthy man is every thing to himself, that a true friend is to his friend*. He too is especially a friend to himself, who is both worthy, and thought to be so. If, however, not all men, but merely the depraved, act in a friendly manner towards themselves, it nevertheless does not invalidate our argument. For the actions of worthy and equitable men eminently belong to man, so far as man, and to our common nature; since virtue, and the worthy man, are the measure of human passions and actions. But the things investigated by a bad man are not referred to a common nature; for we do not assent to opinions with respect to these particulars on the authority of the diseased, but on that of the healthful.

It is manifest, however, that the worthy man is friendly to himself in all his actions; for he accords with himself, and desires those things that are congenial both to his rational and irrational soul. Moreover he does not, like a man destitute of judgment, seek for such as are contrary; and his passive part does not wage war against his reasoning faculty. But the worthy man also wishes good things for himself, (I mean *properly good*) and such as tend to virtue. They are also not only those that are manifestly good; but such as are auxiliary to virtue itself; and he wishes that he may possess good for his own sake. The bad man, however, does not wish for good for his own sake. And since the *dianoëtic* * *part* constitutes the *very being* of man,—for the sake

* Conformably to the philosophy of Aristotle, the *essence* of man consists in his *dianoëtic* part; for the *essence* of every being is in its *summit*; and the summit of man is *that part of his soul which reasons scientifically*; or, in other words, his *dianoëtic power*. The reader

of this the worthy man does every thing, and investigates all manner of good; but the bad man has no regard to this whatever. For he has not contemplation for the end of his own actions, but depraved pleasure. Hence he does not wish good to himself for his own sake. Again; the worthy man is solicitous about his own life and preservation, and especially so far as relates to his dianoëtic part: he also does every thing that he thinks will promote his good, and tend to his life and salvation. Of other characters, however, those who do not altogether deviate from rectitude, subsist in such a manner as still to be capable of believing themselves worthy: hence they seek for apparent good, and are solicitous about their life and preservation. But this happens because they are in a certain respect similar to the worthy man. Those, however, who are exceedingly depraved and iniquitous in their conduct, have no wishes of this kind. For these do not pursue even apparent good; but are solicitous about one thing, while they really desire another; and such are incontinent* men, and those who through timidity and indolence abstain from doing those things which they fancy are best for them. Hence they neither pursue things apparently good, nor are they anxious about their own life and salvation. For there are some who, in consequence of their many dire actions, hate themselves through their excessive depravity, and are not only careless about life, but even commit suicide.

On the contrary, the worthy man is solicitous about his own life. For existence is good to a worthy man, since he pursues the contemplative life; and the essence of every man consists in intellectual energy, or at least principally in this. He, however, who is solicitous about the

* The original is *εὐνοῦταις*, *continent* men; but the sense evidently requires the substitution of *ἀνῆταις*, which the translator has followed.

existence and preservation of his irrational part, and wishes for things good to himself, while wandering from his *proper being*, does not wish for good things to *himself*, but to *that part into which he is changed*; nevertheless every one is solicitous that good may befall him, fancying that he will remain what he now is. But if he should perceive that he has assumed another character, he will not, having become that character, wish to possess every good. For there is no difference between a man wishing good to another, and wishing good to himself when he has assumed a new character. No one, however, is altogether satisfied if good befall another in preference to himself.

But every kind of good is present to Divinity. FOR HE IS THAT WHICH HE IS.

Hence we are not satisfied unless we possess things good together with ourselves and our friends, because friends are as it were a part of ourselves. The worthy man also wishes to pass his time alone, because he is sufficient and pleasant to himself. For he is delighted with the recollection of his own actions; and hoping that he shall effect some further good, and obtain what is good, he abounds with generous speculations in his dianoëtic part. But all these things render him most pleasant to himself; and he is delighted by associating and living with himself in leisure*.

On the other hand depraved characters endeavour to find persons with whom they may dissipate their time, and fly from themselves. For many troublesome things come to their recollection when alone, which

* This passage may remind the reader of Plotinus of the very remarkable words with which he concludes his works; namely, that the employment of a *truly good* man is *Φευγη μόνου προς μόνον*, *a flight of the alone to the alone*.

they hope to forget when in company. But the eminently worthy man sympathises with himself both in grief and joy, because he always wishes for and ardently desires the same things; and his rational does not war against his passive part; hence too he is always pleased with and grieved at the same thing. For, as we may say, he is unchanged; but this is not the case with depraved men; since not being in any respect amiable, they are not at all affected in a friendly manner towards themselves. On this account they neither sympathise in their own joy nor grief. For their soul is in sedition, and their irrational part wages war with their rational part. The irrational part grieves also when it abstains from depravity; but in this case it does not grieve together with the rational part:—on the contrary, when the irrational part grieves, the rational part rejoices. In short, these two parts of the soul draw different ways, as if they were divulsed. But although it may not be possible to be grieved at, or delighted with the same thing, the rational part will be grieved after a little time, in consequence of having been previously pleased; since it did not wish for such a pleasure as it had received: for bad men are full of remorse. It appears, therefore, that a depraved man, since he possesses nothing amiable, is not disposed in a friendly manner towards himself.

If, however, it is very miserable to be thus affected, we should most studiously avoid depravity, and each of us endeavour to become equitable and worthy. For thus we may subsist in a friendly manner towards ourselves, and become the friends of others.

Since, therefore, it is necessary that a worthy man should attribute the same things to his friend, as to himself; (for it is proper to be affected towards friends, in the same manner as to ourselves, since a

friend is another self;)--since this is the case, it is evident that a worthy man wishes for, and attributes to, himself friendly offices; and that in these friendship consists.

But we shall at present omit the consideration whether or not friendship consists in a man's being attached to himself. For friendship subsists between two or three, as is evident from what has been said. And if any one calls the offices that regard himself friendship, they will indeed be friendship, so far as differing from himself, the passive part of his soul is in unison with its rational part. But because the excess of friendship resembles the *kindness* which each person has for himself, *that* also may be denominated friendship.

CHAP. VI.

CONCERNING BENEVOLENCE.

BENEVOLENCE is indeed similar to friendship; nevertheless it is not friendship. For we may be benevolently disposed towards those to whom we are not friends; since benevolence is sometimes exercised towards those who are unknown to us, and is at the same time concealed from the object of our regard. But this is not the case with respect to friendship, as we have very fully shown above.

Benevolence, therefore, is neither friendship, nor does it appear to be friendly love. For friendly love has a certain impulse and motion towards the object of its regard, and a desire for it; and that which loves always seeks the object of its love: but benevolence is not a

thing of this kind. For those who are benevolent wish indeed for the welfare of those to whom they are so disposed; but do not altogether desire to live with them. Again; friendly love is produced together with custom; for it takes place after a certain time, and succeeds familiar intercourse. But, as we may say, benevolence is suddenly exercised; just as spectators are affected towards those who contend in the public games. For men are benevolently disposed towards them as soon as they perceive them victorious, and at the same time wish them well, though they are not inclined to act together with them. For not having that regard which is derived from time and familiar intercourse, they do not possess a friendly love towards them; but as soon as they see them, are delighted with them. Hence their regard is superficial, which indeed is benevolence.

It appears, therefore, that benevolence is the principle of friendship; just as the pleasure arising from the sight is the principle of love. And as no one can feel that passion without having been previously delighted with the form of its object; (though it is possible to be pleased without loving; for one person then loves another, when he both loves in absence, and earnestly desires the presence of the party beloved) thus also it is impossible for men to be friends without first having been benevolently disposed towards each other, though they may be so disposed, and yet not be friends. For benevolent men wish for the good of those to whom they are benevolently inclined, although they should neither co-operate with them in any thing, nor subject themselves to any trouble or inconvenience on their account. Hence benevolence may be metaphorically called an indolent friendship; for receiving the benefit of time, and having arrived at familiar intercourse, it becomes friendship.

But I do not mean the friendship that subsists through advantage or pleasure, but that which subsists for the sake of *the good*. For one person may be benevolently disposed towards another through his virtue and worth of character, as when he appears to be correct in his conduct, or brave, or endued with any other virtue. But he who wishes to serve another for the sake of a pleasurable or useful object, is not benevolent to that man, but to himself: neither can such a man be properly called a friend. In like manner also he who wishes well to his benefactor, merely because he has received services at his hands, is not properly benevolent, but a doer of just things. For rendering to his benefactor, that for the sake of which he himself was benefited, he does not appear to delight in the virtue of his benefactor, but in the good derived to himself.

Benevolence, therefore, is neither friendship, nor friendly love; but the principle of friendship, which by the intervention of time, familiar intercourse, and other friendly things, produces true friendship; that is, friendship subsisting for the sake of the good, and of virtue.

CHAP. VII.

CONCERNING CONCORD.

CONCORD also is both itself something friendly, and an attendant on friendship. But it is not concord merely to opine the same things; as for instance, any certain concurrence of opinion. For consent of opinion may take place between persons unknown to each other; since nothing hinders but that they may form the same opinions on the same subjects, and even possess the science itself with respect to those subjects, and still have no knowledge of each other. But concord pertains to those particulars which are conversant with a certain communion and friendship. For a city is said to be in concord when the inhabitants entertain one general opinion about things advantageous to it, and act and think alike in common.

Concord, therefore, is the consent of opinion among friends, not in speculative but in practical matters; and of these, such as are worthy of regard, and of great importance. For with respect to the trifling occurrences of life, neither a city nor friends are said to be in concord with each other. Such, for instance, as staying at home, or going abroad; or saying or doing this or that particular thing, through which no material advantage or injury ensues. For concord is not said to subsist about these, and such like particulars; but about such as are important and advantageous to two friends and the commonwealth. As for example, when it appears to the whole city that the magistrates ought not to be appointed by lot, assuming the government by a certain right of succession, but appointed; or, when it is the common

opinion that an offensive alliance ought to be made with the Lacedæmonians; or, in short, any thing else that is thought worthy the attention of, and concerns the whole community. And we say, that friends are in like manner in concord when they choose the same way of life, or those things that are most important in life, and both similarly avoid or pursue such things as tend to the injury or advantage of both. For it is not only necessary that those who are in concord with each other should investigate the same objects, but they ought to be similar in every thing. For instance, if it should appear to two friends that one ought to direct the life of the other, but they are not willing to lead the same life, but each his own; since in this case though they seek the same thing, yet not in the same manner, but each his own, which is not being in concord. But a city is in concord when the inhabitants assemble to elect magistrates, and all choose the same person, and not each himself, as Euripides represents in his play called *Phænissæ*. For thus, that which is agreeable to all, does not take place; and, therefore, it is not concord. But when all obtain the object they aspire after, they are then in concord.

Hence concord is a certain political friendship, and thus it is denominated. For it is conversant with practical and advantageous concerns, and such as pertain to human life: but these belong to political communion.

Concord subsists among persons of worthy character; since they accord both with themselves and each other, in consequence of the stability of their character. For the things that men of this kind wish for are stable, and do not ebb and flow like the Euripus, since they wish for such as are just and advantageous, and aspire after these in common.

But it is not possible for depraved men to live in concord unless it be for a little time ; just as neither can friends remain firm who aspire to usurp more than is their due, and when each endeavours to possess a greater share than the other of things useful and advantageous. For on the contrary, in labours and services to be performed to each other, they always endeavour to sustain the lesser part; and each thinking that he ought to endure a small portion of labour, but to receive great advantage, directs the other, minutely arguing upon the nature of the services, and forbidding him to enjoy so much of the advantages as he wishes, in consequence of having undergone great and disgraceful labours. On this account, not preserving their mutual and common advantage, but each his own, their friendship is quickly dissolved. For the common good, and concord which was the bond of their union, is broken. But when this bond is dissolved, it is not possible they can be united. Hence it happens that they fall into sedition, and mutually demand friendly offices from, but are unwilling to act justly towards, each other. On this account it is not possible that concord can subsist between depraved persons, but among the equitable and worthy alone.

CHAP. VIII.

CONCERNING BENEFICENCE.

WE must now inquire why benefactors love those whom they have benefited more than they are beloved by them. For this is investigated as a thing that takes place contrary to reason. Hence the multitude say, that benefactors love the more, for the same reason that creditors love their debtors, though they are not beloved by them. For those who give credit, wish for the safety of those whom they trust, and afford them all manner of assistance, in order that they may be reimbursed: but the debtor is not thus affected towards his creditor. For he may even wish he were not in existence; since his death might enable him to do better. After the very same manner also they say, that benefactors are solicitous for the life and preservation of those whom they have benefited, as by these means they may obtain a recompence. The latter, however, do not very much love the safety of the former. For men in general are not so attentive to return, as to receive favours. This, therefore, is the apparent cause to the many, who judging from the example of ungrateful and bad men, and from what Epicharmus says when contemplating such characters, they pretend to believe that it is the real cause.

Such conduct, however, appears to belong to the human species. For the multitude are unmindful of benefits, and are more solicitous to receive than to confer them. But it may appear that this cause is more natural than, and not similar to that towards creditors. For friendly love subsists between benefactors, and those whom they have

benefited; but between debtors and creditors there is no friendly love. For the creditor does not love his debtor, though he wishes for his preservation for his own advantage, in order that he may be reimbursed; but benefactors entertain a kindness for those whom they have benefited, although they are not useful to them, nor even capable of becoming so. This also happens among artists; for every one has greater kindness for his own proper work, than the work would entertain for him if it were animated. And this is particularly the case with poets; for they are enamoured of their own poems, and love them as their children. But such kind of regard appears to be similar to that which benefactors entertain towards the objects of their beneficence. For those who are benefited are in this respect the work of their benefactors; and on this account they have a greater kindness for their works than their works entertain for them. And for this reason, because existence is an object of choice and love to every one. But we properly *are*, when we *are in energy*; and we are in energy by living and acting: but he who acts is in energy in his work. For the building art, which is the productive principle of a house, is in energy in the house: since the house itself, so far as it is a house, is the artist in energy so far as he is an artist. In like manner also every one who energizes is in energy in his own work. If, therefore, it is natural to aspire after being, but being consists in action, and the work is the workman in energy, it is manifest that so far as any one desires his own being, so far also he will desire to be his own work. But every man naturally loves himself, and wishes to exist. Every man, therefore, naturally loves his own work. But since every man especially loves himself, and his own work, he will also be similarly affected towards him whom he has benefited, so far as he is his work; and on this account he will

love the object of his beneficence more than the man benefited loves his benefactor. For the greatest friendly love is that with which a man loves himself.

Again: because a benefactor, while exercising his beneficence, becomes better than he was before, and it is a good to him to confer benefits; on this account also he rejoices in the object of his beneficence, because in him he contemplates his own good. But he who is benefited does not become better than he was before by receiving benefits; neither does he possess any good in his benefactor. A man may become better indeed from what he himself does; since, as we have said above, human good consists in energizing. Hence if he who is benefited receives any pleasure from his benefactor, this pleasure is not his own good, but rather his advantage: but the advantageous is not so pleasurable and amiable as the good. For that which is good, is the end of the advantageous; and for the sake of the good, that which is useful, is both pleasurable and amiable. A benefactor, therefore, loves him whom he has benefited more than he is beloved by him.

Further: the energy, hope, and recollection of good, are pleasurable: and energy pertains to the present, and to that which is now taking place; but hope to the future, and recollection to the past. But present good is more pleasurable than future or past good. He, however, who confers benefits is the present good of him who receives them. For the good that a benefactor contemplates in him whom he has benefited is permanent, and of long duration. But the good of the latter is not permanent; for it *was* useful; but being used, is no longer so; neither is it properly good. Hence if both be present, the good of the benefactor will be more pleasurable; or if both be absent, the recollection of him who is benefited will be more pleasurable than that of the

benefactor, so far as the recollection of the good is especially the most pleasurable; but the recollection of the useful is not entirely so, or at any rate in a less degree; although the expectation of things useful subsists vice versâ, and is more pleasant than the recollection of past goods. It appears, therefore, from what has been said, that a benefactor loves him whom he has benefited more than he is beloved by him.

Again: friendly love is similar to energy; but to be loved, to passion. Hence it is more adapted to those who really perform friendly offices, *i. e.* benefactors, than to those who receive benefits.

Further still: we rather love and are more attached to possessions obtained by labour, than to such as are easily acquired; whence also men love the riches procured by themselves more than those that they inherit from their ancestors. Besides, to receive benefits is not laborious, but to confer them is attended with labour. The former, however, is in the person benefited, but the latter in the benefactor:—hence also the person benefited is more beloved than the benefactor. Mothers likewise love their children more than they are beloved by them, because they bring them forth with labour; but their children are not subject to the pains of childbirth. Mothers also more know that children are their offspring than children know that their mothers brought them into life. But it may appear that the same reasons hold good with respect to benefactors; since they not only bestow some pains on those whom they benefit, but know them better than they know their benefactors. For it may happen that he who confers a benefit does not do it from his own inward impulse, but from that of another, to whom he is subservient; and on this account it may happen that he is not the benefactor himself, or that he himself benefits from

his own impulse, and not for the sake of him whom he benefits, but for his own, and to promote his own interest. He thus acts, however, in order that the object of his beneficence may not exactly know who ~~is~~ his benefactor. Nevertheless nothing hinders but that the benefactor may know him whom he has benefited, because he accurately knows himself, and is truly a benefactor; and hence he loves ~~the~~ person who is benefited ~~more~~ than he is beloved by him.

CHAP. IX.

CONCERNING SELF-LOVE.

LET us now inquire whether it be proper for a man to love himself in a greater degree than another. For it appears that it is not the province of good men especially to love themselves; and on this account those who do so are blamed; and bad men, by way of reproach, call them selfish. But again, because a depraved man appears to do every thing for his own sake, and in proportion to his depravity; on this account he is accused; for though he seeks for nothing more than his own, yet he does every thing for the sake of himself. On the contrary, a worthy man does every thing for the sake of rectitude, and this by so much the more, by how much he is more worthy and equitable. For the sake of his friend also, and in order that he may be able to give to others those things of which they are in need, he will even sustain a loss of his own property. Hence then it would appear that a man ought not to love himself above all things: but the

deeds of men contradict these assertions, and not without reason. For it is said that he ought to be most loved who is most a friend: but he is most a friend who observes all friendly offices towards the object of his regard. Friendly offices, however, consist in wishing the welfare of a friend for his own sake, even though it is not known to any one, in being desirous to live with him, and in sympathizing in his sorrows and joys. But a man himself attributes all these things to himself, and assumes that mode of conduct which pertains to his friends, from that which pertains to himself, as has been shown in the fourth Chapter of this Book. The truth of these observations is testified also by Proverbs; for when signifying those who are in the highest degree friends, it is said *they have one soul*. Again, the proverb *the possessions of friends are common*, tends to this; also *friendship is equality*; and *the leg is very near the knee*. For if friendship is that which is common, and equality, and what is most near, what can become more friendly to every man than himself? A man, therefore, is especially a friend to himself. But if it is very necessary to love one who is especially a friend, it is especially necessary for a man to love himself.

Since, therefore, according to this reasoning, both assertions appear to be true, we may very reasonably doubt which it is proper to follow. But by dividing and defining, we shall discover how far, and in what respect, each is true. For if we should admit the signification of a selfish man, which both assertions seem to enforce, the thing investigated would become evident. The first assertion, therefore, does not call those lovers of self, who simply love themselves, but those who seek to attribute the more to themselves; not in good and virtue, but in riches, honours, and corporeal pleasures. For the multitude desire, and earnestly endeavour to obtain, these things, as being the most excellent;

on which account also they very much contend for them. But those who usurp more than a due share of these, gratify their desires, and, in short, every passion, and the irrational part of their soul. Such, however, is the character of the multitude. On this account also the appellation of self-love is applied to these; for names are assigned to things that most generally happen.* But such as rarely occur are seldom denominated; for some of these are not even known. Base characters, however, and such as attribute to themselves apparent good, are numerous; but the worthy are rare. Hence the many, as being generally depraved, are also called lovers of self or selfish. And those who are in this manner lovers of self are justly accused. It is evident, however, that the multitude call those lovers of self who conduct themselves in a depraved manner with respect to their desires. But if a man *above every other consideration* earnestly endeavours to perform just or temperate actions, or such others as are conformable to the virtues; and, in short, always vindicates to himself rectitude of conduct, *no one will either blame, or call such a man* selfish.* The first assertion, therefore, denominates that man selfish who loves himself in a depraved manner; and so far it is true. For it is not proper for a man thus to love himself. But the second asserts, that a worthy man, who vindicates to himself virtue and the good, especially loves himself.

Such a character indeed very reasonably appears to be a lover of

* From want of duly considering this truth, it is by no means uncommon to hear the Stoics reviled, and even such an illustrious example as that of *Silpo* treated with contempt. The saying of this extraordinary man, (when he had lost all his external goods) "All that is mine is with me," is doubtless familiar to the reader; and signified nothing more than that he still possessed virtue, of which nothing could deprive him. Such a man, therefore, so far from being *selfish*, evinced a *truly generous mind.*"

self, since he gratifies himself. For he attributes to his most principal part, that is, his dianoëtic part, the most excellent goods. But he who gratifies his most principal part in an especial manner, gratifies himself. For just as the principal part of a city, and its most excellent inhabitants, are the city, thus also *man* is the most principal of all that is *in man*. On this account likewise he is especially a lover of self who loves, and gratifies this most principal part; since any one is called continent or incontinent, not simply by governing or being governed, but in consequence of his intellect governing, or being governed by his passions. So that when intellect governs, the *man himself* is said to govern; but when the passions govern, the *man himself* does not govern, but is governed. Hence it is evident that the dianoëtic part of every man is especially the *man himself*. But he who loves his dianoëtic part, and gratifies it in every way, may very properly be called a lover of self, according to another and blameless species of self-love, differing from the first as much as a life conformable to reason, differs from that according to passion, and as much as an appetite for the good differs from depraved desires.

Since, therefore, all men praise, and commend worthy and equitable characters, and it is proper that all men should be worthy (for if all men contended to the beautiful, and endeavoured to act in the most excellent manner, they would meet with every good, both all in common, and each in particular,)—since this is the case, it is evident that a good man ought to be a lover of himself. For since he performs worthy actions, he benefits himself, and urges others to pursue a similar mode of conduct. But this is not the case with a depraved man. For when he loves and gratifies himself, in consequence of following

depraved passions, he injures both himself and his neighbours. Those things indeed which are done by the worthy man, and the actions that are adapted to him, are the same; for every good man is his own intellect, and intellect prefers that which is best to itself;—on this account worthy men are obedient to and follow intellect. The actions of depraved men, however, and the becoming, are at variance with each other; and hence it is not proper that the depraved should be lovers of self, though it is especially fit that the worthy should love themselves. And thus indeed the true opinion is determined.

But we must also solve the first argument, through which it appeared that a good man is not a lover of self, because he neglects his own concerns, rather endeavouring to promote the welfare of his friends, and his country; and because he would even lay down his life for them if it were necessary. Because, therefore, such is the character of a worthy man, we must not on that account assert that he is not very much a lover of self. It appears indeed through the very same reasons that he is a lover of self. For he neglects trifling for great concerns; and throwing aside the former, vindicates to himself the most mighty goods. For to his friends and his country he imparts riches, honours, and things of this kind; but to himself the beautiful, the good, the useful, to be a lover of his country, and other things similar, to which all the other goods are inferior. But if he dies, and bestows his own life for the sake of his friends, or his country, he gains more than he loses. For he had rather be very much delighted for a short time with good and laudable pleasure, than for an extended period, with abundant and trifling pleasure. He also thinks that a short life, abounding in great and glorious exploits, is better to him than a longer life that is not thus praiseworthy; and he had rather

perform one great and good deed, than many and trifling actions: for the former is more beautiful than the latter. But sometimes he concedes worthy actions in favour of his friend; and when he himself is able to perform them, relinquishes the honour to his friend. Even in this case, however, he attributes to himself the greater good. For to become the cause of right conduct to a friend is more beautiful than acting himself. But preferring rectitude to every thing, and seeking the more in all *real* goods, he very properly appears to be worthy. It seems, therefore, that the worthy man especially loves himself, and that at all times he attributes to himself the more of the beautiful and becoming.

Thus, therefore, it is proper for a man to love himself, as we have said; but by no means *after the manner of the multitude*. How, therefore, it is necessary for a man eminently to love himself has so far been explained.

CHAP. X.

THAT THE HAPPY MAN HAS NEED OF WORTHY FRIENDS.

It has been doubted, however, whether or not happy men have need of friends. For it is said that the blessed, and self-sufficient, are unindigent: and if they are sufficient to themselves, and possess all kind of goods, how can they be in want of others? For friends have need of friends, and obtain through their property such things as they are unable to procure from their own; since a friend is another self. But since the happy are sufficient to themselves they have no need of friends; and hence it is said,

“ When Fortune’s goods abound, what boots a friend ? ”

Thus then it appears that the happy do not require friends.

But, according to another argument, it seems to be absurd that every good should be attributed to the happy man, and that friends should not; since they appear to be the greatest of external goods. Besides, the exercise of beneficence is necessary to felicity; but the beneficence which is the most beautiful and especially laudable is that exerted towards friends. Hence happy men require friends; since it is necessary to confer benefits according to the most excellent beneficence. For it is especially adapted to a friend both to receive and confer benefits; moreover it is more proper to benefit friends than either strangers, or persons unknown to us, or those who are not connected with us through similarity of manners, or by being of the same country.

On these accounts, therefore, it appears that the happy man has need of friends; and for this reason it is investigated whether friends are more necessary in prosperity, or in adversity. For a man in adversity requires such friends as can render him assistance, and ~~amend his~~ fortune, while the prosperous have need of them in order that they may benefit others. It is also absurd to fancy that a solitary man, and one who lives for himself only, should be blessed. For felicity is eligible; but no one would choose to live secluded; since no one wishes to engross every good to himself. For man is a political animal, and naturally desires to live in a state of society. But the happy man does this, and wishes to live with others; since he also possesses things naturally good. If, however, it is necessary to the happy man to live in society, it is evident that he will associate with the most excellent characters, and such as are most adapted to his own. But these are friends and the worthy, with whom it is better and more pleasant to associate than with strangers, and those we casually meet with. The happy man, therefore, has need of friends.

But let us solve the first argument, namely, that the blessed do not require friends. And we must admit that those who advance it say something to the purpose, and in a certain respect what is true. We reply, therefore, that the multitude fancy that friends are useful, and are loved not for the sake of good, but of the advantage they afford; and others again for the sake of pleasure. But the happy man does not require these: he needs not the useful indeed, because he possesses all manner of good; nor the pleasurable, because his life is pleasant to him, and he does not require external pleasure.

But because the happy man does not require friends of this kind, it does not appear that he has no need of true friends; I mean such as

are loved through virtue, and for the sake of the good. That this, however, is not true, will be manifest from what follows.

For, as we have said in the beginning, felicity is an energy. But it is evident that energy is a thing generating, and that its very being consists in generation, or in becoming to be; and not like a possession, in that which is already produced, and has a present subsistence. Energy, therefore, consists in living and acting. For to live according to virtue, and to perform worthy actions, constitute felicity. And since an energy of this kind is pleasant to a worthy man, (because, as was said in the beginning, it is essentially good and pleasurable, and also familiar to him) it will be most pleasant to the happy man to contemplate such an energy. We are, however, better able to survey what pertains to our neighbours, than what pertains to ourselves, and their actions, than our own. Hence the happy man especially contemplates the actions of his friend; and when they are good, is very much delighted with them. But if it is necessary that the pleasure with which the happy man is delighted should be good, it is evident that he has need of such friends, since he chooses to contemplate worthy actions, and such as are familiar to him, which are those of a good man when he is a friend.

Further still: every one thinks that the life of the happy man is most pleasant. But his life consists in energizing according to virtue: to energize incessantly, however, in conjunction with others, is easy; but difficult when alone. Hence a solitary life is difficult. That which is easy, however, is more pleasant than that which is difficult; but the former is especially adapted to a blessed man; and at the same time his energy, being more pleasant, will be more continued. But it is

especially adapted to the blessed man to energize continually according to virtue. And this again makes his pleasure greater; for the worthy man is pleased with actions according to virtue, so far as they are worthy; but detests such as are bad. Just as a musician is delighted with beautiful tones, but is disgusted with such as are unharmonious.

The worthy man, however, not only energizes incessantly according to the habit he has acquired from living with worthy characters similar to himself; but also either acquires a habit which he had not before, or renders that better which he already possesses. For as Theognis also says, an accession of virtue is obtained by living with worthy men. Friends, therefore, are necessary to the happy man.

Again: thus also it will be manifest if we consider the argument in a more physical point of view. For we should speculate, not from things which peculiarly pertain to the happy man, but from such as are common to all men. To live, therefore, is naturally pleasant to all animals. But to live, so far as regards irrational animals, is defined to be the faculty or power of sense; but with respect to men it is the power of sense or intellection. And power subsists through energy; and that which is most principal in it is in energy. If, therefore, the power of perceiving sensibly or intellectually constitutes life, it will in a much greater degree consist in being sensible, and exercising intellect in energy. To do these, therefore, is to live. But to live is essentially good and pleasant, and more especially because it is something definite. And that which is definite pertains to the nature of the good, as it appears also to the Pythagoreans. For the definite is arranged in the co-ordination of the good; to which we may add, that all things aspire after life: but that which all things aspire after is essentially good and

pleasant. When I say life I do not mean a depraved one, nor that which is full of ten thousand calamities. For such a life is indefinite, as also are the occurrences in it. But we shall treat of these when we ~~spee~~ speak further concerning pleasure.

Since, therefore, to live is essentially good and pleasurable, and a man when he sees in himself something good and pleasurable, rejoices, and is delighted; thus also we rejoice and are delighted when we have a sensible perception that we live. For we are sensible that we live in the same manner as by seeing, hearing, and walking about, we are sensible that we do see, hear, and walk about; and by energizing intellectually and being sensible, we know that we thus energize, and are sensible: but to energize intellectually and to be sensible, constitute the existence of sensible and intellectual beings. We know, therefore, intellectually that we exist; and, in short, there is a certain power within us by which we know that we energize and live. If, however, to live is good, and for any one to be conscious of some good in himself is essentially pleasurable, to know that we live will be pleasurable. Since, therefore, things naturally good and pleasurable, are likewise so to the worthy man, he will be delighted with life, and in a greater degree than other men, inasmuch as his life is more eligible, more pleasant, and more blessed. He is delighted, however, knowing that he lives: but to live is to energize intellectually. The worthy man, therefore, is delighted, knowing that he energizes intellectually: but the worthy man subsists towards his friend in the same manner as towards himself. For his friend is another self. Hence it is evident that just as existence itself, and life are eligible and grateful to him, thus also he investigates the *being* of his friend; that is, that his friend

may energize intellectually; since *being* and life consist in intellectual energy. But as the worthy man rejoices in knowing that he energizes intellectually, so likewise it is grateful and eligible to him to know that his friend does the same. But the knowledge that his friend ~~energizes~~ intellectually, then subsists in energy, when he knows the particulars about which he is so employed, and not when he simply exercises his dianoëtic power. This, however, will take place by living with others, and by the communication of words and intellectual conceptions; since after this manner men are said to live together. For being does not consist in living together in the same place, just as cattle feed in the same pasture. It is eligible and pleasant, therefore, to a worthy man to live with friends. But that which is an object of his choice ought also to be present to him; for if it is not, he will be in this respect indigent, which is contrary to felicity. Hence, therefore, the happy man has need of worthy friends.

CHAP. XI.

CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF FRIENDS.

SINCE the happy man has need of friends, let us inquire whether or not he ought for the most part to acquire many friends; or whether, as has been beautifully and aptly said about hospitality, that "we should neither be without a guest, nor yet have many guests," so likewise with respect to friends, we should say, that neither ought we to be friendless, nor yet have many friends.

We answer, therefore, that since friendship admits of a threefold division, and one species subsists according to *the useful*, a second according to pleasure, and the other for the sake of the good and virtue, there can be little need of the two former, and particularly of the first, because one man is competent to render assistance to but a few in their necessities; and to administer to many is laborious, particularly if they are very troublesome, and look for assiduous attentions.

With respect to the friendships subsisting through pleasure, we say that as at a banquet there is little need of seasoning, so life requires but little pleasure and relaxation.

But with respect to worthy friendships, which also subsist through virtue, and with regard to men who love each other for the sake of good, we say, that of these the happy man requires many; though even here a certain measure is to be observed. For just as there is a measure of a city, and as neither ten men, nor a hundred thousand men, will constitute a city; (for such an association will not be a city)

thus also it is necessary that the number of friends should be definite, and have a measure. And just as in a city, the quantity and precise number of the multitude adapted to it are not defined; but the measure of a city lies between the number that exceeds, and that ~~which~~ falls short of the definite; and as in this case we say that some intermediate quantity is the measure, (as for instance, neither one thousand, nor an hundred thousand, but some intermediate number) so likewise with respect to friends, we cannot assume any definite number; but it will be as many as any one is able to live and associate with; for this appears most agreeable to friendship. That it is not possible indeed for a man to live with many persons, and to divide himself, is evident. It is necessary, however, to pass our time with friends; but to do this with many, would be extremely troublesome. Besides it is proper to sympathize in their sorrows and joys in a proper manner; but this will be difficult for one who uses many friends. For when there are many, some will rejoice, and others grieve, at the same time; and it is proper for a friend to divide himself between both: but this is laborious. Perhaps, therefore, he conducts himself best who does not very much seek to be a lover of many friends; but admits so many only as he is capable of living, and passing his time with, and as he is able to sympathize with in their sorrows and joys. Thus also we cannot use many friends. Neither can one person be the friend of many according to amatory friendship; for this is a transcendence of friendship; and hence cannot possibly subsist towards more than one. Similarly also it is impossible vehemently to love many friends according to virtuous friendship, and to preserve all friendly offices towards them, though we may so act with a few: but circumstances also corroborate these

arguments. The friendship of familiars likewise does not subsist among many; but such as are celebrated as familiar, are said to subsist between two.

Those, however, who are lovers of many friends, who conduct themselves familiarly to all men, and appear both in words and deeds to render to every citizen those services which he requires, are not the friends of any one according to accurate and true friendship; but they may be denominated friends according to what is called political friendship. Of these, however, some are courteous, and gratify those they live with in every thing, concerning whom we have already spoken. But others are equitable and worthy, and associate with others, with a view towards truth and the good; these also are called friends through the similitude of their conduct to true friendship, and are praised, as holding an intermediate rank between the courteous and the morose, both of whom are blameable, as has been shown in the eighth Chapter of the fourth Book. Of *such* friends, therefore, any one may find many; but of *friends properly so called* we must be satisfied to find few.

CHAP. XII.

WHETHER FRIENDS ARE MORE NECESSARY IN PROSPERITY OR ADVERSITY: ALSO, THAT LIVING TOGETHER IS THE MOST CHARACTERISTIC OFFICE OF FRIENDSHIP, AS WELL OF THAT BETWEEN THE WORTHY, AS OF THAT SUBSISTING BETWEEN THE DEPRAVED.

SINCE both the happy and the unfortunate require friends, we must investigate which have most need of them. For the unfortunate require aid from friends; and the happy, friends with whom they may live, and on whom they may confer benefits; since to do good is what they wish, and necessary to their felicity.

In one respect, therefore, the unfortunate have more need of friends; but in another, the prosperous. The former, indeed, through necessity; but the latter for the sake of rectitude. For friends are more *necessary* to the unfortunate than to the prosperous man; but the possession of friends is more *beautiful* to the happy man than to one in difficult circumstances. On this account the unfortunate have not so much need of worthy as of advantageous and useful friends; on the other hand the prosperous by no means require useful, but good friends only. For the happy seek such as are equitable and worthy; and rather wish to benefit and pass their time with them; since to the prosperous the very presence of friends is pleasant.

Those who are afflicted indeed experience relief from the sympathy of friends. Hence it may be doubted why they find relief from seeing friends grieve with them; for it appears like a divided burthen, and that they are relieved by their friends: but this is not the case. On the contrary, the pleasure derived from the presence of friends, and

seeing them sympathize in our griefs, being pleasant, mitigates our pain: for pleasure drives away pain. At present, therefore, I shall omit the inquiry whether they are alleviated on this or any other account: but that those who are grieved, become easier from the presence of friends, is evident.

It seems, however, that they do not simply rejoice in the sympathy of friends, neither is a pleasure of this kind unmixed, but they are still afflicted in some measure. The very sight of friends is indeed pleasant, and especially to the unfortunate, which affords, as it were, a certain alleviation to their grief. For the appearance and conversation of a friend, if he be a skilful one, are consoling; since he not only knows the manners of his friend, but also with what he is delighted and grieved, and is easily able to comfort him.

Thus then the presence of friends is pleasurable. But when we perceive a friend grieving for our calamities, it makes the association of friends painful; for every one thinks it painful to be the cause of pain to his friends. On this account men who are naturally manly do not easily admit their friends to grieve with them, unless the consolation to be derived from them, or their own calamities, be great; but trifling pain they lament by themselves, and cannot endure that their friends should be partakers of their evils: in short, they do not admit effeminate characters, because neither are they themselves given to lamentation; but conduct themselves generously in painful circumstances. But women and effeminate men delight in those who are given to lamentation, and love those as friends who join in their complaints. It is not proper, however, to imitate these characters, but such as are manly: for we ought in every thing to follow the better. Thus, therefore, friends afford assistance to the unfortunate. But in

prosperity the presence of friends is doubly pleasant, because the intercourse with them is most pleasant so far as they are friends; and because they see us rejoicing in their good fortune, which is a proof of the greatest benevolence.

Since, therefore, we afflict our friends by communicating our calamities to them, but delight them by imparting our felicity, it may appear proper to call them promptly to our prosperity; but to be backward in summoning them to our misfortunes. For it is beautiful to benefit friends, but we ought to make them partakers of our evils as little as possible. On this account the Tragedian * also says, "*It is sufficient that I am miserable.*" For neither is it proper to burthen friends with our own evils. But we should then only invite friends to grieve with us when they will suffer but little inconvenience, and are likely to afford material advantage to those who are afflicted.

It is fit, however, that friends while they themselves are free from calamity, should pursue a contrary line of conduct towards those under calamity. For it is proper to visit the unfortunate unsolicited, and with alacrity; since it is the province of a friend to do good, and more especially to those in need, though they have not yet asked for our assistance. For to do this is more becoming and more pleasant both to the giver and the receiver. It is the office of a friend, however, not only to visit those who are in prosperity, but also cheerfully to make our own good fortune co-operate with and aid our friends; but we should be more tardy in partaking of their good fortune; since it is not becoming to be very ready to receive benefits. Perhaps, however, it is not proper, when friends are prompt and urgent to benefit us, to

* Euripides in Oreste.

reject or shake off their proffered service, lest we should appear to act ungraciously towards them. For this sometimes happens.

It is evident then from what has been said, that it is most eligible to friends to live together. And just as it is most grateful to lovers to see each other, and they rather choose to associate together in such a manner as that they may gratify this inclination; (since their love originated through, and is kept alive by, the sense of sight) so likewise the living together is very much preferred by friends to every other friendly office.

For living together is communion, and the most perfect of all communions. But friendship has its very being in communion; for communion is friendship. In short, as we have observed above, nothing can be more eligible than for any one to have a sensible perception of himself: but a man subsists in the same manner towards his friend as towards himself. Hence it will be the most eligible of all things to have a sensible perception of a friend: but a man may have a sensible perception of himself in energy by associating, living, and passing his time with his friend. On this account also that which each individual conceives to be human energy, for the sake of which he chooses to live, and which he also thinks to be human life,—in this he will wish to live, and pass his time together with his friends. Some indeed fancy that it is proper to drink with their friends, others to play at games of chance, and others again to hunt or engage in athletic exercises with them, because it appears to them that these things are honourable, and that their friends ought to participate in them. But some philosophize together, others again make their friends partakers of other energies, and other modes of life:—in short, each individual wishes that his friend may spend his time in such a manner as he himself thinks most

conducive to the enjoyment of life. For those who wish to live together with their friends thus act, and they mutually communicate such things as are pleasant to both; since by these means they are able to live together.

The friendship of depraved persons, therefore, becomes depraved; since they communicate vicious manners to each other, and their friendship is unstable. For not only they themselves are unsteady, but assimilating themselves to, and mutually exciting each other to vicious practices, they become worse than they were before.

But the friendship of worthy men is equitable and stable, always increasing by familiar intercourse; and the one correcting the other, they appear to become better in worthy energies. For, as it were, they mutually receive the impression of each others' good qualities, through which they are friends to each other. Hence a certain poet * says,

“ From good example worthy actions spring.”

For we derive good things from the good, and base things from the depraved. And thus much concerning friendship. It now follows that we should speak concerning pleasure.

* Theognis, v. 35.

THE END OF THE NINTH BOOK.

BOOK X.

CHAP. I.

CONCERNING PLEASURE.

IT follows in the next place to discourse in a more perfect manner about pleasure. For it is connascent with, and familiar to, our race. On this account also, when educating youth, we lead them by pleasure and pain; through pain, indeed, withdrawing them from base conduct; but exhorting them to the good through pleasure. Whence it is evident that we naturally shun pain, and pursue pleasure. Since, however, our discourse is about human passions and actions, it will be fit and appropriate to our subject to treat concerning pleasure. But it appears that to rejoice in such things as it is proper to be delighted with, and to hate such as ought to be hated, will not a little contribute to the acquisition of ethical virtue. For these are co-extended with human life; since we rejoice in some things, but are grieved with others: and to do this well, worthily, and conformably to right reason, is very important towards the attainment of virtue, and a happy life.

But it by no means appears proper to omit the discussion of these particulars; since the definition of pleasure is neither simple, nor obvious; but requires many and weighty arguments. It is, however, involved in so much doubt that some say, pleasure is itself the ultimate end; and others, that no pleasure is simply good; but, on the contrary, that it is altogether depraved. And among those who assert that pleasure is bad, some indeed really conceive that it is so, and persuade themselves accordingly; but others conceive that a particular pleasure is good, though they wish to persuade others that every pleasure is simply bad; thus thinking it is more conducive to life, and more advantageous to mankind in general to suppose that all pleasure is bad. For since all men naturally verge towards pleasure, the advocates of this opinion say, that it is proper to give them a contrary bias, and draw them as much as possible from pleasure altogether, in order that they may be able to attain the medium, and properly conduct themselves in the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasure. But those who thus speak, do not speak well; since by these arguments they are not able to divert the multitude from depraved pleasures. For a greater degree of credit is attached to human passions and actions than to discourses about these. When, therefore, men condemn pleasure in words, but by what they do and suffer, praise it, and thus contradict themselves, they are ridiculed by those who see and hear them; and though they may argue to the purpose, nevertheless such discourses do not tend to reform the vulgar, since their words are confuted by their deeds. For if a man who condemns pleasure is at the same time seen to aspire after it, he appears to be prone to, and to think it good; and thus he will make those who see him imagine not that some particular pleasure only is good; but that every pleasure ought to be praised. For to define, to

distinguish, and judge that one pleasure is to be reckoned good, and another bad, is not the province of the vulgar. But whenever they see a man endued with intellect delighted with any particular pleasure, they immediately fancy that all pleasure is good and eligible. And thus such men not only fail to convince where they wish to convince, but also subvert truth itself.

Whence it is evident that true assertions are not only more conducive to knowledge, as purifying it from error; but also are more advantageous to life; since they are believed when followed up by deeds.

CHAP. II.

THE OPINION OF EUDOXUS, PLATO, AND OTHERS, CONCERNING PLEASURE. FURTHER, THAT PLEASURE IS GOOD, AND THAT EVERY PLEASURE IS NOT ELIGIBLE: ALSO, A SOLUTION OF THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS.

BUT of these things enough. Let us now speak further concerning pleasure; and in the first place we will unfold the opinions of the ancients respecting it.

Eudoxus then fancied that pleasure was the ultimate good itself, because he saw that all natures, as well rational as irrational, aspired after it. But that which all aspire after is the summit of all goods; for they imagine that what each individual peculiarly seeks, *that* is good to each respectively, just as each also pursues such food as is good and advantageous to him. That, however, is good to all in common, which all in common aspire after, and wish to obtain for themselves.

But that which is simply good to all, and which all aspire after, will be the ultimate good. Such, therefore, are the opinions promulgated by Eudoxus concerning pleasure. But these arguments rather gain credit from the virtuous conduct of their author than through themselves. For being remarkably temperate, he did not appear to advance these opinions as the friend of pleasure, but because he paid great regard to truth. Again, he thought this opinion manifest in consequence of the opposition of pain to pleasure. For since all animals fly from pain, he imagined it necessary that all should pursue pleasure: but that which all pursue is good. And he endeavoured still further to support his argument, by saying that what is eligible *per se*, and which we choose not through another, or for the sake of any thing else, is especially eligible. Now pleasure is evidently a thing of this kind; for no one interrogates us as to the motive through which we wish for pleasure; but we ask questions about other things; as for instance, on what account we are desirous of riches or honour. But this is not the case with respect to pleasure; for no one can assign the end of pleasure, for the sake of which he wishes to be pleased, but chooses it *per se*, as subsisting essentially. Since, however, that which is eligible *per se* is the ultimate end, and the good itself, on this account he concludes that pleasure will be the ultimate good. Further still, that he thought as he spoke, is hence evident. For (says he) pleasure being added to any kind of good, renders it more eligible and desirable; since temperance or justice, when conjoined with pleasure, will be more pleasant and eligible than they were before. But that which being added to every good is able to render it better, is properly considered as the ultimate good. This, however, is not the case. For it clearly appears that *that* is good, which being added to good, renders it still better; but this is not

necessarily the ultimate good itself, or better than any thing else. For every good, when added to another good, makes that good still more eligible; since in all things, the whole is greater than a part. And such indeed are the opinions of Eudoxus with respect to pleasure.

But Plato says*, that pleasure is not the ultimate good, and endeavours to prove his assertion by the very same arguments, through which Eudoxus endeavours to show that it is the ultimate good. For he says, *that* is not the ultimate good which can be increased; since it is proper that it should itself be the greatest good. If another good, therefore, being added to a good, renders it greater and more eligible, *that* cannot be the ultimate good; for that is not the greatest good, than which another can become greater. But pleasure is a thing of this kind. For a life that is pleasant will become still more so, and more eligible by the addition of prudence, or temperance: Hence there is something better than pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, is not the ultimate good: but a thing of this kind is good in a certain respect, and the virtues, the sciences, and other particulars, of which we participate, may be ranked in this class. For this is what *we* endeavour to show at present; namely, that pleasure is some one of these goods. But others insisting on the arguments advanced by Eudoxus, assert, *that* is not good which all things aspire after. These, however, say nothing to the purpose. For we say, *that* is true, which to all men appears to be so. But how can a man who subverts this common opinion, and thence undermines the credit given to it, how, I say, can his assertions be more worthy of belief? It appears to all men, however, endued

* See the Philebus of Plato.

with common sense, that what all aspire after is good ; for they pursue those things which tend to it. Hence they properly think it is good. For if animals destitute of intellect, alone desired it, it would appear good to them only ; the decision of such animals would want *stability* ; and it would not appear to be really good. But when both unintelligent and intelligent animals really think it is good, and on this account investigate it, what is there still to prevent it from being *truly* good ? For in unintelligent animals there is a certain physical good transcending their degradation, through which, being familiarized to good, they now desire it as their own proper good ; and thus they apply the argument to the first opinion of Eudoxus. But with respect to the second, which is adduced from the contrary ; namely, that if pain be evil, pleasure must be good ; they do not assert that this is a necessary consequence. For it does not follow that if a thing is evil, the contrary to it is good ; since evil also is contrary to evil. Thus stupid insensibility is contrary to intemperance, both being bad, and both are contrary to temperance. Although, therefore, they say this well, nevertheless their assertion concerning pleasure is not true. For if both pleasure and pain were evil, both ought to be avoided ; just as if both were good, both would be eligible ; or, if they were neither good, nor to be avoided, neither would both be similarly eligible. But we fly from pain as an evil, and choose pleasure as a good ; whence it is evident that as evil is opposed to good, so likewise pleasure is opposed to pain.

Others, however, who assert that pleasure is not good because it does not belong to the predicament of *Quality*, say nothing to the purpose. For neither are the energies of the virtues, qualities, nor is felicity a

quality ; since both are energies. Nevertheless nothing prevents them from being good.

Further still : because pleasure is not a certain definite thing, but good is definite ; on this account they assert that pleasure is not good. But they say that pleasure is a thing indefinite, because it is not always the same, but subject to the more and the less. If, therefore, the more and the less were surveyed in pleasure itself, their assertion would be true. But the fact is, that intension and remission take place in the being delighted, because this is subject to the more and the less, which indeed appears to be the case also with the virtues ; since men are more and less just or temperate, and in a greater and lesser degree act justly and temperately. Nevertheless the virtues are not on this account indefinite. After the very same manner also pleasure itself is not essentially indefinite, but admits of intension and remission among those who are pleased, because it is not in all things unmingled with pain, neither is it enjoyed in a similar manner. Just as it happens with respect to health ; since health, being definite, ebbs and flows in those who are recovering their health. For there is not the same symmetry in all bodies, neither is there always one symmetry in the same body, but it changes at one time to the more, and at another to the less. At one time also a man's whole frame is healthful, but at another, it is partially diseased. Something of this kind, however, also happens with respect to pleasure.

Again : that pleasure is not good, they infer from hence. Pleasure, say they, is a certain motion and generation ; but motion and generation are imperfect ; and that which is imperfect is not good : for the good is perfect. Pleasure, therefore, is not good. Their minor proposition, however, is false : for pleasure is neither motion, nor

generation *. But it will also be manifest from what follows that pleasure is not motion.

For it appears that swiftness and slowness are peculiar to every motion; and although motion itself is neither swiftness nor slowness, it is evident that things in motion, by being moved, become swifter or slower than they were before; just as with respect to things that are moved anomalously, one compared with another is said to be moved swifter or slower. Thus the motion of the whole heaven, considered by itself, is equable; but compared with that of the stars, it is said to be swift. Swiftness and slowness, therefore, are intimately allied to every motion: but they are not adapted to pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, is not motion: but that there is neither swiftness nor slowness in pleasure is evident. For any one is said to be quickly pleased, just as we say a man is quickly angered, because in a little time he is moved to delight from the contrary. Still, however, he is not pleased either quickly or slowly, neither indeed so far as regards himself, like things moved anomalously, nor with respect to any thing else, like such as are equably moved. But to walk, to be increased, to be changed in quality, and to do such other things as pertain to motion, are beheld together with swiftness and slowness. For a man is said to change quickly or slowly to pleasure; but to energize quickly or slowly according to pleasure, is not possible. For pleasure is a termination of motion, and a certain rest; and it cannot indeed be motion. That pleasure, therefore, is not motion, is manifest.

Again: neither is pleasure generation; for if it were, pain would be corruption, and it would follow that of those things, of which pleasure is

* This has been already shown in the seventh Book.

the generation, pain is the corruption. For that which is casual, is not generated from that which is casually corrupted; but that from which any thing is generated, into that also it is naturally adapted to be dissolved.

Since, however, it is asserted that pain is a natural indigence, pleasure will be a natural replenishing: but indigence and replenishing are corporeal passions. And if pleasure be a replenishing of that which is according to nature, that in which there is replenishing will also possess pleasure, and be capable of being pleased. The body, therefore, is pleased, and consequently in this there is pleasure: but this assertion is not true. For it appears that to be pleased, pertains to the soul. Pleasure, therefore, is neither a certain generation, nor replenishing, but is consequent to replenishing, just as pain follows indigence. For we are delighted while replenishing takes place, but pained when separated from it.

But it appears that this same opinion arises from those corporeal pleasures and pains which take place with respect to nutriment; since while becoming indigent, and before we are really pained, we are delighted with replenishing. This, however, does not happen with every description of pleasures. For the mathematical pleasures, and those that arise from some of the senses, are free from pain; since hearing, smelling, and seeing, produce no previous pain, and yet in these senses there is no replenishing of indigence. Further still: the hope and recollection of goods are most pleasant. But are the pleasures from these a replenishing? For since these are not preceded by any indigence, they cannot admit of a replenishing; and hence it is manifest that pleasure is not generation.

Others again, instancing the most disgraceful pleasures, think fit to

say that pleasure is not good. To whom we answer, that those things are not *really* pleasurable which appear so to the depraved. For we must not suppose, that if they were pleasant to those who are evilly-disposed, they are on this account simply pleasurable, but merely that they are so to them. Just as things which, to the sick, appear salubrious, or sweet, or bitter, are not, simply so, but to them only: neither are those objects which appear white to one afflicted with an ophthalmia, simply white. But it is evident that even these arguments do not prove that pleasure is not good. Principally, indeed, because the pleasures of the depraved are not real pleasures; and in the next place, because though we should grant that they are pleasures, nevertheless it does not necessarily follow that pleasure is simply bad. For there is not one species of pleasure only, but many; and nothing hinders but that some may be depraved, and others good. For some pleasures arise from worthy and laudable, but others from base, conduct; and some are good, but others to be avoided. For instance, to acquire riches, or health; since it is possible for a man possessing wealth whence no one is injured, to grow rich in a worthy manner; and it is also possible to be wealthy through base means, as by betraying our country, or selling our kindred for slaves. It is likewise possible for a man who uses such food as is adapted to man, to acquire health in a becoming manner; and otherwise, when it is procured by improper means; and similarly in other particulars. The very same reasoning will also apply to pleasures. For they are altogether different in species, and one who is not a musician cannot receive the same pleasure that a musician receives, neither can one who is not just be delighted as a just man is delighted. Whence it is manifest that one species of pleasure pertains to the musician, and another to the just man, and similarly with respect to

other characters. Although, therefore, the pleasure of the depraved is vicious, pleasure, simply as such, is not on that account to be avoided.

Further still: it appears from the difference between a friend and a flatterer, that pleasure is not good: for the flatterer is blamed, because he converses with others merely with a view to give them pleasure, but the friend is praised because he does not associate with his friend on account of pleasure, but with a view to truth, and the good. Hence it would appear a necessary consequence that pleasure is a most disgraceful thing. This conclusion, however, cannot be fairly drawn; but it ought rather to be inferred that there are different species of pleasure: and that the one is praiseworthy, but the other disgraceful. For who is ignorant that a friend is both pleasant in himself, and affords pleasure to his friend? It is evident, therefore, that those who associate together derive pleasure from each other. And the pleasure afforded by the flatterer is reprobated, but that derived from a friend is praised.

Again: it may appear from what follows that pleasure is very disgraceful. For no one endued with intellect would wish to be delighted through life with puerile pleasures, reflecting on and rejoicing in them like children, or to do any other disgraceful thing in order to be pleased through life. There is no necessity, however, that pleasure should on this account be a depraved thing. For an intelligent man does not avoid a puerile life, and the commission of base actions merely for the sake of pleasure, but shuns them because they are in themselves disgraceful, and ought to be avoided.

But although we pursue many things which lead to pleasure, nevertheless we do not pursue them for the sake of pleasure, but because they are themselves in themselves eligible. For we should choose to see, to

recollect, to know, and to possess the virtues, even though unattended with pleasure. If, however, pleasures necessarily follow these, our argument is by no means invalidated, since we may wish for these things independently of any pleasure they afford. Hence that not all pleasure is eligible and good, and that some pleasures are eligible of themselves, but differing from the depraved, either in species, or their productive causes, seems manifest.

CHAP. III.

FURTHER ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT PLEASURE IS NOT MOTION.

SUCH, therefore, are the assertions about pleasure and pain. We must now, however, inquire what they are, and what qualities they possess; but this will become clear by assuming a more elevated exordium. Pleasure, therefore, is perfect. Just as sight likewise is always perfect; and we cannot in seeing assume any part, but the whole of time, in which that sense is exerted; since motion is imperfect, and specifically different in each part. For the parts of motion not only differ from each other, but from the whole of motion; just as the whole of a building differs from its parts. For instance, with respect to the whole of the thing effected; say a temple, the cementing of the stones is one thing, but the raising of the pillars, another; and these differ both between themselves, and from the whole building. For the whole is perfect (since it is deficient in nothing that is necessary) but the

foundation, and the triglyph, are imperfect; since each is a part of the building. These differ, therefore, in species; and, in short, we cannot receive in any part of time (that is to say, of time with respect to motion) a perfect specific motion, which is investigated in a perfect motion; but perfect motion is completed in the whole of time. The same thing also takes place in walking, and other motions; since local motion, or lation, comprehends different species of motions. For leaping, flying, and walking, which are all local motions, are specifically different from each other; and not only so, but in each of these lations, different kinds of progressions are produced. For the boundaries, that is, *from whence*, and *to what place*, are different. But since the boundaries are different, the species of progression will also be different. For a part of progression in the stadium has bounds different from the whole of the progression, and not only different from the whole, but also from the remaining parts. For if the whole progression is from A to E, that from A to C will be different according to the boundaries, both from the whole, and the progression from C to D, from D to F, and from that which is from F to E. And since there are different boundaries, the boundaries also will be specifically different. For if each progression is passed through in a line, which is the same in species, the progression will be specifically the same; but since each line is in place, and the places are different, on this account also the motions are different. We have, however, discoursed more accurately concerning motion elsewhere*. It is only necessary to say here that motion is not perfect in every time, but in the whole of the given time. But the motions that are in the parts of the whole of the time are

* See the PHYSICS, Lib. III.

imperfect, and differ from each other in species; since the boundaries of motion, that is, *from whence*, and *to what place*, specifically distinguish motion. The species of pleasure, however, are perfect in any time whatever. It is evident, therefore, that pleasure and motion are different from each other; and pleasure in addition to its being perfect, is a certain whole; but motion is not perfect in every time: and besides this, motion cannot subsist without time, but pleasure can. For in *the now*, and an indivisible part of time, it is not possible for any thing to be moved, but it is possible to be pleased according to a whole and perfect pleasure, in an impartible *now*.

Hence it is manifest that pleasure not only is not motion, but that neither is it generation. For there is not a generation of all things simply; but of such as are divisible, and which are not wholes; since neither is there a generation of sight, of a point, nor of unity. And because each of these is a certain whole, and not divisible, neither do they arrive at the perfect, from the imperfect, in time; but each of them, in every instant of time, is a certain whole and perfect. For with respect to unity, or a point, one part is not perfect, but another imperfect, and perfected in time. To see also, so far as we do see, is perfect in every instant of time: and, in short, the energy of every sense, when energizing towards its proper object, is perfect in every part of time.

CHAP. IV.

THAT PLEASURE PERFECTS EVERY ENERGY.

PLEASURE is consequent to the energies of sense, and the dianoëtic power; and especially when these, being in a healthful state, exert the most perfect energy, and energize about the most beautiful subject; that is, sense about the most beautiful of sensible, but the dianoëtic power about the most beautiful of dianoëtic objects. For energy, or the energizing habit, is then especially exercised in a perfect manner; (since it makes no difference whether we say sense, or the dianoëtic power energizes) for when we see healthfully and perfectly, and see the most beautiful object of sight, that energy is then the most perfect. The like also takes place with other objects of sense, and the dianoëtic power: but that which is most perfect is most pleasant. It is evident, however, that we derive pleasure as well from our dianoëtic part, as from each of our senses. For we say, that the objects of the dianoëtic part are pleasurable; that we rejoice in the objects of contemplation, and are delighted with the objects of sight and hearing; and, as we have observed, we are especially so affected when we energize perfectly, and see or contemplate the most excellent things, or exercise sense in any other way. For such being the nature of sense and sensibles, of the dianoëtic power, and its objects, there will always be pleasure so long as the dianoëtic power and sense are passive to their objects.

Pleasure, therefore, is consequent to energy; and is, as it were, a

certain perfection of energy. But it perfects, not as habit perfects its possessor, by leading him from a subsistence in capacity to a subsistence in energy; just for instance, as the building art perfects the architect in capacity, and makes him an architect in energy; and just as neither are health and the physician similarly the cause of being in a good state of health. For health produces the energy of being in a good state of health when health is wanting; but the physician preserves and guards it, and investigates how it may be permanent. Further still: neither does pleasure perfect the energies of these in the same manner as the object of sense, or of the dianoëtic power, perfects sense, or the dianoëtic power. For habit and its object lead forth energy from capacity into energy. But pleasure being connascent with energy already produced, preserves and guards it. For pleasure persuades us to energize towards itself, and is, as it were, an end supervening energy, just as beauty supervenes those in the vigour of age; and pleasure always attends energy as long as sense and the dianoëtic power energize about that which is sensible and dianoëtic; and this especially when they subsist in the most excellent manner, and are employed about the most excellent object.

It may be doubted, however, if this be the case, how it happens that no one thus energizing is continually delighted. To which we must answer, that all human beings are obnoxious to fatigue, and that it is not possible to energize continually. On this account neither is it possible to be delighted continually, because pleasure is an attendant on energy. But some things which afford delight at the first view, cease to appear pleasing when we have been accustomed to them for a certain time: and the cause is that which we have assigned. For at first the dianoëtic

power inclines to and intently energizes about these things. Just as those who first see any object attentively behold it: afterwards, however, not such an energy as this, but one more negligent is exerted; and on this account pleasure is obscured.

CHAP. V.

THAT PLEASURE IS NATURALLY AN OBJECT OF PURSUIT; AND THAT THERE ARE
DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PLEASURES.

SINCE pleasure perfects every energy, and energy is to live, it follows that those beings which aspire after life also desire pleasure, because it is the perfection of life. All beings, however, aspire after life; so that it would appear that all beings aspire after pleasure. For pleasure renders every energy much more desirable; and every being especially energizes about those things that afford it the greatest delight. For instance, the musician is delighted with hearing melodies, the lover of literature with contemplation, and each individual with the respective object of his pursuit. Since, therefore, pleasure thus renders energy better and more eligible, those beings that desire any energy very properly aspire after the pleasure of that energy. Hence such as aspire after life, very reasonably aspire also after the pleasure resulting from life, because it perfects the objects of their choice and desire. But we must for the present omit the inquiry whether pleasure is eligible for the sake of living, or life for the sake of pleasure. It appears, however, that these are inseparable from each other, and

that no one can find pleasure without energy, nor energy without pleasure. For pleasure is the perfection of energy, and on this account cannot subsist separately from it.

Hence it appears also that pleasures differ from each other in species. For since the perfections of energies are specifically different, the energies themselves are also different. For the perfections of energies being different, the energies themselves must necessarily be different; as for instance, the energies of the dianoëtic power are different from those of sense, and these again differ from each other. But this is evident, because every energy has a pleasure intimately allied to it. And that it is so is manifest; since appropriate pleasure at the same time increases energy. For a man then especially knows, accurately perceives, and wholly energizes, when he energizes in conjunction with pleasure. As those who especially delight in geometrizing, become more accurate geometers, and better understand the particulars of that science; and as pleasure makes every one pay attention to the employment peculiarly adapted to him. If, therefore, pleasures increase together with energies, but things that increase together are appropriate, and things appropriate increase together with such as are specifically different, it is evident that these very things are different in species, because pleasures differ from each other in species. Further still: because inappropriate pleasures impede energies, just as the contrary render them more perfect, it is manifest that there are different species of pleasures. Thus, for example, the pleasure arising from the sound of a pipe will easily disturb those who are engaged in mathematical contemplations, when he who contemplates does not possess a mathematical habit, but is more delighted with hearing the pipe, than with contemplation; and thus the pleasure derived from

the sound of the pipe destroys the energy that was employed in reasoning. The like also happens in other particulars when any one is ~~employed~~ about two energies at the same time; since the more pleasant expels the other, and this by so much the more, by how much they differ in the degree of pleasure they afford. For if the one very much surpasses the other in pleasure, it will entirely obliterate the inappropriate energy, so that it can no longer energize according to it. On this account, when we are exceedingly delighted with any one thing we cannot attentively apply to another. If, however, any particular thing does not entirely please us, we can attend to something else. Just as those who eat sweetmeats at a theatre; for when they see the actors perform their parts badly, and are not very much pleased with the spectacle, they are especially induced to amuse themselves in this manner. Since, therefore, appropriate pleasure makes energies more accurate, and renders them better and of longer duration, but inappropriate pleasure destroys them, it is evident that pleasures very much differ from one another. And just as almost all pains peculiar to any part of the body or soul are impediments to the energies of those parts, and do not allow them to be persisted in, thus also inappropriate pleasures produce the same effect; since the pains we have mentioned destroy energies. For if a man should find it painful to write, he would not write; and if it should be unpleasant to him to reason, he would not contemplate. But he will experience this also, as we have said, from inappropriate pleasure. If, therefore, inappropriate pleasure produces the same effect as peculiar pains, but the latter has a contrary subsistence to the former, it is evident that inappropriate pleasure subsists contrary to that which is appropriate. But things of this kind cannot be specifically the same; and hence there are more species of pleasure than one.

CHAP. VI.

THAT PLEASURES DIFFER IN THEIR WORTH AND DEPRAVITY, AND ALSO IN THEIR PURITY: FURTHER, THAT DIFFERENT ANIMALS HAVE DIFFERENT PLEASURES; AND WHAT TRUE PLEASURE IS.

SINCE every pleasure subsists appropriately to the energy whence it is derived, and energies differ from each other in worth and depravity, and some are eligible, and others to be avoided, but others again are neither eligible, nor to be avoided, it is necessary that pleasures should subsist after the very same manner, and that some should be good others bad, and others again neither good nor bad. And *that* pleasure is equitable and good, which is intimately connected with an equitable, good, and worthy energy; but *that* pleasure is depraved which is connected with a depraved energy. For the desires of worthy objects are laudable, but the contrary are reprehended. That pleasure, however, which is appropriate to energy, or which is neither laudable nor blameable, is also itself neither of these. But since there is an appetite in energy, whence any one is excited to energize, we must inquire whether pleasure is more appropriate to energy, or to desire. It appears, however, that it is more intimately connected with energy. For pleasure is neither connascent with, nor produced at the same time with desire, but differs from it both in time and nature. For appetite precedes energy, and also the pleasure derived from it; but pleasure is so connascent with, and inseparable from energy, that it may be doubted whether pleasure and energy are not the same thing. It may appear, therefore, that pleasure is more intimately connected with energy than with appetite:—this, however, is not the case. For

pleasure is neither indetical with the dianoëtic power, nor with any of the senses:—it would, indeed, be absurd to fancy so. But because they are inseparable from each other, pleasure appears to differ in no respect from energy.

But pleasures themselves are different from each other, because energies are different. For the sight differs from the touch in purity, so far as it apprehends form alone; but the touch leads us more to matter; and the hearing differs from the smell and the taste, inasmuch as they are more connected with matter. Hence also the attendant pleasures differ from each other, and from the pleasures of the dianoëtic part, because the energies of these are different. The pleasures also of the dianoëtic part will not be the same with each other, because there are different energies of this part.

It appears, however, that there is a pleasure appropriate to every animal, in the same manner as there is a proper work. For if pleasures are attendant on energies, and there is a certain energy appropriate to each animal, and correspondent by nature, there will be also an appropriate pleasure: and this will become evident from a survey of particulars. For the pleasure of a horse, of a dog, and of a man, are different. Just as Heraclitus says, that “*an ass prefers straw to gold*,” since food is more grateful to this animal than gold. There are pleasures, therefore, intimately connected with different energies, and they themselves are also different. It is rational to suppose, however, that pleasures derived from the same energies, are themselves specifically the same, though they differ in the more and the less. For it is evident that all animals are not similarly delighted with the same energies. And since there is so much difference, that some are delighted, and others pained with the same objects, and since the same things are not sweet to all animals; for the same do not appear sweet

both to a man in a fever, and to one who is well; neither are the same hot to an infirm and a robust person. The same diversity happens also in other particulars.

But just as in pleasures of this kind, from healthful subjects we know how to distinguish things really pleasurable from such as only appear so, in the same manner likewise we define moral pleasures from those whose manners are correct; that is to say, from worthy men. If, however, this be well said, and virtue is the measure of every man's worth, and the good to every one is derived through virtue,—this being admitted, those pleasures will be real which to the worthy man appear to be pleasures, and those things in which he rejoices will be truly pleasurable. But with respect to such as are unpleasant to him, these cannot rationally be called either pleasurable or pleasures. It is nothing wonderful, however, if these things should appear pleasurable to those who are corrupted. For man is subject to many corruptions and blemishes; and though these seem pleasant, yet they are not *really* so, but to those only who are corrupted. It is manifest, therefore, that pleasures which are confessedly disgraceful, cannot be considered pleasures to any but those who are corrupt.

Now among worthy pleasures, which shall we say is properly human pleasure? This will be evident, however, from what has preceded. For since appropriate pleasures are consequent to energies, it remains that human energy is that which pertains to man, so far as he is man, whether it be one energy, or more than one. But the pleasures that perfect the energies of the perfect and blessed man, the same pertain to man so far as he is man. Other pleasures, however, may be said to be human, secondarily, and multifariously, in the same manner as energies.

CHAP. VII.

CONCERNING FELICITY.

SINCE we have discoursed about the virtues, friendship, and pleasure, it now remains to delineate felicity; for we say that this is the end of all human pursuits. And if we resume our former arguments concerning felicity, our present discourse will be perspicuous and easy.

We have observed, therefore, in the thirteenth Chapter of the first Book, that felicity is not a habit. For if it were, a man who sleeps all his life, or lives a mere plantal life, or labours under great calamity, would be happy; since any one possessing the *habit* of virtue may thus live.

But if it is absurd to call a man who thus subsists happy, felicity must be a certain energy. We must inquire, however, to which of human energies it pertains.

For since of energies some are necessary, tend to, and are investigated for the sake of others; but others are eligible in themselves, it is manifest that felicity is to be ranked among those that are eligible for their own sake. For felicity is self-sufficient, and not indigent of any thing. But that which is eligible for the sake of another thing, is in want of that thing through which it is investigated, in order to obtain the eligible and the good.

But those energies according to the virtues are in themselves self-sufficient, which we do not investigate through any thing else, but for their own sake. For to perform beautiful and worthy actions belongs

to things essentially eligible. Agreeable sports, however, are not investigated through any thing else; since those who choose to engage in them derive no advantage from them; for they are rather ~~injure~~ by neglecting their bodies, and those possessions which are sought for the sake of the body. On this account also many fortunate persons, and such as are prosperous, betake themselves to a sportive life, and make much of men of versatile manners. Those also who know how to jest agreeably are held in estimation by kings; since they are pleasant, so far as they afford them the amusement they desire, and which is considered by the multitude as requisite to felicity. It would seem, therefore, that sports pertain to felicity, because those in power are especially given to them. But this is not the case. For the decision of such men is not a sufficient proof; since neither virtue, nor an especially sound intellect, whence worthy energies are derived, consists in possessing power. Neither is it reasonable to suppose, because having no taste for liberal and ingenuous, they fly to corporeal pleasures, that these are more eligible than true pleasures; since children also fancy that those things are the best which they hold in estimation. These, however, do not appear estimable to men, neither do worthy men admire that which is admired by the depraved; but *apparent* pleasure especially gratifies the latter, while the former are delighted with *true* pleasure.

As we said in the beginning, therefore, those things are to be considered truly estimable and good which the worthy man admires and is delighted with. But since every one investigates those energies that are consequent to the habit confirmed in his soul, and fancies that these are especially most eligible, but the worthy man lives according to the habit of virtue,—since this is the case, it is evident that he is

delighted with virtuous energies, and thinks these estimable and pleasant. But he despises sports as being foreign from his habit. Since, however, he determines rightly and sanely, he does not reckon sports as estimable, neither does he place his felicity in such amusements. It would indeed be absurd to make amusements the end of human energies, and to be busily employed, and endure all sorts of calamities through life, for the sake of enjoying them; since if any one supposes that felicity consists in these, it follows that he must admit our subsequent assertions. For all our investigations are for the sake of felicity; but to labour and strenuously exert ourselves through life for the sake of amusement appears to be something very foolish and puerile. As Anacharsis says, however, the contrary may worthily and rightly happen when we choose sports with a view to make ourselves capable of strenuous exertions. For amusements are, as it were, a relaxation to those engaged in laborious pursuits, and are incapable of incessant toil; or they restore their powers, and thus being refreshed they are enabled to resume their labours. Hence relaxation is not the end of energy, but energy of relaxation. Besides it is acknowledged by all that a life according to virtue is happy: but this is attended with strenuous exertion; and not he who follows amusements, but he who strenuously exerts himself, is the worthy man. Further still, we assert that arduous employments are better than those accompanied with amusement and laughter; and we also say, that the best part of the soul is that which most strenuously exerts itself: but the better, and that which belongs to the more excellent part, is especially adapted to felicity. Again, relaxation from corporeal pleasures is alike common to every one, even to depraved men and slaves; and this in no less a

degree to the most thoroughly depraved than to the most excellent characters. But felicity is predicated of the latter only; and no one will say it is the lot of the depraved; since neither do both lead the same life, because, as we have before said, felicity is inconsistent with a depraved life, but is alone to be found in virtuous energies.

CHAP. VIII.

CONCERNING CONTEMPLATIVE FELICITY.

SINCE we have shown that felicity consists in virtuous energies, if any one excels in such energies, he will eminently enjoy felicity.

For felicity is the most excellent and best of all things; but the most excellent energy which pertains to the most exalted part of our energies, is that which naturally governs and conducts us to truth and the good, whether it be called intellect, or by any other name, and which possesses a conception of things beautiful and divine, whether it be itself divine, or the most divine of all our parts. But the energy of this, if it subsists well, worthily, and according to appropriate virtue, will be perfect felicity. And this energy, as we have before said, is contemplative. But that perfect felicity consists in contemplative energy, not only our former discourses about human energies, but truth itself, clearly testifies.

For as we observed in our treatise concerning friendship, *intellect is our very being*: hence the energy of intellect is the most excellent, and

those things which it apprehends are much more excellent than such as are known to sense. But if it is proper to consider felicity as the best thing, there is every necessity that it should reside in our most exalted part.

Further still: it is requisite to attribute continuity to felicity. For thus a man may be perfectly happy—since there will be no intermission of his felicity. But this is especially possible to the contemplative; since we are more capable of contemplating continually, than of doing any other thing whatever.

Again: we suppose it is necessary that pleasure should be mingled with felicity. But of energies, that is confessedly the most pleasurable—which is according to wisdom. It appears, therefore, that philosophy possesses admirable pleasures, as well through its purity, and being entirely liberated from matter, as through its stability, because it energizes about things immutable, and such as always subsist after the same manner. For practical virtue requires a material subject, and is conversant with contingencies, since things practicable are contingent. Hence, therefore, it is not possible to be *perfectly* happy through practical virtue.

Further still: it is necessary that the happy man should be self-sufficient. But self-sufficiency pertains more to theoretical than to practical virtue; for both the contemplative and practical man require the necessities of life. Besides these, however, the latter has need of other things in order to virtuous energies. For the just man, the temperate, and the brave man, require the assistance of subjects for the exercise of their respective virtues. But the wise man, even when alone, is able to contemplate, and needs not any foreign aid,—and by how much the wiser he is, by so much the more he will contemplate.

If, however, he also should in some degree require the assistance of others, because it is better to contemplate with others, he is nevertheless in the highest degree sufficient to himself when alone, to energize in perfect manner.

Again: it is necessary that felicity should be eligible and amiable through itself. But it appears that the contemplative life is itself lovely through itself. For we investigate nothing else but contemplation from it, neither is any thing else effected by us. But from each of the practical virtues, we may obtain something else either greater or smaller. For from fortitude victory is obtained; from temperance tranquillity of soul; from prudence we can discover what tends to the ultimate end; and political felicity is the offspring of all these. There is nothing, however, for the sake of which it appears that contemplation ought to be investigated, but it is itself loved for its own sake. It is clear, therefore, that human felicity consists in contemplation.

Further still: it is requisite that felicity should consist in a certain tranquillity and leisure. * For leisure is a certain end; and we engage in various pursuits in order that we may be able to enjoy leisure; and we embrace war for the sake of peace. The energies of the practical virtues, therefore, are conversant with political and warlike concerns; but all actions connected with these appear to be very remote from tranquillity and leisure; and those indeed attached to warlike employments are entirely destitute of both; for in these there is no tranquillity; since if there were, war would be a thing investigated for its own sake. No one, however, would choose to wage war, merely for the sake of going to war; neither would any one wish to make preparations for no other purpose than to possess the apparatus of war. For any one would be thought a homicide if he should make enemies of his friends in

order to produce battles and slaughter. But the actions of men in a political character are manifestly destitute of leisure; and besides this, ~~to be~~ engaged in the administration of public affairs is the province of those who wish to acquire power and honours, or felicity for themselves and their fellow-citizens. For the felicity of the political character is one thing, and that of a city another. And this is evident; for the politician being himself happy is not satisfied, but seeks the felicity of the city; and hence they are manifestly different.

Since, therefore, among virtuous actions the political and warlike excel the others both in beauty and magnitude, but these are void of leisure, aspire after a certain end, and are not eligible for their own sake; but the energy of intellect is the more worthy, because it pertains to the best part of the soul, and is not investigated for the sake of any thing else, neither does it aspire after any other end,—since this is the case, the energy of intellect possesses an appropriate pleasure greater than that arising from practical energies, and its pleasure increases together with energy.—Again: the energy of intellect is in an especial manner self-sufficient, and productive of tranquillity, as far as man is capable of being self-sufficient and tranquil; and it imparts such other things to the blessed man as appear to belong to this energy. Hence it is evident that the perfect felicity of man will be *this*, when it receives a perfect length of life. For it is fit that nothing belonging to felicity should be imperfect.

CHAP. IX.

THAT CONTEMPLATIVE FELICITY IS GREATER THAN THE FELICITY WHICH BELONGS TO MAN; AND FURTHER STILL CONCERNING MORAL, THAT IS TO SAY, HUMAN FELICITY.

A LIFE of this kind indeed is more excellent than that which belongs to man. For he who thus lives, does not so live, as *man*, but so far as *something divine* is inherent in him. And as much as this divine part differs from our composite nature, by so much do the energies of this differ from other human energies, and the virtue of this from the rest of ethical virtue. For if intellect is divine with respect to man, the life also according to intellect is divine with respect to human life.

It is not proper, however, that we being *men*, following the admonitions of some persons, should be wise in merely human concerns, or being mortal, in those pertaining to mortality; but it is requisite that every one should immortalize himself as far as it is possible for man, and use every endeavour to live according to the most powerful and exalted part of his nature: but *this is intellect*. For although in magnitude and bulk it does not transcend any thing, that is to say, considered with relation to matter, nevertheless it is the greatest of all things in power and excellence:—besides it would be very absurd if any one should choose for himself a life not his own, but that of some other being. For every man is *himself* that which is the most sovereign and excellent of all his parts; and he who lives according to this will live to himself, and at the same time a life especially appropriate to him. In short, what we have before said accords also with our present assertion. For that which is appropriate to the nature of every thing is the

most excellent and pleasant to that thing. But it is most of all things appropriate to man to energize according to intellect, since he *himself* is intellect: and to every one that energizes, it is appropriate to energize from himself. Hence the life according to intellect, is the most excellent and pleasant to man. This life, therefore, is also the most happy, and this will be primarily human felicity.

But human felicity secondarily will be found in a life according to the other virtues; since the energies according to them are human, and consist in the communions of men with each other. For the just, brave, and other virtuous offices, which we perform towards each other, consist in actions, and their application, and in mutual contracts; and by disciplining our passions we observe a becoming conduct towards our neighbour. But all these preserve our composite life. Things of this kind, however, are human. Again, the moral virtues sometimes have much reference to the body. For some persons are naturally disposed to be temperate, and are constitutionally brave and magnanimous. In short, moral virtue is intimately connected with the passions, as also is prudence. For prudence, as we have before shown, since it derives its principles from the moral virtues, is conjoined with them, and enables us to judge rightly about their end.

From prudence also ethical virtue derives the mode by which it may obtain its end, as we have shown in the thirteenth Chapter of the sixth Book. Since, therefore, ethical virtue is conversant about human passions, and exists together with these, but prudence has been proved to be inseparable from it, it is evident that all practical virtue is co-existent with the passions. It is conversant, therefore, about the composite and its life; but the virtues of this composite are human. For the definition of man is assumed from the composite; so that both the

life and felicity according to the energies of virtue, are human. But the intellectual life alone is separate from human affairs, as also is the felicity according to intellect. Accurately to define, however, in what manner it is separated and how it subsists, is a greater undertaking than we now propose to ourselves, and more properly belongs to theology; but it is sufficient to say thus much only at present, that it transcends human concerns.

But this will become manifest from what follows; since intellect does not require externals, nor the supply derived from thence, in order to its proper energy. For the contemplative man, so far as he is man, has need of things necessary in order to life, but is indigent of nothing in order to this energy. But the practical man has need of those things which the contemplative requires, and in a greater degree indeed, by how much the more he employs his body in the exercise of his energies.

Further still: he also requires a supply of externals that he may exercise his energies. For both the liberal and the just man have need of riches; the one that he may perform liberal actions, and the other that he may make retribution; since, without these externals, neither could act conformably to his respective and appropriate virtue. The brave man also requires a certain opportunity, and bodily power, in order that he may evince his intrepidity and endurance. Again, the temperate man has need of authority and power over himself whenever he wishes to indulge in pleasures. In like manner also others require the aid of such externals as may enable them to act conformably to their respective virtues; since without acting according to the habit of virtue, both will and habit are especially immanifest. For some who are not just, pretend to be desirous of acting justly, and of doing

liberal things, though they are not liberal. In the next place, neither is that virtue perfect which consists in pre-election alone, but action also is requisite to its perfection ; since virtue consists in both, and in such a manner in both, that it becomes a question in which of the two it has a greater subsistence. For it is manifest that the perfect will consist in the possession of both.

It is evident, therefore, that practical virtue requires external supplies towards its perfection ; and this in proportion to its magnitude and beauty. For great actions that are virtuous, and worthy of regard, require many externals ; but the contemplative man has no need of any of these things in order to his energy. On the contrary, as we may say, they are rather an impediment to contemplation. He requires them, however, not as a contemplative, but as a practical character ; since being a man, and associating with men, he chooses things connected with practical virtue, in order that he may exercise human offices towards those with whom he lives.

CHAP. X.

CONCERNING THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, AND THAT PERFECT FELICITY CONSISTS IN
THAT LIFE.

It will also appear from what follows that perfect felicity consists in the contemplative life. For contemplation is the only employment of Divinity, who is truly blessed and happy. For what other actions can we attribute to Him? Shall we say just actions? But would it not be ridiculous to say, that divinity is engaged in barter, and that he returns pledges, and things of this kind? Shall we say then that God performs brave actions? But can he sustain dreadful things, or encounter the dangers of life for the sake of the beautiful? Thus to speak, therefore, is also absurd. Or shall we say, that divinity performs liberal actions? To whom, therefore, and what will he give? This too is absurd: for if we assert that he possesses money, or a thing of this kind, as necessary to his life, it follows that he must give to some other being, and this for the sake of the good. Again, how can God be temperate, since he has no base desires? All actions of this kind, therefore, are trifling, and beneath the dignity of divinity. But since all men agree that He lives, it is necessary also that he should energize. For it is not proper that like Endymion, he should pass his time in sleep. But since, as has been shown, when energizing he does not even *act*, by a much greater reason he will not *make*; (for it is not reasonable to suppose that God should be continually engaged about producing certain effects in the same manner as operative artists;) what then remains as the employment of divinity, but to contemplate? Since, therefore, the energy of

God surpasses that of man in blessedness, it will be contemplative. Hence there is every necessity that perfect felicity should consist in the contemplative life. For it is most congenial to the energy of divinity.

This is also manifest because no irrational animals, since they are entirely deprived of the contemplative energy, participate of felicity. For the whole life of God is blessed; but that of men, so far only as it is similar to his, and bears the image of his energy. Nothing blessed, however, pertains to other animals, since they are by no means partakers of contemplation. Such, therefore, as participate of contemplation, also partake of felicity; and those beings which contemplate in a greater degree, are in a greater degree happy:—in short, however widely contemplation extends itself, so widely also is felicity extended; and this not accidentally, but according to contemplation itself; for it is itself honourable through itself. Hence it follows that felicity will be a certain contemplation; that is, the most excellent and most perfect.

But the contemplative man also requires externals towards the maintenance of his body and health; for, being man, it is not likely he should not want them, since nature is not self-sufficient with respect to things of this kind.

He does not, however, require so many externals as the practical man, neither does he simply want many of them, or such as are great; since, though we say he has need of things necessary, yet it is only in a moderate degree. For the being surrounded with wealth, and other external goods, does not render his felicity self-sufficient; neither does it dispose him to form a right judgment about practical affairs, or perform becoming actions. It is possible also for one who has not

dominion over the earth and the sea, to act worthily and beautifully, and with a moderate portion of external goods he may perform such things as are adapted to those invested with great authority. But this may be clearly seen; for private persons, when they act equitably, appear to perform something great, not in an inferior, and perhaps in a superior manner to those in power. It is sufficient, therefore, if the happy man is supplied with as many of these things as tend to his felicity; for he energizes according to his proper virtue without impediment, and leads the life of a happy man. The testimony of Solon also confirms these assertions, who does not define felicity by external goods, but says that they are happy who are supplied with these, if at the same time they perform the most worthy actions, and live temperately; since it is possible for those who possess a moderate share of external goods to act in a proper manner. Anaxagoras also appears to have conceived that neither a rich, nor a powerful, is a happy man: for he says, "it is by no means wonderful that a man should seem to be absurd to the many." For it may happen that a good and happy man may be considered base and miserable by the multitude, who judge from externals and appearances, of which alone they are sensible. The opinions of wise men, therefore, accord with our assertions; and thus give them at least a moderate share of credibility; since the truth in practical matters is manifest from deeds and conduct in life. For in these, falsehood is detected when words do not accord with things, since that which is principal consists in actions. It is necessary, therefore, to pay attention to what has been said, and adapt it to such as promote human actions and life. We must also admit those that are accordant, but reject, as mere empty words, such as are discordant.

Further still: it will be evident from what follows, that he who energizes according to intellect, is in the highest degree happy; since he is most dear to Divinity; than which what can be more felicitous? For if God takes any care of human concerns, and providentially inspects them (as it appears to all men to be and really is the case) with what, among the things pertaining to man, is it more probable that divinity should be pleased, than with that which is the most excellent and congenial to his own nature? But this is intellect. If, however, God is in an especial manner delighted with intellect, he will entirely recompense those who love and honour it in the highest degree, and energize intellectually, as paying attention to what is dear and allied to himself; and besides this, as acting rightly and well. But he who thus acts is the wise man, and one who energizes according to intellect: he, therefore, is most dear to Divinity. It is likewise reasonable to suppose that he is most happy; hence the wise man is eminently happy. Perfect felicity, therefore, consists in the contemplative life.

CHAP. XI.

THAT IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO HAVE A KNOWLEDGE OF VIRTUE; BUT WE MUST
ENDEAVOUR TO POSSESS AND USE IT.

WITH respect to the delineation of the virtues, and friendship, of pleasure, and felicity, enough has been said:—perhaps too nothing further need be added to our discourse concerning these particulars. What then? Is our purpose now effected, and have our endeavours arrived at their desired end? For morals are a certain practical philosophy, and it is necessary that they should have a correspondent end. But to possess a *knowledge* of virtue, and the before-mentioned particulars, is only a certain theory. It is not fit, therefore, for one hastening to obtain virtue to stop his endeavours here, while learning what it is proper to do, and from what to abstain; likewise what virtue and vice are, and also what is the ultimate end of human concerns;—but besides all this, it is necessary to engage in such actions as enable him to fly from vice, pursue virtue, and use every endeavour to obtain felicity. In the very same manner likewise it is necessary that a teacher of virtue should not rest satisfied with those discussions only which instruct us in every particular, but he should also direct us how each may be obtained; and by teaching this, he ought to be convinced that he will thus become a genuine preceptor of virtue. For it is fit that the preceptor should deliver his precepts in such a manner as may perfect him who is exercised. But the perfection of the champion of virtue will consist in being *himself* good, and in acting worthily. It is evident,

therefore, that to what we have already said concerning the virtues, this must be added:—by what conduct, or by what manners, every one may be adapted to the habit of virtue and goodness, may cheerfully hear discourses about, and be able to live conformably to it. For thus the discussion of virtue will obtain sufficient perfection by every where preserving the character it has formed. We must endeavour, therefore, to adopt this method. And if indeed our discourse should be sufficient to persuade men to become worthy, we ought justly, according to Theognis, to receive many and great rewards; and it would be proper to purchase our method at a great price, and search for the attainment of it by every possible means.

Our arguments indeed do appear capable of persuading good and liberal youth, and those whose manners are generous and worthy; and of exhorting them as well to the pursuit as to the practice and habit of virtue.

They are unable, however, to produce this effect with the vulgar; since none of these are capable of obtaining probity, or of flying from vice by any argument or persuasion. For not shame but fear leads them to think it is in itself a dreadful thing to have bad opinions entertained of their conduct. Neither do they abstain from base actions, because they are base and disgraceful, but because they are attended with punishment. This, however, is to be accounted for because they do not live rationally, (for if they did shame would attend their evil conduct) but following their own passions and their concomitant pleasures, they avoid the opposing pains. To avoid pains, however, is to be afraid. But what argument can reform those who thus conduct themselves, who have never tasted the sweetness of things truly beautiful

and worthy, and who are incapable of arriving at the conception of them? For it is impossible, or at least not easy, that what is established by length of time, and confirmed by custom, should be moved by argument alone. Other means, therefore, are necessary; which being obtained, we must be content if we should find that, through them, any one partakes of virtue and worthy manners. And since mere arguments are insufficient to our present purpose, we must inquire what rules ought to be previously laid down, in order that reason may persuade men to goodness.

CHAP. XII.

HOW A MAN MAY BECOME WORTHY AND GOOD; AND THAT LAW IS NECESSARY TO EFFECT THIS.

It appears, therefore, to all men, that the causes of human virtue are three; namely, *nature*, *instruction*, and *custom*. It is manifest, however, that nature is not in our power. For a natural aptitude to virtue is the offspring of a certain divine cause in those who are truly fortunate. With respect to the doctrine of and a discourse about the virtues, it is evident from what has been said, that they are incapable of persuading all men; and it is necessary that the soul of the hearer should be prepared in order to delight in such things as are proper, and to abhor such as ought to be detested. For thus a man will be properly disposed to receive instruction, just as the earth is capable of nourishing seed.

But without this, how can any one hear a discourse which withdraws him from pleasures? And how, in short, can a man understand, who lives according to passion? How too is it possible that one who thus conducts himself can be persuaded to act otherwise? For it evidently is not possible to subdue passion by argument, but by a certain force. On this account argument is not sufficient to make us worthy; but it is necessary that custom should precede instruction, through which the manners of the auditor may become adapted to virtue, loving worthy, and detesting base conduct.

It is manifestly necessary, therefore, from what has been said, that good customs should be previously established, and the soul previously disposed. But without upright and just laws, and, in short, such as are correspondent to virtue, how can any one be accustomed to goodness, attain to upright conduct, and a mode of life tending to virtue? For it is proper that we should, while yet youths, be brought up under such laws; since a life of temperance and endurance is unpleasant to the multitude, and especially to young persons. On this account it is fit that the laws themselves should ordain particular studies, food, and other necessities of life; and thus from custom, they will no longer be painful. But laws are requisite not only to young persons, but to those likewise already arrived at manhood; for it is not sufficient, in order to render us good, to pay attention to right education and food while young only; but it is necessary also when arrived at manhood, studiously to observe a becoming conduct, and accustom ourselves to virtue; and even then, and indeed through life, we shall require laws. For the many are more obedient to necessity than to reason; and to punishment,* than to probity. Hence also some persons think that

legislators should first incite men to virtue and goodness by arguments, thus encouraging them for the sake of the beautiful. For in this manner worthy men, being accustomed to goodness, will still become better. In the next place they think it proper that punishments and chastisements should be inflicted on those who are disobedient and naturally unadapted to goodness, and that the incurable should be separated from the society of those who are in a sane condition, or capable of becoming so. For it is proper that an equitable man, and one who lives worthily, should be obedient to reason. But a depraved man, because he craves after pleasure, and follows irrational passions, will not be amended by reason, and must, therefore, be punished like cattle under the yoke. Whence also it is said, that those who lead a very irrational life ought to be punished with such pains as are the opposites of the pleasures they are addicted to. For instance, an avaricious man should be deprived of his property, but the arrogant and insolent ought to be disgraced, and the intemperate beaten.

If, however, these punishments are considered hard and unpleasant, it is necessary that every man should be good and worthy, and it is fit that every one should be brought up and educated worthily and uprightly, and be accustomed to probity from childhood: he ought, moreover, afterwards thus to live in a good course of life, and neither willingly nor unwillingly do any thing base. But this may be effected by those who live according to a certain order, and conformably to definite precepts which possess authority and power. The mandates, therefore, of fathers to their children have not sufficient power to be compulsory, nor indeed are the arguments of any one man, unless he be a tyrant or a king, able to effect so much as to induce the many, provided they are

unwilling, to worthy conduct. But law alone possesses a certain compulsive power. For it is believed to have been originally ordained by intellect and prudence. Hence the vulgar are enraged with those who oppose their natural appetites, even though they do this rightly. But no one is indignant with law ordering what is equitable, and withdrawing men from base conduct, though perhaps it may be thought that living preceptors hate some particular person, and are excited to punish him through envy. Laws, however, are not subject to this suspicion. It is evident, therefore, that such laws are necessary as orderly direct and dispose us towards virtue from our very childhood.

But such laws subsist in the city of the Lacedæmonians alone, or in very few others. In the greater part of cities, however, they do not pay attention to things of this kind, but every man orders his life, and directs his house as he pleases, commanding like a Cyclops,

“ His children and his wife ———.”

It is best, therefore, that a common and right care should be taken, that all men may be able to live orderly, and as right reason requires; but if this should not be done, and general care be neglected, each individual ought to give assistance to his children and friends towards the attainment of virtue, or at least endeavour to do so; and each, if he assumes a legislative character, will be able to benefit his family in this respect as is evident from what has been said. For *every kind* of care is produced through *laws*, and *general* care is the offspring of *common laws*; but worthy and equitable attentions spring from correspondent laws; I mean such as are worthy and equitable.

It makes no difference, however, whether laws be promulgated or not; neither is it of any consequence if some one introduces a difference in the laws, in order to instruct many, or regulate a single individual. Just as it happens with a musician, a master of gymnastic, and persons of other professions; for the things which are capable of exercising one person in gymnastic, are able to do so with many; the same also may be said of music, and vice versâ. Nothing hinders, therefore, but that he who directs and orderly arranges laws for one family, or instructs one man, may be no less legislative than he who directs a whole city or nation. For just as in cities legal precepts and customs, so also paternal precepts in one family, possess authority and power; and the manners, in which the head of a family appears to delight, have great weight with his children and domestics; and this in a higher degree in consequence of the ties of blood, and the benefits he confers on them. For children are on these accounts more attached to their fathers, than citizens to a legislator: hence they are easily led, and more obedient to their laws, though otherwise disobedient, because they naturally love them from infancy.

Further still: particular laws will be the most accurate, and consequently the most beneficial; just as it happens in the medical science. For partial medical precepts, since they are adapted to one particular constitution, better effect a cure than such as are universal. The universal indeed say, that abstinence and quiet are proper for a man in a fever; but to some particular person perhaps, not these, but the contrary may be beneficial. On this account also he who gives laws to one man will act the part of a legislator more accurately than he who merely directs all. A pugilist likewise if he always conducts a

contest with reference to the qualifications of his antagonist, and does not always use the same, or a similar mode of fighting, but adopts such as is suitable to his present opponent, will contend more skilfully. And, in short, each individual thing will be more accurately benefited if it receives peculiar and particular attention, since each will in this manner obtain what is fit. It is evident, therefore, that a man will pay attention in the best manner both to an individual and a few, whether he be a physician, a master of gymnastic, or a legislator, when having a knowledge of the universal, he conjoins the reason of universal science with particulars; since he then not only knows what is beneficial to *all* but to *each individual*. For sciences are said to belong to that which is common, and really do so. Nothing, however, prevents a man who does not know the universal, but who accurately directs things accidental through experience, from paying proper attention to some one object: for some persons are their own physicians, though they are incapable of affording medical assistance to others. It also happens similarly in other pursuits, and thus experience is sufficient to promote the benefit of each. He likewise, who wishes to become an artist, and at the same time theoretic, should, with all possible earnestness, investigate science, and proceed to the universal. For science is conversant with the universal; but it is necessary to know the universal, whether with respect to medicine, or legislation, or other similar sciences, not as a thing immutable indeed, and always subsisting after the same manner, but as that which most usually happens. For sciences of this kind belong to things contingent, and not to such as are immutable. We must, therefore, investigate the science pertaining to each; and he who wishes through better attentions to perform many

or a few things, must endeavour to become legislative; since by laws we are excited to goodness and virtue. For it is not the province of any casual person rightly to direct either many or one, and properly discipline them to virtue; but if this can be effected by man, that man alone will be able to do it who knows how to judge of and ordain laws.

CHAP. XIII.

CONCERNING SOPHISTS, AND THOSE WHO PROFESS TO TEACH POLITICS; AND THAT IT STILL REMAINS TO CONSIDER LEGISLATION, IN ORDER TO THE PERFECTION OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, that a teacher of virtue should be legislative; and it is our business now to inquire by what means he may become so. Unless indeed it be manifest, that just as from knowing what pertains to grammar or music, a man may become a grammarian or a musician, so likewise from knowing how to give laws a man may become a legislator, or, in other words, a politician; for the legislative is a part of the political science.

It does not appear, however, that the same things attach to the political science as to the other faculties and sciences. For in the others, the very same persons appear to deliver the doctrines of their sciences, and to energize according to those doctrines. Thus a physician and a painter teach their own arts; and the one paints, and the other administers medicine. But it appears to be otherwise with respect to the political art. For the sophists, while they profess to teach it,

perform nothing political: on the contrary, those who are engaged in government act indeed, but teach nothing; for they are not able.

For they do not act by any particular method, and according to political science, but by a certain natural aptitude; and by experience more than by dianoëtic energy. It is clear, however, that they are incapable of giving any instruction in the political science; since they do not teach it, neither do they write or discourse about it, which they would do if they were able. For such discourses would tend more to gratify their ambition than orations in courts of justice, or public assemblies: at any rate they would make their own children, or some others whom they love, political if they were able; for it is not reasonable to suppose that, if they were able, they would refuse this benefit to their friends, and those who are dear to them; since they could not bequeath a greater good, nor do any thing more beneficial to the community than by committing to writing, and teaching things of this kind. Neither could they wish for a greater good either to themselves, their children, or their familiars, than to possess this power. It is manifest, therefore, that if they were capable, they would also be willing to teach politics. But since it appears they do not teach them, it is evident that they are not able; neither do they themselves transact public affairs by any certain method or science, but from experience; for this does not a little contribute to action, since they become more political in consequence of being accustomed to the administration of public affairs. On this account those who aspire after a knowledge of political concerns, require a certain experience and custom with respect to them.

The sophists themselves, however, profess to teach the legislative

science, but they teach nothing more than how a man may be able to speak properly about politics; so that in fact they neither know what the political science is, nor what quality it possesses. For they think that it is either the same with or inferior to rhetoric, and that it is so very easy to give laws that every man may become a legislator. They also think that to collect celebrated laws, and select the best of these, constitute legislation; but that it is attended with no difficulty to form a judgment of them, and adopt the best.

In the first place, however, it is neither easy, nor the province of every one to judge rightly of what each particular law proposes; but it requires an admirable sagacity and intelligence to obtain a capacity of this kind; for those only who are experienced in and able to form a judgment of all laws, can attain this. Just as those who are skilled in musical or grammatical, and other similar studies, are capable of judging of what respectively pertains to each; for they know the causes of each particular, and at the same time what ought to be done, and how each subsists. But those who are unexperienced, having no knowledge of these things, so far from selecting the best, do not even choose the better; and they are satisfied if they merely know that their work is effected, whether it be done well or ill; just as it happens in the art of painting. For one who is not a painter, may know with respect to a most excellent picture that it is well painted; but to know that it is most excellent, and in what particulars it differs from others, is the province of one alone who understands painting, or at least has some experience in the art. Hence no one is capable of forming a right judgment of the works of a painter, of a musician, or a grammarian, unless he understands them scientifically; neither is it possible to judge

of the works of a politician without a knowledge of the political science. But law is the work of the statesman. In the first place, therefore, it is impossible to collect laws, and select the most excellent without experience in political affairs: in the next place, if we should even grant that a man who is not a politician may know how to judge of laws, and select the most excellent, it would be insufficient to establish the political and legislative character; as neither do men become physicians by collecting medical books, and reading them from beginning to end. And although persons of this kind endeavour to deliver discourses not only about remedies, but also about the mode of employing them to effect a cure, and though they explain in what manner it is proper to apply them to each disease, and how to distinguish the habit of each,—though they do all this, nevertheless they are not physicians; for to become so, a certain experience and custom are necessary. Writings, however, and theories on these subjects, enable those who are experienced to act better, but to the unexperienced they contribute nothing to the capability of administering remedies.

The very same thing also happens with respect to laws and politics. For to collect the laws, and scrutinize the government of every nation, will be very beneficial to those who, through experience, are able properly to speculate and consider each particular; which are right, which wrong, and what kind of laws are adapted to particular countries; since they will thus become more skilled in the politics of their own. But the endeavours of those who hurry on without such a habit and experience, are foolish so far as regards the attainment of the political science. For they are incapable of judging rightly about the

affairs of government unless by chance; though perhaps if they had learned the political art, they would have been very expert about them. It is clear, therefore, that neither the sophists, nor those who administer public concerns, are able to teach the political or legislative science *.

* The following passage, which forms the concluding paragraph of this work, as it merely announces Aristotle's intention of extending the discussion of *morals* to *politics*, is here given by way of note; for if inserted in the text, it would cause the work to appear imperfect by promising what is not performed.

But since it follows, as we have already shown, that a teacher of virtue ought also minutely to examine public affairs; and since our predecessors have not thoroughly investigated laws and politics, it may perhaps be better for us to take a view of these arts so far as relates to the philosophy of our present subject, which is concerning human passions and actions; and which having obtained its appropriate end, nothing will be wanting that can contribute to the object of its pursuit. Admitting, therefore, that our preceding discourses are correct, we shall in the first place endeavour to discuss the subject partially, and in the next collecting different forms of government, carefully consider which corrupt and which preserve cities: we shall likewise survey by what means polities are established and dissolved; what constitutes a regal, what a democratic, and what other species of government. Lastly, we must consider through what causes some polities are worthily administered, but others the contrary. And from all these speculations we shall discover what government is the most excellent, how each ought to be constituted, and by the use of what laws each polity is beneficial to those who live under its direction.

FINIS.

